Rodriguez-Lozada v. USA

Filing 9

ORDER denying 1 Motion to Vacate. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 8/14/2015. (VCC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

ELIAS RODRIGUEZ-LOZADA,
Petitioner,

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v.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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Respondent.
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___________________________________*

CIVIL NO. 13-1277(PG)
RELATED CRIM. 02-0391(PG)

OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. §2255 Habeas Corpus
Petition (D.E.1)1. Respondent filed a Response to the Petition
(D.E.5). Petitioner filed a Reply to the Government’s Response (D.E.
8). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds the Petition
shall be DENIED and the request for evidentiary hearing is also
DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On
October
9,
2003,
Petitioner
Elias
Rodriguez-Lozada
(hereinafter “Petitioner” or “Rodriguez-Lozada”) was indicted by a
Federal Grand Jury, along with co-defendant Nelson Rivera-Garcia
(hereinafter “Rivera-Garcia”). See Crim. D.E. 14 of Case No. 03284(PG)2. The seven(7) count Indictment charged Rodriguez-Lozada and
Rivera-Garcia with possession with the intent to distribute
narcotics. See Crim. D.E. 14 in Case No. 03-284 (PG). Specifically,
Count One (1) charged Rodriguez-Lozada with aiding and abetting in
possession with the intent to distribute approximately one thousand
two hundred and sixty point eight (1,260.8) grams (gross weight) of
heroin, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section
841(a)(1) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. See Crim. D.E.
19 in Case No. 03-284(PG).
Count Two (2) charged Rodriguez-Lozada with aiding and abetting
1
2

D.E. is an abbreviation of docket entry number.
Crim.D.E. is an abbreviation of criminal docket entry.

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Page 2

in the possession with intention to distribute approximately two
thousand one hundred and twenty point two (2,120.2) grams (gross
weight) of cocaine, in violation of Title 21, United States Code,
Section 841 (a)(1) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. See
Crim. D.E. 19 in Case No. 03-284(PG).
Count Three (3) charged Rodriguez-Lozada with aiding and
abetting in the possession with intent to distribute approximately
one hundred and twenty seven point three (127.3) grams (gross weight)
of cocaine base, in violation of Title 21, United States Code,
Section 841(a)(1) and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. See
Crim. D.E. 19 in Case No. 03-284(PG).
Count Four (4) charged Rodriguez-Lozada with aiding and abetting
in the possession with intent to distribute approximately sixteen
point seven (16.7) grams (gross weight) of marijuana, in violation of
Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) and Title 18, United
States Code, Section 2. See Crim. D.E. 19 in Case No. 03-284(PG).
Count Five (5) charged Rodriguez-Lozada with aiding and abetting
in the knowing possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 924(c)(1) and 2. See Crim. D.E. 19 in Case No. 03-284(PG).
Count Six (6) charged Rodriguez-Lozada with being a convicted
felon in possession or receipt of firearms which had been shipped in
interstate or foreign commerce, in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 922(g)(1). See Crim. D.E. 19 in Case No. 03284(PG).
On December 17, 2003, Petitioner was charged in a two (2) count
Superseding Indictment in Criminal Case 02-391(PG)3. See Crim.D.E. 238
in Case No. 02-391(PG). Count One (1) charged Rodriguez-Lozada with
conspiring to possess with intent to distribute approximately one (1)
or more kilograms of heroin, five (5) or more kilograms of cocaine,
fifty (50) or more kilograms of cocaine base, and one hundred (100)
or more kilograms of marijuana, in violation of Title 21, United
States Code, Section 841(a)(1). See Crim. D.E. 238 in Case No. 02-

3

In this Superseding indictment Rivera-Garcia was also charged.

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391(PG). Count Two (2) was a forfeiture allegation pursuant to Title
21, United States Code, Section 853. See Crim.D.E. 238 in Case No.
02-391(PG).
On December 30, 2003, the Government moved to consolidate cases
No. 03-284 and 02-391, (Crim. D.E. 243 in Case No. 02-391(PG)) and
the Court granted its request. Ultimately, a trial was held and the
jury found Rodriguez-Lozada guilty. See Crim. D.E. 429 in Case No.
02-391(PG).
On July 1, 2005, Petitioner’s court appointed counsel filed a
Motion to Withdraw as legal counsel4. See Crim. D.E. 436 in Case No.
02-391(PG).
On July 20, 2005, Rodriguez-Lozada, pro se, filed a
Motion To Appoint New Counsel. In said motion Petitioner provided
specific names of attorneys whom he wished for this Court to appoint
as his new counsel. See Crim. D.E. 40 in Case No. 02-391(PG).
On August 24, 2005, Rodriguez-Lozada filed prose a Motion for
Hearing pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)5.
See Crim. D.E. 446 in Case No. 02-391(PG). On August 26, 20056 the
Court held the Strickland hearing. See Crim. D.E. 447 in Case No. 02391(PG).
On September 13, 2005, Petitioner’s counsel filed an informative
motion stating that he had attempted to visit Rodriguez-Lozada at
MDC-Guaynabo in order to discuss his Pre-Sentence Report and
Petitioner had refused to see him. See Crim. D.E. 450 in Case No. 02391(PG). On October 7, 2005, the Court again attempted to hold
Rodriguez-Lozada’s sentencing hearing, to no avail. See Crim. D.E.
456 in Case No. 02-391(PG). Once again Rodriguez-Lozada informed the
Court that he wanted new counsel for sentencing based on the same

4

Counsel Garcia informed the court that he had received a letter from RodriguezLozada stating he was dissatisfied with his services and no longer wanted him as counsel.
See Crim. D.E. 436 in Case No. 02-391(PG).
5

In the Strickland motion, Petitioner requested a hearing from the court in order
to develop and establish that his court appointed counsel had incurred in ineffective
assistance of counsel thus depriving him of his Sixth Amendment Constitutional right. See
Crim. D.E. 446 in Case No. 02-391(PG).
6

The August 26, 2005 hearing was originally scheduled as a sentencing hearing but
the Court later converted it into a Strickland hearing.

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Page 4

arguments that he had previously raised in his Strickland motion.
See D.E. 456 in Case No. 02-391(PG).
On October 24, 2005, the Court appointed new counsel for
Petitioner. See Crim. D.E. 457 in Case No. 02-391(PG). On November
16, 2005, newly appointed counsel Reveron filed a Motion to Withdraw
as Rodriguez-Lozada’s attorney, due to a possible conflict with
another client.
See Crim. D.E. 459 in Case No. 02-391(PG).
On
November 17, 2005, the Court appointed Rodriguez-Lozada’s third
counsel, Gustavo Del Toro.
See Crim. D.E. 461 in Case No. 02391(PG).
On May 17, 2006, Rodriguez-Lozada’s sentencing hearing was held.
Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two hundred and
ten (210) months, to be served concurrently with the terms of
imprisonment imposed in Criminal Case No. 03-284(PG) as to counts one
(1) through three (3), four (4) and seven (7) but consecutively to
count five (5) in Criminal Case No. 03-284(PG). A supervised release
term of five (5) years was imposed as well as a special monetary
assessment of one hundred (100) dollars7. See Crim.D.E.497 in Case
No. 02-391(PG).
On May 26, 2006, Judgment was entered. See Crim.D.E. 500 in
Case No. 02-391(PG). On June 1, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal. See Crim.D.E. 499 in Case No. 02-391(PG).
On February 24, 2009, the First Circuit Court of Appeals issued
its Opinion and Order. The First Circuit affirmed Rodriguez-Lozada’s
convictions and sentences in criminal case 02-391(PG) and counts one
(1), two (2), three (3) and four (4) of criminal case 03-284(PG).
However, Rodriguez-Lozada’s convictions and sentences on counts five
7

On May 17, 2006, Rodriguez-Lozada was sentenced in Case No. 03-284(PG)to a term of
imprisonment of two hundred and ten (210) moths as to counts one (1), two (2) and three
(3); a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) months as to count four (4); a term of
imprisonment of one hundred and twenty (120) months as to count seven (7), said terms to
be served concurrently with each other and with the terms imposed in count one (1) in
Crim. Case 02-391(PG). A term of imprisonment of sixty (60) months in count five (5),
said term to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed, for a total term of
imprisonment of two hundred and seventy (270) months. A term of supervised release of
five (5) years as to counts one (1), two (2) and three (3); a term of supervised release
of three (3) years as to counts four (4), five (5) and seven (7). Multiple terms of
supervised release to be served concurrently with each other and with the term imposed in
Crim. No. 02-391(PG). A special monetary assessment of one hundred (100) dollars as to
each count for a total of six hundred (600) dollars. See Crim. D.E. 113 in Case No. 03284(PG).

Civil No. 13-1277(PG)

Page 5

(5) and seven (7) in Crim. No. 03-284(PG) were vacated. The First
Circuit Court remanded the case for appropriate action. See United
States v. Rodriguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2009).
On May 23, 2010, Petitioner’s fourth (4) court-appointed counsel
filed a Sentencing Memorandum in anticipation of Rodriguez-Lozada’s
re-sentencing hearing8. See Crim. D.E. 649 in Case No. 02-391(PG).
On May 24, 2010, Petitioner’s re-sentencing hearing was held.
Rodriguez-Lozada was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two
hundred and ten (210) months as to count one (1) of criminal case 02391(PG), a term of supervised release of five (5) years and a special
monetary assessment of one hundred (100) dollars. See Crim. D.E. 651
in Case No. 02-391(PG). Petitioner was further sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of two hundred and ten (210) months as to counts one
(1) through three (3) and sixty (60) months as to count four (4) in
criminal case 03-284(PG); said terms to be served concurrently with
each other and with the sentence imposed in Case No. 02-391(PG)).
A term of supervised release of five (5) years was imposed as to
counts one (1) through three (3) and three (3) years as to count four
(4); multiple terms of supervised release to be served concurrent
with each other. See Crim. D.E. 200 in Case No. 03-284(PG). On May
24, 2010, Rodriguez-Lozada filed a Notice of Appeal. See Crim.D.E.
650 in Case No. 02-391(PG).
On May 25, 2010, an Amended Judgment was entered. See Crim. D.E.
652 in Case No. 02-391(PG)). On March 28, 2012, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals issued its Judgment affirming Rodriguez-Lozada’s resentence. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lozada, Appeal Nos. 101785; 10-1786 (1st Cir. 2012). No petition for writ of certiorari
was filed. Therefore, Rodriguez-Lozada’s conviction became final on
June 26, 2012. Petitioner signed and dated his 2255 Petition for
relief on March 26, 20139, therefore the same is timely.
II. STANDARD

8

Counsel Anglada was appointed as counsel for Petitioner by the First Circuit Court
of Appeals.
9

D.E. 1 at page 12,the Petition was docketed on April 5, 2013.

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Page 6

The standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having
produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984); Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1993). In order
to succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel RodriguezLozada must show both incompetence and prejudice: (1) Petitioner must
show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, and (2) Petitioner must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Argencourt
v. United States, 78 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1996), Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168 (1986), Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
III. DISCUSSION
In his 2255 Petition and Memorandum in Support of, RodriguezLozada raises the following allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel:
(1) Counsel failed to move the court for automatic dismissal of
the indictment based upon the court’s failure to make “ends of
justice” findings as required by the Speedy Trial Act.
(2) Counsel failed to conduct a “reasonable amount” of pretrial
investigation, trial preparation, interview and subpoena
potential witnesses, file timely pretrial motions and file
objections during trial and to the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”).
(3) Counsel deprived movant of his Constitutional right to take
the stand and testify on his own behalf.
(4) Counsel was ineffective by giving movant erroneous advice
in plea bargaining, when he had reviewed no discovery, or
relevant materials in violation of Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri
v. Frye.
Finally, Rodriguez-Lozada requested the appointment of new
counsel and an evidentiary hearing to discuss these arguments10.
10

The Court notes that in Rodriguez-Lozada’s Petition (D.E. 1) he raised three (3)
additional ground for relief. (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction;
(2) weapons count of conviction should be reversed and vacated, and (3) the sentence
imposed was patently unreasonable. See D.E. 1 at p. 2. These three (3) allegation are

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A. Claims addressed at Strickland hearing
The Court has reviewed the transcript of the August 26, 2005
hearing and there is no doubt that at least three (3) of the four (4)
issues raised in Rodriguez-Lozada’s pending 2255 Petition were
thoroughly discussed, evaluated and denied at the Strickland hearing.
Not only does the record contradict Petitioner’s claim but this Court
already specifically addressed Petitioner’s allegations. Petitioner
cannot continue to rehash the same arguments before this Court and
expect a different outcome.
For example, the record states as follows:
The Court: Now, in that motion you raise various
issues or various facts concerning ineffective
assistance of counsel, and you’re requesting that
under Strickland, a hearing be held. Some of the
things that you mention there are incorrect and
are not reflected in the record, as such. For
example, all this issue you’re bringing about the
Motion to Suppress, your attorney did present
Motion to Suppress. The thing is that the Court
denied the Motion to Suppress, because you did not
have standing to raise a Motion to Suppress.
Certainly, that was not an action on the part of
your attorney that is conductive to ineffective
assistance.
See Sentencing Hrg. Transcript at pages 4-5, August 26, 2005.
The Court: Also, you mentioned the fact of certain
witnesses that were brought in, some doctors that
were brought in. And your attorney did bring in
those doctors. And some of them, the Court did
not allow to testify. So the fact that they were
not presented, is not the doing of your attorney.
He did follow through with bringing those
witnesses in; it’s just that the Court did not
allow him to testify.
See Sentencing Hrg. Transcript at pages 5-6, August 26, 2005.

not developed nor discussed in Petitioner’s Memorandum or subsequent filings.
Furthermore, the issues were addressed and ruled upon by the First Circuit Court in
Petitioner’s appeal and he is therefore precluded from raising them here. United States
v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Rodriguez-Lozada, 558
F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2009)(Court vacated weapons conviction and discussed at length the
sufficiency of the evidence as to other counts of conviction).

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Page 8

This Court had previously rejected Petitioner’s allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file timely motions
and failure to call witnesses to the stand during trial. The Court
stands by its original determination.
Likewise, during the hearing, the Court addressed Petitioner’s
claim that counsel had not allowed him to testify during his trial.
The record states as follows:
Mr. Garcia Garcia: Yes, Your Honor. He stated in
his motion, first of all, he wishes to testify.
It is correct that I advised him not to do so.
However, afterwards, he was the one in front of
Attorney Lizarribar who stated that he would not
testify at trial.
The Court: I believe your client has a criminal
record.
Mr. Garcia Garcia: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: That’s one of the main reasons why
defendants do not testify.
Mr. Garcia Garcia: And, also, Your Honor, I
advised him not to, because Rivera Rubero was the
witness that testified, really, against my client,
Mr. Elias Rodriguez Lozada. And if he were to
testify, the government has the right to crossexamine Mr. Elias Rodriguez Lozada in relation
with his business deals with Rivera Rubero, in
front of the jury.
The Court: That would be additional evidence
damaging to the defendant.
See Sentencing Hrg. Transcript at pages 6-7, August 26, 2005.
As the record shows, counsel’s actions do not amount to
ineffective assistance. Not only would the government have the
opportunity to impeach Petitioner’s testimony with his criminal
record, it also had available Rodriguez-Lozada’s prior testimony at
the Suppression Hearing. The government had already filed a motion
advising that it intended to use said testimony (Crim.D.E.398 in Case
No. 02-391(PG)).
Petitioner’s allegation that counsel failed to call certain
witnesses is also meritless and contradicted by the record.
Mr. Garcia Garcia: ...We filed a subpoena, and Dr.
Miro came at the request of the defendant.

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Page 9

We tried to introduce the witness, and the Court
denied the presentation of the testimony of Dr.
Miro because it was collateral impeachment. That
was the disposition of the Court.
We called Tanya Lopez and she came to testify.
And the wife of Mr. Rodriguez Lozada also came to
testify.
The Court: As a matter of fact, they also
testified in a Motion to Suppress.
Mr. Garcia Garcia: That’s correct, Your Honor.
See Sentencing Hrg. Transcript at page 7, August 26, 2005.
There is no new evidence brought forth by Petitioner in his
2255 Petition that would alter or change the record which clearly
leaves no doubt that his counsel did in fact subpoena and present
witnesses at his trial.
This Court also dealt with Rodriguez-Lozada’s allegation that
his counsel was ineffective for the belated filing of a motion to
suppress. Once again the record leaves no doubt that Petitioner is
wrong in his allegation.
Mr. Garcia Garcia:...During trial, Ms. Lydia
Lizarribar stated that at that point Mr. Nelson
Rivera Garcia would testify on behalf of the
defendant if we filed a Motion for Severance.
We did so at the moment that Attorney Lydia
Lizarribar advised us that her client was willing
to testify.
The Court: And the Court denied the motion...
So the matter of the testimony of Mr. Nelson
Garcia available to your client, was not a matter
that neither you nor your client could resolve; it
was his co-defendant. And once the decision was
made by Mr. Nelson Rivera Garcia with his attorney
that he would be willing to testify on behalf of
Mr. Rodriguez, it was at that time that you filed
the motion.
Mr. Garcia Garcia: That’s correct. And it was
argued before the Court. (Sentencing Hrg.
Transcript at page 8, August 26, 2005)
Mr. Garcia Garcia: We also filed a motion under
Rule 804B of the Rules of Evidence, Your Honor, to
bring the testimony of Mr. Nelson Rivera Conejo of
the Suppression hearing.
The Court also denied such motion.
And that moment, Mrs. Lydia Lizarribar, attorney
for Mr. Nelson Rivera Conejo, stated to the Court
that Nelson Rivera Conejo would take the Fifth.
But that was besides the point because I had

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already filed the motion.
See Sentencing Hrg. Transcript at page 9, August 26, 2005.
Not satisfied with the determinations made by the Court during
the Strickland hearing, Rodriguez-Lozada addressed the Court, argued
zealously his claims and cited case law in support of his arguments.
This Court carefully considered Petitioner’s arguments and
meticulously explained why he failed to put forth the necessary
evidence to obtain relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. See
Sentencing Hrg. Transcript at pages 14-20.
Hence, Rodriguez-Lozada’s allegations two (2) through four (4)
of ineffective assistance of counsel are deemed meritless as well as
contrary to the record and are DENIED.
B. Ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to move the
court for automatic dismissal of the indictment based on the Speedy
Trial Act
Lastly, Rodriguez-Lozada avers that his counsel was ineffective
for failure to file for dismissal of the indictment pending against
him due to Speedy Trial Act violations. Petitioner raised this claim
for the first time in his 2255 petition.
It is well settled law that claims not raised on direct appeal
may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner can show
cause and actual prejudice. Massaro v. United States, 538 US 500
(2003). Under the longstanding “procedural default” rule “a non
constitutional claim that could have been, but was not, raised on
appeal, may not be asserted by collateral attack under Section 2255
absent exceptional circumstances.” Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d
769 at 772 (1st Cir. 1994). In such cases, “where a defendant has
procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct
review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can
first demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice’ or that he
is ‘actually innocent.’” Bousley v. United States, 523 US 614, 622
(1998).
In the case at hand Rodriguez-Lozada has made no claim of actual
innocence and has failed to demonstrate either cause or actual

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prejudice. The Supreme Court reiterated that in order to constitute
cause for procedural default, a claim must be “so novel that its
legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel” Reed v. Ross, 468
U.S. 1, 16 (1984). There is nothing novel about a claim of Speedy
Trial Act violation. Petitioner has failed to establish actual
prejudice as well.
Rodriguez-Lozada, perhaps well aware that he can not present
this collateral attack, has creatively worded his allegation of
Speedy Trial Act violation as one of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The Court is not fooled.
A review of the record and
Petitioner’s computations reveal that there are no Speedy Trial
violations present. Petitioner’s counsel cannot file for dismissal
of indictment for Speedy Trial Act violation when the same has not
occurred. Therefore, Rodriguez-Lozada’s allegations are unavailing.
C. Request for an Evidentiary hearing
Evidentiary hearings in section 2255 cases are the exception,
not the norm, and there is a heavy burden on the petitioner to
demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing is warranted. Moreno-Morales
v. United Sates, 334 F.3d 140 (1st Cir. 2003). An evidentiary hearing
“is not necessary when a section 2255 petition is inadequate on its
face, or although facially adequate, is conclusively refuted as to
the alleged facts by the files and records of the case.” United
States v. DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952, 954 (1st Cir. 1978).
Rodriguez-Lozada has failed to raise any cognizable issue under
section 2255. In fact, on August 26, 2005, (Crim. D.E. 537 in case
no. 02-391(PG)) Petitioner got the evidentiary hearing he now
requests and vigorously argued his position as to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s request for another evidentiary
hearing is thus DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner
ELIAS RODRIGUEZ-LOZADA, is not entitled to federal habeas relief on
the claims.
Accordingly, it is ordered that petitioner ELIAS
RODRIGUEZ-LOZADA’S request for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec.
2255(D.E.1) is DENIED, and his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

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Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Petitioner’s request for evidentiary hearing is also
DENIED. Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel is DENIED.
V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILTY
For the reasons previously stated the Court hereby denies
Petitioner’s request for relief pursuant to 28 U.S. C. Section 2255.
It is further ordered that no certificate of appealability should be
issued in the event that Petitioner files a notice of appeal because
there is no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 14th of August 2015.

S/JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE