Quilez-Velar et al v. Ox Bodies, Inc. et al
Filing
328
OPINION AND ORDER re: 272 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' motion for summary judgment, construed as a renewed motion for judgment on the pleadings, is DENIED. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 5/16/2014. (NBB)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BERARDO A. QUILEZ-VELAR,
ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIV. NO.: 12-1780(SCC)
OX BODIES, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a purported motion for summary
judgment1 filed by Defendants Ox Bodies, Inc., and Truck
1.
Defendants previously filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
see Docket No. 197, which the Court denied without prejudice,
instructing Defendants to proceed by motion for summary judgment,
Docket No. 218. In response, Defendants filed the current motion, but
its factual allegations are drawn entirely from the pleadings. See Docket
No. 272. At Plaintiffs’ prompting, Defendants now agree that the
proper standard for consideration of the motion is the standard for
judgment on the pleadings. See Docket No. 293-1, at 2. We therefore
GRANT Defendants’ motion to convert their motion into one for
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 2
Bodies & Equipment International, Inc. The motion focuses
principally on the scope of the crashworthiness doctrine under
Puerto Rico law. After reviewing the parties’ papers, we deny
the motion for the reasons stated below.
I. Factual Background
On the morning of October 1, 2010, Maribel Quilez-Bonelli
was driving her 2004 Jeep Liberty in the left lane of Expreso
Román Baldorioty de Castro. Quilez was traveling west, in the
direction of San Juan from Carolina, at about kilometer 4.0,
near the Norte Shopping Center, at which point the highway
is elevated. As she was descending the elevation, Quilez
impacted a 2003 International Truck 4300, which was stopped
or nearly stopped in the left lane while municipal employees
did maintenance work in the area. Quilez apparently realized
at the last minute that the truck was not moving and she
swerved to the right; nonetheless, the driver’s side of her Jeep
impacted the Truck. The hood of Quilez’s jeep underrode the
Truck, and the Truck’s bumper penetrated the Jeep’s driver’s
side roof and windshield. The impact struck Quilez in her face
and head, killing her.
judgment on the pleadings.
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 3
The Truck’s cab and chassis were designed and manufactured by Third-Party Defendant Navistar, Inc. The Truck’s
dump body was designed and manufactured by Defendant Ox
Bodies, Inc.; the design and manufacture of the dump body
included the design and manufacture of the Truck’s rear
underride guard. Plaintiffs, all relatives of Quilez, sue Defendants Ox Bodies and Truck Bodies for failing to properly design
or manufacture the Truck’s rear guard.
II. Analysis
A. Strict Liability
In 1968, the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, held
that automobile manufacturers had a strict liability duty to
design their products to be safe in the event of foreseeable
accidents, including collisions, even where the defect was not
the cause of the accident. Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d
495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).2 While Larsen recognized that “an
2.
Larsen concerned injuries to the plaintiff-driver who was involved in a
head-on collision, the force of which caused the steering mechanism to
thrust into his head. See Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 496–97
(8th Cir. 1968). The alleged defect did not cause the accident; instead,
the so-called “secondary collision” of the plaintiff with the inside of the
vehicle aggravated injuries that he would have suffered otherwise. Id.
at 497.
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 4
automobile manufacturer is under no duty to design an
accident-proof or fool-proof vehicle,” it held that a manufacture is “under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its
vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of
injury in the event of a collision.” Id. After all, regardless of a
driver’s fault, collisions “are clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable.” Id.; see also id. at 502 n.4
(citing contemporary accident figures). Larsen turned out to be
a seminal case, and in its aftermath, the doctrine that it
birthed—referred to as “crashworthiness”—became the norm
across the United States. See 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 21:3 (3d ed.) (discussing the doctrine of crashworthiness).
Defendants suggest, however, that the crashworthiness
doctrine may not exist under Puerto Rico law. See Docket No.
272, at 6 & n.2; see also Docket No. 293-1, at 3–4. It is true that
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted
Larsen. It has, however, “consistently relied upon California
Supreme Court precedent” in deciding strict products liability
cases. Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25 (1st
Cir. 1998) (citing Montero-Saldaña v. Am. Motors Corp., 107
D.P.R. 452, 7 P.R. Offic. Trans. 501 (1978)); see also Vazquez-
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 5
Fileppetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2007)
(“Puerto Rico has generally followed the example set by
California for defective product design claims . . . .”). And
California has unambiguously followed Larsen. See, e.g., Horn
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 366 (1976). Indeed, every
American jurisdiction follows Larsen. 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21:3 (“[I]t seems safe to say that the
crashworthiness doctrine is now the law in every American
jurisdiction.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.
§ 16, cmt. a (“The Larsen rule appears now to be the unanimous
position of American courts. . . . The Reporters are unaware of
any jurisdiction that espouses [a contrary rule].”).3 Accordingly, we conclude that the crashworthiness doctrine does exist
under Puerto Rico law.
That said, this case does not precisely fit the Larsen paradigm. In Larsen, the plaintiff was injured by a defect in the
3.
Larsen responded in large part to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Evans
v. General Motors Corp., which held that under Indiana law, automobile
manufacturers had no duty to design their automobiles to protect
against foreseeable collisions. 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1966). Within
a decade of Larsen, the Seventh Circuit reversed itself and held that the
crashworthiness doctrine did exist under Indiana law. Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109–10 (7th Cir. 1977).
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 6
vehicle in which he was riding. Here, by contrast, Quilez was
killed by an alleged defect in the Truck into which she crashed.
According to Defendants, this difference is dispositive. Relying
on Rennert v. Great Dane Ltd., Defendants argue that Puerto
Rico would not recognize a duty of a manufacturer to design
its automobiles so as to protect those who crash into them. See
543 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Illinois
Supreme Court had held that a “manufacturer does not owe a
duty to protect those who collide with its vehicle” (citing
Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539 (1973))). Rennert noted that at
least nine states had adopted a contrary rule but that it was
bound by clear precedent from the Illinois Supreme Court. See
id. (“It is Rennert’s bad luck that Illinois is not among the
states—by at least one count, nine—that have recognized a
cause of action in a case such as this.”).
According to Defendants, Rennert states the majority rule,
as it stands for the proposition that “only nine states out of fifty
have embraced the position championed by Plaintiffs.” Docket
No. 272, at 8. Defendants misapprehend the case law. It is
certainly true that less than a majority of the states have
explicitly acknowledged causes of action of this type, but that
seems to be a product of the small number of courts that have
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Page 7
considered the question. As Defendants emphasize, the
Seventh Circuit counted at least nine states that would
acknowledge Plaintiffs’ cause of action, see Rennert, 543 F.3d at
916, and our own count reveals twelve, see, e.g., Harris v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 234 F.3d 398 (8th Cir. 2000) (Arkansas law);
Buzzard v. RoadrunnerTrucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1992)
(Pennsylvania law); Karney v. Leonard Transp. Corp., 561 F.
Supp. 2d 260 (D. Conn. 2008); Rivers v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,
816 F. Supp. 1525 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (Florida law); Boyle v. Ford
Motor Co., 942 A.2d 850 (N.J. App. Div. 2008); Great Dane
Trailers, Inc. v. Wells, 52 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. 2001); Quay v.
Crawford, 788 So.2d 76 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); Hagan v. Gemstate
Mfg., Inc., 982 P.2d 1108 (Or. 1999); Worldwide Equip., Inc. v.
Mullins, 11 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); Detillier v. Sullivan,
714 So.2d 244 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Poorman v. Kidron, Inc., No.
17573, 1996 WL 515547 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1996)
(unpublished); Garcia v. Rivera, 160 A.D.2d 274 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).4 What Defendants don’t do is point to any cases that
4.
Several of these cases do not expressly decide the issue now before us.
Instead, they seem to take the validity of such a claim for granted. For
example, in Boyle, the court held that the plaintiff, injured due to an
underride accident, could not sue the chassis-cab manufacturer because
the chassis cab was, in essence, a component part. See Boyle v. Ford
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 8
have followed Rennert or Mieher, and our own search reveals
not a single post-Larsen case from outside of Illinois applying
the Rennert/Miehler rule. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ strident
position,5 their rule is disfavored, and Plaintiffs’ position
constitutes the majority rule, at least so far as one can be
determined.
Motor Co., 942 A.2d 850, 862 (N.J. App. Div. 2008) (holding that the
“safety device could not have been pre-installed by [the chassis-cab
manufacturer] because, depending on the vehicle’s end-use, such a
device could have been ineffective, inadequate, or unnecessary”). The
court expressed no qualms about liability falling on the final stage
manufacturer, however. See id. at 852 n.1, 862 (noting that the final stage
manufacturer, which had settled, was “in the best position to ascertain
the safety needs of the modified” chassis cab). As we explain below,
claims such as Plaintiffs’ flow naturally from the principles expressed
in Larsen; thus, we are unsurprised that most courts to have passed
upon the question have simply assumed such claims’ validity without
comment.
5.
Plaintiffs point out that Rennert cites no cases from outside of Illinois
supporting its rule, though it cites to at least nine cases from outside of
Illinois that contradict it. See Docket No. 280, at 10–11. Plaintiffs
understand this to be an acknowledgment by the Seventh Circuit that
Illinois’s rule was in the minority. See id. (“The Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that the Illinois rule constitutes the minority view . . . .”).
Defendants call this a “strained” “misrepresentation” of Rennert, and
they point out that “only nine states recognize a cause of action similar
to what Plaintiffs[] advance in this case.” Docket No. 293-1, at 5. But
that is eight more states than Defendants can adduce in support of their
position.
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
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That twelve of the thirteen jurisdictions to have considered
the question have favored Plaintiffs’ rule is itself persuasive
evidence of the course that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
would take. More persuasive is the fact that Plaintiffs’ position
is stronger on the merits. It is true that in some places Larsen
refers to manufacturers’ duty to protect against reasonably
foreseeable harms to “users” of their products. See, e.g., Larsen,
391 F.2d at 502 (holding that a manufacturer “is under a duty
to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid
subjecting the user to an unreasonable injury in the event of a
collision”). These statements, however, are based on a broader
principle: that manufacturers must be “held to a reasonable
duty of care in the design of [their] vehicle[s] consonant with
the state of the art to minimize the effect of accidents.” Id. at
503. Thus, because “the intended use of an automotive product
contemplates its travel on crowded and high speed roads and
highways that inevitably subject it to the foreseeable hazards
of collisions and impacts,” a manufacturer has a duty to design
its products so as to “minimize or lessen the injurious effects of
a collision.” Id. at 503–04.
Mieher relied on Larsen, but it distinguished it based on a
restrictive understanding of foreseeability. Mieher’s facts
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describe a typical underride case: the plaintiff’s car struck a
large truck, and she was killed when her vehicle “proceed[ed]
unimpeded under the bed of the truck” because of an alleged
defect in the truck’s rear bumper design. See Mieher, 54 Ill. 2d
at 540–41. The Mieher court seems to have found these facts
remarkable, however. See id. at 544 (“We do not believe,
however, that the foreseeability rule applied in Larsen is
intended to bring within the ambit fo the defendant’s duty
every consequence which might possibly occur.”). Indeed, the
court called the accident an “extraordinary occurrence.” Id. at
545. This seems to have been the basis for the court distinguishing its case—about “the duty of the manufacturer to design a
vehicle with which it is safe to collide”—with Larsen, which it
said was about “the duty of the manufacturer to design a
vehicle in which it was safe to ride.” Id. at 543.
As decisions relying on Mieher have acknowledged,
however, Mieher was flatly wrong about the “extraordinary”
nature of the accident in that case; rear-end collisions are
common, and when they involve large trucks, they can be
extremely dangerous. See Beattie v. Lindelof, 262 Ill. App. 3d 372,
379 n. 2 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that “rear-end collisions are
common”); see also 64 Fed. Reg. 2004, 2004 (Jan. 24, 1996)
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(estimating “that about 11,551 rear-end crashes with trucks,
trailers, and semitrailers occur annually,” resulting in “approximately 423 passenger vehicle occupant fatalities and
about 5,030 non-fatal injuries”). Thus, no serious argument can
be made that the accident in Mieher—much less here—was an
“extraordinary occurrence.” To the contrary, the danger of
underride accidents is well known to truck manufacturers and
has been for decades.
Thus, foreseeability concerns do not support Mieher’s
decision to draw a distinction between injuries to occupants of
defective vehicles and injuries to occupants of other vehicles.
And, frankly, we see no other justification for such a limitation
in either Mieher or Beattie, on which Rennert also relies.6 The
better rule—and the one favored by the Restatement—holds
that the manufacturer has a duty that is coexstensive with the
foreseeability of the harm. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
6.
We find it useful to note here that Mieher was a negligence case, and it
did not involve any strict liability claims. See Mieher, 54 Ill. 2d at 541.
Nonetheless, Beattie extended its applicability into the strict liability
realm. Beattie, 262 Ill. App. 2d at 383 (reasoning that the “[a]lthough the
court in Mieher did not address” the strict liability issue, it “would have
reached the same conclusion for strict liability claims as it did with
negligence claims”).
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PROD. LIAB. § 16, cmt. a (“A manufacturer has a duty to design
and manufacture its product so as reasonably to reduce the
foreseeable harm that may occur in an accident brought about
by causes other than a product defect.”); see also, e.g., Jurado v.
Western Gear Works, 619 A.2d 1312, 1318 (N.J. 1993) (“A
manufacturer . . . has a duty to prevent injury caused by the
foreseeable misuse of his product.”); Bean v. BIC Corp., 597
So. 2d 1350, 1352 (Ala. 1992) (“The scope of a manufacturer’s
legal duty, therefore, depends upon two factors: (1) the
foreseeability of the danger; and (2) the feasibility of an
alternative design that averts that danger.”); Ellsworth v. Sherne
Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 355 (Md. 1985) (holding that “a
seller is required to provide a product that is not unreasonably
dangerous when used for a purpose and in a manner that is
reasonably foreseeable”). Given that the foreseeability of this
type of accident is indisputable, in the language of Larsen,
“[w]e perceive of no sound reason, either in logic or experience, nor any command in precedent, why the manufacturer
should not be held to a reasonable duty of care in the design
of” its rear bumpers so as to “minimize the effects of accidents”
to those who collide with its vehicles. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503.
The motion for summary judgment is accordingly denied as to
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the strict products liability claim.7
B. Negligence
Plaintiffs also press a negligent design claim under Article
1802 of the Puerto Rico civil code. Defendants oppose this
claim for much the same reasons as they do Plaintiffs’ strict
liability claims, and the strongest case in their favor is Rivers v.
Great Dane Trailers. In Rivers, which was also an underride
collision case, the court allowed the plaintiff’s strict liability
claims for reasons similar to ours above. See Rivers, 816 F.
Supp. at 1531–32. However, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants as to the plaintiffs negligence claims. In doing so, the court relied on Mieher and two
other cases that had found no duty on the part of manufactur7.
Larsen made clear that it was not making special rules for automobile
manufacturers; to the contrary, it applied long-standing principles
“equally applicable to all manufacturers.” Larsen, 391 F.2d at 504. It is
worth noting, therefore, that bystanders “are widely recognized as
protected by” products liability law. Mary J. Davis, Design Defect
Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217,
1236 (1993) (citing Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 88 (Cal.
1969) (holding that “the doctrine may not be limited on the theory that
no representation of safety is made to the bystander” because “a
bystander is often a perfectly foreseeable risk of the maker’s enterprise”
(internal quotation omitted))). Given that fact, it is unremarkable to
extend that protection to occupants of vehicles that crash into a
defective vehicle.
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
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ers to make their vehicles safe for third parties to strike from
the outside. See id. at 1529; see also Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F.
Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (concerning a child injured by riding
his bike into a parked car); Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 329 P.2d 605
(Cal. App. 1958) (same). Rivers provides no further analysis in
support of its holding that Florida law would not recognize a
duty to third parties.
We do not believe that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
would follow Rivers. First, of course, we disagree with its
reliance on Mieher for the reasons stated in the previous
section: that case did not well explain its decision to draw an
arbitrary line between those inside and outside of the manufacturer’s vehicle despite the fact that certain types accidents
concerning both groups are reasonably foreseeable. Second,
neither Hatch nor Kahn are persuasive authorities in an underride case. Crucially, “[b]oth Hatch and Kahn were decided before
their respective jurisdictions adopted the Larsen rule,” and so
each has been superceded doctrinally. Knippen v. Ford Motor
Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Jones v.
NordicTrack, Inc., 236 F.3d 658, 660–61 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting
that Hatch “has since been called into doubt in California”).
Moreover, both Hatch and Kahn describe a fairly peculiar
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factual scenario concerning children injuring themselves after
striking stopped, legally parked automobiles. In that sense, the
cases are factually distinguishable, as they present far less
foreseeable accidents than do underride cases.
A plaintiff making a negligence claim under Puerto Rico
law is obliged to prove, among other things, a breach of duty
on the part of the defendant. See, e.g., Sociedad de Gananciales v.
Gonzalez Padin, 17 P.R. Offic. Trans. 111, 125 (1986). Typically,
the duty is one of due care: “the general rule that one must act
as would a prudent and reasonable person under the circumstances.” Vazquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43,
49 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Ortíz v. Levitt & Sons of P.R., Inc., 1 P.R.
Offic. Trans. 407 (1973)). This duty is breached when a person’s
actions “create reasonably foreseeable risks.” Id. Thus, “in a
negligence action, foreseeability provides the linchpin” for
“determining the duty of an actor.” Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car
Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 972 (1st Cir. 1991); see also Woods-Leber v.
Hyatt Hotels of P.R., Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (D.P.R. 1996)
(“The duty of care may therefore be defined as an obligation to
anticipate and take measures against a danger that is reasonably foreseeable.” (citing Pabón-Escabí v. Axtmayer, 90 D.P.R. 20,
25 (1964))), aff’d, 124 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 1997); Elba A.B.M. v.
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Universidad de P.R., 125 D.P.R. 294, 309 (1990) (“The duty to
exercise due care comprises the obligations to foresee and to
prevent the occurrence of damages which may reasonably be
foreseen.”).8 In negligent design cases, Puerto Rico law also
requires the plaintiff to establish—usually by expert testimony—the relevant standard of care owed by the manufacturer, as well as the ways in which the manufacturer breached
that standard. See Vazquez-Fileppetti, 504 F.3d at 54.9
8.
For an official English-language translation of Elba, from which this
quote is drawn, see Elba A.B.M v. Univ. of P.R., No. RE-86-214, 1990 WL
658047 (P.R. 1990).
9.
We do not understand Puerto Rico law to establish any special burden
for negligent design plaintiffs. Vazquez-Filippetti relied primarily on a
series of cases from this Court concerning the negligent design of
cigarettes. See Vazquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43, 53
(1st Cir. 2007) (citing cases). The first of those cases—and the one on
which the others relied—cited only to the elements of a negligence
action in a typical tort case. See Cruz-Vargas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
218 F. Supp. 2d 109, 119 (D.P.R. 2002); see also Tokio Marine & Fire Ins.
Co. v. Grove Mfg. Co., 958 F.2d 1169, 1171 (1st Cir. 1992) (providing the
standard for negligence used by Cruz-Vargas). Instead, we understand
a design negligence plaintiff’s burden to mirror that of a plaintiff in any
other professional negligence suit, where expert evidence is typically
necessary to define the standard of care and its breach. Compare Colon
Prieto v. Geigel, 15 P.R. Offic. Trans. 313, 321 (1984) (discussing
professional negligence), with Vazquez-Fileppetti, 504 F.3d at 52
(explaining that expert testimony is necessary in negligent design cases
because “the design of the relevant product is beyond the experience or
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Given this legal background, and given the foreseeability of
underride accidents, we cannot decide, as a matter of law, that
negligent design cases of this sort are barred by Puerto Rico
law. Further, because Defendants’ motion is effectively one to
dismiss, not for summary judgment, we will not inquire into
whether Plaintiffs can prove the standard of care, something
that they must do by expert evidence.10 Accordingly, we deny
the motion for summary judgment as to the negligent design
claim.
III.
Conclusion
knowledge of an average lay person”).
10. In its motion, Defendants spend some time arguing that a federal
regulation providing standards for rear impact guards on certain large
trucks, see 49 C.F.R. § 393.86, does not apply to them. We agree with
Defendants to an extent: the regulation applies only to motor carriers,
see 49 C.F.R. § 393.1(b)(1), a category that does not include Defendants.
See, e.g., Mottu v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 804 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex.
App. 1990) (holding that § 393.86 does not apply to manufacturers).
That said, it is not apparent what relief Defendants are requesting in
making these arguments. As best we can tell, their motion reads like a
motion in limine seeking to exclude § 393.86 as evidence at trial. If
that’s the case, the motion is premature. But see Hagan v. Gemstate Mfg.,
Inc., 982 P.2d 1108, 1117 (Or. 1999) (holding that § 393.86 may be used
as evidence against a manufacturer at trial in establishing the standard
fo care). We reserve the matter of § 393.86's admissibility for a later
time.
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For all of the reasons state above, Defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings, Docket No. 272, is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 16th day of May, 2014.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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