Rivera-Carrasquillo et al v. Bhatia-Gautier et al

Filing 77

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 22 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The court hereby orders that (1) any claim for monetary damages against the individual defendants in their official capacity is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (2) the plaintiffs' due process claim under theFifth Amendment is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (3) plaintiffs Sonja Marcano-Rios, Manuel Velez-Santiago, Kathia Soto-Cepeda, Elvin Caban-Muniz, Hector Medina-Gonzalez, Yamilka Garcia-Matos, Ricardo Ca sellas-Morales, Carlos X. Cotto-Roman procedural due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment remain; (4) plaintiffs' substantive due process claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 10/23/2013. (PMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ELIZAIDA RIVERA-CARRASQUILLO, ET
AL,
Plaintiffs,
CIV. NO. 13-1296 (PG)
v.
EDUARDO BHATIA-GAUTIER, ET AL,
Defendants.

YAMILKA GARCÍA-MATOS, ET AL,
Plaintiffs,
CIV. NO. 13-1384 (PG)
v.
EDUARDO BHATIA-GAUTIER, ET AL,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
The court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the defendants’
motions to dismiss (Docket No. 15 in Civil Case No. 13-1384; Docket No. 22 in
Civil Case No. 13-1296).
The defendants first argue that the plaintiffs’ claims against defendants
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and thus, plaintiffs cannot maintain
claims for monetary damages against the state and the individual defendants
in their official capacities. However, the Eleventh Amendment does not
preclude “official capacity” suits against state officers for injunctive or
declaratory relief brought pursuant to federal law. See Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). State officials sued for injunctive relief in their
official capacity are “persons” subject to liability under Section 1983. See
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 24 (1991) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10.).
In their response, the plaintiffs contend that they only seek prospective
injunctive and declaratory relief against all defendants in their official
capacities. The plaintiffs agree they cannot maintain claims for monetary
damages against the individual defendants in their official capacity and the
court thus GRANTS the defendants’ request for dismissal of such claims.

CIV. NO. 13-1296 (PG)
CIV. NO. 13-1384 (PG)

Page 2

This court must also dismiss plaintiffs’ claim under the Fifth Amendment.
It is well-settled that the Fifth Amendment “applies to actions of the federal
government, not those of private individuals.” See Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal
Services, Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 449 (1st Cir.1983) (citing Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952)). Here, the complaint is
brought against state and not federal actors. Accordingly, the court hereby
GRANTS the defendants’ request that the plaintiffs’ due process claim under
the Fifth Amendment be dismissed. See also Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez-Ramos,
498

F.3d

3,

8-9

(1st

Cir.2007)

(affirming

a

sua

sponte

dismissal

of

plaintiffs’ claims under the Fifth Amendment because the defendant police
officers where state actors and not federal actors).
The defendants also request the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ procedural
due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. “Under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, persons who possess a property interest
in continued public employment cannot be deprived of that interest without due
process of law.” Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st
Cir.2000) (citing Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 263 (1st
Cir.1987).

“In

a

due

process

claim

stemming

from

the

termination

of

employment, ‘a public employee must first demonstrate that he has a reasonable
expectation, arising out of a statute, policy, rule, or contract, that he will
continue to be employed.’” Acevedo-Feliciano v. Ruiz-Hernandez, 447 F.3d at
121 (quoting Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm’n, 300 F.3d 92, 101 (1st
Cir.2002). “It is well established, both in Puerto Rico and in federal law,
that a person has secured a property right in his employment if he has an
expectation of continuity in said employment.” Quiles Rodriguez v. Calderon,
172 F.Supp.2d 334, 344 (D.P.R.2001). The plaintiffs contend, however, that
some plaintiffs, namely, Sonja Marcano-Ríos, Manuel Vélez-Santiago, Kathia
Soto-Cepeda, Elvin Cabán-Muñiz, Héctor Medina-González, Yamilka García-Matos,
Ricardo Casellas-Morales, Carlos X. Cotto-Román, had contracts that expired
on January 31, 2012 and were not afforded due process prior to their removal
before the expiration of their contracts. See Docket No. 27 in Civil Case
No. 13-1296; Docket No. 21 in Civil Case No. 13-1384. The named plaintiffs
have plausibly plead their procedural due process claims, and thus, the
defendants’ motion is thus DENIED as to these particular plaintiffs.
The defendants also request the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ substantive
due process claims. The Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee has both
procedural and substantive aspects. Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753 (1st

CIV. NO. 13-1296 (PG)
CIV. NO. 13-1384 (PG)

Page 3

Cir.1990). A “claim is cognizable as a violation of substantive due process
only when it is so extreme and egregious as to shock the contemporary
conscience.” McConkie v. Nichols, 446 F.3d 258, 260 (1st Cir.2006); see also
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994)) (“Substantive due process claims
generally have something to do with ‘matters relating to marriage, family,
procreation, and the right to bodily integrity’ rather than property or
employment issues.”); Bibiloni Del Valle v. Puerto Rico, 661 F.Supp.2d 155,
185 (D.P.R.2009) (“The very nature of this constitutional protection has
caused that substantive due process protection be used sparingly.”). The First
Circuit has held that a plaintiff’s substantive due process claims, in
connection with allegations of political discrimination, are coextensive with
his First Amendment claims. See Ramírez v. Arlequín, 447 F.3d 19, 25 (1st
Cir.2006)) (citing Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32,
46 (1st Cir.1992)). As a result, “where the plaintiffs have stated a viable
First Amendment claim for the very same conduct, [the court] declined to
‘enter the uncharted thicket of substantive due process to find an avenue for
relief.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In

response,

the

plaintiffs

argued

that

their

“claims

under

the

Substantive Due Process Clause are not ‘for the very same conduct.’ While the
political discrimination claims are based on both the individual and joint
acts of the Defendants, the Substantive Due Process of Law claims are based
on the extensiveness and pervasiveness of the same.” See Docket No. 27 at page
12 in Civil Case 13-1296; Docket No. 21 at pages 12-13 in Civil Case 13-1384.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs request that the court hold in abeyance the
resolution of this request for dismissal until the record is more fully
developed. The court disagrees. “The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that substantive due process “is an inappropriate avenue of relief” when the
conduct at issue is covered by the First Amendment.” Quiles-Santiago v.
Rodriguez-Diaz, 851 F.Supp.2d 411, 427 (2012) (quoting Pagan v. Calderon, 448
F.3d 16, 33 (1st Cir.2006)). “It is the First Amendment, not the Fourteenth
Amendment, that guards individuals against state-sponsored acts of political
discrimination

or

retaliation.

…

Thus,

when

allegations

of

political

discrimination and retaliation are covered by the First Amendment, those
allegations cannot serve as a basis for a substantive due process claim.”
Quiles-Santiago v. Rodriguez-Diaz, 851 F.Supp.2d at 427 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

Therefore, the defendants’ request is GRANTED

and plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

CIV. NO. 13-1296 (PG)
CIV. NO. 13-1384 (PG)

Page 4

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ requests for dismissal (Docket
No. 15 in Civil Case No. 13-1384; Docket No. 22 in Civil Case No. 13-1296) are
hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Therefore, (1) any claim for
monetary damages against the individual defendants in their official capacity
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (2) the plaintiffs’ due process claim under the
Fifth

Amendment

is

DISMISSED

WITH

PREJUDICE;

(3)

plaintiffs

Sonja

Marcano-Ríos, Manuel Vélez-Santiago, Kathia Soto-Cepeda, Elvin Cabán-Muñiz,
Héctor Medina-González, Yamilka García-Matos, Ricardo Casellas-Morales, Carlos
X. Cotto-Román procedural due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
remain; (4) plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 23, 2013.

S/ JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE