Gonzalez-Hugues v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Department of Justice et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED 17 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Signed by Judge Salvador E. Casellas on 1/14/2013. (AVB)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
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IDALIA GONZALEZ-HUGUES,
Plaintiff,
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v.
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Civil No. 12-1747 (SEC)
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO,
ET AL.,
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Defendants.
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OPINION AND ORDER
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Before the Court are the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
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jurisdiction (Docket # 17), and the plaintiff’s opposition thereto (Docket # 18). After reviewing
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the filings and the applicable law, the defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
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Factual and Procedural Background
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Pro se plaintiff Idalia Gonzalez-Hugues filed this putative federal-question suit on
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September 11, 2012, alleging that co-defendant Puerto Rico Department of Education (the
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“Department”) discriminated against her, “violating her Civil Rights and the US Equal
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Opportunity Federal Law.” Docket # 2, p. 1.1 She also alleges that the Department violated Title
I of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB”), 20 U.S.C. § 6301. A succinct
introduction to the facts of this case suffices to set the stage for the analysis.
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The plaintiff, a high school teacher, says that the Department illegally authorized her
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school director “to damage and change plaintiff’s contract three times, and didn’t correct it”.
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Docket # 2, p. 1. She also avers that the director removed eight high school students from her
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classroom and transferred them to the classroom of another teacher. Such actions, the plaintiff
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Although her motion to appoint counsel was granted (Docket # 4), upon this court’s inquiry
regarding whether her allegations were actionable under the federal laws invoked in her complaint, her
court-appointed counsel moved to withdraw, citing a “substantial disagreement”concerning the
appropriate course of action to follow in this case. On November 9, 2012, the Court allowed her
counsel’s withdrawal and ordered the plaintiff to continue pro se.
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maintains, violate NLCB. Id. Relatedly, the plaintiff alleges that the director and the
“Coordinator of Title I-Phonogram from Educative Region of Caguas” changed the conditions
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of her contract, thereby violating the procedures mandated by Title I of NLCB. According to
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the complaint, the plaintiff was not paid $4,200 for professional services rendered with the
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Department in the summer of 2010. She requests one million dollars in economic and emotional
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damage, as she suffered “serious discrimination and labor persecution.” Docket # 2, p. 4.
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On December 14, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss under 12(b)(1), arguing that
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neither Title I nor NLCB “confer a private cause of action, and plaintiff’s allegations are but
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a breach of contract and state tort claim.” Docket # 17, p. 102. The defendants also argue that
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the plaintiff’s damages claim is time barred and contravenes the Eleventh Amendment. Id. The
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plaintiff resists dismissal, arguing that because the funds used to pay her contract derive from
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the Office of Federal Affairs, the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the controversy. Docket #
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18.
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Standard of Review
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is the appropriate vessel for challenging a court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. Valentín v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir. 2001). In
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reviewing a motion to dismiss under this rule, the court construes the plaintiffs’ allegations
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liberally and “may consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as . . . depositions and
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exhibits.” Carroll v. United States, 661 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
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citations omitted). Accordingly, this court is empowered to “[w]eigh the evidence and make
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factual determinations, if necessary, to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.”
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Massachusetts Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley, 671 F.3d 33, 40 n. 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Torres-
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Negrón v. J & N Records, LLC, 504 F.3d 151, 163 (1st Cir. 2007)). When faced with a
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jurisdictional challenge, importantly, courts must credit the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual
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averments and indulge every reasonable inference in the pleader’s favor. Merlonghi v. United
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States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Valentin, 254 F.3d at 363). A plaintiff faced with
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subject-matter jurisdiction challenge has the burden to demonstrate its existence. Johansen v.
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United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). But in order for a plaintiff’s
claim to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, due to the inadequacy of the
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plaintiff’s federal claim, that claim must be “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior
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decisions of . . . [the Supreme Court], or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve
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a federal controversy . . . .” Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,
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666 (1974).
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Applicable Law and Analysis
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Federal question arises when a plaintiff sets forth allegations founded on a claim or right
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arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. See 28 U.S .C. § 1331.
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Because federal courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction,” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
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of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), for a claim to arise under federal law, “a right or
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immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an
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essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S.
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109, 112 (1936). As relevant here, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created
by Congress. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979);see also Mims v.
Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 132 S.Ct. 740, 748 (2012) (“A suit arises under the law that
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creates the cause of action.” (quoting American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241
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U.S. 257, 260 (1916))). It thus follows that, “[w]ithout [statutory intent], a cause of action does
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not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy
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matter, or how compatible with the statute.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87
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(2001).
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The NCLB, which focuses strengthening elementary and secondary schools, “is a
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comprehensive education reform statute.” Ass’n of Cmty. Organizations for Reform Now v.
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New York City Dept. of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§
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6301(1)-(12)). Here, the plaintiff posits that the fact that federal funds are at play here
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automatically confer this court with jurisdiction under NLCB. This argument is without merit.
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As a threshold matter, she has cited no authority standing for such a proposition. And it turns
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out that quite the opposite is true: Every court that has considered whether NCLB provides a
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private cause of action has decided it does not. E.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 456 n. 6
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(2009) (noting that “NCLB does not provide a private right of action” and is “enforceable only
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by the agency charged with administering it”) (citations omitted); Blakely v. Wells, 380 F.
App’x 6, 8 (2d Cir. May. 28, 2010) (unpublished). The plaintiff, then, cannot shoulder her
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burden of providing the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, as her claim is indeed “
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insubstantial, implausible . . . [and] completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal
controversy . . . .” Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 414 U.S. at 666.
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Finally, the plaintiff’s cursory and undeveloped mentions to “serious discrimination and
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labor persecution,” and to “Civil Rights and the US Equal Opportunity Federal Law” are plainly
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insufficient to survive dismissal. She makes absolutely no allegations explaining how she was
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discriminated against, and whether such discrimination falls under a protected category. In any
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event, because these allegations were not even pled as a claim, they must be dismissed.
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Marrero-Rodriguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 677 F.3d 497, 501 (1st Cir. 2012). The
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plaintiff’s pro se status does not insulate her from complying with basic pleading requirements.
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Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Pro se status does not insulate a party
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from complying with procedural and substantive law.”). Accordingly, such generalities fall way
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short of stating a plausible entitlement to relief. See Liu v. Amerco, 677 F.3d 489, 497 (1st Cir.
2012).
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To be sure, the Court sympathizes with the plaintiff’s toll. “But sympathy . . . is not a
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sound basis for administering a system of justice,” Sheet Metal Workers’ International Asso.
v. Carter, 450 U.S. 949, 953 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and there being no jurisdictional
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basis, the Court is simply without authority to entertain her claims. This court takes very
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seriously its responsibility to preserve its legitimacy by respecting the limits of its jurisdiction.
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Having established a lack of jurisdiction, the Court need not entertain the defendant’s other
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arguments.
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Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Consequently,
this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 14th day of January, 2013.
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S/Salvador E. Casellas
SALVADOR E. CASELLAS
U.S. Senior District Judge
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