Christian Village Fishermen's Association et al v. Municipality of Loiza et al

Filing 71

ORDER granting 60 Motion for Attorney Fees in the amount of $29,549.21. To be paid by July 29, 2016. So ordered.Signed by US Magistrate Judge Bruce J. McGiverin on June 14, 2016. (McGiverin, Bruce)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
RAMON ORTIZ OSORIO, et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 13-1352 (BJM)

MUNICIPALITY OF LOIZA,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Ramon Ortiz Osorio, Eric Cruz Negron, and Jose M. Landrau brought this action
against the Municipality of Loíza (“Municipality”). Plaintiffs, alleging they have prevailed
by settlement in the federal-court action, seek a total of $ 34,549.21 in attorney’s fees and
costs from defendant pursuant to the attorney’s fee provision of the Federal Water Pollution
Act (“Clean Water Act” or “CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). Docket No. 60. Defendants
opposed. Docket No. 61. The case is before me on consent of the parties. Docket Nos. 12,
13. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972 to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
Under the CWA, pollutants generally may not be discharged into the waters of the United
States without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342.
Plaintiffs are members of the Christian Village Fishermen’s Association and
residents of the Christian Village Community in Loíza, Puerto Rico. Compl. ¶ 6. The
Municipality owns and operates a small municipal storm system (“MS4”) serving Loíza,
including the Christian Village Community. Compl. ¶¶ 10–11. Defendant operates the MS4
pursuant to NPDES General Permit number PPR040051. Compl. ¶ 17.

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Plaintiffs alleged they were affected by storm water discharge originating from one
of the outfalls of the storm sewer system owned by the Municipality. In addition to storm
water, this outfall receives raw sewage from multiple sources and is discharged directly
into the Atlantic Ocean. Plaintiffs allege the discharge has severely degraded water quality
and marine ecosystems in the surrounding beaches, and as a result, plaintiffs can no longer
use and enjoy those beaches. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8.
The NPDES permit requires the Municipality to implement six measures designed
to reduce the discharge of pollutants from the MS4 into navigable waters, including the
development and implementation of a public education program, programs to address
storm water runoff from construction activity and development projects, and a storm water
management plan (“SWMP”). Compl. ¶¶ 18–19. The permit requires all owners and
operators of small MS4s in Puerto Rico to submit their SWMP to the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) by August 2007, Compl. ¶ 20, and all programs and
requirements in the permit had to be implemented by November 7, 2011. Compl. ¶ 21.
Plaintiffs filed this action on May 7, 2013. Docket No. 1. The complaint alleges
that defendant failed to comply with the NPDES permit requirements because no SWMP
had been developed and none of the six control measures had been implemented. Compl.
¶ 23. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, the imposition of civil penalties,
and an award of costs for defendant’s violation of the Clean Water Act. In May 2016, the
parties settled. Docket No. 48.
DISCUSSION
I.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (“Rule 54”)
The Municipality argues plaintiffs waived their claim for attorney’s fees by filing a

belated request nine days after the fourteen-day time limit established by Rule
54(d)(2)(B)(i), and therefore the court must dismiss plaintiffs’ request. However, Rule 54
states that the fourteen day time limit applies unless a court order provides otherwise. Rule
54(d)(2)(B).

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The Municipality and plaintiffs negotiated a Consent Decree in this case. Docket
No. 48. The negotiation included a specific agreement that allowed plaintiff to file his
Motion for Attorney’s Fees within 30 days from the effective date. Id. at 15. This agreement
was approved and entered as an order of the Court on July 27, 2015, Docket No. 59, giving
plaintiffs until August 26 to file their application for attorney’s fees. That motion was filed
August 21, well within the time limit agreed upon by the parties. As such, this Motion is
not barred by Rule 54.
II.

Prevailing Party
Plaintiffs seek attorney’s fees and costs due to them as prevailing parties pursuant

to the Clean Water Act. See 33. U.S.C. § 1365(d) (“The court, in issuing any final order in
any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing
party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.”). Under § 1365(d), it is
necessary that a party achieve some degree of success on the merits to obtain attorney’s
fees. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682 (1983).
A “prevailing or substantially prevailing” party is one that achieves material
alteration of the legal relationship between itself and the defendant and has “succeeded on
any significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefit the party sought in
bringing suit.” Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791–
92 (1989) (internal quotations omitted); see Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. R., 321 F.3d 9,
15 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of H & HR,
532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)) (“[A] party may be considered ‘prevailing’ even without
obtaining a favorable final judgment on all (or even the most crucial) of her claims.”));
United States v. Comunidades Unidas Contra La Contaminacion, 204 F.3d 275 (1st Cir.
2000). So long as the plaintiffs achieve a necessary degree of success on some claims, the
denial of the full range or originally requested relief is not a basis for denying a fee award.

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Gay Officers Action League v. P.R., 247 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Tex. State
Teachers, 489 U.S. at 792–93).
Under the Clean Water Act, a “prevailing party” is not limited to a victory only after
entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits. Sierra Club v. City of Little
Rock, 351 F.3d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992))
(internal citations omitted)). “The fact that [plaintiff] prevailed through a settlement rather
than through litigation does not weaken the claim to fees.” Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122,
129 (1980). In the context of allowing an award of attorney fees to a prevailing or
substantially prevailing party, a party prevails either by obtaining an enforceable judgment
or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement that “directly benefits plaintiff
at the time of the judgment or settlement.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111 (citing Maher, 448 U.S
at 129). Otherwise, the judgment or settlement cannot be said to “affec[t] the behavior of
the defendant toward the plaintiff.” Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988). Although a
consent decree does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, it
nonetheless is a court order that may change the legal relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant, for purposes of prevailing party fee-shifting statutes. Northeast Iowa
Citizens for Clean Water v. Agriprocessors, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 881, (N.D. Iowa 2007)
(citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604).
Here, the Consent Decree entered by the court substantially and materially alters
the legal relationship between the parties in a way that directly benefits the plaintiffs,
conferring prevailing party status on plaintiffs. While many provisions of the Consent
Decree mandate the Municipality to continue existing efforts towards compliance with its
MS4 permit, it also requires the completion of several additional tasks directly benefiting
the plaintiffs and the furtherance of the goals of the Clean Water Act. It requires the
Municipality to continue the implementation of the SWMP and to prepare and send the
plaintiffs a report explaining the current status of implementation of each of the six
minimum control measures included in the SWMP on a specific time schedule until the

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SMWP is fully or substantially implemented or the EPA approves a new SWMP for the
Municipality. Docket No. 48 at 8–9.
Of most immediate direct benefit to the plaintiffs, the Consent Decree also requires
the implementation of a Supplemental Environmental Project (“SEP”) in lieu of civil
penalties whose purpose will be to provide interim measures to mitigate the current
problem affecting Christian Village’s storm sewer system. Id. at 11–12. The SEP requires
the Municipality to develop and execute a maintenance program with the purpose of
keeping Christian Village’s storm sewer system free of raw sewage and sediments. It must
do so by using vacuum trucks to remove to the maximum extent possible the scum, waste
water, and sludge accumulated in all of Christian Village’s storm sewer system on a strict
time schedule (within six months of the effective date of the Consent Decree and every six
months afterward until the Municipality fully develops, implements, and enforces the
program to detect and eliminate illicit discharges established in its SWMP or the Puerto
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) constructs and starts operation of a new
sewer system for the Christian Village Community.) Id. at 12–13.
All of these measures require the Municipality to engage in additional practices to
“further the objectives set forth under section 101 of the CWA” and to move the
Municipality to “achieve and maintain full or substantial compliance with, and to further
the purposes of, the CWA,” id. at 7:2, particularly the full implementation of the NPDES
permit. Specifically, the SEP works to ensure the minimization of waste within the section
of the MS4 that runs through Christian Village that could flow into the ocean while the
SWMP is being implemented. This was plaintiff’s ultimate goal in filing suit against the
Municipality. See Compl. ¶ 10:25 (“Plaintiffs believe and allege that, without the
imposition of appropriate civil penalties and the issuance of an injunction, Defendants will
continue to violate the Clean Water Act.”).
In negotiating and settling for the SEP instead of requiring the Municipality to pay
civil penalties until the SWMP is fully implemented, plaintiffs demonstrate that such a

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measure is more appropriate for achieving its ultimate goal. And, by ordering the
defendants to develop and fully implement the control measures required by its NPDES
permit and establishing a plan to clear waste from the MS4 in the interim, plaintiffs have
succeeded in stopping the Municipality from continuing its alleged practice of discharging
storm water from its MS4 in such a manner that will result in further violation of the
NPDES permit. Accordingly, I find that plaintiffs are the prevailing party for attorney’s
fees purposes. I turn, then, to the determination of a reasonable fee amount.
III.

Reasonable Fees
The court has “great discretion in deciding what claimed legal services should be

compensated.” Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 492 (1st Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs who
substantially prevail may not necessarily recover the totality of their requested fees. See
Culebra Enters. Corp. v. Rivera-Ríos, 846 F.2d 94, 102 (1st Cir. 1988). Instead, the court
calculates a reasonable fee award using the “lodestar” method: a reasonable hourly rate
multiplied by the number of hours reasonably spent on the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Under the lodestar approach, the judge first calculates the time
counsel spent on the case, subtracts duplicative, unproductive, or excessive hours, and then
applies prevailing hourly billing rates in the community, taking into account counsel’s
qualifications, experience, and specialized competence. Gay Officers, 247 F.3d at 295.
Once calculated, “the lodestar represents a presumptively reasonable fee, although it is
subject to upward or downward adjustment in certain circumstances.” Lipsett v. Blanco,
975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1992).
Plaintiffs seek compensation for $33,560.00 in attorney’s fees based on 167.8 hours
of work, and $989.21 for out of pocket expenses related to the case, for a total of
$34,549.21. Docket No. 64. This is reduced from the originally requested $41,199.21.
Docket No. 60. Plaintiff’s motion is supported by timesheets, a declaration, and a resume
for the plaintiffs’ attorney, Miguel Sarriera Román (“Román”). Román claims plaintiffs in
this case do not have the financial capability of paying attorneys’ fees at prevailing market

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rates, so he has accepted compensation exclusively for whatever fee award may result from
the litigation on a contingent basis. Docket No. 60-1 at 3 ¶ 8.
Information on customary rates in the marketplace for similarly situated attorneys
must be provided in supporting documentation by the party seeking an award in a feeshifting context. See Spooner, 644 F.3d at 68. Rates must be adjusted under the lodestar
method in accordance with reasonable community standards. See Metro. Dist. Comm’n,
847 F.2d at 19. In addition, the court can use an attorney’s standard billing rate as guidance,
but it is not bound by it. See Gay Officers, 247 F.3d at 296.
Information provided by plaintiffs on customary hourly rates in recent civil-rights
cases indicates a range from $100.00 to $250.00 for in-court work, and from $90.00 to
$225.00 for out-of-court time. Cortes-Reyes v. Salas-Quintana, 806 F. Supp. 2d 470, 476
(D.P.R. 2011) (citing Rosario-Urdaz v. Rivera-Hernandez, 451 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309-10
(D.P.R. 2006)). In Cortes-Reyes, an attorney who had over 37 years of practice experience
and extensive specialized experience in civil-rights litigation was granted an out-of-court
hourly rate of $200.00. Román has litigated specialized cases under Section 505 of the
CWA for 23 years. Docket No. 60 at 9. The hourly rate offered by the defendant in his last
settlement regarding attorney’s fees in a Clean Water Act case was $200.00. Docket 60-1
at 3 ¶ 10. Because defendants do not dispute this rate, this is the rate I will employ for the
lodestar analysis.
Defendants oppose the fee motion, arguing that counsel’s travel time is not
recoverable, block-billing should result in a reduction of the lodestar amount, quarter-ofan-hour billing should result in a severe reduction or disallowance of those hours, generic
or vague time entries should be reduced or eliminated, all hours claimed for work on nonprevailing issues and the Motion for Attorney’s Fees should be disallowed, and the court
should consider the “precarious economic situation that the Municipality, as well as many
other municipalities, is facing.” Docket No. 61 at 9–12. I will address in turn each of

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defendant’s arguments for downward reductions in the fee award, using the timesheets
provided by plaintiffs. Docket No. 60-1.
Travel Time
The Municipality objects to Román’s entries including time spent traveling, totaling
29.30 hours (defendant’s opposition incorrectly counts 28.3 hours, Docket No. 61). The
First Circuit accepts a reduced rate for travel time when granting attorney’s fees but does
not typically eliminate these hours altogether. See Hutchinson ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 636
F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Travel is often a necessary incident of litigation, and an
attorney’s travel time may be reimbursed in a fee award.”); Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38,
40 (1st Cir. 1983) (court provided a 50% reduction in the attorney’s reasonable regular rate
for travel time).
Plaintiffs concedes that the objection to travel time is partially reasonable.
Plaintiffs’ billing does not separately itemize travel and the work done upon arrival, so
travel time is not billed at a reduced rate. As such, plaintiffs agrees to reduce by 50% all
hours related to traveling, resulting in a 14.65 hour reduction. Docket No. 64 at 4. This
across-the-board reduction is a reasonable compromise, and I accept it when calculating
the lodestar amount.1
Out of Pocket Expenses
The additional out-of-pocket expenses include filing fees ($400.00), copies ($7.95),
mail ($55.96), and millage and tolls ($525.30). The First Circuit holds that reasonable
expenses necessary for the prosecution of a case are ancillary to and may be incorporated
as part of a fee award under a prototypical federal fee-shifting provision. Hutchinson ex
rel. Julien, 636 F.3d 1 at 17 (citing Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 707 F.2d 636, 637 (1st Cir.
1983)). As such, I find all of Román’s out-of-pocket expenses recoverable as necessary for
success in the litigation.
1

Reducing the hourly rate by 50% and retaining the original number of hours results in the same
award.

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Quarter-Hour Billing
Defendant challenges Román’s practice of billing “virtually every time entry” in
quarter-hour increments rather than in tenths of an hour, and argues this should result in a
severe reduction or disallowance of those hours. Docket No. 61 at 10. However, all of the
entries were billed in tenth of an hour increments. As such, none of the hours will be
reduced or disallowed.
Block-Billing
Defendants argue that block-billing makes it more difficult to determine whether
the amount of time spent on various tasks was reasonable, citing Davis v. Perry, 991 F.
Supp. 2d 809, 835–36 (W.D. Tex. 2014), and justifies an across-the-board reduction in
block-billed hours to offset the effects of block-billing. To this end, the First Circuit
affirmed a reduction in the fee request due to block billing when the plaintiff’s attorney
“fail[ed to] adequately describe the tasks for which the time was expended.” See, e.g.,
Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 340 (1st Cir. 2008).
While Román’s entries are billed based on how much daily time was spent working
on a case, rather than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks, his entries are quite
detailed and adequately describe the tasks for which the time was expended. For example,
Román’s time entry for September 25, 2013, explains he reviewed case law on discovery
and substantive and jurisdictional requirements for a motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, which took 7.20 hours. Docket No. 60 at 11. There does not seem to be
any other way to make this more specific without requiring the attorney to indicate exactly
what case law he reviewed or what his findings were, which is not necessary for the
purposes of providing an adequate explanation of what he has done. As such, a global
reduction for block billing is unwarranted.
Generic or Vague Time Entries
Next, the Municipality challenges numerous timesheet entries for being too vague
for the court to allow the hours claimed. A court may adjust the hours to account for time

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records that are “too generic,” causing them to be “insufficient as a practical matter to
permit a court to answer questions about excessiveness, redundancy, and the like.” Colón
Vázquez v. Puerto Rico, No. 3:14-cv-01644, 2015 WL 847291, at *2 (D.P.R. 2015) (citing
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). The Grendel’s Den standard requires attorneys to keep
contemporaneous and detailed time records, except in extraordinary circumstances.
Grendel’s Den, Inc. v Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 951 (1st Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs are “not required
to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at
437. They should, however, identify the general subject of the time being billed. Id. at 455.
The problem with imprecise records is that “they fail to allow the paying party to dispute
the accuracy of the records as well as the reasonableness of the time spent.” Lipsett, 975
F.2d at 938 (internal citation and quotation omitted) (alteration in original).
Records will be sufficient and compensable if the subject matter and nature of the tasks
are either explicitly stated or readily ascertainable based on other information contained in the
records. Parker v. Town of Swansea, 310 F. Supp. 2d 376, 392 (D. Mass. 2004). When there is
no interrelation between the entries and the dates or surrounding entries, a full account of the
task performed will be required. Walsh v. Bos. Univ., 661 F. Supp. 2d 91, 106 (D. Mass. 2009).
References to telephone calls should not require extensive details to be compensable. Parker,
310 F. Supp at 392. A court must be cognizant of attorney-client privilege when attorneys are
describing a task such as an email or a conference with the client; therefore, if the court can
deduce the general reason by examining the date of the task surrounding it, it will be considered
reasonable. Walsh, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 117.

The Municipality contests Román’s entries that have “no explanation whatsoever,
just mentioning [a] phone call [or] review of dockets.” Docket No. 61, p. 11. It cites TorresRivera, but this does not further its position. Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331
(1st Cir. 2008). In that case, the court found generic descriptions such as “telephone call,”
“review court order,” “review correspondence,” “work on brief,” and “conduct legal
research” far too vague to provide guidance to the court in evaluating the requested fees.

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Id. at 340. However, a review of the time records in this case shows that every phone call
includes the name of the person and the matter discussed, every entry explaining a review
of the docket indicates the docket number itself being reviewed, every entry regarding legal
research indicates what the research entailed, and so forth. It is difficult to imagine more
detail being required for these time entries. As such, they are not too vague or generic and
will be considered in the lodestar amount for the award of attorney’s fees.
Non-Prevailing Motions
In fashioning the fee award lodestar, the court may adjust the hours claimed to
eliminate time that was unreasonably, unnecessarily, or inefficiently devoted to the case.
Subject to principles of interconnectedness, the court may disallow time spent in litigating
failed claims. Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 336 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Lipsett, 975
F.2d at 940-41). If the claims on which plaintiff lost were unrelated to the successful ones,
no fees may be awarded for the work on the unsuccessful claims. If, however, the losing
claims included “a common core of facts” or were “based on related legal theories” linking
them to the successful claim, the award may include compensation for legal work
performed on the unsuccessful claims. Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 734 (1st Cir. 1984)
(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435). After determining the number of reasonable hours and
the reasonable rate, the court must still account for other considerations that may lead it to
adjust the lodestar upward or downward, based on such factors as the results obtained and
“the time actually required for the efficacious handling of the matter.” Hensley, 461 U.S.
at 434; Torres-Rivera, 524 F.3d at 331 (citations omitted).
Defendant argues that the hours expended on the response to its Motion to Dismiss
(Docket No. 7) and the Motion for Summary Judgement filed by plaintiffs (Docket No. 23)
should be stricken because plaintiffs did not prevail. The Municipality’s Motion to Dismiss
was granted in part and denied in part. While including the mayor as a defendant was found
to be redundant, I found that the plaintiffs were not precluded by the diligent prosecution
bar of the CWA and thus plausibly stated a claim for relief against the Municipality (Docket

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No. 20), who entered the settlement with plaintiffs. As such, time spent working on the
opposition to the motion to dismiss will be counted towards the lodestar because
elimination of the mayor as a defendant did not impede plaintiffs’ overall success in
settlement. Plaintiffs agree that their Motion for Summary Judgment failed and did not
contribute to their overall success, so hours spent working on this motion should be
stricken. Docket No. 64 at 5. I agree and will strike this from the lodestar amount.
The Municipality argues hours invested in settlement negotiations are not
recoverable, as they are not spent litigating controversies. The court has the discretion to
adjust hours “up or down, to reflect other considerations.” United States v. One Star Class
Sloop Sailboat built in 1930 with hull no. 721, Named “Flash II,” 546 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir.
2009) (quoting Coutin v. Young & Rubicam P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 337 (1st Cir. 1997)).
Settlement negotiations are not normally considered in the lodestar calculation. Janney
Montgomery Scott LLC v. Tobin, 692 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (D. Mass. 2010) (awarding fees
for time spent negotiating runs counter to the institutional policy favoring settlement); see
also St. John’s Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054,
1064 (Tallman, J., concurring) (“Courts should not be interpreting attorney’s fee
requirements in such a way as to discourage settlement.”). The First Circuit adopts this
view, agreeing there is a “strong public policy in favor of settlements, particularly in very
complex and technical regulatory contexts . . . .” Comunidades Unidas, 204 F.2d at 280.
As such, hours spent negotiating and drafting the agreement, totaling 25 hours, will be
deducted from the lodestar amount. This reduces the requested attorney’s fee award by
$5,000.00.
Lastly, the Municipality argues that time spent on the Motion for Attorney’s fees
should be discounted from the lodestar because the time claimed is extravagant and
exaggerated for this type of motion. Docket No. 61 at 12. However, defendant fails to
demonstrate how this time is extravagant or exaggerated or how much time a motion like
this should take. The burden is on the defeated party to demonstrate circumstances that are

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appropriate to overcome the presumption in favor of the prevalent party. Charles Alan
Wright, et al., 10 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2668 (3d ed., 2015). Román explains this
was his first time drafting such a motion and this was the amount of time it took. With no
available comparison, I am inclined to believe him and afford these hours towards the
attorney’s fees award. See Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1254 (10th
Cir. 2000) (“An award of reasonable attorney’s fees may include compensation for work
performed in preparing and presenting the fee application.”).
The Municipality’s “Precarious Financial Situation”
As previously stated, the court has broad discretion in awarding reasonable and
appropriate attorney’s fees. See 33. U.S.C. § 1365(d) (“The court, in issuing any final order
in any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation . . . whenever
the court determines such award is appropriate.”). The Municipality asks for its financial
condition to be considered. Docket No. 61 at 12. The Municipality provides no case law to
support the idea that its ability to pay should be a factor in awarding attorney’s fees to a
prevailing party. While I understand the economic crisis and hardship the Municipality is
undergoing, Román’s work in ensuring plaintiffs’ success must be compensated at a
reasonable rate. Plaintiffs have provided evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount
requested and have voluntarily reduced the amount. The policy considerations underlying
the attorney’s fees provision of the Clean Water Act further support the idea that the
government must bear the costs for its alleged failure to enforce environmental regulations
that result in detrimental impacts on its citizens.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff’s motion
seeks a total of $34,549.21. The following adjustment is made:

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Deduction for settlement negotiations: -$5,000.00 of the total hours billed by
Miguel Sarriera Román.

After this downward adjustment, the total award amount is $29,549.21 in costs,
fees, and litigation expenses.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 14th day of June, 2016.
S/Bruce J. McGiverin
BRUCE J. MCGIVERIN
United States Magistrate Judge