Gonzalez-Nieves v. Municipality of Aguadilla et al
Filing
160
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER re 152 MOTION for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is DENIED. Defendant's motion for new trial is GRANTED, conditioned upon the refusal of Plainti ff Gonzalez to remit $5,400,000. If Plaintiff agrees within thirty days of the date of this order to the reduced award of $600,000.00, Defendant's motion for new trial shall be denied. If Plaintiff refuses within the specified time to remit the sum noted above, Defendant's motion for new trial will be granted. See Order for further details. Signed by Judge Jose A. Fuste on 6/26/2015. (nat)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
1
2
3
4
LUZ GONZALEZ NIEVES,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF AGUADILLA, et al.,
Defendants.
5
6
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
7
This matter is before the court on Defendant Municipality of Aguadilla’s Renewed
8
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and, in the
9
alternative, its motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.
10
R. Civ. P. 59(a) and (e). (Docket No. 152). The parties have fully briefed the matter and
11
it is ripe for review.
12
I.
13
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
14
Plaintiff Luz M. Gonzalez Nieves (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) commenced this action
15
against her employer, the Municipality of Aguadilla (hereinafter, “Defendant”) 1, alleging
16
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §
17
12101, et seq., retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
18
2000e, et seq., and P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1 § 501 and P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 194a. The
1
Plaintiff also brought claims against Carlos Mendez-Martinez, personally and as Mayor of Aguadilla, and against
Nannette Guevara-Perez, personally, under the ADA, ADAA, the Rehabilitation Act and Puerto Rico Law 44 and
Puerto Rico Law 44. The court dismissed the personal capacity claims brought under the ADA, ADAA, the
Rehabilitation Act and Puerto Rico Law 44 as these statutes do not provide for individual or personal liability.
(Docket No. 61). Plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed her remaining personal liability claims under Puerto Rico Law
115. (Docket No. 66).
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-2-
1
court held a jury trial March 16-20, 2015. On March 20, 2015, the jury returned a verdict
2
in favor of Plaintiff on all claims, awarding $3,000,000 in compensatory damages, which
3
doubles to $6,000,000 under Puerto Rico law.
4
judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R.
5
Civ. P. 50(b) and 59(a). Additionally, Defendant moved for a remittitur.
Defendant renewed its motion for
6
II.
7
STANDARD OF REVIEW
8
A motion for judgment pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
9
Procedure, “may be granted only if a reasonable person, on the evidence presented, could
10
not reach the conclusion that the jury reached.” Visible Systems Corp. v. Unisys Corp.,
11
551 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The court may not “evaluate the
12
credibility of the witnesses or weigh the evidence.” Cortés–Reyes v. Salas–Quintana, 608
13
F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). We must view the evidence in the light
14
most favorable to the verdict and determine whether “a rational jury could have found in
15
favor of the party that prevailed.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The jury’s verdict
16
may be vacated “[o]nly if the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly
17
in favor of the movant that a reasonable jury could not have [returned the verdict] will we
18
set it aside.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
19
We may grant Defendant’s motion for a new trial “only if the verdict is against the
20
clear weight of the evidence, such that letting it stand would result in a miscarriage of
21
justice.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
22
based on the claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages
A motion for a new trial may be
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-3-
1
are excessive, or that the trial was not fair to the moving party, and may raise questions of
2
law arising out of the trial. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251
3
(1940).
4
III.
5
FACTS
6
7
When viewing the facts most favorable to the Plaintiff here, a rational jury could
have found the facts as follows.
8
Plaintiff González began working for the Defendant, Municipality of Aguadilla, as
9
an administrative officer in August 1999 at the Office of the Federal Programs and the
10
Aguadilla Municipal Police. In 2007, Defendant appointed Plaintiff to an Executive
11
Officer I at the Micro Business Program, with four merit increases in salary. On June 30,
12
2010, the Mayor notified Plaintiff that the Micro Business Program had lost funding and
13
that she would be transferred to the Municipal Office for Emergency Management
14
(“MOEM”), located at the Luis A. Canena Márquez Stadium (the “Stadium”), effective
15
July 16, 2010. By July 7, 2010, just seven days after receipt of the transfer letter, Plaintiff
16
had met with an attorney who sent a letter to Mayor Méndez challenging the transfer to
17
MOEM, inter alia, because the conditions at the Stadium would be harmful to her health
18
as she suffered from asthma. The mayor responded to the July 7th letter, but did not
19
address Plaintiff’s health concerns. Instead, the mayor explained that Plaintiff’s previous
20
experience training people at the Micro Business Program would be beneficial at MOEM
21
where she would be giving seminars and orientations to business people and the general
22
public regarding responding to natural disasters and other emergencies.
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-4-
1
Plaintiff began working at the Stadium on August 16, 2010. On August 24, 2010,
2
Plaintiff received her initial explanation of duties, which included her supervision of the
3
administrative personnel at MOEM, from her supervisor. Ten days after Defendant
4
transferred Plaintiff to the Stadium, Plaintiff visited her physician complaining of trouble
5
breathing, chest pains, and wheezing. The only thing that had changed for Plaintiff was
6
the location of her employment, at the Stadium she was being exposed to health hazards
7
including fumes from coworkers smoking cigarettes near the time clock outside her
8
office, cat feces, excrement from pigeons both inside the Stadium and the waste being
9
washed off the seats of the stadium and running through her office ceiling. Over the
10
four-and-a-half years that Plaintiff worked for MOEM at the Stadium, she suffered,
11
among others ailments, substantial loss of her pulmonary function, deterioration of her
12
diabetes, toxoplasmosis from the cat feces near her work station; altered mood,
13
irritability, and Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood.
14
Over the course of her time at MOEM, Plaintiff received no fewer than nine
15
certificates from Dr. Román requesting that Plaintiff be transferred out of the Stadium for
16
health concerns. Plaintiff provided each certificate to Defendant, the first following her
17
initial visit on August 26, 2010, along with the letter from her attorney requesting the
18
transfer for a reasonable accommodation. At no point during the four and a half years did
19
Defendant transfer Plaintiff out of MOEM or relocate her from the Stadium. Each day,
20
Plaintiff arrived at work and sat through the day without performing any job functions
21
essential to the Executive Officer I. Her asthmatic condition made breathing and moving
22
difficult, and the assortment of medications she required to treat the asthma affected her
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-5-
1
cognitive processes. Combined, Plaintiff’s ailments made working at the Stadium
2
difficult, if not impossible.
3
Despite Plaintiff’s various and consistent complaints about the conditions at the
4
Stadium, Defendant neither cured the conditions, nor moved Plaintiff out of the Stadium.
5
Plaintiff produced evidence showing that the pigeon, cat, and bat droppings issue
6
remained even after Defendant cleaned the Stadium in 2010. In fact, part of the problem
7
was the manner of Defendant’s cleaning of the Stadium and storage of cleaning supplies.
8
Defendant used chlorine and ammonia simultaneously creating fumes that exasperated
9
the health risks of Plaintiff’s already suffering pulmonary system. When the Stadium
10
was power washed, the feces made its way through the cracks and spaces of the Stadium
11
seats, through the ceiling of the offices, and then leaked down Plaintiff’s office walls.
12
Whereas any one or possibly all of these conditions may not injure a person with a
13
healthy pulmonary system, each circumstance caused more and more damage to
14
Plaintiff’s body.
15
Eventually, after about four years of a stalemate, Defendant offered to transfer
16
Plaintiff out of MOEM. Plaintiff declined the offer stating that the positions offered
17
would be a demotion. At the same time as her denial, Plaintiff pointed out to Defendant
18
the existence of another vacant Executive Officer I position to which she would accept a
19
transfer. Defendant did not complete the transfer at that time.
20
21
IV.
22
LAW & ANALYSIS
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
1
-6-
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law
1. Reasonable Accommodation
2
3
Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from discriminating “against a qualified
4
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
5
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
6
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”
7
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA,
8
Plaintiff must show “(1) that she suffers from a disability, as defined by the ADA, (2) that
9
she is an otherwise qualified individual, meaning that she is ‘nevertheless able to perform
10
the essential functions of [her] job, either with or without reasonable accommodation,’
11
and (3) that the [Defendant] knew of her disability and did not reasonably accommodate
12
it.” Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir. 2002) (citations
13
omitted).
14
Plaintiff demonstrated that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
15
A “disability” is defined as, inter alia, “a physical ... impairment that substantially
16
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). §
17
12102(2)(A). The EEOC regulations themselves define “physical impairment” as “[a]ny
18
physiological disorder, or condition ... affecting one or more of the following body
19
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
20
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune,
21
circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine[.]” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-7-
1
It is undisputed that Plaintiff suffers from bronchial asthma, an inflammation of
2
the bronchi by a thickening of the bronchi wall and a decrease in the lining of the bronchi
3
(the lumen), which causes the individual to struggle breathing and to have wheezes and
4
shortness of breath (dyspnea) during even light exercises such as walking. (Docket No.
5
154-1 at p. 84:1-10.) Moreover, the parties stipulate that “[a]sthma is a covered disability
6
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” (Docket No. 127 at p. 3:17.) Further,
7
breathing is a major life activity and Plaintiff produced evidence that her asthma
8
substantially limits her ability to breathe properly. (Docket No. 154-1 at passim.)
9
10
11
12
Plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, either with or
without reasonable accommodations.
13
when the Defendant refused to transfer her to another department or facility. This means
14
that Plaintiff must show that she had the skill, experience, education, and other job-
15
related requirements for Executive Officer I, and could do the essential functions of the
16
job—with or without reasonable accommodation. “[C]onsideration shall be given to the
17
employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has
18
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,
19
this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42
20
U.S.C. § 12111(8).
The second element requires the Plaintiff show that she was “qualified” for the job
21
A “reasonable accommodation” includes:
22
23
24
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
-8-
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment
to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
9
Here, Plaintiff was employed at the level of Executive Officer I since 2007 in the
10
microbusiness program. Her job functions included speaking at various locations to
11
people who were interested in starting up a small business and assisting the individuals
12
with the orientation for a successful start-up. (Docket No. 154-2 at p. 3:23-4:9). In 2010,
13
the funding ran out for the microbusiness program and Defendant reassigned Plaintiff to
14
the MOEM located at the Stadium. As an Executive Officer I at MOEM, Plaintiff’s
15
essential job functions included giving seminars and orientations to business people and
16
the public in general regarding preventative and reactive events of natural disaster or
17
other emergency situations.
18
subordinates at MOEM.
Additionally, Plaintiff was to supervise up to seven
19
There is evidentiary support for the jury’s finding that Plaintiff was qualified to
20
perform the essential functions of an Executive Officer I, with or without reasonable
21
accommodation. “An ‘essential function’ is a fundamental job duty of the position at
22
issue.” Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Ward v. Massachusetts
23
Health Research Institute, Inc., 209 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)).
24
“The term does not include ‘marginal’ tasks, but may encompass ‘individual or
25
idiosyncratic characteristics’ of the job[.]” Id. (citation omitted).
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-9-
1
Plaintiff had previously performed substantially similar job functions as an
2
Executive Officer I in the microbusiness program, and, in fact, the similarity of the two
3
positions was the reason the Defendant transferred her into MOEM. A reasonable jury
4
could find that Plaintiff was able to perform the essential job function of supervising the
5
administrative personnel at MOEM.
6
supervise the administrative officers at MOEM, Defendant simply pointed out that she
7
did not. However, a rational jury could believe the testimony from both the Plaintiff and
8
Mr. Alfonso Moline Robles that Plaintiff’s supervisor actively prevented her from
9
performing her supervisory duties.
There is no evidence that Plaintiff could not
(Docket Nos. 145 at 64:25-65:19). Plaintiff’s
10
unwillingness to perform menial job duties not associated with the job duties of an
11
Executive Officer I is inconsequential. See Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 55. A reasonable jury
12
reviewing the evidence could have determined that the essential job functions of an
13
Executive Officer I differ from those of an administrative officer, and that Plaintiff was
14
able to perform all essential job functions of an Executive Officer I with or without
15
reasonable accommodation.
16
Defendant argues that Plaintiff must not only be able but also willing to perform
17
the essential job duties. This is a red-herring. Defendant offers no citation for the
18
requirement
19
Notwithstanding, there is evidence that Plaintiff is and was willing to perform the
20
essential functions of an Executive Officer I with the accommodation for her disability.
21
Plaintiff provided Defendant with a location of vacant Executive Officer I positions
22
where she could be transferred. Instead, Defendant offered her locations where her job
that
an
individual
be
willing
to
perform
essential
functions.
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-10-
1
functions would be that of an administrative officer.
Plaintiff was not willing to
2
essentially demote herself from an Executive Officer I to an administrative officer.
3
Accordingly, even if willingness were a factor for consideration, a rational jury could
4
find that Plaintiff was willing to perform the essential functions of an Executive Officer I.
5
6
7
8
Defendant refused to provide Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation for her
disability.
9
disability by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability. Defendant
10
asserts that the request for the reasonable accommodation and the allegation regarding
11
discrimination under the ADA are a subterfuge to obtain a transfer to another department
12
of the Municipality and to challenge the job functions assigned to her. Under the ADA, if
13
an employer knows that an employee has a disability and needs a reasonable
14
accommodation to perform the essential functions of her job, the employer must provide
15
a reasonable accommodation.
Plaintiff claims that the Defendant discriminated against her because of her
16
A rational jury could have found the following facts. Prior to her transfer into
17
MOEM, Plaintiff challenged the transfer out of concern for her health due to the harmful
18
conditions at the Stadium. Within 10 days of arriving at MOEM, Plaintiff’s health began
19
deteriorating. She visited Dr. Román, showing symptoms of difficulty breathing, chest
20
pains, and wheezing. Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation – to be transferred
21
out of the Stadium due to the harmful effects the stadium had on her health. Defendant
22
took steps to clean the Stadium, and denied Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation.
23
Plaintiff presented evidence that the conditions at the Stadium, including employees
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-11-
1
smoking in the area outside her office, pigeon and cat excrement, and other general
2
uncleanliness, persisted despite the cleaning of the Stadium. Moreover, as both the
3
Plaintiff and Dr. Román testified, Plaintiff’s health continued to significantly deteriorate.
4
(Docket No. 154-1 at 97:12-19). Defendant received documentation from Dr. Román on
5
at least nine separate occasions from August 2010 through February 2015, requesting that
6
Plaintiff be moved out of the Stadium due to her health condition which was exacerbated
7
by the filth of the Stadium. Defendant failed to move Plaintiff out of MOEM. Defendant
8
did not request that Plaintiff submit to a consultation by a physician of its choice. At no
9
point did Defendant argue that transferring plaintiff out of the Stadium would cause an
10
undue hardship on it.
11
Though this court may have decided differently than the jury, the jury
12
determination must not be overturned if there is evidence that supports the verdict. Here,
13
a rational jury court have heard the testimony, weighed the witnesses credibility,
14
examined the exhibits, and reached a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. Accordingly, Defendant
15
is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation
16
claim.
17
2. Retaliation
18
The ADA prohibits retaliation against “any individual because such individual has
19
opposed any act or practice made unlawful” by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
20
“Requesting an accommodation is protected conduct for purposes of the ADA’s
21
retaliation provision,” Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 106 (1st
22
Cir. 2007). Complaining of discrimination on the basis of disability is also protected
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-12-
1
conduct under the ADA. Valle-Arce v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 651 F.3d 190, 198
2
(1st Cir. 2011). “To establish a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she
3
engaged in protected conduct, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3)
4
there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse
5
employment action.” Id. (citation omitted).
6
First, there is no dispute that Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct when she
7
requested a reasonable accommodation and when she filed her charge with the EEOC on
8
September 6, 2011.
9
Second, Plaintiff suffered adverse employment actions while at MOEM including
10
a 45 day suspension (30 days unpaid), Defendant’s delay in considering her request for
11
reasonable accommodation – it took 83 days for the Defendant to respond despite the
12
regulations requiring a response within 15 days, and Defendant’s failure to transfer or
13
otherwise reasonably accommodate Plaintiff over the course of four and a half years.
14
Third, Plaintiff established a causal connection between the adverse employment
15
actions and her engagement in the protected conduct. Plaintiff’s prima facie case is “a
16
small showing that is not onerous and is easily made.” Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331
17
F.3d 207, 213 (1st Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
18
On January 11, 2012, Plaintiff received a letter from the mayor that indicated his
19
intent to terminate her position as an Executive Officer I as a disciplinary measure for
20
acts that occurred in 2011. In February, 2011, Plaintiff had a nervous breakdown “[d]ue
21
to a situation of pressure and mockery by two employees by the Department of
22
Recreation -- Sports and Recreation[.]”
Despite an investigation into the incident,
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-13-
1
Plaintiff was never interviewed regarding her version, nor was she disciplined prior to
2
January 2012 for the February 2011 event.
3
The second event which led to Plaintiff’s suspension took place in September
4
2011. The Stadium lost electricity causing Plaintiff’s office to lose power to her air
5
conditioning unit. Plaintiff’s office did not have a window and essentially became an
6
oven. She and another worker at the Stadium moved their chairs out of their offices into
7
the hallway in order to get breathable air. After two days of sitting in the hallway,
8
Plaintiff requested that her supervisor reach out to the administration to find out what
9
could be done about the situation as the heat was exacerbating her bronchial asthma.
10
According to Plaintiff, her supervisor then turned to her in a hostile manner and told her
11
that she was obligated to stay at the Stadium under the extreme conditions and that if she
12
could not handle it she should just punch out and leave. Plaintiff found his comment very
13
disrespectful due to both the tone and the fact that he delivered it in front of four co-
14
workers. Plaintiff then left the office in tears. Defendant conducted an investigation by
15
interviewing the four co-workers who witnessed the event but did not speak with
16
Plaintiff. The report of the investigation found no fraud or deceit and recommended
17
suspending Plaintiff for a minimum of 30 days.
18
After carefully examining the record, we believe there is ample evidence of a
19
“pattern of antagonism” from which a jury could find a causal connection between
20
Defendant’s adverse employment actions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s engagement in
21
protected conduct.
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-14-
1
Once a prima facie case has been presented, an inference of discrimination arises.
2
See Hazel v. United States Postmaster Gen., 7 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). The burden then
3
shifts to the employer to offer a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
4
action. Zapata-Matos v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2002) (citation
5
omitted). In this case, the Defendant claims that it: 1) failed to respond to Plaintiff’s
6
reasonable accommodation request within 15 days because Plaintiff involved a lawyer; 2)
7
suspended Plaintiff as a disciplinary measure; and 3) did not transfer Plaintiff out of
8
MOEM because the issues she complained of had been resolved and her continued
9
requests were merely subterfuge to facilitate a relocation.
10
When the employer offers a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action, the
11
inference of discrimination fades away. Id. at 45. The burden then shifts back to the
12
plaintiff to show that the adverse employment action was the result of discriminatory
13
animus. Id. Evidence that the employer’s stated reasons are pretextual can be sufficient
14
for a jury to infer discriminatory animus. See Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69
15
(1st Cir. 2002). One way to demonstrate pretext is “by showing that the employer’s
16
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
17
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
18
Here, Plaintiff presented photographic evidence along with testimony that the
19
conditions present at the Stadium had not changed despite the Defendant’s claim that the
20
Stadium had been cleaned. The testimony revealed that workers continued to smoke by
21
the time clock near Plaintiff’s office.
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-15-
1
The medical certifications provided by Plaintiff’s physician state on-going and
2
even worsening health problems over the course of the four and a half years at MOEM;
3
Plaintiff provided these certificates to Defendant in the hopes that Defendant would
4
follow the physician’s recommendation and transfer Plaintiff out of the Stadium and
5
away from the health risks. Defendant could have requested that Plaintiff’s condition be
6
examined by a physician of their choice if it truly believed that Plaintiff was malingering.
7
Instead, we are left with the only evidence before us showing that Plaintiff’s condition
8
continued to worsen while she was employed at the Stadium.
9
Plaintiff’s involvement of a lawyer did not stay Defendant’s duty to investigate,
10
consider, and advise Plaintiff of the outcome of her reasonable accommodation complaint
11
within 15 day time frame under the regulations. Even if we would believe that the
12
involvement of lawyers extends the time allowed, either by practice or necessity, there is
13
no explanation for why it took Defendant 83 days to deny Plaintiff’s request – especially
14
given that Defendant had cleaned the Stadium (an act which it argues took care of
15
Plaintiff’s cleanliness complaint) within weeks of Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation
16
request. There is simply no cognizable foundation for Defendant’s excuse for failing to
17
address Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation request for 83 days.
18
Finally, Plaintiff demonstrated that the stated reason for her suspension was
19
pretextual. A rational jury could have found that the investigations were only performed
20
in order to paper Plaintiff’s file. The sanction of termination indicated in the mayor’s
21
letter of intent is severely disproportionate to the alleged wrongful act. The letter of
22
intent to terminate included both events from 2011, one of which occurred nearly a year
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-16-
1
prior and for which no reprimand had been given at the time. Having heard all of the
2
evidence presented at trial, the court feels that a rational jury could have found that
3
Defendant’s disciplinary measures were merely pretext for its continued discrimination of
4
Plaintiff for requesting a reasonable accommodation.
5
consistent deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health concerns.
The evidence demonstrates a
6
Accordingly, there is evidence from which a rational jury could determine that
7
Defendant’s proffered reasons for its adverse actions were merely pretext, and Defendant
8
is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
9
B. Motion for New Trial & Remittitur
10
“A new trial is warranted only if the verdict, though rationally based on the
11
evidence, was so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to amount to a manifest
12
miscarriage of justice.” Bogosian v. Mercedes–Benz of North America, 104 F.3d 472,
13
482 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A trial court must
14
exercise its discretion in favor of granting a new trial very sparingly, since “a jury’s
15
verdict on the facts should only be overturned in the most compelling circumstances.”
16
Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 811 (1st Cir.
17
1988). Since the jurors are the ultimate triers of fact, “the trial court is especially
18
reluctant to order a new trial when the verdict rendered rested upon the jury’s
19
determination of the credibility of witnesses”. Raybourn v. San Juan Marriott Resort and
20
Stellaris Casino, 259 F.Supp.2d 110, 112 (D.P.R. 2003) (citing Ríos v. Empresas Líneas
21
Marítimas Argentinas, 575 F.2d 986, 990 (1st Cir. 1978)). Therefore, where the jury
22
verdict is reasonably based on the evidence presented at trial, the court may not upset the
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-17-
1
verdict merely because he or she might have decided the case differently. Velázquez v.
2
Figueroa–Gómez, 996 F.2d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 1993).
3
Generally, a jury’s verdict should not be disturbed unless it is “grossly excessive,”
4
“inordinate,” “shocking to the conscience of the court,” or “so high that it would be a
5
denial of justice to permit it to stand.” Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 80–
6
81, (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting McDonald v. Federal Laboratories, 724 F.2d 243, 246 (1st
7
Cir. 1984)). A jury’s award should only be reversed if it is “so grossly disproportionate
8
to any injury established by the evidence as to be unconscionable as a matter of law.”
9
Koster v. TWA, 181 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 1999). A remittitur is appropriate “only when
10
the award exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based
11
upon the evidence before it.” Trainor v. HEI Hospitality, LLC, 699 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir.
12
2012) (quoting Wortley v. Camplin, 333 F.3d 284, 297 (1st Cir. 2003)). When a court
13
decides that a remittitur is warranted, the verdict winner will be allowed the option of
14
either accepting the reduced amount or a new trial. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v.
15
Continental Casualty Company, 771 F.2d 579, 588 (1st Cir. 1985).
16
Here, the jury award is split into two parts: Part 1 is $1,500,000 to compensate
17
Plaintiff’s physical damages and/or deterioration of her health condition as a result of
18
Defendant’s discrimination and/or retaliation; and Part 2 is $1,500,000 to compensate
19
Plaintiff’s mental pain and anguish. The jury award was then doubled under Puerto Rico
20
law.
21
22
The jury’s verdict “shocks the conscience of the court” and far exceeds any
rational amount based on the evidence presented at trial.
Plaintiff and Dr. Román
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-18-
1
testified regarding the physical damage and emotional pain and suffering that Plaintiff
2
experienced during her time at MOEM. Dr. Román detailed Plaintiff’s lung deterioration
3
and physiological symptoms resulting from her time at MOEM. Plaintiff herself testified
4
about her fear of dying from an asthma attack, the side effects of all the medications she
5
requires because of the conditions at the Stadium, and the emotional hardship she went
6
through for four and a half years wanting to perform the job duties of an Executive
7
Officer I, but being unable to do so.
8
Despite this testimony, the $6 Million verdict is more than “extremely generous,”
9
it is grossly excessive. Plaintiff produced no evidence of her medical expenses; in fact,
10
the evidence shows that she does not have any medical expenses. There is no evidence
11
that Plaintiff ever sought psychiatric or psychological treatment for her alleged
12
depression. 2
13
exception of her 30 day suspension, Plaintiff received a paycheck at the salary
14
commensurate with an Executive Officer I.
Despite not performing any job functions while at MOEM, with the
15
Plaintiff is able to work in a location other than the Stadium. There was no
16
testimony that Plaintiff’s health would continue to deteriorate once she was removed
17
from the Stadium. In fact, Dr. Román stated that if Plaintiff stayed, eventually her
18
condition would become irreversible, but that typically, the health problems associated
19
with bronchial asthma are temporary and abate once the conditions creating them no
20
longer exist. Such is the case here. Plaintiff no longer works at the Stadium; she has
2
“Although testimony from a mental health expert is not required to sustain an award for
emotional distress, the absence of such evidence is useful in comparing the injury to the award of
damages.” Koster, 181 F.3d at 35.
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-19-
1
been transferred as an Executive Officer I to the Office of Elderly Affairs, effective
2
March 24, 2015.
3
Having determined that the jury’s verdict cannot stand, the court turns now to
4
determine the appropriate amount. Under the “maximum recovery rule,” the court directs
5
a remittitur geared to the maximum recovery for which there is evidentiary support.
6
Koster, 181 F.3d at 36.
7
translating legal damage into money damages—especially in cases which involve few
8
significant items of measurable economic loss—is a matter peculiarly within a jury’s
9
ken.” Trainor, 699 F.3d at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Sanchez v. P.R.
10
Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 723 (1st Cir. 1994)). Though the evidence presented at trial dictates
11
the amount of remittitur, examination of other cases is useful in reaching a decision. See
12
Koster, 181 F.3d at 36. In Koster, the First Circuit concluded that an emotional distress
13
award of $716,000 was excessive and that the evidence would support a maximum
14
recovery of $250,000. Id. There, “[t]here was no evidence that Koster ever sought
15
medical treatment or suffered any long-term depression or incapacitation” and opened a
16
business of his own after losing his job. Id. Additionally, the Court recognized that
17
Koster could have remained with his employer, “albeit in a different job with a reduced
18
salary.” Id.
In making its decision, this court remains “mindful that
19
In Aponte-Rivera v. DHL Solutions (USA), Inc., the First Circuit upheld the district
20
court’s decision to remit the jury award from $350,000 to $200,000 for emotional distress
21
where the plaintiff “did not introduce any testimony by a medical expert, presented no
22
notable evidence of outward manifestations of emotional distress, and presented no
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-20-
1
evidence of long term depression or medical treatment.” 650 F.3d 803, 811 (1st Cir.
2
2011). In Sanchez, the circuit upheld a district court’s reduction from $150,000 to
3
$37,000 for emotional distress where the plaintiff testified he was humiliated losing his
4
job and having to file bankruptcy but produced no medical or psychiatric testimony
5
regarding same. 37 F.3d at 724. As explained in Aponte-Rivera,
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
We have also upheld damages awards where the plaintiff did not seek
medical treatment or have long-term physical symptoms. See McDonough
v. City of Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 22 (1st Cir. 2006) (upholding award of
$300,000 in Title VII retaliation case, where “the bulk” of the award was
for emotional distress in the form of humiliation and damage to reputation
and family relationships); Rodriguez–Torres, 399 F.3d at 64 (affirming a
$250,000 emotional distress award where plaintiff testified that
employment discrimination caused her marriage to suffer and made her
depressed); Koster, 181 F.3d at 35–36 (upholding $250,000 award where
plaintiff testified that employer’s conduct caused him to suffer anxiety and
insomnia and damaged his family life).
650 F.3d at 811.
19
Having presided over the trial and observed the Plaintiff and the other witnesses
20
first hand, this court “is in the best position to assess the evidence and set an amount for
21
remittitur.” Anthony v. G.M.D. Airline Services, Inc., 17 F.3d 490, 496 (1st Cir. 1994).
22
Without impinging on the function of the jury, the court states that there were many
23
issues of Plaintiff’s credibility that do not appear in the black and white of a trial
24
transcript but were apparent to this experienced judge who had the opportunity to
25
personally observe tone and body language. Among those perceptions was Plaintiff’s
26
litigious nature from her initial receipt of the transfer letter in June of 2010, her
27
unwillingness to compromise, her relentless defiance, and the undercurrent from day one
28
that she simply did not want to be relocated at the Stadium and was dead set on obtaining
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-21-
1
a transfer no matter what the cost.
2
Plaintiff's unwillingness to accept a transfer – primarily on principle – in the face of her
3
assertion that she was daily subjected to life threatening conditions. Plaintiff argues that
4
the positions offered to her were for a position inferior to that of an Executive Officer I –
5
but with the same salary as the Executive Officer I position. Even accepting that as true,
6
the court must consider the fact that Plaintiff refused to remove herself from an area that
7
was allegedly so harmful to her health that she feared death. See Koster, 181 F. 3d at 36.
8
While not dispositive with respect to her credibility, the fact that Plaintiff could assert
9
life-threatening conditions yet decline a transfer is certainly suggestive of exaggerated
10
There is no better example of this mindset than
damages.
11
After a careful review of the record and analogous cases, the court hereby reduces
12
Plaintiff’s award for damages to One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00), to
13
compensate Plaintiff for her physical damages and/or deterioration of her health
14
condition, and One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) to compensate
15
Plaintiff for her mental pain and anguish. The $300,000 award, if accepted by Plaintiff,
16
is then doubled to $600,000.00 under Puerto Rico law. If Plaintiff refuses to remit to
17
$600,000.000, a new trial will be held on all issues. A new trial on all issues is warranted
18
on the grounds that failing to do so would constitute an injustice because the jury’s
19
verdict against Defendant of $3,000,000.00 (which was doubled under Puerto Rico law)
20
was not supported by legally sufficient evidence at trial. Moreover, given the nature of
21
the claims raised by Plaintiff, her damage claims are so intertwined with her underlying
Civil No. 3:13-cv-01132 (JAF)
-22-
1
claims regarding liability that a retrial on solely damages would result in juror confusion
2
too substantial to overcome with instructions and caveats from the court.
3
V.
4
CONCLUSION
5
Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is DENIED.
6
Defendant’s motion for new trial is GRANTED, conditioned upon the refusal of Plaintiff
7
Gonzalez to remit $5,400,000. If Plaintiff agrees within thirty days of the date of this
8
order to remit this sum, Defendant’s motion for new trial shall be denied. If Plaintiff
9
refuses within the specified time to remit the sum noted above, Defendant’s motion for
10
new trial will be granted.
11
IT IS SO ORDERED.
12
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 26th day of June, 2015.
13
14
15
S/José Antonio Fusté
JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?