Sastre Fernandez v. Superitendencia del Capitolio et al

Filing 21

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 11 MOTION to dismiss & Memorandum In Support Thereof as to All Plaintiffs filed by All Defendants. Signed by Judge Jose A Fuste on 9/26/2013.(mrj)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

PABLO SASTRE-FERNÁNDEZ,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 13-1245 (JAF)

v.
SUPERINTENDENCIA DEL CAPITOLIO,
et al.,
Defendants.
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OPINION AND ORDER

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We consider the defendants' motion to dismiss on various grounds in this employment
discrimination case.

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I.

Pablo Sastre-Fernández worked as an agronomist for the Office of the Superintendent of

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the Capitol Building of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 1 at 3.) Sastre-

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Fernández is a member of the New Progressive Party and has volunteered for NPP candidates.

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(Id.)

Background

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Sastre-Fernández claims that following the 2008 general elections in Puerto Rico he

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suffered political discrimination at the hands of the defendants, who fired him from his post as

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Assistant Superintendent of the Capitol. (Id.) Sastre-Fernández claims that Javier Vázquez, the

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newly-named Superintendent of the Capitol and a Popular Democratic Party affiliate, told Sastre-

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Fernández that he wanted him to continue working at the Capitol but that he would need to

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reduce Sastre-Fernández’ pay to provide employment for PDP affiliates. (Id. at 4.) Shortly after

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this conversation, Sastre-Fernández received a dismissal letter. (Id. at 5.) Sastre-Fernández filed

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suit against Vázquez, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Office of the Superintendent of the

Civil No. 13-1245 (JAF)

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Capitol Building, and various unnamed insurance companies. (Docket No. 1.) The defendants

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moved to dismiss. (Docket No. 11.)

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II.
Legal Standard
A.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

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A plaintiff’s complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it alleges sufficient facts to

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establish a plausible claim for relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

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678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In assessing a

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claim’s plausibility, the court must construe the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, accept all non-

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conclusory allegations as true, and draw any reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

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Rodríguez-Ramos v. Hernández-Gregorat, 685 F.3d 34, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

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III.

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Discussion

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The defendants argue that Sastre-Fernández’ duties as a groundskeeper constituted a

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politically-sensitive, trust position that included policy-making powers. (Docket No. 11 at 7-8.)

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We disagree.

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Puerto Rico recognizes two general categories of state employees: “trust” employees,

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who are involved in policy-making and can be more or less hired or fired at will, and “career”

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employees who essentially occupy permanent positions and must be hired or fired on merit-

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based criteria. Costa-Urena v. Segarra, 590 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2009).

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Determining whether a position entails policymaking powers and, thus, qualifies as a

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“trust” position requires the court to make a fact-specific inquiry. Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26,

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29 (1st Cir. 2004). Facts we look to may include: “relative pay, technical competence, power to

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control others, authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public perception, influence on

Civil No. 13-1245 (JAF)

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programs, contact with elected officials, and responsiveness to partisan politics and political

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leaders.” Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

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While the government’s classification of a particular position is a relevant fact that we will

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consider, it is not dispositive. Galloza, 389 F.3d at 29.

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To aid our fact-specific inquiry, the First Circuit has articulated a two-part test that

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examines whether: (1) the employing agency’s functions involve partisan political interests or

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concerns; and (2) the employee’s position resembles the role of a policymaker or office-holder

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such that party affiliation would be an appropriate consideration in determining tenure. See

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Mendez-Aponte, 645 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2011). Sastre-Fernández’ position satisfies neither

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part of this test.

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First, Sastre-Fernández’ employing agency was the Office of the Superintendent of the

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Capitol Building. (Docket No. 11.) The office is charged with “the upkeep, maintenance,

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extension, construction and remodeling of the buildings and grounds of the Commonwealth’s

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Capitol Building.”

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Commonwealth’s Capitol grounds hardly involves partisan political interests.

2 L.P.R.A. §§ 651-661.

The maintenance and upkeep of the

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Second, the job description shows that Sastre-Fernández performed duties only of the sort

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which “are measured solely by strictly technical or professional criteria.” Mendez-Palou v.

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Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1st Cir. 1987). Sastre-Fernández’ job was to plan,

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direct, supervise, and coordinate activities directed at the conservation of the green areas of the

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parks, plazas, monuments, and other installations and facilities administered by the office. None

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of these duties involve policymaking, the communication of political ideas, or sensitive tasks

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connected with a policymaking function. Sastre-Fernández, to be sure, had some supervisory

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authority—but it seems over only minor operational issues. (Docket No. 1 at 4.) As partisan

Civil No. 13-1245 (JAF)

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ideology “cannot plausibly be said to have the remotest bearing on how food should be served or

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how doorknobs should be polished,” Vazquez Rios v. Hernandez Colon, 819 F.2d 319, 322 (1st

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Cir. 1987), it has equally little bearing on agronomical services or the decoration of the

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Commonwealth Legislature’s public buildings and gardens.

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The defendants argue that Sastre-Fernández has failed to allege a prima-facie case of

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political discrimination in his complaint because he has offered “no specific date, environment,

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and mention of witnesses and/or specific details as to this custom tailored conclusion.” (Docket

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No. 11 at 11.) But the prima-facie standard “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading standard.”

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Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). While “the elements of

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a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim,” they

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need not be pled with exactness. Id. A sufficient pleading needs to state only a plausible claim,

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not “a detailed evidentiary proffer.” Id.

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Here, Sastre-Fernández has alleged that he worked as a non-political employee, that a

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new supervisor arrived from the opposing political party and, as a result, the new supervisor

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informed Sastre-Fernández that his salary would be reduced in order to provide employment to

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Popular Democratic Party affiliates. These facts state a plausible claim for relief and that is all

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that is required of the plaintiff at this stage. The motion to dismiss is denied.

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The defendants’ remaining arguments — that qualified immunity protects them from suit

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and that Sastre-Fernández failed to state a due process claim — rely entirely on the trust position

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arguments that we have already rejected. For the same reasons, these claims fail.

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Finally, since his federal claim survives the motion to dismiss, supplemental jurisdiction
over Sastre-Fernández’ Commonwealth-law claims remains proper, see 28 USC § 1367(a).

Civil No. 13-1245 (JAF)
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-5IV.
Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Docket No. 11), is
DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 26th day of September, 2013.

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S/José Antonio Fusté
JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE