Santana-Diaz et al v. Buckeye Caribbean Terminals, LLC., et al.
Filing
84
ORDER granting 45 motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff's federal law claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 1/23/2015. (TW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
DIONISIO SANTANA-DIAZ,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)
v.
METROPOLITAN
AL.,
LIFE
INSURANCE,
ET
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Dionisio Santana-Diaz brings this suit against the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company and several codefendants for denying him longterm disability benefits.
MetLife moves for summary judgment on the
grounds that Santana-Diaz’s action is time-barred.
I.
BACKGROUND
Because the Court must view all facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party when considering a summary judgment motion, to
the extent that any facts are disputed, the facts set forth below
represent the plaintiff’s version of the events.
Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
However,
where Santana-Diaz’s asserted facts do not properly comply with Local
Rule
56(c)
and
(e),
we
statements as admitted.
deem
the
defendants’
properly-supported
See Sanchez-Figueroa v. Banco Popular de
Puerto Rico, 527 F.3d 209, 213-14 (1st Cir. 2008)(affirming district
court’s decision to deem moving party’s statements of facts admitted
where
opposing
party
fails
to
comply
with
local
rules
properly).
Shell Chemical Yabucoa, Inc maintained an employee welfare benefit
Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)
Page 2
plan in compliance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (ERISA).
plan
provided
long-term
disability
employees of Shell Chemical.
disability
benefits
under
insurance
policy
issued
Santana-Diaz
worked
(Docket No. 28–3 at 32.)
healthcare
benefits
(Docket No. 66 at 4, 28.)
the
by
plan
were
provided
Metropolitan
Life
to
This
eligible
The long term
through
a
Insurance
group
Company
(MetLife).
for
Shell
Chemical
in
a
variety
of
capacities, including first as a clerk, and then later as a payroll
accountant and as a financial analyst.
coverage under the plan.
Diaz
first
complained
Santana-Diaz qualified for
(Docket No. 1 at 5.)
of
several
mental
In late 2007, Santanaand
including depression and high blood pressure.
physical
ailments,
His request for short-
term disability benefits was approved.
At the expiration of his short-term benefits coverage, SantanaDiaz
applied
for
coverage
administered by MetLife.
term
disability
MetLife.
under
the
long-term
benefits
plan
For 24 months, Santana-Diaz received long-
benefits
under
the
group
policy
administered
by
On November 22, 2010, MetLife notified Santana-Diaz that his
long-term disability benefits would be terminated.
On August 19,
2011, MetLife issued its final decision denying Santana-Diaz’s request
for
long-term
disability
benefits
on
the
grounds
that
his
health
condition did not qualify him for coverage under the terms of the
long-term disability scheme detailed in the plan.
The
group
policy
administered
by
MetLife
contains
a
360-day
elimination period – requiring proof of disability within three months
Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)
Page 3
from the end of the elimination period.
Starting with his initial
claim for short-term benefits, Santana-Diaz had until February 17,
2009 to provide MetLife with proof of ongoing disability to qualify
for continuous benefits under the plan.
He did not.
Instead, on August 18, 2013, Santana-Diaz filed this complaint in
federal district court.
(Docket No. 1.)
A few months later, in
November of 2013, Santana-Diaz filed an amended complaint.
(Docket
No.
summary
4.)
On
judgment.
(Docket
May
12,
(Docket No. 45.)
No.
54.)
Codefendant
(Docket No. 78.)
MetLife
moved
for
On June 19, 2014, Santana-Diaz opposed.
Codefendant
(Docket No. 63-1.)
of
2009,
MetLife
replied
on
July
31,
2014.
On September 1, 2014, Santana-Diaz sur-replied.
We issued an order granting the voluntary dismissal
Santana–Diaz’s
claims
against
Codefendants
Ikon
Group,
Inc.,
(Docket No. 44), and Buckeye Terminals, (Docket No. 80).
II.
Summary
evidence
judgment
demonstrate
is
that
LEGAL STANDARD
appropriate
“there
is
when
no
the
pleadings
genuine
dispute
and
as
the
to
any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
The moving party may successfully support
its motion by identifying those portions of “the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,”
which
it
believes
material fact.
demonstrate
the
absence
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
of
a
genuine
issue
of
The party seeking summary
judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence
Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)
Page 4
of a genuine dispute of material fact.
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
To determine which facts are “material,” a
court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A “genuine
issue” is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim
or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action.
Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23.
In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute of material
fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment, the Court must regard
the non-movant's statements as true and accept all evidence and make
all inferences in the non-movant's favor.
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
See Anderson v. Liberty
The non-moving party must,
however, establish more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence” in support of its position, Id. at 252, and may not rely
solely on conclusory allegations or “incredible” statements, Statchen
v. Palmer, 623 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2010).
evidence
summary
is
merely
judgment
colorable,
may
be
or
is
granted.”
(internal citations omitted).
not
Moreover, “[i]f the
significantly
Anderson,
477
U.S.
probative,
at
249-50
Summary judgment, then, is appropriate
if the non-movant fails to offer “evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [non-movant].”
Id. at 252.
III. DISCUSSION
MetLife
argues
that
(Docket No. 45 at 11.)
Congress
has
not
Santana-Diaz’s
claims
are
time
barred.
The Court agrees.
established
a
limitations
period
claims brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
for
ERISA
Santaliz-Rios
Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)
Page 5
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 57, 59 (1st Cir. 2012); see
also Island View Residential Treatment Ctr. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Mass., Inc., 548 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2008).
In deciding ERISA
claims, federal courts borrow the most closely analogous statute of
limitations in the forum state.
Edes v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 417
F.3d 133, 138 (1st Cir.2005).
However, where the plan itself provides a shorter limitations
period, that period will govern as long as it is reasonable.
Island
View,
548
F.3d
at
27(applying
a
contractually
See
agreed-upon
limitations period to ERISA claim); Rios–Coriano v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 642 F.Supp.2d 80, 83 (D.P.R.2009)(“Choosing which
state statute to borrow is unnecessary, however, where the parties
have
contractually
limitations
period
agreed
is
upon
a
limitations
period,
reasonable.”)(internal
provided
quotation
the
marks
omitted)).
Here, the plan stated that “[n]o legal action of any kind may be
filed
against
[MetLife]:
(1)
within
the
60
days
after
proof
of
Disability has been given; or (2) more than three years after proof of
Disability must be filed...”
(Docket 36-2 at 33.)
As the First
Circuit has previously found a contractual provision setting a twoyear limitations period on ERISA claims reasonable, see Island View,
548 F.3d at 27, the Court has no difficulty concluding that the threeyear period provided by the plan is also reasonable.
See Heimeshoff
v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 134 S.Ct. 604, 609 (2013) (holding
that a contractual limitations provision of three years in a long-term
disability benefits scheme governed by ERISA was enforceable); see
Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)
Page 6
also Rios–Coriano, 642 F.Supp.2d at 83 (finding three-year limitations
period on ERISA claims reasonable).
The three-year limitations period
in this case expired on February 18, 2012.
complaint
on
August
contractually
18,
2013.
agreed-upon
Because
three-year
Santana-Diaz filed his
the
Court
limitations
finds
period
that
the
applies,
Santana-Diaz’s claim is time-barred.
In opposition, Santana-Diaz argues that because the final notice
issued by MetLife did not include a statement detailing the time frame
plaintiff had to file a civil action, he is entitled to equitable
tolling.
Where
a
extraordinary
plan
participant
circumstances
prevented
equitable
Heimeshoff, 134 S.Ct. at 615.
extraordinary circumstances:
was
tolling
from
may
filing
suit
apply.
by
See
But Santana-Diaz was not laboring under
he was made aware of both the time limit
for plan participants to file legal action and how the plan calculates
time, since these matters were clearly and explicitly laid out in the
group policy.
provide
(Docket 36-2 at 31-33.)
grounds
justifying
why
As such, Santana-Diaz cannot
the
extraordinary measure of equitable tolling.
Court
should
apply
the
See Tetreault v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 769 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that
estoppel would not free a plan participant from satisfying filing
deadlines).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the MetLife’s motion for summary judgment, (Docket
No. 45), is GRANTED.
WITH PREJUDICE.
The plaintiffs’ federal law claims are DISMISSED
Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)
Page 7
IT SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 23rd, 2014.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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