Robert-Urrutia et al v. International Business Machines Corp. (IBM)

Filing 30

OPINION AND ORDER. The motion for voluntary dismissal (Docket # 24) is hereby GRANTED. Signed by Judge Salvador E. Casellas on 6/7/13.(YUC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

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RAFAEL F. ROBERT-URRUTIA, ET
AL.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
MACHINES CORP. (IBM),

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Defendant.

Civil No. 12-1912 (SEC)

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OPINION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (Docket # 24) and, after reviewing the filings and the applicable
law, plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.
Factual and Procedural Background
On November 2, 2012, Rafael F. Robert-Urrutia, his wife, and their conjugal partnership
(collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against International Business Machines Corp.
(Defendant), alleging discrimination and retaliation because of national origin under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act and the Constitution of the United States, as well as under the laws and
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. On January 25, 2013, Defendant filed
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and immediately after filed an answer
to the complaint. Dockets # 18 and 19. Defendant requested the dismissal of all claims under
the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Law
115, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194(a), and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. In response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a

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motion for voluntary dismissal of these causes of action. Docket # 24. Defendant did not oppose
to Plaintiffs’ request.
Standard of Review
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) provides that, after the defendant has answered the complaint
or filed a motion for summary judgment, “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request
only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Id. By requiring such approval,
the First Circuit has explained, courts ensure that “‘no other party will be prejudiced.’” Doe v.
Urohealth Sys., Inc., 216 F.3d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth. v.
Leith, 668 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1981)). The court is responsible under the rule for exercising
its discretion to ensure that such prejudice will not occur.” Id.; see also Mateo v. Empire Gas
Company, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 124 (D.P.R. 2012); Sánchez-Velázquez v. Municipality of Carolina,
No. 11-1586, 2012 WL 541127 (D.P.R. Nov. 9, 2012). Finally, a voluntary dismissal under
Rule 41(a)(2) is without prejudice unless the order states otherwise. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).
In making a determination under a Rule 41(a)(2) motion, courts have to evaluate the
following factors: (1) the effort and expense incurred by the defendant in preparation for trial;
(2) excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting the action;
(3) insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal; and (4) the fact that a motion for
summary judgment has been filed by the defendant. Doe, 216 F.3d at 160; see also Mateo, 287
F.R.D. at 124. Courts, however, “need not analyze each factor or limit their consideration to
these factors.” Id. (“The enumeration of the[se] factors . . . is not equivalent to a mandate that
each and every such factor be resolved in favor of the moving party before dismissal is
appropriate. It is rather simply a guide for the trial judge, in whom the discretion ultimately
rests.” Id. (quoting Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 627 F.2d 54, 56 (7th Cir. 1980)). A district
court abuses its discretion in granting a Rule 41(a)(2) motion only where the defendant would

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suffer “‘[p]lain legal prejudice’ as a result of a dismissal without prejudice”. Grover v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper
Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947)). “Neither the prospect of a second suit nor a technical advantage
to the plaintiff should bar the dismissal.” Leith, 668 F.2d at 50.
Applicable Law and Analysis
The first factor that the Court must evaluate is the effort and expenses incurred by the
defendants in preparation for trial. Up to the date when Plaintiffs filed the motion for voluntary
dismissal, Defendant had filed only an answer to the complaint and a motion to dismiss. Also,
at that stage, the Case Management Order was issued just several days before Plaintiffs’ motion
and thus the discovery proceedings were just commencing. Therefore, an analysis of this factor
favors dismissal.
The second and fourth factors, which require an analysis of Plaintiff’s diligence in
prosecuting this action and of whether a motion for summary judgment had been filed, also
favor the dismissal requested. A perusal of the docket reveals that Plaintiffs have been diligent
in prosecuting this action, and that no motion for summary judgment has been filed.
Finally, with regard to the third factor -explanation for the need to take a dismissalPlaintiffs allege that in light of the motion to dismiss filed, they analyzed and evaluated
Defendant’s arguments, and they agree that the dismissal of the three causes of action is
appropriate in order to avoid unnecessary litigation procedures and expenses. This explanation
seems adequate to this court. Moreover, Defendant did not oppose Plaintiffs’ request for
dismissal, and this course of action will avoid the wasteful use of this court’s resources.
Therefore, a brief analysis of the four factors stated above leads this court to exercise its
discretion to grant the motion. Plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal is hereby GRANTED,
and all claims against Defendant under the Constitution of the United States and the

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Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Law 115, and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil
Code are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 7th day of June, 2013.
S/ Salvador E. Casellas
SALVADOR E. CASELLAS
U.S. Senior District Judge