Morales-Melecio et al v. United States of America (Department of Health and Human Services)

Filing 280

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 279 Order denying Plaintiffs' motion at Docket # 272. Signed by Judge Salvador E. Casellas on 8/3/2016.(JRD)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
LUZ Z. MORALES-MELECIO ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 13-1311 (SEC)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
María Martínez, Emilio Matos-Pérez, minor Z.M.M., and Mariela Matos;
parents, daughter, and sister of the late Emilio Matos-Martínez (Matos) (collectively,
Plaintiffs), move for reconsideration, Docket # 272, of this Court’s Opinion and Order
dismissing their medical malpractice claims against the United States as time barred by
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). See Docket # 268, Morales-Melecio v. United
States, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2016 WL 3129419 (D.P.R. June 3, 2016). For the reasons
that follow, as well as those stated in the Government’s response, Plaintiffs’ motion is
denied.
In its previous opinion, the Court held that this case did not warrant the
application of the discovery rule because at the time of Matos’ death, Plaintiffs had
sufficient knowledge of their injury and its probable cause so as to trigger the FTCA’s
statute of limitations. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court stressed that Matos died
within two days after he first sought medical treatment at the federally-funded hospital
Salud Integral la Montaña, and while he was still receiving medical treatment at the
Puerto Rico Medical Center.

Civil No. 13-1311 (SEC)

Page 2

Plaintiffs insist, however, that the limitations clock did not start until they
received Matos’ medical records and autopsy report which revealed perforated
diverticula as the cause of death. The Court disagrees.
In enacting the FTCA, Congress considered that two-years were sufficient for a
claimant to perform a diligent investigation and gather the information necessary to
file a claim. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, the discovery rule, which delays the start of
this statute of limitations, is applicable only where the factual basis of the cause of
action is “inherently unknowable,” which is to say “incapable of detection by the
wronged party through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” González v. United
States, 284 F.3d 281, 288-89 (1st Cir. 2002).
This, however, does not mean that the discovery rule applies in every FTCA
case where a plaintiff lacks some particular fact necessary to assert his cause of action.
To invoke the discovery rule, the information needed must not only be lacking at the
time of injury but must also be “incapable of detection” within a reasonable time
thereafter despite the exercise of reasonable diligence. This last bit is missing here.
Although it is true that Plaintiffs had no knowledge of Matos’ diverticulitis at
the time of death, this was easily discernible by examining the medical records and
autopsy report. Obtaining medical records is a routine part of the due diligence
required

in

any

medical

malpractice

investigation.

Barring

exceptional

circumstances—such as extreme delay by medical facilities—the limitations clock will
not wait until a plaintiff gathers the relevant medical records. No such circumstances
are present here.
Matos died on March 1, 2010. Five months later, on July 28, Plaintiffs received
Matos’ medical records and autopsy report. Then, Plaintiffs had more than nineteen
months, until March 1, 2012, to file their administrative claim. “It can hardly be
claimed that this time was unreasonable or inadequate,” Kington v. United States, 396
F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1968), particularly considering that they filed a medical
malpractice action in state court almost a year before the deadline expired.

Civil No. 13-1311 (SEC)

Page 3

In short, the Court is convinced that Plaintiffs’ duty of inquiry, and thus the
FTCA statute of limitations, began on the date of Matos’ death. “This duty of inquiry
is particularly strict when the injury at issue is a death.” Cutting v. United States, 204
F. Supp. 2d 216, 225 (D. Mass. 2002) aff’d sub nom. Skwira, 344 F.3d 64. Plaintiffs’
motion is therefore denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 3rd day of August, 2016.
S/ Salvador E. Casellas
SALVADOR E. CASELLAS
U.S. Senior District Judge