Artache-Pagan v. of Gurabo et al
Filing
19
OPINION AND ORDER. GRANTED in part and DENIED in part 14 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Salvador E. Casellas on 5/13/13. (YUC) Modified on 5/13/2013 to add text to event title (cm).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
CESAR ARTACHE-PAGAN,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 12-1842(SEC)
v.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF GURABO, ET
AL.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is co-defendant Municipality of Gurabo’s motion to dismiss
(Docket # 14) and the plaintiff’s opposition thereto (Docket #15). After reviewing the
filings and the applicable law, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part.
Factual and Procedural Background
César Artache-Pagán (“Plaintiff”) was a career employee at the Public Works
Department of the Municipality of Gurabo (“Municipality”) since 2001, and a lifelong
member of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”). Docket # 1, p. 2-3. He was terminated
from his employment in 2012. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff alleges that the Director of the
Municipality’s Public Works Department (“Director”) and the Mayor of the Municipality
discriminated against him for contributing to the 2012 political campaign of the Mayor’s
adversary. Id. at 1, 4.
Plaintiff alleges that on September 8, 2011, he was notified of the Mayor’s intention
to terminate his employment for disobeying the Director’s orders. Id. at 4. Later, Plaintiff
Civil No. 12-1842 (SEC)
Page 2
received a second letter indicating the Mayor’s intention to terminate him. Id. at 4. This
time the Mayor alleged that Plaintiff intentionally destroyed property of the Municipality.
Id. at 5. An administrative hearing was held on February 9, 2012. Plaintiff was terminated
by letter on April 2, 2012. This suit followed.
Plaintiff filed this suit under § 1983, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as under the Constitution and laws
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Id. at 6-8. The Municipality moved to dismiss,
arguing that the complaint failed to establish a procedural due process claim; and that under
the Mt. Healthy defense Plaintiff’s action cannot prevail. Docket # 14.
Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs’ “well-pleaded facts must
possess enough heft to show that [they are] entitled to relief.” Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d
107, 112 (1st Cir. 2008). In evaluating whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the court
must accept as true all “well pleaded facts [and indulge] all reasonable inferences” in their
favor. Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Nevertheless, even under the
liberal pleading standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, the Supreme Court has held that to survive a
motion to dismiss a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Id. at 570. Although complaints need not contain detailed factual
allegations, and the plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” it still
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. at 556.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Twombly
and clarified that two underlying principles must guide a court’s assessment of the adequacy
Civil No. 12-1842 (SEC)
Page 3
of pleadings when evaluating whether a complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First,
a court must identify any conclusory allegations in the complaint, as such allegations are not
entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. at 677. That is to say, courts must disregard “rote
repetition of statutory language,” McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F.3d 207, 217
(1st Cir. 2012), as “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555); see also Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011)
(“[S]ome allegations, while not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so
threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line between the conclusory to the
factual.”). Put another way, “[a] plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of
allegations that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action.” Ocasio-Hernández v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
Second, a complaint survives only if it states a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 670. A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded facts allow the court to
reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the specific misconduct alleged. Id. at 677,
682. Such inferences must amount to more than a sheer possibility and be as plausible as
any obvious alternative explanation. Id. at 677. Plausibility is a context-specific
determination that requires the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.
Id. at 678. Because “the response to Twombly and Iqbal is still a work in progress,” Menard
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2012), however, the First Circuit has
cautioned that “‘some latitude’ may be appropriate where a plausible claim may be
Civil No. 12-1842 (SEC)
Page 4
indicated ‘based on what is known,’ at least where . . . . ‘some of the information needed
may be in the control of [the] defendants.’” Id. (quoting Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d
10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012)).
The aforementioned requirements complement a bedrock principle: the complaint
must contain enough detail to give “a defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 8 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). So,
while a complaint must be supported by facts and not mere generalities, “only enough facts
to make the claim plausible” are required. Liu v. Amerco, 677 F.3d 489, 497 (1st Cir. 2012).
“The place to test factual assertions for deficiencies and against conflicting evidence is at
summary judgment or trial.” Id. Accordingly, even after Twombly and Iqbal, “[d]ismissal of
a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is inappropriate if the complaint satisfies Rule 8(a)(2)’s
requirement of a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 11.
Applicable Law and Analysis
I.Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution “protects against deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law ‘and guards against any encroachment
on those rights by federal or state authority.’” Rangel-Padilla v. Román-Torres, 2012 WL
1535454, No. 11-1480, at *7 (D.P.R. May 1, 2012) (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,
344 U.S. 590, 596-597, n. 5 (1953); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 669 n. 5 (1974) (stating that these protections extend to the Commonwealth of Puerto
Civil No. 12-1842 (SEC)
Page 5
Rico)); see also Reyes-Orta v. Highway and Transp. Authority, 843 F. Supp. 2d 216, 226
(2012).
The Constitution affords procedural due process protections to government
employees who possess a property interest in continued public employment. CasianoMontañez v. State Ins. Fund Corp., 707 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2013). Property interests are
creatures of state law, and under the laws of Puerto Rico, public employees who lawfully
hold career positions have a protected property interest in continued employment in those
positions. Id. (citing Costa-Urena v. Segarra, 590 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 2009)). “Depending
on context, employees often but not always, may not be deprived of continued employment
without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in advance of the termination.”
Rodríguez-Sánchez v. Municipality of Santa Isabel, 658 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 2011). As
explained by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, prior to
termination “[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges
against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his
side of the story.” 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
In its motion to dismiss, the Municipality asserts that Plaintiff was afforded predeprivation remedies which constituted constitutionally adequate process under the
procedural due process claim. Plaintiff does not rebut this contention in his opposition.
Rather, he claims only that, since the facts and accusations contained in both notices of
proposed termination were false, he was deprived of his duties without a due process of law.
Docket # 15, p. 3. Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.
Civil No. 12-1842 (SEC)
Page 6
The allegations set forth in the complaint do not properly plead a procedural due
process claim. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on September 8, 2011, the Mayor
informed him of his intention to terminate him from employment for allegedly disobeying
the Director’s orders. Docket # 1, p. 4. He further alleges that the Mayor sent him another
letter notifying him of his intention to terminate his employment for allegedly destroying
Municipality’s property. Id. at p. 5. On February 9, 2012, an evidentiary hearing was held in
order for Plaintiff to present his position as to the allegations contained in both letters. Id.
Plaintiff was terminated from his employment on April 2, 2012. Id.
According to Plaintiff’s own allegations, the Municipality provided him with written
notice of the charges against him, and held a hearing to afford him an opportunity to present
his side of the story. Moreover, nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege that any of
the minimum due process requirements were not provided to him. Plaintiff does not explain
why or how the pretermination proceedings afforded to him abridged his due process rights.
See Rangel-Padilla, 2012 WL 1535454, at *8; Reyes-Orta, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 226. The
Municipality underscores these facts on its motion to dismiss, but Plaintiff ignored them on
his opposition. Plaintiff’s only contention, “that the facts contained in the letters of intent
were false accusations,” (Docket # 15, p. 3) while may be relevant to his political
discrimination claim, does not provide a basis for a procedural due process claim.
Plaintiff’s allegations, without more, preclude a procedural due process claim.
Plaintiff has not pled a plausible claim for procedural due process violation. Consequently,
the Municipality’s request to dismiss Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim is hereby
GRANTED.
Civil No. 12-1842 (SEC)
Page 7
II. The Mt. Healthy Defense
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech protects non-policymaking public
employees from adverse employment decisions based on political affiliation. Roa-Méndez
v. Deficiencias en el Desarrollo (CEDD), No. 9711-1989, 2012 WL 4092622, *7 (D.P.R.
Sept. 13, 2012) (citing Padilla-García v. Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000)). “In Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, the Court established a two-part
burden-shifting analysis for evaluating free speech claims, which has also been applied in
the political discrimination context.” Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at 74. Under this analysis, the
plaintiff must first show that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, and that this
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment decision. Id. If
the plaintiff does so, then the defendant is given the opportunity to establish that it would
have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiff’s political beliefs- commonly referred
to as the Mt. Healthy defense. Id. The Mt. Healthy defense has been described by the
Supreme Court in the following way: “it deals with employment actions driven by ‘mixed
motives,’ and provides that where there are both ‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’ reasons for the
adverse employment action, ‘if the lawful reason alone would have sufficed to justify the
[action], ‘then the employee cannot prevail.” Soto-Padró v. Public Buildings Authority, 675
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 359
(1995)).
Here, the Municipality also moves the Court to dismiss the complaint asserting that
“[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff could prove that the Defendants knew of his
political affiliation, Defendants would still prevail under Mt. Healthy, by showing that the
Civil No. 12-1842 (SEC)
Page 8
adverse personnel action would have taken place in any event.” Docket # 14, p. 9. The
Municipality, however, has provided no reason for the Court to deviate from the general rule
that the Mt. Healthy defense “is inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage because the
parties have not yet engaged in any significant discovery.” Rangel-Padilla, 2012 WL
1535454, at *2. Accordingly, the Municipality’s request is DENIED. If appropriate, the
Municipality may restate this defense at a later stage.
III. The Supplemental State-Law Claims
Because the Municipality’s plea for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state-law claims
assumes the dismissal of all of his federal-law claims, the Court need not address the same.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. The Municipality’s motion
to dismiss is DENIED as to all other claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 13th day of May, 2013.
S/ Salvador E. Casellas
SALVADOR E. CASELLAS
U.S. Senior District Judge
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?