Garcia Feliciano v. United States of America
Filing
52
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 4/28/2015.(NBB)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
JOSÉ GARCÍA-FELICIANO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIV. NO.: 12-1959(SCC)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff José García-Feliciano pled guilty to a conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute narcotics, and he was remanded pending sentencing. On March 24, 2011, he was
brought to the federal courthouse in Hato Rey for his sentencing hearing. While restrained and under the custody of the U.S.
Marshals Service, García fell down a flight of stairs, suffering
various injuries. He brought this Federal Tort Claims Act suit
seeking compensation for what he says was the Marshals
GARCIA-FELICIANO v. UNITED STATES
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Service’s negligence in having him walk restrained down a
flight of stairs without assistance. Relying on the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, the Government sought dismissal. Docket No. 26. I denied
the Government’s motion, however, explaining that the scope
of the Marshals Service policies, as they related to García’s
restraint and movement through the courthouse on March 24,
2011, were not entirely clear. See García-Feliciano v. United
States, Civ. No. 12-1959(SCC), 2014 WL 1653143, at *4 n.9
(D.P.R. April 23, 2014) (ordering the Government to produce
any policies regarding the route that prisoners take through
the building); id. at *6 (warning that if the Government later
proved that the discretionary function exception applied, the
case would be dismissed). The Government moved for
reconsideration, Docket No. 41, which was denied based on an
understanding that the applicability of the discretionary
function exception could best be addressed at trial, Docket No.
47 (“The Court understands that the question of the discretionary function exception’s applicability is a close one. Given that
I have already ruled on the matter, the better course, then will
be for the Government to renew its arguments at trial.”).
Accordingly, a bench trial was held on April 13, 2015.
GARCIA-FELICIANO v. UNITED STATES
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The facts in this case are fairly simple. On March 24, 2011,
after García’s sentencing hearing, two Deputy Marshals—Andres Jiménez and another unidentified deputy—were responsible for leading García and ten other
detainees to the courthouse’s loading dock, where they would
be put on a bus and returned to the federal detention center in
Guaynabo. Deputy Jiménez, who was in charge of the detainees’ transport that day, testified that typically, he would take
the detainees to the loading dock on an elevator. That day,
however, he chose to take the stairs. Deputy Jiménez credibly
testified that the choice of route through the building is chosen
by the Deputy assigned to transport the detainees based on a
large number of factors, including the number of detainees
being moved, the number of civilians in the building, and
whether those civilians have any relationship to the persons
being transported.1 These and other questions are considered
1.
The District of Puerto Rico has two federal courthouses, both in San
Juan; one is in the historic district of Old San Juan, and the other is in
the business district of Hato Rey. The District’s magistrate judges and
all but one of its active district judges work out of the Hato Rey
courthouse, which is thus the site of the vast majority of the District’s
criminal hearings. And these hearings are numerous: in the 2014 fiscal
year, criminal cases were commenced against more defendants in the
District of Puerto Rico than in all but nine of the United States’s judicial
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by the Deputy Marshal, who makes a route decision that he or
she believes will allow for the detainees to be transported in
the safest manner possible. Deputy Jiménez does not remember why he chose to take the stairs that day, but he testified
that he must have made the decision after assessing the
situation and based on some perceived risk.
Deputy Jiménez led the detainees down the stairs in a
single-file line. Deputy Jiménez went first, followed by the
eleven detainees, followed by the other Deputy on duty.
According to security camera footage, García was the third
detainee in line. See JOINT EXH. E. García, like all of the other
detainees, was “fully restrained,” as defined by the Marshals
Service. See JOINT EXH. D, § 9.18(D)(2). This means that he was
wearing handcuffs attached to a waist chain, along with leg
districts. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS—CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND
PENDING (INCLUDING TRANSFERS) DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS
E N D I N G S E P T E M B E R 3 0 , 2 0 13 A N D 2 0 14 , av ailable a t
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2014/a
ppendices/D00DSep14.pdf. Nonetheless, the federal courthouse in Hato
Rey, unlike most federal courthouses, lacks any hallways or elevators
dedicated to the transport of detainees. Accordingly, detainees must be
moved through the courthouse’s public spaces, creating a special
potential for security problems, especially when those public areas are
crowded.
GARCIA-FELICIANO v. UNITED STATES
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irons.2 See id.; see also Joint Exh. E. Deputy Jiménez testified that
he had no discretion in choosing the type of restraints that
García wore; his only choice, he said, was to fully restrain
García during transportation through the building.3 García
testified that he tripped and fell because his leg irons were too
short, causing him to trip. Given that he and other detainees
managed to walk down other stairs without incident, it seems
2.
During the trial, and in response to Deputy Jiménez’s suggestion that
many detainees grip the handrail when descending the stairs, García
demonstrated the range of motion that handcuffs attached to a waist
chain allow. He could move his hands only a foot or so out from his
body, and he could move them no further up towards his head. When
trying to grip an approximation of a handrail, García could not do so
without turning his body to face it. Notably, in the video of the incident
no detainee is seen holding the handrail. See JOINT EXH. E.
3.
The Marshals Service’s Policy Directive 9.18 requires prisoners to “be
fully restrained during transportation.” JOINT EXH. D, § 9.18(D)(3). The
Directives offer some discretion—the choice between full restraints or
cuffing behind the back—when escorting detainees within a facility, id.
§ 9.18(E)(3)(a), but because García was being transported to the federal
detention center, not to another location within the courthouse, that
provision would not apply. The Directives also provide that during
“short haul” transportation, detainees may, “with district management
approval,” be cuffed behind the back rather than fully restrained. Id.
§ 9.18(E)(2)(e). However, there was no testimony during the trial that
such approval existed. To the contrary, Deputy Jiménez testified
unequivocally that he had no discretion regarding how to restrain
García.
GARCIA-FELICIANO v. UNITED STATES
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clear that the leg chains were not too short to entirely prevent
walking down stairs. Even so, video of the incident supports
García’s testimony that his fall was caused by tripping over the
leg irons. The video’s resolution is not good enough to see the
chain as anything more than a blur, but if the video is watched
at very slow motion, García’s left foot can be seen jerking
backward just as it is about to touch the ground on the last step
in the flight of stairs. As that jerk happens, García falls forward
and to the side, hitting the wall to his left, ricocheting off that
wall and into one in front of him, and then falling to the floor.
I find that the cause of the fall was García tripping over the
chain, probably because it got caught under his right foot as he
walked down the stairs, causing there to be insufficient slack
for his left foot to firmly contact the ground.
In considering the applicability of the discretionary function
exception, a court must “cut through the plaintiff’s characterization of the Government’s conduct[] and identify the ‘nature
and quality of the harm producing conduct.’” Rios-Colon v.
United States, 928 F. Supp. 2d 376, 383 (D.P.R. 2012) (quoting
Fothergill v. United States, 566 F.3d 248, 252 (1st Cir. 2009)).
Here, the conduct that harmed García was Deputy Jiménez’s
decision to have García walk, unaided, down a flight of stairs
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while fully restrained. Importantly, this conduct involved
multiple, discrete decisions on Deputy Jiménez’s part. First,
there was the decision to fully restrain García, regarding which
Deputy Jiménez had no discretion. Second, there was the
decision to use the stairs, regarding which Deputy Jiménez did
have discretion. And third, there was the decision not to assist
García down the stairs, regarding which Deputy Jiménez also
had discretion.4
The difficult question presented by this case is thus how to
4.
Nothing presented at trial suggested that Deputy Jiménez had a nondiscretionary duty to assist García down the stairs. In attempting to
make a contrary showing, García relied heavily on a Policy Directive
requiring that detainees not be left unattended while in Marshals
Service custody. See JOINT EXH. D, § 9.18(E)(1)(e) (“Prisoners will not be
secured to any fixed object that would endanger the prisoner’s life or
be left unattended.”). Though Deputy Jiménez could not see García at
the time García fell, García was not unattended at that time; to the
contrary, he was being moved through the courthouse in the active
custody of two deputies. Further, even if “unattended” were equated
with “out of the deputy’s vision,” the fall happened fast enough that
even if Deputy Jiménez did see the fall, he could not have prevented it;
thus, García being unattended in that sense could not have been the
proximate cause of his injuries. And last, a prohibition on leaving a
detainee “unattended” cannot be fairly read to require a deputy to be
physically supporting a detainee at all times; thus, this Policy Directive
cannot be read as mandating that Deputy Jiménez physically assist
García down the stairs.
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proceed when “two discrete actions on the Government’s
part”—one discretionary and the other not—together cause a
claimant’s injuries. García-Feliciano, 2014 WL 1653143, at *2. The
most relevant cases I have found on this point are Vinzant v.
United States and Dobrowski v. United States. In both of these
cases, detainees under Marshals Service custody sued after
allegedly suffering injuries because the van in which they were
being transported was involved in an accident. In each case,
the plaintiff pressed two theories of liability: first, that the
Marshals Service was negligent in not buckling the detainee
into his seat; and second, that the van was driven recklessly.
Dobrowski, Civ. No. 11-2835, 2013 WL 5954901, at *3–4 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 7, 2013); Vinzant, Civ. No. 06-10561, 2010 WL
1857277, at *1 (E.D. La. May 7, 2010), aff’d, 458 F. App’x 329 (5th
Cir. 2012). In both cases, the courts found that the decision
regarding seatbelts was discretionary, while, of course, the
decision to drive recklessly was not; thus, while the courts
dismissed the plaintiffs’ FTCA claims regarding the seatbelts,
they permitted the claims regarding the driving to go forward.
Dobrowski, 2013 WL 5954901, at *4; Vinzant, 2010 WL 1857277,
at *6.
Previously, I suggested that Vinzant and Dobrowski augured
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well for García’s claim. On reflection, however, and after
hearing the evidence at trial, I conclude that this case does not
fit the Vinzant paradigm. The crucial point is that in Vinzant
and Dobrowski, both of the discrete actions alleged to have
brought about the plaintiffs’ injuries—a failure to use seatbelts
and reckless driving—were themselves negligent. Thus, even
if the seatbelt allegations were put to the side, the plaintiffs
could argue that official negligence caused their injuries. In this
case, by contrast, the two discrete actions—the full restraint
and the use of the stairs—were allegedly negligent only in
combination. That is, if the choice of route is put to the side, all
that is left is the decision to fully restrain García, and that
decision, standing alone, was not negligent. Thus, while the
discretionary function exception does not necessarily bar
García’s claim, it requires the Court to not consider, in determining whether there was negligence, the route that Deputy
Jiménez chose to use that day. And without considering the
route, there is no basis for finding negligence.
I find, moreover, that McKinney v. United States, 950 F.
Supp. 2d 923, 928 (N.D. Tex. 2013), which I mentioned in my
earlier opinion, see García-Feliciano, 2014 WL 1653143, at *5,
cannot save García’s claim. In McKinney, the court considered
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the FTCA claim arising out of an accident that occurred when
a prisoner fell down a flight of aircraft stairs while under
Bureau of Prisons custody. See id. at 925. The claimant, who
was elderly and in poor health, was made to walk down the
stairs despite being fully restrained. See id. The McKinney court
relied principally on 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2), which requires BOP
officials to “exercise . . . ordinary diligence to keep prisoners
safe and free from harm.” Id. at 927. The court held that
although BOP officers had “broad discretion” under § 4042,
they could not “blatantly disregard the mandatory obligation”
to keep prisoners safe. Id. at 928. The court thus held that the
discretionary function exception did not apply because the
claimant was at great risk walking down the stairs in his
condition, and the officials knew of this risk; thus, the officials
were “bound to exercise ordinary care in providing for [the
claimant’s] safety.” Id. In the alternative, the court found that
the decision not to assist the claimant was not guided by
“legitimate policy considerations.” Id. at 930. The court thus
denied the Government’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion.5 Id.
5.
The claimant’s case was later dismissed on summary judgment after the
court determined that he had no cognizable injury. McKinney v. United
States, Civ. No. 12-394, 2013 WL 4050146, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2013),
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In this case, the Marshals Service undoubtedly had an
obligation to provide for García’s safety. It failed in this
obligation, and so I share the sentiments that motivated the
McKinney court. Nonetheless, I cannot follow that decision,
because the caselaw provides that officials generally have
discretion in determining how to comply with broad safety
mandates, and in determining how to balance those mandates
with other considerations (including the security of the
courthouse and the Deputy Marshals themselves). In Shansky
v. United States, for instance, the First Circuit noted that while
the National Park Service was bound by a broad and general
mandate to protect human life, it nonetheless had broad
discretion in determining how to achieve that goal while also
balancing it against competing concerns. 164 F.3d 688, 691 (1st
Cir. 1991). And in a more recent case, the First Circuit explained that its precedents “reject[]” the argument that broad
safety concerns may “dictate[] a specific course of conduct that
could not be subject to policy analysis.” Sanchez ex rel. D.R.-S.
v. United States, 671 F.3d 86, 99–100 (1st Cir. 2012). As the First
Circuit explained in Sanchez, this is because “conduct does not
aff’d, 584 F. App’x 229 (5th Cir. 2014) (memorandum opinion).
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involve an element of judgment or choice” only “if a ‘federal
statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of
action for an employee to follow.’” Id. at 97 (quoting United
States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991)) (emphasis supplied
by Sanchez). Here, of course, no specific course of conduct was
prescribed, and so while I believe that the Marshals Service put
García at risk by having him walk unaided and shackled down
a flight of stairs, I see no basis for sustaining his lawsuit: the
Government’s action were discretionary, and they were plainly
motivated by policy considerations.
For the reasons stated above, I find that the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA bars García’s claim. Judgment
dismissing this case will be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 28th day of March, 2015.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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