Ruiz-Jusino v. Sears Roebuck of PR, Inc. et al

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER: Denying 21 Motion to Alter Judgment. Signed by Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi on 8/7/2013. (TC) Modified on 8/8/2013 as to title (er).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

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JACQUELINE RUIZ JUSINO,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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SEAR ROEBUCK OF PUERTO RICO,
INC., et al.,

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Defendants.

Civil No. 13-1138 (GAG)

OPINION AND ORDER

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Presently before the court is Sears Roebuck of Puerto Rico, Inc. (“Sears”), Carlos Martínez

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Rivera (“Martínez”), and Edwin García Rodríguez’ (“García”) (collectively “Defendants”) motion

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to alter or amend an issued opinion and order under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure. In Defendants’ memorandum in support of their motion, Defendants reiterate arguments

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previously considered and rejected by the court. (See Docket No. 17.) For the following reasons,

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the court DENIES Defendants’ motion to amend judgment.

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I.

Standard of Review

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A motion for reconsideration is generally considered under FED. R. CIV. P. 59 or 60,

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depending on the time such motion is served. Perez-Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d

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281, 284 (1st Cir. 1993). Whether under Rule 59 or Rule 60, a motion for reconsideration cannot

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be used as a vehicle to relitigate matters already litigated and decided by the court.

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Villanueva-Mendez v. Vazquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322 (D.P.R. 2005). Courts entertain these

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motions if they seek to correct manifest errors of law or fact, present newly discovered evidence,

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or when there is an intervening change in law. See Rivera Surillo & Co. v. Falconer Glass Indus.

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Inc., 37 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing FDIC Ins. Co. v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st

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Cir. 1992)); Cherena v. Coors Brewing Co., 20 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 (D.P.R. 1998). Hence, this

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vehicle may not be used by the losing party “to repeat old arguments previously considered and

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rejected, or to raise new legal theories that should have been raised earlier.” Nat’l Metal Finishing

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Co. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1990).

Civil No. 13-1138 (GAG)
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II.

Discussion

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Approximately half of the discussion section in Defendants’ motion to amend is copied and

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pasted from their original motion to dismiss. (See Docket Nos. 8, 21.) Furthermore, with the

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exception of two cases, the authority cited is simply repeated from their motion to dismiss. (Id.)

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The court addresses the two cases below.

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Defendants cite Velázquez-Rivera v. J. Danzing, 81 F. Supp. 2d 316, 327 (D.P.R. 2000)

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aff’d, 234 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 2000) and Martínez v. Eagle Global Logistics, CIV. No. 09–02265

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(PG), 2011 WL 3843918, at *10 (D.P.R. Aug. 26, 2011) in support of their conclusion that the

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“mere fact that a plaintiff checked the box of a protected class under the applicable anti-

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discrimination statutes, in the form provided by the ADU or the EEOC, ‘is not enough’ to

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exhaust administrative remedies because [it] ‘does not fulfill’ the administrative purposes that

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a charge is designed to serve.” (Docket No. 21 at 4.) (emphasis in original). However, Defendants

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fail to recognize that in both cases the parties checked multiple boxes when filing their respective

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claims. Therefore, confusion existed as to which protected class each of the alleged discriminatory

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acts pertained. See Velázquez-Rivera, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 327; Martínez, 2011 WL 3843918, at *10.

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In the instant case, Jacqueline Ruiz Jusino (“Plaintiff”) only checked the age discrimination box,

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leaving no room for confusion as to which protected class she linked the discriminatory acts against

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her. (See Docket No. 8-1 at 1.) Given the factual differences between this case and those cited by

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Defendants, the court does not find Defendants’ argument sufficiently persuasive to alter its

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previous opinion.

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Secondly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to

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the hostile work environment and retaliation charges because she did not allege them in her

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complaint. The court disagrees. In the letter attached to the EEOC charge Plaintiff alleges that her

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coworkers sent her emails with offensive content.

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representative from human resources on January 14, 2012 and was fired eight days later on the

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January 23, 2012. These alleged facts demonstrate that the hostile work environment and retaliation

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She also alleges that she met with a

Civil No. 13-1138 (GAG)
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claims are like or reasonably related to the EEOC charge; therefore, Plaintiff exhausted her

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administrative remedies.

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Defendants also fail to recognize the authority to which this court cited in Vijay N. Borase

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v. M/A-Com., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 65, 67-68 (D. Mass. 1995). The Vijay court stated, “[T]he first

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question . . . is whether or not a retaliation claim might ‘reasonably be expected to have been within

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the scope of the EEOC’s investigation.’. . . ‘What controls is not what the EEOC did but what it was

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given the opportunity to do.’” 906 F. Supp. at 67-68 (internal citations omitted). Given the

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information presented in Plaintiff’s EEOC claim, the EEOC had ample opportunity to investigate

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the alleged hostile work environment and retaliation.

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III.

Conclusion
Pursuant to the opinion and analysis above, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion to alter

or amend judgment. (Docket No.21.)

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SO ORDERED.

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In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 6th day of August, 2013

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S/Gustavo A. Gelpí

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GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ

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United States District Judge

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