CH Properties, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance Company

Filing 119

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 102 Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiff CH Properties's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 12/15/2014. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
CH PROPERTIES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL NO. 13-1354 (FAB)

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is plaintiff CH Properties, Inc.’s (“CH
Properties”) motion to reconsider the Court’s Opinion and Order
granting in part and denying in part the parties’ cross motions for
summary judgment.

(Docket No. 102.)

For the reasons articulated

below, CH Properties’ motion to reconsider is DENIED.
I.

Motion for Reconsideration Standard
“A motion for reconsideration of an order which has granted

summary judgment should be treated as a Rule 59(e) [of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure] motion.”

Rosario Rivera v. PS Group of

P.R., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D.P.R. 2002) (Laffitte, J.)
(internal citations omitted).

Motions for reconsideration do “not

provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures
[or] allow a party [to] advance arguments that could and should
have been presented to the district court prior to judgment.”
Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006)

Civil No. 13-1354 (FAB)

2

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
for

reconsideration

circumstances,

such

are
as

appropriate
(1)

where

in

the

a

Rather, motions

limited

movant

number

presents

of

newly

discovered evidence, (2) where there has been an intervening change
in the law, or (3) where the movant can demonstrate that the
original decision was based on a manifest error of law or was
clearly unjust.

Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7

n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)).
II.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
CH Properties asks the Court to reconsider three aspects of

its September 9, 2014 opinion and order entered. (Docket No. 102.)
The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A.

The Amount of Attorney’s Fees Incurred in the State Court
Actions
The Court’s opinion and order granted CH Properties’s

motion for summary judgment in part on the issue of reimbursement
of legal expenses incurred in the state court actions.
No. 92 at p. 31.)

(Docket

The Court found, however, that “genuine issues

of fact remain[ed] regarding the appropriateness of CH Properties’s
hiring of Attorney Pedro Rosario Urdaz and the reasonableness of
the fees paid to Andreu & Sagardia,” and consequently reserved
judgment on the amount to be reimbursed.

Id. at n.19.

Plaintiff’s

first swing at reconsideration contends that no genuine factual
issues remain as to the appropriateness of hiring attorney Pedro

Civil No. 13-1354 (FAB)

3

Rosario-Urdaz or the reasonableness of the fees paid by plaintiff
to Andreu & Sagardia in the state court actions.
at p. 3.)

(Docket No. 102

Plaintiff urges that because defendant First American

Title Insurance Company (“FATIC”) possessed all of the invoices and
facts pertaining to these fees by February 14, 2014, but failed to
contest the amounts until July of 2014 — after the close of
pleadings and discovery — FATIC waived any objection to the fees.
Id. at p. 4.

As a result of this waiver, plaintiff maintains, the

Court should have found that no factual issues existed regarding
the fees and entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s argument is untethered from waiver law.
party waives

a

right

[]

if

he

intentionally

relinquishes

“A
or

abandons it; he forfeits a right by failing to assert it in a
timely manner.”

Davila Corporacion de P.R. para la Difusion

Publica, 498 F.3d 9, 14 n.2 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal citations
omitted); see also United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v.
163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1096 (1st Cir. 1992)
(“[L]egal theories not squarely presented in the nisi prius court
are deemed waived on appeal.”)

In the summary judgment context, a

party who fails to oppose a motion for summary judgment “waive[s]
the right to object to the material facts set forth by the movant.”
Ocasio v. Hogar Geobel Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 167, 171 (D.P.R. 2008)
(Dominguez, J.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, defendant FATIC raised objections to the reasonableness and

Civil No. 13-1354 (FAB)

4

appropriateness of the state action legal fees in its surreply and
opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (Docket No.
84 at pp. 7-8.)

FATIC neither failed to oppose plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment, nor failed to assert its objections in a
timely manner.

FATIC thus did not waive its right to contest the

amount of legal fees sought by plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court
declines to reconsider its earlier denial of summary judgment
regarding the appropriateness and reasonableness of fees in the
state court actions.
B.

The Court’s Denial of Legal Fees in the Federal Court
Action
Second,

plaintiff

CH

Properties

asks

the

Court

to

reconsider its order refusing to reimburse plaintiff for legal fees
and costs incurred in the federal court action.1
p. 98.)

(Docket No. 92 at

Because plaintiff “repeat[s] old arguments previously

considered and rejected” by the Court, Nat’l. Metal Finishing Co.,
Inc. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st
Cir.

1990),

the

Court

declines

to

reconsider

its

denial

of

reimbursement of legal fees in the federal court action.
C.

The Court’s Denial of Indemnification
Last,

plaintiff

contests

the

Court’s

denial

of

its

request for indemnification of its rent and mortgage payments,

1

Specifically, the Court granted FATIC’s motion for summary
judgment as to legal expenses incurred in the federal court action.
(Docket No. 92 at p. 38.)

Civil No. 13-1354 (FAB)

5

arguing that the Court mistakenly equated two distinct concepts:
(1) leasehold interests, and (2) title to property.
No.

102

at

p.

8.)

Plaintiff

points

to

extensive

(Docket
authority

indicating that Puerto Rico law distinguishes between these two
real property concepts.

Be that as it may, plaintiff provides no

authority challenging the Court’s earlier legal analysis regarding
the applicability of the title insurance policy at issue.

The

Court — now, like before — finds no support in the law for
plaintiff’s interpretation of “diminished” title, and accordingly
declines

to

reconsider

its

conclusion

that

the

trespassers’

presence on plaintiff’s the 5-cuerda tract of land failed to
trigger the indemnification provisions in FATIC’s policy.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons articulated above, plaintiff CH Properties’s
motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, December 15, 2014.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
United States District Judge