Quilez-Velar et al v. Ox Bodies, Inc. et al
Filing
383
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION denying 374 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 9/17/2014.(NBB)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BERARDO A. QUILEZ-VELAR,
ET AL.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIV. NO.: 12-1780(SCC)
OX BODIES, INC., ET AL.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On September 4, 2014, I dismissed the Municipality of San
Juan, ruling that because it had deposited in state court the
maximum amount for which it might be liable in this case,
there was no purpose in requiring it to participate any further
here. See Quilez-Velar v. Ox Bodies, Inc., Civ. No. 12-1780, 2014
WL 4385418 (D.P.R. Sept. 4, 2014). Plaintiffs now ask that I
reconsider that Order, Docket No. 374, a matter regarding
which they provided further argument during the Pretrial
Conference held on September 16, 2014. After considering
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 2
Plaintiffs’ arguments, I deny the motion for reconsideration.
In the first place, I remain convinced that the Municipality
has properly complied with the provisions of Article 1130 of
the Civil Code, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 3180. As my previous
Order noted, the cases of Pilot Life Insurance v. Crespo, 136
D.P.R. 624 (1994), and Pabon Lugo v. MONY Life Insurance
Company of America, 465 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.P.R. 2006), confirm
that a court’s finding of liability is not a prerequisite to the
holder of funds invoking Article 1130. See Quilez-Velar, 2014
WL 4385418, at *2. Rather, Article 1130 acts much like an
interpleader statute, cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 22, permitting the holder
of the money to consign it to the court, where the various
claimants can fight over their entitlement to the money.
Further, the Municipality has admitted liability,1 but it
cannot alone determine to whom the $500,000 it has admitted
owing is due. Indeed, it has no interest in that fight at all.
1.
I agree with the Municipality that the consignation of funds pursuant
to Article 1130 is, in effect, an admission of liability. Moreover, the
Municipality has admitted liability up to the limit of its insurance
policy. See Docket Nos. 378-1, 378-2. I reject Plaintiffs’ characterization
of this admission as incomplete. Given that the Municipality cannot be
liable for more than $500,000, it is of no moment that it has “only”
admitted liability up to that amount.
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 3
Plaintiffs are incorrect, moreover, when they suggest that the
only way that those funds can be distributed is after a trial on
liability. With liability admitted and the funds deposited, the
state court—where all potential beneficiaries remain parties—need only hold a damages hearing, after which it can
distribute the funds to the various claimants as it deems
appropriate.
Finally, Plaintiffs take issue with my suggestion that
Defendants would be entitled to a proportionate share set-off
for the Municipality’s liability. To the contrary, Plaintiffs
suggest that joint and several liability principles require that
Defendants satisfy any portion of the judgment against the
Municipality that the Municipality is statutorily exempted
from paying.2 As stated in my previous Order, I disagree. The
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has suggested that the doctrine
2.
At the Pretrial Conference, Plaintiffs made much of the Municipality’s
and Defendants’ inability to cite any cases directly stating that a joint
tortfeasor with a municipality would not be responsible for the
Municipality’s excess liability under these circumstances. I note,
however, that Plaintiffs have also failed to cite any cases supporting
their own position, instead citing to cases generally discussing joint and
several liability principles that are not in question. I have been unable
to find any cases in either state or federal court that directly address
this question.
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 4
of joint and several liability goes hand-in-hand with the
defendants’ right of contribution. See Szendrey v. Hospicare, Inc.,
158 D.P.R. 648, 654 (2003) (“[W]e have held that joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable to the injured party, but the onerous
effect between joint tortfeasors should be distributed in
proportion to their respective degree of negligence.”). The
Supreme Court has also stated that the “main purpose of the
right of contribution” is the prevention of “unjust enrichment.”
Id. As the Supreme Court held in Ramos v. Caparra Dairy, Inc.,
the right of contribution is meant to “allocat[e] the obligation
to those who, in the last instance, it may correspond.” 16 P.R.
Offic. Trans. 78, 82–83 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).
Applying these principles in Szendrey, the Supreme Court held
that where a plaintiff release one of two co-defendants from
liability, the remaining co-defendant is responsible to the
plaintiffs “only for the share that represents its degree of contribution to the cause of the damage.” Szendrey, 158 D.P.R. at 656.
And the remaining co-defendant need not implead the released
co-defendant to benefit from such a set-off. Id.; see also id. at
658–59.
Here, the Municipality’s liability is extinguished by statute
rather than by contract, but I see no reason why Szendrey’s
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Page 5
principles should not still apply. As Szendrey makes clear, joint
and several liability is a two-way street; there is an obligation
on each defendant to make the plaintiff whole, but there is also
a corresponding right of contribution for any defendant who
pays more than his share. Here, though, if Defendants pay for
the Municipality’s excess liability, they are statutorily barred
from seeking contribution from the Municipality. Defendants
cannot be required to pay beyond their proportional share
without any hope of contribution.
The case of Widow of Andino v. Puerto Rico Water Resources
Authority, 93 P.R.R. 168 (1966), is to the same effect. There, the
Supreme Court held that where an employer-tortfeasor was
immune from liability on account of Puerto Rico’s workers’
compensation statute, recovery could not be sought for the
employer-tortfeasor’s negligence from a joint-tortfeasor. Id. at
179. The Supreme Court accordingly held that the jointtortfeasor—who could not seek contribution from the
employer-tortfeasor—“should be held liable for the damage
only in proportion to its fault and to the degree of contribution in
producing the same.” Id. at 180 (emphasis added). Here, the
Municipality, like the employer in Widow of Andino, benefits
from statutory immunity, and so its joint-tortfeasors cannot
QUILEZ-VELAR v. OX BODIES
Page 6
seek contribution from it. Widow of Andino provides that in
such a circumstances, the joint-tortfeasors are obligated to pay
only the proportion of the damages for which they themselves
are responsible.3 Accordingly, I affirm that Defendants here
would be entitled to a proportionate share set-off.
The motion to reconsider is thus DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 17th day of September, 2014.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
3.
I reject Plaintiffs’ contention that Widow of Andino does not apply to the
present dispute because it arose in the context of the workers’
compensation statute. The Supreme Court in Widow of Andino
understood the joint-tortfeasor’s proportional—not total—liability to
be a consequence of its inability to seek contribution from the
employer, which was immune by statute. Those precise circumstances
also exist here, and so Widow of Andino is, at a minimum, strong
persuasive authority in favor of proportionate share set-offs in this case.
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