Torres-Vazquez v. Questell et al
Filing
16
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 6 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The plaintiff's ADEA claims based on the incidents prior to the August 2, 2012 transfer are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The plaintiff's construc tive discharge claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The plaintiff's political discrimination claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The plaintiff's Title VII claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The plaintiff's ADEA claim based on the August 2, 2012 transfer may proceed. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 09/10/2014. (TW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
GRACIELA TORRES-VAZQUEZ,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 13-1601 (PG)
v.
ENRIQUE QUESTELL, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Graciela Torres-Vazquez is suing Mayor Enrique Questell and the
Municipality of Santa Isabel for age and political discrimination.
The municipality moves to dismiss her complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Torres-Vazquez has worked for the municipality in a variety of
roles
for
election
over
of
30
Mayor
years.
Questell
Torres-Vazquez
in
2005,
her
claims
role
that,
at
the
after
the
municipality
started to change, including being transferred from one position to
another several—at least six—times.
Torres-Vazquez argues that the
new
“clean
administration
was
seeking
to
house”
of
both
employees and members of the new mayor’s rival political party.
older
The
successive transfers—including being moved to an office that required
her to walk a great distance, aggravating her existing leg problems—
ultimately led Torres-Vazquez to tender her resignation on April 1,
2013.
On August 6, 2013, Torres-Vazquez filed suit against Mayor
Questell,
the
municipality,
and
several
unnamed
parties,
alleging
constructive discharge and violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), Title VII and political discrimination under 42
Civil No. 13-1601 (PG)
Page 2
U.S.C. § 1983.
(Docket No. 1.)
The municipality moved to dismiss.
(Docket No. 6.)
We grant the motion in part and deny in part.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s
complaint must contain “‘ a short and plain statement of the
claim.’”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also FED.R.CIV.P.
8(a)(2).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, Rodriguez-Vives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps
of Puerto Rico, 743 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir.2014), a plaintiff
must provide “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).
claim’s
plausibility,
plaintiff’s
true,
and
plaintiff.
favor,
draw
we
must
accept
any
construe
all
v.
Iqbal,
inferences
556
U.S.
In assessing a
complaint
non-conclusory
reasonable
Ashcroft
the
Twombly, 550
in
allegations
in
favor
662,
of
678
the
as
the
(citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); accord Maloy v. Ballori–Lage, 744
F.3d
250,
252
(1st
Cir.2014).
When
reviewing
a
motion
to
dismiss, we “must consider the complaint in its entirety, as
well as other sources ordinarily examined when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6)
motions
to
dismiss,
in
particular,
documents
incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of
which a court may take judicial notice.”
Issues
&
Rights,
Ltd.,
551
U.S.
308,
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
322
(2007).
Finally,
Civil No. 13-1601 (PG)
determining
the
Page 3
plausibility
of
a
claim
for
relief
is
a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679.
III. DISCUSSION
The municipality argues that the majority of Torres-Vazquez’s
claims under the ADEA are barred because of a failure to comply with
administrative exhaustion requirements.
(Docket No. 6 at 6.)
We
agree.
A person seeking to file a civil action under the ADEA must first
file an administrative charge alleging unlawful discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
626(d).
See 29 U.S.C. §
In a deferral jurisdiction, such as Puerto Rico, the EEOC
charge must be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory event.
See
29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 633(b); Sánchez-Arroyo v. Puerto
Rico
Dep’t
of
Education,
842
F.
Supp.2d
416,
431
(D.P.R.
2012).
Personnel actions such as transfers are considered discrete acts of
discrimination.
Lugo v. Avon Products, Inc., 777 F.Supp.2d 275, 287
(D.P.R. 2011).
Each discrete act generates its own independent 300-
day period.
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 114-16 (2002).
Here, Torres-Vazquez’s complaint cites several inter-departmental
transfers as the basis for her ADEA claim.
However, the charge she
filed with the EEOC only lists one transfer, occurring in August of
2012.
in
her
Therefore, all of the other transfers cited by Torres-Vazquez
complaint
fail
to
comply
with
administrative
exhaustion
Civil No. 13-1601 (PG)
requirements.
Page 4
Because the applicable time period for filing claims
before the EEOC has elapsed, these earlier transfers are now timebarred.
It is worth noting, however, that Torres-Vazquez may use the
time-barred
claim.
acts
as
background
evidence
in
support
of
any
timely
Vesprini v. Shaw Contract Flooring Services, Inc., 315 F.3d
37, 42 n. 4 (1st Cir.2002) (citation omitted); see also United Air
Lines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977) (explaining that prior
acts outside the statutory period “may constitute relevant background
evidence” of employment discrimination).
The municipality further argues that the remaining August 2, 2012
transfer encounters its own share of difficulties, as Torres-Vazquez
has not argued several elements necessary for establishing a prima
facie case for her ADEA claim.
We cannot agree.
At this stage, Torres-Vazquez is not obligated to plead factual
matter sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
Rodriguez-Reyes v.
Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013)(prima facie standard
is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading standard, and there is no
need to set forth a detailed evidentiary proffer in a complaint.).
Therefore,
the
transfer
Torres-Vazquez
names
in
her
EEOC
charge
remains.
The municipality argues Torres-Vazquez failed to file a formal
complaint raising her constructive discharge claim before the EEOC.
We agree.
A plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies, including
EEOC
procedures,
before
proceeding
in
federal
court.
Frederique-
Alexandre v. Department of Natural and Environmental Resources Puerto
Civil No. 13-1601 (PG)
Page 5
Rico, 478 F.3d 433, 440 (1st Cir. 2007).
no
evidence
that
she
filed
a
charge
Here, Torres-Vazquez offers
with
the
EEOC
regarding
her
constructive discharge claim. Thus, Torres-Vazquez failed to properly
exhaust her claim of constructive discharge.
The
municipality
claims
that
Torres-Vazquez’s
political
discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are time-barred.
We agree.
In
cases
brought
pursuant
to
§
1983,
including
claims
of
political discrimination, we apply the forum jurisdiction’s statute of
limitations
period
for
personal
injury
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is one year.
actions,
which
in
the
31 P.R. Laws Ann. §5298 (2);
see also Morales Tañon v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 524 F.3d 15,
18
(2008).
We
then
apply
federal
limitations period begins to accrue.
law
to
determine
when
the
Ruiz-Sulsona v. University of
Puerto Rico, 334 F.3d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 2003).
In most instances,
the date of accrual occurs when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to
know, of the injury on which the action is based.
Id.
Here, Torres-Vazquez was last transferred on August 2, 2012—a
transfer she claims was illegal and motivated solely by her age and
political affiliation.
She filed suit for political discrimination on
August 6, 2013—one year and four days after the date of her transfer.
As such, Torres-Vazquez’s § 1983 claims for political discrimination
are time barred.
Finally, the municipality argues that Torres-Vazquez fails to
argue claims under Title VII.
We agree.
Civil No. 13-1601 (PG)
Title
VII
Page 6
prohibits
employers
from
discriminating
against
individuals because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
(1st
Cir.
Ramos-Echevarria v. Pichis, Inc., 659 F.3d 182, 186
2011).
Municipality
Here,
discriminated
however,
against
Torres-Vazquez
her
on
alleges
account
of
her
that
the
age
and
political affiliation—not her race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
As such, her Title VII claim fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
(1) The defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (Docket No. 17), is GRANTED IN
PART.
The plaintiff’s ADEA claims based on the incidents prior to the
August 2, 2012 transfer are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
constructive
discharge
claim
is
DISMISSED
WITH
The plaintiff’s
PREJUDICE.
The
plaintiff’s political discrimination claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The plaintiff’s claims brought
under Title VII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(2) The defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Docket No. 17), is DENIED IN
PART.
The plaintiff’s ADEA claim based on the 2012 incident may
proceed.
IT SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 11th, 2014.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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