Quilez-Velar et al v. Ox Bodies, Inc. et al

Filing 503

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 3/3/2015.(NBB)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

BERARDO QUILEZ-VELAR, ET
AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CIV. NO.: 12-1780(SCC)

OX BODIES, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
After a trial, the jury rendered a verdict against Defendant
Ox Bodies and in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $6,000,000.
Docket No. 502, at 3. Finding Ox Bodies liable on a strictliability theory, the verdict was apportioned as follows:
1. Berardo A. Quilez-Velar:

$1,800,000

2. Marta Bonelli-Cabán:

$3,000,000

3. Berardo A. Quilez-Bonelli:

$900,000

4. Carlos A. Quilez-Bonelli:

$300,000

Id. The jury failed to find Ox Bodies liable on a negligence

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theory. Id. at 2. It furthermore found the Municipality of San
Juan—but not the decedent, Maribel Quilez-Bonelli—contributorily negligent. Id. at 3. The jury found that Ox Bodies was
only responsible for 20% of Plaintiffs’ damages, while the
Municipality was responsible for the other 80%.
I have previously indicated that, should the Municipality be
found contributorily negligent, Ox Bodies would only be
adjudged liable for the portion of the damages for which it is
responsible. See 2014 WL 4385418, at *3 (D.P.R. Sept. 4, 2014);
see also 2014 WL 4656649, at *1–2 (D.P.R. Sept. 17, 2014).
Plaintiffs have opposed this, focusing principally on the
generally-applicable rule of joint and several liability under
Puerto Rico law. See, e.g., Docket No. 374, at 10. According to
Plaintiffs, there are only two exceptions to this principle: (1)
where there is a settlement agreement releasing a joint-tortfeasor,1 and (2) cases “arising under Puerto Rico’s Workmen’s
Compensation Act.” Id. at 12.
I have already addressed in some detail the way that Puerto
Rico’s solidary liability rule is of a piece with the principle of
nivelación. See 2014 WL 4656649, at *2 (“[J]oint and several
1.

See, e.g., Szendrey v. Hospicare, Inc., 158 D.P.R. 648, 654 (2003). But see
Blas v. Hosp. Guadalupe, 167 D.P.R. 439 (2006).

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liability is a two-way street; there is an obligation on each
defendant to make the plaintiff whole, but there is also a
corresponding right of contribution for any defendant who
pays more than his share.”). I stand by that holding. Subsequently, I have also conducted a great deal of research into the
question of whether or not Plaintiff’s position that cases
“arising under” Puerto Rico’s workers’ compensation statute
present a special class of cases, into which this suit cannot fit.
I have found no support for Plaintiffs’ restrictive reading of the
case law.
According to Plaintiffs, in the workers’ compensation
context, an insured employer cannot be liable to a jointtortfeasor because to hold otherwise “would defeat the public
policy purpose of” the statute. Docket No. 374, at 13. This is an
accurate description of Cortijo-Walker v. Water Resources Authority, 91 D.P.R. 574, 91 P.R.R. 557 (1964), one of the three cases on
which Plaintiffs rely. In that case, the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico considered whether a defendant, sued by a person who
received worker’s compensation, could bring a third-party suit
against the plaintiff’s immune employer. 91 P.R.R. at 558–59.
The Court said that no such suit was available, as it would
allow the employer’s “statutory immunity” to “be defeated

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through the indirect means of the third-party claim.” Id. at 565;
see also id. at 564 (“To permit the third-party claim would
amount to doing indirectly what the lawmaker has forbidden
to be done directly.”). As the Supreme Court’s language in
Cortijo-Walker makes clear, its holding was as simple as
identifying the employer’s statutory immunity and refusing to
let that immunity be vitiated by indirect means. See P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 11, § 21 (providing that the workers’ compensation
remedy “shall be the only remedy against the employer”).
Notably, the Cortijo-Walker Court understood its holding to
foreclose contribution suits against the immune employer. Id.
at 563 (“A third-party claim against the employer . . . is not
available . . . on the theory of ‘contribution’ . . . .”).
Cortijo-Walker concerned the immunity of an employer
under the workers’ compensation statute, which immunity was
enacted by the legislature to benefit the workers’ compensation
system. See id. at 562 (explaining that the provision of immunity was an essential “means of encouraging every employer
to take out insurance, without which the system could not be
effective”). The present case involves the immunity of a
municipality, which immunity the legislature has likewise
enacted for important policy reasons: namely, the protection of

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the municipal fisc. See, e.g., Luciano Morales v. Municipio de Vega
Alta, KLAN0400829, 2005 PR App. LEXIS 3327, at *31–32 (P.R.
App. Oct. 31, 2005) (explaining that the while the Commonwealth and its subdivisions are generally immune from suit,
the legislature has enacted a limited waiver of that immunity).2
As Plaintiffs recognize,3 then, Cortijo-Walker precludes Ox
Bodies from seeking contribution from the Municipality of San
Juan.4
2.

Generally, the damages in an action against a municipality may not
exceed $75,000 for a single plaintiff or $150,000 for a single occurrence.
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 21, § 4704. However, a municipality’s sovereign
immunity does not inure to the benefit of its liability insurer; if the
municipality is insured, a plaintiff may collect up to the insurance
policy’s limits. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 2004.

3.

See Docket No. 374, at 10 (arguing that Ox Bodies is “‘stuck’ with the
amount for which the Municipality and its insurer are not
responsible”); id. (arguing that the “loss must be borne by the other
joint tortfeasors”).

4.

Theoretically, Ox Bodies could seek contribution from the municipality
up to the limits of its insurance policy—$300,000 in this case. However,
the municipality has already consigned that full amount to the
Commonwealth court for Plaintiffs’ benefit (as well as the benefit of the
plaintiffs in the companion case). Thus, because Plaintiffs have already
recovered from the municipality coextensively with its liability (or will
as soon as the Commonwealth court distributes the funds held in its
registry), Ox Bodies cannot seek an contribution whatsoever from the
municipality.

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The question then is what happens when a defendant’s
general right to contribution is lost due to a joint-tortfeasor’s
statutory immunity. The other cases on which Plaintiffs rely
provide an answer to this question. See Rosario-Crespo v. Water
Resources Auth., 94 D.P.R. 834, 94 P.R.R. 799 (1967), Widow of
Andino v. Water Resources Auth., 93 D.P.R. 170, 93 P.R.R. 168
(1966). The facts in Widow of Andino are similar to those in
Cortijo-Walker: a worker was killed, he was compensated by the
State Insurance Fund, and his family sued an entity other than
his employer for damages due to its negligence. See 93 P.R.R.
at 171. Citing Cortijo-Walker, the Supreme Court noted that the
defendant would not be able to seek contribution from the
immune employer. Id. at 179. Without further analysis,5 the
Supreme Court held that the “defendant should be held liable
for the damage only in proportion to its fault.” Id. at 180 (emphasis added). Rosario-Crespo is to the same effect. 94 P.R.R. at 813
(holding that where the defendant was a joint-tortfeasor with

5.

The Widow of Andino Court did refer to “the fact that this case is
governed by the special Act on the matter,” i.e., the Workman’s
Compensation Act. Widow of Andino v. Water Resources Auth., 93 P.R.R.
168, 180 (1966). But the present case is also governed by a “special Act
on the matter,” id.—namely, the Autonomous Municipalities Act, P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 21, § 4001, et seq.

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the immune employer, “[i]ts liability . . . [was] limited to the
proportion in which its negligence contributed in producing
the damage suffered by plaintiffs”).
It should be noted that the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Widow of Andino and Rosario-Crespo were not based on any
language in the workers’ compensation statute, which does not
address its effect on joint-tortfeasors’ rights of contribution. As
explained by Cortijo-Walker, the purpose of employer immunity
was the protection of the workers’ compensation system. This
policy would have been undermined if employer immunity
could have been circumvented by clever pleading. It would not
have been undermined, however, by requiring the defendants
in Widow of Andino or Rivera-Crespo to pay for damages
assessed to the immune employers. In such a case, the employer would have remained immune and the compensation
system strong. And yet, the Supreme Court held that there was
no solidary liability, implying that whether solidary liability
exists in the present context cannot be answered simply by
looking at whether it would defeat the statute’s purpose: it
would not, but neither would it have in Widow of Andino or
Rosario Crespo.
Though the relevant statutes are different, the present

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case’s circumstances mirror those in Widow of Andino and
Rosario-Crespo, and I cannot find a rationale in text or logic not
to apply those cases’ reasoning. As in Widow of Andino, there is
a responsible party immune by virtue of a special statute. As in
Widow of Andino, that immunity cannot be circumvented via
third-part suits. As in Widow of Andino, then, the defendant
may not seek contribution from the immune party if forced to
pay damages ascribable to it. And as in Widow of Andino, the
question of contribution is not answered by the statute.
Therefore, following Widow of Andino’s logic, Ox Bodies should
be held responsible “only in proportion to its fault.” 93 P.R.R.
at 180.
At the end of the day, Plaintiffs’ mistake is in assuming that
because the seminal cases in this area arose in the workers’
compensation context, their principles apply in that context
alone.6 The distinction that Plaintiffs wish to draw between

6.

I have done an exhaustive search of cases from this District, as well as
from Puerto Rico’s Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and I have
been unable to find a single case addressing the question presented
here. Asked during trial, Plaintiffs could not point to any either. See also
Docket No. 374, at 14 (suggesting that it “is an everyday occurrence for
joint tortfeasors of municipalities . . . to absorb the municipality’s share
of liability,” but citing no cases). This surprises me, but it has not
influenced my analysis, which is guided by the logic of the Supreme

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immunity under the Workman’s Compensation Act and the
Autonomous Municipalities Act is illusory, as both statutes are
designed to protect important state interests—and both have
similar effects on the rights of joint-tortfeasors. I accordingly
hold that where, as here, statutory immunity vitiates a defendant’s right of contribution against another responsible party,
the defendant may be adjudged liable only for its own share of
the damages.7 See Ramos v. Caparra Dairy, Inc., 16 P.R. Offic.
Trans. 78, 83 (1985) (explaining that the right of contribution is
“aimed at preventing situations of unjust enrichment, subjectively allocating the obligation to those who, in the last
instance, it may correspond”).8

Court’s holdings in the most analogous cases I have been able to find.
7.

Though this considerations has not animated my analysis, I note that
a contrary holding, under which the defendant would be responsible
for the immune municipality’s damages, would essentially amount to
the Commonwealth shifting to a private party, by statute, responsibility
for its instrumentality’s negligence. Such a result would strike me as
unjust.

8.

Citing García v. Northern Assurance Co., 92 D.P.R. 245 (1965), Plaintiffs
argue that the municipality’s sovereign immunity cannot inure to Ox
Bodies’s benefit. Docket No. 374, at 14. While I note that García, which
was a statutory interpretation case, is not helpful here, I agree with
Plaintiffs: the municipality’s sovereign immunity does not extend to Ox

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In keeping with the above, and consistent with the jury’s
verdict, I find that Ox Bodies is responsible for 20% of the
damages that the jury awarded to each Plaintiff. Judgment will
accordingly be entered as follows:
1. Berardo A. Quilez-Velar:

$360,000

2. Marta Bonelli-Cabán:

$600,000

3. Berardo A. Quilez-Bonelli:

$180,000

4. Carlos A. Quilez-Bonelli:

$60,000

Judgment will be entered against Plaintiffs on their negligence claim, and all other claims and defendants (including
Truck Bodies Equipment International, Inc.) will be dismissed
with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 3rd day of March, 2015.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Bodies. Likewise, the Supreme Court in Widow of Andino and RosarioCrespo did not hold that the employers’ immunity extended to the
defendants. Instead, those cases’ holdings—and by extension
mine—seem to be motivated by the more fundamental principle found
in Ramos: the defendant cannot be liable, “in the last instance,” for
damages not ascribable to it; and the immune party cannot be unjustly
enriched by forcing others to bear its debts. Ramos v. Caparra Dairy, Inc.,
16 P.R. Offic. Trans. 78, 83 (1985).