Flores v. Salazar

Filing 33

ORDER denying 32 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 08/03/2016. (NNR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
Milagros Flores,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. 13-1201 (PG)
v.
Sally Jewell,
Defendant.

ORDER
Before the court is the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of
the court’s order dismissing the complaint with prejudice for lack of
prosecution (Docket No. 32). For the reasons explained below, the court
DENIES the motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

On March 8, 2013, plaintiff Milagros Flores (hereinafter “plaintiff”
or “Flores”) filed the above-captioned case against the Secretary of the
United States Department of Interior alleging she was discriminated and
retaliated

against

by

her

employer,

the

National

Park

Service,

in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. See
Docket No. 1. In May 2014, the parties requested that the case be referred
to mediation “as soon as practicable.” Docket No. 17 at p. 18. That
request was reiterated during the initial scheduling conference held on
May 19, 2014,

at

which time

the

parties also

apprised the court

of

settlement efforts up to that point and their intention to proceed with
the same. See Docket No. 20. Per the parties’ stipulation, the case was
referred to mediation, but the parties did not comply with the court’s
order to commence mediation proceedings. Approximately three years after
the complaint was filed, on April 4, 2016, the parties were ordered to
inform the court of the case’s status by April 13, 2016. 1 The court further
warned that dismissal for lack of prosecution would be considered as a
sanction if the parties failed to comply. Docket No. 22.
1

Pursuant to this court’s order at Docket No. 21, since at least May 2014, this
case was flagged and reported as “referred to mediation” in the court’s case
management/electronic filing case system (CM/ECF). It was during the first week of April
2016, that the case’s period of inactivity was brought to the undersigned’s attention via
the civil cases report and the docket report generated by CM/ECF.

Civil No. 13-1201 (PG)

Between

April

Page 2

and

May

2016,

the

parties

filed

three

informative

motions stating that a settlement had yet to be reached between them,
notwithstanding their “significant and periodic settlement discussions.”
See e.g. Docket No. 26. They also requested successive extensions of time
within which to conclude settlement negotiations. The court granted them a
final extension of time, until June 10, 2016, to submit settlement papers.
That warning went unheeded: the deadline elapsed without any filing on the
parties’

behalf.

Pursuant

to

the

court's

“unquestionable

authority

to

dismiss a case...for want of prosecution in order to prevent undue delay in
the disposition of pending cases, docket congestion and the possibility of
harassment

of

a

defendant,”

Jardines

Ltd.

Partnership

v.

Executive

Homesearch Realty Serv. Inc., 178 F.R.D. 365, 367 (D.P.R. 1998), the case
was dismissed with prejudice under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). 2 Docket No. 30.
On June 29, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)
requesting reconsideration of the court’s order dismissing the case with
prejudice. Docket No. 32.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may seek to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so long as the motion is filed “no
later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P.59(e).
The rule, however, “does not list specific grounds for affording relief
but, rather, leaves the matter to the sound discretion of the district
court.” Ira Green, Inc. v. Military Sales & Service Co., 775 F.3d 12, 27
(1st Cir.2014). The First Circuit has held that Rule 59(e) motions are
granted only “when the original judgment evidenced a manifest error of
law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow
situations.”

Ocasio-Hernandez

v.

Fortuño-Burset,

777

F.3d

1,

9

(1st

Cir.2015) (citing Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st
Cir.2014)). Notwithstanding, the court’s “discretion must be exercised
with

considerable

circumspection:

revising

a

final

judgment

is

an

extraordinary remedy and should be employed sparingly.” Ira Green, Inc.,

2
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[i]f the plaintiff
fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to
dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Nevertheless, First
Circuit precedent gives district courts broad discretion to involuntarily dismiss a case
under Rule 41(b) in order to further its case management responsibilities. See GarciaPerez v. Hosp. Metropolitano, 597 F.3d 6 (1st Cir.2010); Ortiz-Anglada v. Ortiz-Perez, 183
F.3d 65 (1st Cir.1999).

Civil No. 13-1201 (PG)

Page 3

775 F.3d at 27 (citing Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st
Cir.2006)).
“Unless the court has misapprehended some material fact or point of
law, such a motion is normally not a promising vehicle for revisiting a
party’s case and rearguing theories previously advanced and rejected.”
Palmer, 465 F.3d at 30. Also, “a Rule 59(e) motion ‘does not provide a
vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures’ or to ‘introduce
new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented
to the district court prior to judgment.’” Quality Cleaning Products R.C.,
Inc. v. SCA Tissue North America, LLC, 794 F.3d 200, 208 (1st Cir.2015)
(citing Emmanuel v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 25, 426 F.3d
416, 422 (1st Cir.2005); Aybar v. Crispin–Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st
Cir.1997)).
III.

DISCUSSION

In her motion for reconsideration, plaintiff first argues that she
prosecuted her claims by engaging in substantive settlement discussions
with the defendant with the intention of ending the instant litigation.
Plaintiff asserts that the three informative motions filed in April and
May of 2016 (Docket Nos. 23, 26 & 29) evince that her “prosecution...is
alive and kicking.” Docket No. 32 at p. 4. Second, Flores argues that the
court did not warn the parties that it was considering dismissal as a
sanction. She also points out

that at the time of the dismissal,

a

significant delay in responding to deadlines had not occurred. See id. at
pp. 4-6. Finally, Flores faults the court for failing to move the case
along

and

for

not

considering

whether

a

lesser

sanction

might

have

sufficed. See id.
As discussed in the court’s dismissal order, see Docket No. 30,
federal district courts possess broad discretion in deciding whether to
dismiss a case for failure to prosecute. See The Shell Co. (P.R.) Ltd. v.
Los Frailes Serv. Station, Inc., 605 F.3d 10, 26 (1st Cir.2010); BenitezGarcia v. Gonzalez-Vega, 468 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2006). The appropriateness of
a particular sanction, such as dismissal with prejudice, depends on the
circumstances of the case. See id. at 44 (citing Torres-Vargas v. Pereira,
431 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir.2005)). When determining which sanction to
impose in a given case, the court considers a number of substantive
factors, including, without limitation: “the severity of the violation,

Civil No. 13-1201 (PG)

the

legitimacy

of

Page 4

the

party’s

excuse,

repetition

of

violations,

the

deliberateness vel non of the misconduct, mitigating excuses, prejudice to
the other side and to the operations of the court, and the adequacy of
lesser

sanctions.”

Benitez-Garcia,

468

F.3d

at

5

(quoting

Robson

v.

Hallenbeck, 81 F3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir.1996)).
Most

of

the

factors

recited

above

lend

themselves

to

a

single

discussion. And we begin with one that plaintiff evidently overlooked: her
protracted

inaction.

Although

Flores

claims

that

she

has

zealously

prosecuted her case, the fact of the matter is that by the time the court
ordered the parties to file an informative motion regarding the case’s
status on April

4, 2016 (Docket

No. 22), over

600 days of

absolute

inactivity had elapsed. None of the informative motions filed thereafter
(Docket Nos. 23, 26 & 29) clarified, much less justified, the litigants’
inaction during that period. Flores’ motion for reconsideration does not
set forth a satisfactory explanation for the perennial lack of progress in
her case for approximately two years, either. 3 Perhaps most significant is
the fact that the parties made no effort to communicate good cause in
order to excuse their failure to mediate the case in violation of this
court’s order. See Docket No. 21. What is more, the litigants’ prolonged
silence after the fact was misleading to the court and, effectively,
pulled the wool over the court’s eyes. The severity of these violations is
not only offensive, but also indicative of deliberate misconduct. See
Torres-Vargas, 431 F.3d at 393 (finding a party’s disregard of a court
order to be a “paradigmatic example of extreme misconduct”).
On

the

settlement

other

hand,

negotiations

is

the
an

court

recognizes

acceptable

excuse

that

the

pendency

for

some

delay

in

of
a

plaintiff’s prosecution of his or her case. See Figueroa v. Ethicon Corp.,
185 F.R.D. 17, 18-19 (D.P.R.1999). Nonetheless, ongoing settlement efforts
or discussions are not an excuse where the delay is unreasonably long, or
if they continue after it is apparent that the negotiations would not be
fruitful. See id. (quotations and citations omitted); de la Torre v.
Continental 15 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.1994)(fact that settlement negotiations
were in progress did not excuse party from making required court filings).

3
That is, of course, with the exception of plaintiff’s misplaced reliance on
periodic settlement discussions with the defendant as indication of her active pursuit of
her claims. See infra.

Civil No. 13-1201 (PG)

Page 5

In the instant case, the parties’ settlement discussions spanned for over
two years. Thus, however genuine or advanced, the court finds that such
settlement negotiations do not excuse plaintiff’s protracted inaction and
the pattern of unreasonable delay in this case. Nothing in the record
indicates that the parties were any closer to making progress on the
negotiations

than

they

were

at

the

initial

stages

of

the

action.

Furthermore, that the defendant “was actively pursuing settlement of all
claims with [Flores]” and, therefore, was “not affect[ed] significantly”
is of little or no consequence. Docket No. 32 at p. 6. It is the lack of
due diligence on plaintiff’s part –-not the prejudice to her adversary-that weighs heavily against plaintiff.
Plaintiff further contends that there was no significant delay in
responding to deadlines on the parties’ part. See id. But the record shows
otherwise. It is worth reiterating, however, that with each informative
motion filed in April and May of 2016, the parties requested successive
extensions

of

time

within

which

to

conclude

settlement

negotiations.

However, they failed to comply with the self-imposed deadline of June 10,
2016 to submit settlement papers, which was granted by the court as a
final

extension.

Flores

remains

unconvinced

with

the

court’s

ruling

because “[t]he parties’ delay, if indeed there was one, was a scant three
(3) days.” Id. at p. 6. Her argument is inapposite.
The court measures that “delay” in light of the history of the
litigation and the parties’ conduct in drawing out the case by proceeding
in a dilatory fashion. Significantly, the failure to comply with selfimposed deadlines weighs heavily against plaintiff. See Cintron-Lorenzo v.
Departamento

de

Asuntos

del

Consumidor,

312

F.3d

522,

526

(1st

Cir.2002)(noting that the plaintiff’s requests for successive extensions
of

time

impliedly

promised

compliance

by

end

of

the

aggregate

period)(citing Tower Ventures, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 296 F.3d 43, 47
(1st

Cir.2002)(finding

litigant’s

failure

to

that
adhere

absent
to

a

extraordinary
self-imposed

circumstances,

deadline

warrants

a
an

inference of deliberate manipulation)); see also Mulero-Abreu v. Puerto
Rico Police Dep't, 675 F.3d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 2012)(reiterating that “[i]f
[the court] sets a reasonable due date, parties should not be allowed ...
painlessly

to

escape

the

foreseeable

consequences

of

noncompliance.”)(quoting Mendez v. Banco Popular de P.R., 900 F.2d 4, 7

Civil No. 13-1201 (PG)

Page 6

(1st Cir.1990)). We also note that the record contains absolutely no
indication of discovery or trial preparation by counsel during this time,
such that absent the court’s decisive stroke to dismiss for lack of
prosecution, the case would remain in the court’s docket without any real
advancement towards resolution.
Based on the foregoing, the only sanction that the court could
impose after the attitude exhibited by the litigants, particularly by
misleading the court, defying deadlines and ignoring warnings, and the
unreasonable period of inactivity (measured in years) was dismissal with
prejudice, not least because the litigants and their attorneys abused the
judicial process by perpetuating an action that was not being seriously
prosecuted inside or outside the court. See Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896
F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir.1990)(finding that district court need not consider
lesser sanctions where a party is “guilty not only of simple delay but of
disobedience of a court order as well”).
IV.

CONCLUSION

To the extent that plaintiff seeks reconsideration under Rule 59(e),
she had to “either establish a clear error of law or point to newly
discovered

evidence

of

sufficient

Guadalupe-Baez

v.

Pesquera,

Landrau-Romero

v.

Banco

819

Popular

consequence

to

F.3d

509,

518

de

P.R.,

make
(1st

212

F.3d

a

difference.”

Cir.2016)(citing
607,

612

(1st

Cir.2000)). After a close examination of plaintiff’s arguments, the court
finds that she has failed to meet this standard. Thus, plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must be denied. 4
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, August 3, 2016.

S/JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

4
Even if the court were to examine the motion for reconsideration under the
provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), Plaintiff’s arguments do not come close to meeting any
of the rule’s valid grounds for extraordinary relief. See e.g. Cintron-Lorenzo, 312 F.3d
at 527-528(reviewing plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e)
under the standard of Rule 60(b), and concluding that district court acted within its
discretion in both dismissing plaintiff’s case for lack of prosecution and in denying
motion for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)).