McIntosh v. Puerto Rico's Ports Authority et al

Filing 243

ORDER granting 139 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 8/23/2016. (VCC)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

DONNA MCINTOSH,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIV. NO.: 12-1943 (SCC)

PUERTO RICO PORTS
AUTHORITY, ET AL.,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Third-party defendant Manuel Goicoechea moved for
dismissal of the claims asserted against him by plaintiff on the
grounds that they are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. After careful analysis, I grant his motion to dismiss.
I. Background
Plaintiff Donna McIntosh filed the Complaint on November

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19, 2012. Docket No. 1. She alleged that on November 22, 2011,
she suffered a fall at the Luis Muñoz Marín International
Airport (“LMM”) in San Juan, Puerto Rico. As a result, her left
kneecap was shattered, requiring her to undergo surgery and
ultimately loose the normal range of motion on that leg.
Plaintiff originally brought claims against the Puerto Rico Ports
Authority (“Ports”), John Doe and Chartis Aerospace
Insurance Services. On August 1, 2013, plaintiff amended the
complaint to include AIG Insurance Company Puerto Rico, Inc.
(“AIG”) as a defendant. Docket No. 18-1.
On January 3, 2014, codefendants Ports and AIG requested
leave to file a third party complaint against several parties,
including Goicoechea.1 Docket No. 32. Soon thereafter, plaintiff
requested leave to amend the complaint to include Goicoechea
and other defendants involved in the design and construction
of the ramp where the fall occurred. Docket No. 38. On
February 25, 2014, plaintiff filed the Second Amended
Complaint. Docket No. 55.

1.

Plaintiff believes that Ports made the decision to file the Third Party
Complaint while in the process of answering an Interrogatory and
Request for Production of Documents that plaintiff had submitted.
Docket No. 162 at page 3.

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On May 20, 2014, Goicoechea moved to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint. Docket No. 95. In an order entered on
May 21, 2014, the court denied the motion without prejudice
and instructed Goicoechea to resubmit a motion discussing
why plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of
Goicoechea’s involvement in the alleged liability earlier than
one year before the filing of the Second Amended Complaint,
that is, before February 26, 2013. Docket No. 96. In the court’s
own words: “If Plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
known of their [the third party defendant’s] involvement, the
claim may be time-barred. If they did not, the claim may be
timely.” Id. Accordingly, Goicoechea once again moved for
dismissal. Docket No. 139. Plaintiff opposed the motion,
Docket no. 162, and Goicoechea replied. Docket No. 172.
Plaintiff filed a surreply. Docket No. 174.
II. Analysis
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments
to a pleading relate back to the date of the original pleading as
long as the conditions established by Rule 15(c) are met. If the
rule’s requirements are satisfied, “the Rule mandates

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relation...it does not leave the decision whether to grant
relation back to the district court's equitable discretion.”
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 553 (2010).
Though plaintiff avers that the Court should instead apply
Puerto Rico’s relation-back doctrine,2 the First Circuit has
instructed that, in diversity cases, Rule 15(c) applies
“notwithstanding the incidence of a more restrictive state
rule...”Morel v. Daimler Chrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 25 (2009).3 In
fact, the Court had already urged the parties to focus their
discussion on Rule 15(c) since “this case is governed by the
relation back doctrine.”4 Guided by Morel and in the absence of
any argument from plaintiff on the restrictiveness of the local
rules vis-a-vis the federal relation-back rules, I will follow the
guidelines of Rule 15(c).
Pursuant to Rule 15(c), when the amendment to a pleading

2.

Plaintiff points to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which
establishes that in diversity actions, the Federal Court must apply the
laws of the place where it sits.

3.

Morel solidified the principle that “less restrictive state relation-back
rules will displace federal relation-back rules, but more restrictive state
relation-back rules will not.” Morel, 565 F.3d at 26.

4.

See Docket No. 151.

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names a new defendant that would otherwise be outside the
statute of limitations, the amendment must, first, “assert a
claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original
pleading...” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(B). Second, the party to be brought
in by the amendment must receive notice of the action, within
the period provided by Rule 4(m),5 so as to not be prejudiced
in asserting its defenses on the merits. And third, that party
must have known, or should have known, that it would be
joined in the suit, “but for a mistake concerning the proper
party's identity.”
The amended complaint certainly fulfills the first condition,
that is, that the amendment asserts a claim that arose out of the
same occurrence described in the original complaint.
The key issue here, then, is whether the prospective
defendant, within the period provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m),
received notice of the action, and whether he understood or
should have understood that he would be sued for the events
that gave rise to the complaint. The notice required by Rule

5.

Rule 4(m) sets a 90 day time-frame to serve the complaint for any case
commenced on or after December 1, 2015. For actions filed before that
date, the time for service of summons is 120 days.

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15(c)(1(c) must be made within the time period set forth on
Rule 4(m). “At a minimum, though, notice requires knowledge
of the filing of suit, not simply knowledge of the incident
giving rise to the cause of action. “ Morel, 565 F.3d at 26 (citing
Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 195 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Goicoechea argues that the Rule 15(c) requirements are not
met and thus, the second amended complaint does not relate
back to the original pleading. According to Goicoechea, the
plaintiff knew that she may have a claim against him even
before filing the complaint, as indicated in her deposition
testimony.6 However, she did not bring him as a party until
after the statute of limitations had passed. Docket No. 139 at
page 3.
Goicoechea mistakenly assumes that the operative point of
view for Rule 15(c) purposes is the plaintiff’s, when it is
actually that of the party brought in by the amendment. See
Krupski, 560 U.S. at 548 (“Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) asks what the
prospective defendant knew or should have known during the
Rule 4(m) period, not what the plaintiff knew or should have
known at the time of filing her original complaint). From that
6.

In her deposition, plaintiff averred that she decided to sue because “the
design [of the ramp] was so poor.” Docket No. 139-1.

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perspective, the Court turns to the second prong of the Rule
15(c) inquiry.
The “notice” requirement contained in Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(I)
has been narrowly construed by the Supreme Court. See
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498.1 (3d ed. 2016) (explaining
that the Supreme Court’s “strict interpretation” of Rule 15(c)
in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986), suggests that it
would adopt a narrow interpretation of 15(c)(1)(C)(I) as well.)
“The fact that one claimant has sued defendant for injuries
arising out of a particular event would not suffice to establish
for Rule 15(c) purposes that defendant had notice of the
possibility of an action by a second claimant.” Id. Adopting
such a view, this Court is hard pressed to find that Goicoechea
had “notice” of the action within the Rule 4(m) period. Even
assuming “the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts” and giving
plaintiff “the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom," as
required in a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis,7 there is no indication here
that Goicoechea received timely notice so as to not “be
prejudiced

7.

in

defending

on

the

merits.”Fed.R.Civ.P.

See Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2007)
(citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1999)).

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15(c)(1)(C)(I).
The third condition, which asks “whether party A knew or
should have known that, absent some mistake, the action
would have been brought against him,” Krupski, 560 U.S. at
549, is also fatal to plaintiff’s attempts to relate-back.
Goicoechea was brought to the action on February 25, 2014,
more than 14 months after plaintiff filed the original complaint.
Specifically, the complaint attributes responsibility to
defendants Ports and John Doe because they allowed a
dangerous condition to exist.8 The complaint also charges that
defendants Ports and John Doe are liable because they failed to
foresee that a visitor to the airport would fall and suffer
injuries.
Plaintiff avers that the allegations of the Complaint are
“sufficiently broad to include the architect as a defendant and
that the architect....could have expected that he would be

8.

The complaint alleges that, as plaintiff walked through the LMM
airport, “the flat tile floor began to slant down on an incline. The
change in the grade of the floor was not noticeable and her [the
plaintiff’s] right foot hit the incline at an angle that caused her right
heel to slide forward.” Docket No. 1 at ¶19. The complaint also claims
that Ports and John Doe are liable “because they failed to foresee that
a visitor to the airport would fall and suffer injuries while walking
towards the Jet Blue baggage area and exit area.” Docket No. 1 at ¶20.

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brought in as a defendant in this case...” Docket No. 162. But
the Court fails to see how these allegations suggest that
Goicoechea was an intended party where the complaint did not
mention Goicoechea specifically or, at the very least, the
existence of any “design defect” on the area where plaintiff fell.
More importantly, there is no indication that plaintiff’s failure
to name Goicoechea as a defendant in her original complaint
was due to a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.
Plaintiff’s other argument, that she first became aware that
Goicoechea was the architect who designed the area when
Ports filed its Third Party Complaint has no bearing in our
analysis. As previously remarked, Rule 15(c) looks to the
perspective of the newly designated defendant, not the
plaintiff’s, to determine whether relation-back is possible.
Applying the requirements of Rule15(c), the Court finds
that, given the allegations in the Complaint, Goicoechea did
not have notice of the action and could not have been under
the impression that he was an intended party.9

9.

Goicoechea presents an alternative argument to defeat relation-back to
the original complaint, but the Courts finds it unnecessary to address
it insofar as the Rule 15(c) factors are not met.

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III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, Goicoechea’s request to dismiss
the second amended complaint is granted. The dismissal,
however, will be without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 23rd of August, 2016.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE