Quilez-Velar et al v. Ox Bodies, Inc. et al

Filing 461

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: 404 Motion in Limine to preclude Plaintiffs from parceling out damages due to the collision between both vehicles from injuries suffered by the decedent during the collision. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 2/2/2015. (NBB) Modified on 2/3/2015 re capital letters. (re).

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

BERARDO A. QUILEZ-VELAR,
ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIV. NO.: 12-1780(SCC)

OX BODIES, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendants have filed a motion in limine concerning the
applicability to this case of section 16 of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability. That section follows what
is commonly known as the Fox-Mitchell rule,1 which describes
a products liability plaintiff’s burden of proof in a case where

1.

The rule was named for two early cases proposing it. See Mitchell v.
Volkswagenwerk, AG, 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982); Fox v. Ford Motor Co.,
575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).

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the alleged design defect caused enhanced damages. Defendants concern is that Plaintiffs have misunderstood this rule,
and, in accordance with this misunderstanding, will imply to
the jury during opening statements that if they find a design
defect, that is all that matters in this case. At a hearing this
morning, counsel for Plaintiffs did in fact take the position that,
at least with regard to Plaintiffs’ strict liability claims, comparative fault is irrelevant. Because this belief is mistaken, and
because I want to make sure that the parties do not attempt to
influence the jury as to the legal rules governing this case, I
offer the following guidance.
Section 16(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Products
Liability provides that where a design defect enhances a
plaintiff’s injury beyond that which would have been resulted
from other causes, and where that injury is a non-divisible one,
like death, the manufacturer “is liable for all of the plaintiff’s
harm attributable to the defect and other causes” (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the manufacturer is “jointly and severally
liable . . . with other parties who bear legal responsibility for
causing the harm,” as that liability would be “determined by
applicable rules of joint and several liability” in the forum.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 16(d).

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In this case, Plaintiffs allege that the design defect caused
their injuries. Defendants argue, by contrast, that other
causes—the Municipality’s negligence, as well the decedent’s—were responsible for the accident. Pursuant to section
16, then, Plaintiffs would only need to prove that, regardless of
other causes, Defendants’ defective design was “a substantial
factor in increasing [Plaintiff’s] harm.” Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability § 16(a). If Plaintiffs succeed in proving
that fact, then Defendants are jointly and severally liable with
any other tortfeasors for all of Plaintiffs’ injuries.
The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not, however, explicitly
followed either § 16 of the Restatement or the Fox-Mitchell rule.
It has, however, generally followed California law when it
comes to products liability. See, e.g., Collazo Santiago v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 149 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1998) (“As it has revisited
the issue of Puerto Rico strict liability law, the Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico has consistently relied upon California Supreme
Court precedent.”). And according to the Restatement,
California is among the jurisdictions that follow the FoxMitchell rule. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability § 16, reporter’s note cmt. d; see also McGee v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Doupnik v.

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Gen. Motors Corp., 275 Cal. Rptr. 715, 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
Likewise, both the First Circuit and the Restatement characterize this as a majority rule. See Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
187 F.3d 88, 101 (1st Cir. 1999) (referring to the “more widely
used Fox-Mitchell approach”); Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability § 16, reporter’s note cmt. d (“A strong
majority of courts that have considered the question have
adopted a rule that supports § 16(c).”). As such, and because I
think it is the better-reasoned approach, I will follow the FoxMitchell rule as codified in § 16.
The next question is what the application of the section § 16
means for apportionment in this case. Section 16(d) makes clear
that its approach is subject to forum law on joint and several
liability. Puerto Rico law explicitly permits comparative
negligence in strict products liability cases. See Collazo Santiago,
149 F.3d at 25 (explaining that Puerto Rico has followed
California law “in holding principles of comparative fault
applicable to strict products liability cases”); Montero Saldaña v.
Am. Motors Corp., 7 P.R. Offic. Trans. 501, 510–11 (holding that
comparative negligence applies in strict liability cases (following Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978))). It is
true that Montero Saldaña discusses only the comparative fault

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of the plaintiff, rather than of alleged joint tortfeasors. But
Montero Saldaña—like Daly, on which it principally relies—reaches its conclusion by rejecting the notion that
apportionment principles should apply differently in strict
liability cases. See Montero Saldaña, 7 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 511–12
(“It has been accepted that comparative fault in cases of
negligence is the most reasonable and just way of imposing
liability. If it is so in cases of negligence, is there any reason,
besides that of strict technicality, why it should not be applied
in cases of strict liability for defects in products?”); Daly, 575
P.2d at 1169–70 (rejecting the notion that juries cannot compare
strict liability with negligence liability). Thus, given that Puerto
Rico generally follows a regime in which liability is apportioned among joint tortfeasors, as well as the plaintiff, there is
no reason in logic or doctrine to hold otherwise in the case of
strict liability. This is especially true given that the Supreme
Court of California, the same year that it decided Daly, specifically held that “the basic equitable considerations that led [it]
to adopt a rule permitting comparative apportionment of
liability among multiple tortfeasors appl[ies] equally in the”
strict liability context. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest Kart, 579 P.2d
441, 444 (Cal. 1978). Accordingly, I will apply general appor-

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tionment principles to both Plaintiffs’ negligence and strict
liability claims.
Thus, based on the parties’ evidentiary proffers, the jury
will ultimately be instructed to apportion liability between
Defendants, the decedent, and the Municipality of San Juan.
The parties are absolutely prohibited from making any
statements to the jury inconsistent with the above discussion,
and they should refrain generally from making statements of
law—whether explicit or implicit—in front of the jury.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 2nd day of February, 2015.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE