Colon-Marrero v. Conty-Perez et al

Filing 194

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION on 174 Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs: GRANTED, as adjusted. An itemized Bill of Costs shall be filed, addressed to the Clerk of Court, for disposition. Signed by Judge Carmen C. Cerezo on 3/22/2017. (mld)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
MYRNA COLON-MARRERO; JOSEFINA
ROMAGUERA-AGRAIT
Plaintiffs

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Vs
HECTOR CONTY-PEREZ, as President
of the Puerto Rico State Elections;
EDWIN MUNDO-RIOS, as Electoral
Commissioner of the New Progressive
Party; EDER E. ORTIZ-ORTIZ, as
Electoral Commissioner of the Popular
Democratic Party; ROBERTO I. APONTEBERRIOS, as Electoral Commissioner of
the Puerto Rican Independence Party;
JULIO FONTANET-MALDONADO, as
Electoral Commissioner of the Movimiento
Unión Soberanista; ADRIAN DIAZ-DIAZ,
as Electoral Commissioner of
Puertorriqueños por Puerto Rico; LILLIAN
APONTE-DONES, as Electoral
Commissioner of Partido del Pueblo
Trabajador
Defendants
vs
NORMAN PARKHURST; JOHN E. MUDD
Intervenor Defendants

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

Before the Court is a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (d.e. 174)
filed by plaintiffs Myrna Colon-Marrero and Josefina Romaguera Agrait,

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defendant Liza M. Garcia-Velez’s timely opposition (d.e. 77) and plaintiffs’
Reply (179-1). In their petition for attorneys’ fees (d.e. 174), plaintiffs request
the Court to grant attorneys' fees and related litigation expenses for the
professional work done by their counsel in the instant case. Defendants
contend that the amount of fees sought by plaintiffs is unreasonable and
excessive. (d.e. 177).

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 12, 2012, plaintiffs filed a Complaint (d.e. 1) alleging that

the President and the Electoral Commissioners of the Puerto Rico State
Elections Commissions (“PRSEC”) violated the National Voter Registration
Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), and the
First Amendment, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States Constitution. The specific claims for relief set forth in their Amended
Complaint (d.e. 19), were for the Court to:
issue the following equitable and declaratory relief under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02: (a) declaring Article 6.012 of the Puerto
Rico Electoral Law, Law No. 78 of June 1, 2011, unlawful as
contrary to the provisions of NVRA and HAVA; (b) enjoining the
S[tate] E[lections] C[ommission] Defendants from holding any future
electoral event concerning a federal office until such time as their
acts and conduct comport to the voter registration and list
maintenance provisions of NVRA, HAVA and the Constitution; (c)
ordering Defendants to immediately activate the plaintiff and all other
similarly situated person as registered voters in the General Registry
of Voters entitled to vote in the upcoming election for federal office;
(d) ordering the SEC Defendants to immediately and individually
contact any and all persons who were removed from the General
Registry of Voters because they did not vote in the 2008 elections;
(e) order the SEC defendants as state officials in charge of
implementing the electoral laws to abide by all the voter registration

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and other applicable mandates of the NVRA, HAVA and the first,
due process and equal protection amendments to the Constitution.
Amended Complaint (d.e. 19, p. 2). On June 4, 2015, an Amended Judgment
(d.e. 161) was entered finding the following:
- Article 6.012 of Puerto Rico’s Electoral Law, by providing for
deactivation of an elector’s right to vote for having failed to vote in
one general election, violates the two consecutive election and
notice requirement for voter removal from the official list of eligible
voters under the Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §
15483(a)(4(A);
- the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission is permanently
enjoined from removing from the official list of eligible voters any
registrant who did not vote in a single general election;
- the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission is affirmatively
ordered that no lawfully registered voter may be removed from the
official list of eligible voters unless they have not voted in the two
immediately preceding elections and have received and have been
given notice of an intent to remove them from such list.
On February 1, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
this grant of declaratory and injunctive relief. (d.e. 169). Its formal mandate
followed on February 23, 2016. (d.e. 171, d.e. 172). Plaintiffs seek an award
of attorneys’ fees and costs under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Award Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
A total of four attorneys participated on plaintiffs' behalf.1 The hourly fee
schedule, invoices, and professional biographies of these attorneys have
been considered. The following compensation is sought for each attorney: (1)

1According to the plaintiffs, attorney Charlie Hernández Lopez “was engaged as a legislator in the House of
Representatives of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico” and therefore “impeded by Puerto Rico law from receiving
income for professional services outside that of legislator.” (d.e. 174, p. 7).

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Carlos A. Del Valle Cruz: $144,300.00; (2) Rafael García Rodón: $74,100.00;
(3) Juan Saavedra Castro: $8,960.00. (d.e. 174, pp. 9-10).
Defendants do not dispute the entitlement to attorneys’ fees but contend:
that the “hours claimed by these attorneys are unreasonable and excessive
because the vast majority of these hours claimed in the schedule were spent
during the portion of the proceeding dedicated to the claims and the relief
sought under the NVRA, and as to that portion of the case, plaintiffs were
clearly not the prevailing party”; that there are 9.25 hours charged by attorney
Del Valle Cruz which should be deducted; and that the Court “should require
a more specific statement of the time spent by attorney Rafael García Rodón
on this portion of the case, and an explanation as to why that time was
required in light of time spent by attorney Carlos Del Valle Cruz working on
the same matter.” (d.e. 177, pp. 2-4). They oppose the proposed hourly fee
of $330 per hour for time spent in court and $300 per hour for time spent out
of court. Id.

II.

ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Under the so-called "American Rule," litigants must bear the cost of their

attorneys’ fees in the absence of explicit congressional authorization to the
contrary. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975). Congress has authorized the award of attorneys' fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988 for prevailing parties in §1983 cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. "[A]
prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust." Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).

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Typically, achieving prevailing party status requires showing that
plaintiffs succeeded on an important issue in the case, thereby gaining at least
some benefit sought in bringing suit. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. “[A] plaintiff
need not prevail on every claim and obtain all relief sought to qualify as a
prevailing party.” Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2002). A plaintiff
who achieves "prevailing party" status, may nevertheless be thwarted by
special circumstances. De Jesus Nazario v. Morris Rodriguez, 554 F.3d 196,
200 (1st Cir. 2009).
1. Prevailing Party Status and Interconnected Claims
On January 30, 2015, Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs
declaring that Article 6.012 of Puerto Rico’s Electoral Law violates the two
consecutive election and notice requirements for voter removal from the
official list of eligible voters under HAVA. This judgment was affirmed by the
First Circuit on February 1, 2016. It is clear that plaintiffs are a “prevailing
party.”
Defendants argue that “[p]laintiffs were the ‘prevailing party’ only as to
their argument under HAVA” and, therefore, the Court should not consider the
time spent by their attorneys on the claims and relief sought under the NVRA.
(d.e. 177, pp. 2-3). This argument misconstrues the nature of the plaintiffs’
voting rights claims. The First Circuit has consistently held that:
Where, as here, plaintiffs have won a federal claim for which
attorneys' fees are allowed to a prevailing party, the question
becomes whether the claims on which they lost in the same suit were
unrelated to the successful ones (in which event no fees may be
awarded for work on the unsuccessful claims), or whether, instead,
the losing claims included “a common core of facts,” or were “based
on related legal theories,” linking them to the successful claim. In the
latter event, the award may include compensation for legal work
performed on the unsuccessful claims.

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Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 734 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Hensley, 461
U.S. at 435).
Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals found for plaintiffs under the
NVRA. However, the HAVA and NVRA claims are “interconnected.” We
noted in our Memorandum Opinion Declaring Rights and Granting Equitable
Relief, under Conclusions of Law, the following:
HAVA expressly includes Puerto Rico in its definition of
"State.” See 42 U.S.C. § 15541, and the parties do not dispute its
applicability to Puerto Rico. Section 303 of HAVA, 42 U.S.C. §
15483, prescribes the requirements that must be met by the voter
registration systems used by the states in elections where a
federal office is on the ballot.
This section of HAVA, 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(4)(A),
addresses the deactivation of voters from the registration lists for
not voting:
The State election system shall include provisions to ensure that
voter registration records in the State are accurate and are
updated regularly, including the following:
(A) A system of file maintenance that makes a reasonable
effort to remove registrants who are ineligible to vote from the
official list of eligible voters. Under such system, consistent
with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. §
1973gg et seq.), registrants who have not responded to a
notice and who have not voted in 2 consecutive general
elections for Federal office shall be removed from the official
list of eligible voters except that no registrant may be
removed solely by reason of a failure to vote.
(Our emphasis.)
Relying on Colón-Marrero, supra, defendant SEC’s current
President, nonetheless, repetitively and emphatically argues that
HAVA cannot incorporate a provision of NVRA because NVRA
does not apply to Puerto Rico. However, this section of HAVA
expressly notes that “consistent with the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. § 1973gg et seq.),
registrants who have not responded to a notice and who have

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not voted in 2 consecutive general elections for Federal office
shall be removed from the official list of eligible voters except that
no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote.”
The provision is not incorporated by a simple reference to NVRA,
leaving it to the reader to refer to that law to determine its contents.
The term of absence from voting in two consecutive general
elections for Federal office is explicitly set forth in the HAVA
paragraph, as opposed to Article 6.012, 16 L.P.R.A. § 4072,
which, as noted above, provides that an elector who fails to vote
in a single general election shall be deactivated in the voter
registry.
The Circuit Court also noted: “Under both NVRA and HAVA, registered
voters retain eligibility to vote in a federal election unless they have failed to
respond to a notice seeking to confirm eligible residency and have not voted
in two consecutive general elections for federal office.” Colon-Marrero v.
Velez, 813 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2016). Both NVRA and HAVA relate to voting
and elections that were jointly transferred from Titles 2 and 42 into the new
Title 52, which is labeled "Voting and Elections." Id. at fn. 5.
Moreover, “[w]hen interrelatedness is in question, the overall degree of
the prevailing party's success is an important datum.” Lipsett v. Blanco, 975
F.2d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1992). The plaintiffs’ success in this case not only
entailed reactivation of thousands of voters, excluded from the electoral
register of active voters for failing to vote in one general election, but also
permanently barred the PRSEC from removing any lawfully registered voters
from the official list of eligible voters unless they did not vote in two
consecutive elections and were given notice of intent to remove. The lasting
effect of the relief obtained is reflected in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion
Declaring Rights and Granting Equitable Relief:
This declaratory judgment deflates the obstructive impact on
voting rights brought about by Article 6.012, 16 L.P.R.A. § 4072 of
Puerto Rico’s Electoral Law. It serves as a reminder to those who

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forgot that voters are the feeders of democracy. Despite the
attempts to criminalize them, I-8’s sowed the seeds of democracy.
(d.e. 170, p. 8). Thus, the Court will compensate plaintiffs’ attorneys for legal
work performed on the claims and relief sought under the NVRA that were
based on a common core of facts and related legal theories under HAVA. We
turn now to the calculation of attorneys’ fees.
2. Calculating Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees
Generally, courts calculate fee awards using the “lodestar” method,
which multiplies the number of hours reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly
rate. See Spooner v. EEN, Inc., 644 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2011). “In crafting
its lodestar, the trial court may adjust the hours claimed to remove time that
was unreasonably, unnecessarily or inefficiently devoted to the case, id., and
subject to principles of interconnectedness.” De Jesus Nazario, 554 F.3d at
207.

The lodestar calculation is presumptively reasonable, but may be

adjusted in certain circumstances. Spooner, 644 F.3d. at 68.
In their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, plaintiffs request the following:
ATTORNEY DEL VALLE CRUZ
0 in court hours at $330:

N/A

481 out of court hours at $300:

$144,300.00

TOTAL: $144,300

ATTORNEY GARCIA RODON
22 in court hours at $330:

$7,760.00 2

247 out of court hours at $300:

$74,100.00

TOTAL: $81,860.00

2We note that the calculation made by the plaintiffs in the Fee Schedule (d.e. 174-1) for in court fees for
both counsel García Rodón and Saavedra Castro is incorrect. The correct amount is $7,260.00.

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ATTORNEY SAAVEDRA CASTRO
22 in court hours at $330:

$7,760.00

4 out of court hours at $300:

$1,200.00

TOTAL: $8,960.00

a. Reasonable Hourly Rates
When determining reasonable hourly rates, courts will “tak[e] into
account the ‘prevailing rates in the community for comparably qualified
attorneys.’” Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 937 (quoting United States v. Metropolitan
Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir.1988)). Defendants object “to the
proposed hourly fee of $330 per hour for time spent in court and of $300 per
hour for time spent out court.” (d.e. 177, pp. 4-5). They suggest instead a
rate not to exceed $250.00 per hour but do not cite any authority or precedent
to support their argument. In support of the rates used in calculating plaintiffs’
fee application, plaintiffs submit CVs for counsel but do not submit affidavits
as to the prevailing rates in the community.
Attorney Saavedra Castro completed his undergraduate studies at Yale
University, and later attended Harvard Law School. He is admitted to practice
law in New York and Puerto Rico and has over 30 years of trial and appellate
experience. Attorney García Rodón graduated from Georgetown University
and the University of Puerto Rico, School of Law. He is admitted to practice
in Puerto Rico, the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. He has over 32 years of experience
trying medical malpractice and First Amendment cases.
Attorney Del Valle Cruz has over 30 years of experience as a scholar
and practitioner. He served as Dean of the Hostos Law School, professor of
constitutional law, civil rights and federal jurisdiction, and has worked on

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numerous constitutional and civil rights cases. Del Valle Cruz received a
bachelors from Colgate University, his law degree from George Washington
University, a Masters degree from the New School for Social Research and is
currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of the Basque Country in Spain.
Plaintiffs submit a 2000 decision by this Court granting Saavedra and
García Rodón attorneys’ fees at a rate of $200 and $225 per hour,
respectively.

Hance v. Hospital San Francisco, USDC-PR Civil No. 99-

1510(JP). 3 Plaintiffs proffer that Reyes Canada v. Rey Hernandez, 411 F.
Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D.P.R. 2006), aff’d Martinez-Velez v. Rey-Hernandez, 506
F.3d 32, 47 (1st Cir. 2007), and Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez Colon, 697
F. Supp. 51, 58 (D.P.R. 1988) support the proposed hourly rates of $330 for
in court time and $300 for out of court time. In Reyes Canada, the District
Court awarded the top billing attorneys in the case $300 for in court time and
$275 for out of court time. The Court in Morales Feliciano determined that a
$10-$20 increase every two years is appropriate in order to account for the
accumulation of experience. Based on the attorneys’ experience, the prior
awards granted and the current prevailing rates, the Court adopts as
reasonable the proposed hourly rates of $330 for in court and $300 for out of
court hours for all three attorneys.
b. Number of Hours
To determine the number of reasonable hours that each of plaintiffs'
attorneys should be paid for, the court should take the hours actually spent
“and then subtract from that figure hours which were duplicative,
unproductive, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary.” Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 937.
The Court has examined each of the invoiced items “to determine whether a

3Attorney

Del Valle Cruz does not have a prior award of attorneys’ fees under § 1988.

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reasonable number of hours was spent, given the nature of the task at hand
and the results achieved” and for the presence of duplicity or
unproductiveness. Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir.
1984).4
Plaintiffs’ fee schedule is deficient in several respects: time billed is
excessive and unnecessary, and entries are vague and fail to provide
sufficient information. Based on a line by line review, the Court has assessed
the invoiced time and reduced the amount in these instances: 5
• Counsel Del Valle Cruz and García Rodón billed a total of 80.6 hours for
time spent, prior to filing the instant case, for the review of statutory
provisions and conducting research. An additional 60 hours were invoiced
for the preparation and filing of the Complaint and Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. Overall, on these tasks, plaintiffs spent 140.6 hours, for a total
of $42,180. Considering that the Complaint is not grounded on complex
legal issues and that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction essentially
incorporates its allegations, the Court finds that the hours invoiced are so
disproportionate to the task as to warrant a reduction of 50%, thereby
reducing the amount by 70.3 hours and the fees to $21,090.6
• Attorneys Del Valle Cruz and García Rodón also invoiced a total of 16
hours for preparation and review of letters to the President of the PRSEC

4“The trial bench need not feel handcuffed by counsel's submission of time records, no matter how elaborate.
To the contrary, the presiding judge must draw[ ] on his own experience and wisdom [in] deciding whether the time
spent on each phase was in excess of a reasonable amount.” Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d at 18 (internal quotation
and citations omitted).
5Items not discussed were approved as invoiced. Additionally, no hours have been deducted from attorney
Saavedra Castro’s time. Thus, the analysis focuses only on the time invoiced by attorneys Del Valle Cruz and García
Rodón.
6The time will be reduced proportionately to the time billed by each attorney. That is, Del Valle Cruz’s time
will be reduced by 33.5 hours and García Rodón’s time by 36.8 hours.

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and U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder. Del Valle Cruz’s time will be
reduced by two hours and García Rodón’s time by eight hours.
• Counsel García Rodón billed four hours for review of “correspondence
between Office of the Attorney General and the Secretary of State US
Department of Justice- Civil Rights Division.”

There is insufficient

information for the Court to make a determination as to the reasonableness
of this time entry. Thus, four hours will be deducted from García Rodón’s
total hours.
• After spending 44.5 hours researching and preparing a brief on the issues
on appeal, 7 counsel Del Valle Cruz invoiced an additional 28 hours for time
spent studying briefs tendered by appellees and preparing for oral
argument and another hour for the designation of the attorney for oral
argument. The Court finds this to be excessive. Thus, Del Valle Cruz’s
hours are reduced by 12.5 hours.

Attorney García Rodón billed an

additional eight hours for the review of appellees briefs and conference to
prepare strategy for oral argument. The time spent by Del Valle Cruz on
this task is duplicative; thus, he will be deducted six hours.
• The record contains entries of time spent by both Del Valle Cruz and
García Rodón reviewing and studying other attorneys’ filings and Court
orders in the captioned-case and finds that most of these entries are
excessive and unproductive in light of the substantive nature of the work.
 Attorney Del Valle Cruz billed a total of six hours for the “[p]reparation
of Informative Motion regarding notification of Appeal to each of the
defendants” and the drafting of a notice letter for each defendant.
Preparation of a standard informative motion that is six sentences

7The

Court did not reduce the time spent researching, preparing and filing the brief for an expedited appeal.

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long, as well as a form letter, does not warrant the time invoiced. The
Court deducts four hours from counsel Del Valle Cruz’s time.
Attorney García Rodón also billed for this same task.

This is

unnecessary and duplicative and therefore the full hour billed will be
deducted.
 Attorney Del Valle Cruz billed two hours for review of the Circuit
Court’s Order entered on October 3, 2012 designating a date and
time for the Oral argument. 8 The Court deducts one hour from Del
Valle Cruz’s allotted hours for excessiveness.
 Attorney Del Valle Cruz billed six hours for review of Appellee Edwin
Mundo-Rios’s Rehearing en banc and Emergency Motion to Clarify.
The Court will deduct three hours from this billing.
• Plaintiffs’ counsel invoiced 16 hours each, or $9,600 each, for preparation
for the two day hearing before this Court. Since lead counsel for plaintiffs’
during the two day hearing was Charlie Hernández Lopez, the Court will
reduce Del Valle Cruz and García Rodón’s total hours by 12 hours each.9
• Attorney Del Valle Cruz invoiced eight hours and attorney García Rodón
four hours for the preparation and filing of a Petition for Rehearing en banc.
Based on the scant information provided in support of these items the time
billed is excessive and duplicative. Therefore, the Court will deduct four
hours from Del Valle Cruz’s time and two hours from García Rodón’s time.
• Most of the entries between November 1 and November 5, 2012 related to
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court decision in Edwin Mundo v. Comisión
Estatal de Elecciones, CT-2012-020 (November 3, 2012) consist of block

8The

Circuit Court Order is four sentences long.
of the in court hours invoiced by attorneys García Rodón and Saavedra Castro for attendance at the two
day hearing were awarded.
9All

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14

“Courts disfavor the use of block billing because it requires

decipher[ing] on the judges' part.” Hermida v. Archstone, 950 F. Supp. 2d
298, 312 (D. Mass. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). These entries are
also deficient due to vagueness. For example: “Review of First Circuit
Order.”; “Preparation of response to First Circuit.” Finally, the time spent
between November 1 and November 5, 2012 was excessive due to the
nature of the tasks.

The attorneys invoiced a total of 48 hours,10 or

$14,400, for filings related to the Supreme Court decision that were
ultimately of little assistance in confronting the situation which led to the
undersigned’s Order to Preserve the Court’s Jurisdiction Pursuant to the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (d.e. 79). Having considered the nature
of the work billed between November 1 and November 5, 2012, the Court
implements a 66% reduction from the total billed by each attorney, that is,
a deduction of 20.46 hours from counsel Del Valle Cruz’s time and 11.22
hours from counsel García Rodón’s time.
• On December 13, 2012, counsel Del Valle Cruz and García Rodón billed
two hours and one hour, respectively, for time spent reviewing a two page
motion to stay, a two page opposition, a two page response to the
opposition and minutes of the court which were only three pages long. It
is illogical that it should take counsel Del Valle Cruz twice the time it takes
counsel García Rodón to read the same nine pages. Overlooking the fact
that between the caption of the case and the signature blocks these
motions are no more than 20 lines long, we do not think it is reasonable for
counsel to spend 14 minutes per page and 7 minutes per page. One and
half hours will be deducted from Del Valle Cruz’s hours and half an hour
will be deducted from García Rodón’s hours.
10Attorney

Del Valle-Cruz invoiced 31 hours and attorney García-Rodón invoiced 17 hours on these dates.

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• Counsel for plaintiffs invoiced three hours each on December 17, 2012 for
a “[c]onference among attorneys to plan course of litigation.” There is
insufficient information for the Court to make a determination as to the
reasonableness of this time entry. Thus, three hours will be deducted from
each attorney’s total hours.
• Attorney Del Valle Cruz invoiced three hours for the preparation of a Motion
for Default Entry against defendants that failed to plead. Attorney García
Rodón invoiced an hour for this same endeavor. Del Valle Cruz’s time will
be reduced by two hours and García Rodón’s time by half an hour.
• The attorneys invoiced one hour each for time to review a three paragraph
opposition filed by defendant Conty-Perez to plaintiffs’ Motion for Default
Entry. The time invoiced is excessive and duplicative. Counsel Del Valle
Cruz’s time will be deducted by half an hour and counsel García Rodón will
not be compensated for this time.
• Both attorneys billed .25 hours to review a motion to withdraw. The Court
finds this to be duplicative and unproductive. It will deduct .25 hours from
counsel García Rodón’s time.
• The record reflects that attorney Del Valle Cruz invoiced for work done on
1/08/2013, 3/07/2013, 3/20/2013, 3/21/2013, 5/28/2013, 6/10/2013 and
6/18/2013. Although attorney Del Valle Cruz withdrew sometime in 2013,
he did not file a motion to withdraw. It was not until March 26, 2014 that
attorney Del Valle Cruz filed a notice of appearance (d.e. 134) stating that
he withdrew “in 2013” without any mention of day or month. Considering
that this information was omitted and that no formal motion to withdraw was
filed by Del Valle Cruz while he worked at the Department of Justice of
Puerto Rico, the services invoiced on the dates above are stricken as to

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attorney Del Valle Cruz. Accordingly, 9.25 hours will be deducted from his
total hours.
 The Court notes that attorney García Rodón invoiced for much of this
time as well. The Court will not deduct from García Rodón’s time for
duplication of effort. However, the Court finds as excessive García
Rodón’s entries on 1/08/2013, 3/21/2013, 6/10/2013, 6/18/2013 and
6/20/2013 and will deduct 3.625 hours from his self-allotted hours.
• Counsel for plaintiffs invoiced one hour each for the review of Partial
Judgment and other miscellaneous orders entered by this Court. The
Court will deduct a half hour from each of the attorneys’ allotted time.
• Counsel Del Valle Cruz invoiced a total of 10 hours, or $3,000, for the
preparation of the Court ordered Joint Stipulation of Facts. Counsel García
Rodón invoiced an additional two hours for the review of the draft of said
stipulation. The Court will deduct three hours from Del Valle Cruz and one
and a half hours from García Rodón’s total hours.
• Both attorneys invoiced one and a half hours each to review a Motion to
Join the Stipulation of Facts and to review a Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Position.

The time invoiced is excessive and unnecessary.

Accordingly, each attorney’s allotment will be reduced by .9 of an hour.
• Attorney Del Valle Cruz invoiced 24 hours, that is $7,200, on time spent
researching and drafting a Memorandum of Law Requesting Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief under the Equal Protection Clause, the
First Amendment and HAVA.

Attorney García Rodón invoiced an

additional four hours for this same task. This time is unwarranted in light
of that fact that the legal research necessary for this memorandum had
previously been conducted and was separately invoiced. Accordingly, the

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Court will reduce Del Valle Cruz’s allotted time by 18 hours and García
Rodón’s time by two hours.
• Del Valle Cruz and García Rodón invoiced six hours and three hours
respectively for legal research and preparation of Reply to Response to
Motion to Dismiss and the study of Reply to Response to Motion for
Declaratory Judgment by defendants. This is excessive. Counsel Del
Valle Cruz’s time will be reduced by four hours and García Rodón’s time
by two hours.
• Another eight hours, or $2,400, were invoiced by the two attorneys for
review of the Court’s Declaratory Judgment (d.e. 152), a seven and a half
page document, filed on January 30, 2015 and a conference. Two hours
will be deducted from each attorney’s total hours.
• The attorneys invoiced another two hours for the review of a notice of
appeal, a motion to substitute party and a teleconference.

The time

apportioned will be reduced by half, that is, half an hour will be deducted
from each attorney’s allotted time.
• Counsel Del Valle Cruz’s entries on 3/10/2015, 4/15/2015, 4/23/2015,
5/20/2015 and 5/29/2015 are unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court will
deduct four and a half hours from his time.
• Plaintiffs’ counsel invoiced four hours, that is, $1,200, for a review of the
Court’s Entry of Partial Judgment and its Memorandum Opinion Declaring
Rights and Granting Equitable Relief filed on June 4, 2015 (d.e. 160). One
hour will be deducted from each of the attorneys’ allotment.
• Attorney Del Valle Cruz billed one and half hours for the preparation of a
simple status report to the First Circuit. A review of a three sentence Order
by the First Circuit lifting the stay was invoiced at another hour. The Court
will deduct 1.7 hours from Del Valle Cruz’s time.

CIVIL 12-1749CCC

18

• During the second appeal, a review of Appellant García Veléz’s ninety-one
page brief on appeal, research of authorities cited by García Veléz,
preparation of reply brief and the filing of the reply brief was billed at a total
of 80 hours for a claimed $24,000.00. Additionally, plaintiffs invoiced 24
hours on August 10 and August 11, 2015 to file an Appellate Brief of 71
pages which have been allowed. We find 80 hours to be excessive for the
14 page reply brief over issues that had been primarily argued at the
commencement of the litigation. Thus, the Court will reduce Del Valle
Cruz’s time by 49.5 hours and García Rodón’s time by 5.5 hours.
• Attorney Cruz Del Valle invoiced 12 hours for legal research on authorities
and arguments cited in the briefs filed by NPP Commissioner Jorge Davila
and PPD Commissioner San Antonio Acha. No reply brief was filed. The
time spent on this task was unnecessary. Thus, the Court will deduct 12
hours from Del Valle Cruz’s allotted time.
• Attorney Del Valle Cruz invoiced three hours for a conference with different
parties on appeal and to prepare a Joint Motion to Enlarge Time for Oral
Argument, and an additional hour and a half to prepare a Motion for Oral
Argument. Three hours will be deducted from the Del Valle Cruz’s time for
excessiveness.
• Attorney Del Valle Cruz invoiced 16 hours for preparation for oral argument
before the First Circuit. Eight hours will be deducted from his total time.
• A review of the First Circuit Opinion was invoiced by each attorney at three
hours, or $900 a piece.

The Court will deduct two hours from each

attorney’s time.
• Finally, attorney García Rodón’s time will be deducted .20 hours for time
spent reviewing a two page letter to Appellees addressing a reduction
amounts in the Bill of Costs.

CIVIL 12-1749CCC

19

Summary of Reduction of Hours Billed 11
Attorney Name

Hours Requested

Hours

Total Hours Awarded

Discounted
Del Valle Cruz
(In Court)

0

0

0

(Out of Court)

481

219.3

261.7

(In Court)

22

0

22

(Out of Court)

247

108

139

(In Court)

22

0

22

(Out of Court)

4

0

4

García Rodón

Saavedra Castro

c. Final Lodestar Calculation for Attorneys’ Fees
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ attorneys will be awarded the following:
Attorney Name

Total Hours

Hourly Rate

Awarded

Total Fees Awarded

Awarded

Del Valle Cruz
(In Court)

0

$330

$0

(Out of Court)

261.7

$300

$78,510

TOTAL

$78,510

García Rodón
(In Court)

22

$330

$7,260

(Out of Court)

139

$300

$41,701

TOTAL

$48,961

Saavedra Castro
(In Court)

22

$330

$7,260

(Out of Court)

4

$300

$1,200

11The

hours have been rounded to the nearest tenth.

CIVIL 12-1749CCC

20

TOTAL

$8,460

GRAND TOTAL

$135,931

III.

COSTS
Plaintiff shall file an itemized Bill of Costs addressed to the Clerk of

Court for disposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 54 (d)(1) and Puerto Rico Local
Rule 54(b).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

and Costs (d.e. 174), as adjusted, is GRANTED. Attorney Del Valle Cruz is
awarded $78,510.00, attorney García Rodón is awarded $48,961.00 and
attorney Saavedra Castro is awarded $8,460.00 in attorneys' fees for a
GRAND TOTAL OF $135,931.00.
SO ORDERED.
At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on March 22, 2017.

S/CARMEN CONSUELO CEREZO
United States District Judge