Santana-Diaz et al v. Buckeye Caribbean Terminals, LLC., et al.

Filing 84

ORDER granting 45 motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff's federal law claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 1/23/2015. (TW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
DIONISIO SANTANA-DIAZ,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)

v.
METROPOLITAN
AL.,

LIFE

INSURANCE,

ET

Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Dionisio Santana-Diaz brings this suit against the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company and several codefendants for denying him longterm disability benefits.

MetLife moves for summary judgment on the

grounds that Santana-Diaz’s action is time-barred.
I.

BACKGROUND

Because the Court must view all facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party when considering a summary judgment motion, to
the extent that any facts are disputed, the facts set forth below
represent the plaintiff’s version of the events.

Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

However,

where Santana-Diaz’s asserted facts do not properly comply with Local
Rule

56(c)

and

(e),

we

statements as admitted.

deem

the

defendants’

properly-supported

See Sanchez-Figueroa v. Banco Popular de

Puerto Rico, 527 F.3d 209, 213-14 (1st Cir. 2008)(affirming district
court’s decision to deem moving party’s statements of facts admitted
where

opposing

party

fails

to

comply

with

local

rules

properly).

Shell Chemical Yabucoa, Inc maintained an employee welfare benefit

Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)

Page 2

plan in compliance with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (ERISA).
plan

provided

long-term

disability

employees of Shell Chemical.
disability

benefits

under

insurance

policy

issued

Santana-Diaz

worked

(Docket No. 28–3 at 32.)
healthcare

benefits

(Docket No. 66 at 4, 28.)
the

by

plan

were

provided

Metropolitan

Life

to

This

eligible

The long term

through

a

Insurance

group

Company

(MetLife).
for

Shell

Chemical

in

a

variety

of

capacities, including first as a clerk, and then later as a payroll
accountant and as a financial analyst.
coverage under the plan.
Diaz

first

complained

Santana-Diaz qualified for

(Docket No. 1 at 5.)
of

several

mental

In late 2007, Santanaand

including depression and high blood pressure.

physical

ailments,

His request for short-

term disability benefits was approved.
At the expiration of his short-term benefits coverage, SantanaDiaz

applied

for

coverage

administered by MetLife.
term

disability

MetLife.

under

the

long-term

benefits

plan

For 24 months, Santana-Diaz received long-

benefits

under

the

group

policy

administered

by

On November 22, 2010, MetLife notified Santana-Diaz that his

long-term disability benefits would be terminated.

On August 19,

2011, MetLife issued its final decision denying Santana-Diaz’s request
for

long-term

disability

benefits

on

the

grounds

that

his

health

condition did not qualify him for coverage under the terms of the
long-term disability scheme detailed in the plan.
The

group

policy

administered

by

MetLife

contains

a

360-day

elimination period – requiring proof of disability within three months

Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)

Page 3

from the end of the elimination period.

Starting with his initial

claim for short-term benefits, Santana-Diaz had until February 17,
2009 to provide MetLife with proof of ongoing disability to qualify
for continuous benefits under the plan.

He did not.

Instead, on August 18, 2013, Santana-Diaz filed this complaint in
federal district court.

(Docket No. 1.)

A few months later, in

November of 2013, Santana-Diaz filed an amended complaint.

(Docket

No.

summary

4.)

On

judgment.
(Docket

May

12,

(Docket No. 45.)

No.

54.)

Codefendant

(Docket No. 78.)

MetLife

moved

for

On June 19, 2014, Santana-Diaz opposed.

Codefendant

(Docket No. 63-1.)

of

2009,

MetLife

replied

on

July

31,

2014.

On September 1, 2014, Santana-Diaz sur-replied.

We issued an order granting the voluntary dismissal

Santana–Diaz’s

claims

against

Codefendants

Ikon

Group,

Inc.,

(Docket No. 44), and Buckeye Terminals, (Docket No. 80).
II.
Summary
evidence

judgment

demonstrate

is

that

LEGAL STANDARD

appropriate
“there

is

when
no

the

pleadings

genuine

dispute

and

as

the

to

any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

The moving party may successfully support

its motion by identifying those portions of “the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,”
which

it

believes

material fact.

demonstrate

the

absence

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

of

a

genuine

issue

of

The party seeking summary

judgment bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence

Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)

Page 4

of a genuine dispute of material fact.
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

To determine which facts are “material,” a

court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A “genuine

issue” is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim
or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action.

Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322-23.
In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute of material
fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment, the Court must regard
the non-movant's statements as true and accept all evidence and make
all inferences in the non-movant's favor.
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

See Anderson v. Liberty
The non-moving party must,

however, establish more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence” in support of its position, Id. at 252, and may not rely
solely on conclusory allegations or “incredible” statements, Statchen
v. Palmer, 623 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2010).
evidence
summary

is

merely

judgment

colorable,

may

be

or

is

granted.”

(internal citations omitted).

not

Moreover, “[i]f the

significantly

Anderson,

477

U.S.

probative,
at

249-50

Summary judgment, then, is appropriate

if the non-movant fails to offer “evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [non-movant].”

Id. at 252.

III. DISCUSSION
MetLife

argues

that

(Docket No. 45 at 11.)
Congress

has

not

Santana-Diaz’s

claims

are

time

barred.

The Court agrees.
established

a

limitations

period

claims brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

for

ERISA

Santaliz-Rios

Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)

Page 5

v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 57, 59 (1st Cir. 2012); see
also Island View Residential Treatment Ctr. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Mass., Inc., 548 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2008).

In deciding ERISA

claims, federal courts borrow the most closely analogous statute of
limitations in the forum state.

Edes v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 417

F.3d 133, 138 (1st Cir.2005).
However, where the plan itself provides a shorter limitations
period, that period will govern as long as it is reasonable.
Island

View,

548

F.3d

at

27(applying

a

contractually

See

agreed-upon

limitations period to ERISA claim); Rios–Coriano v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 642 F.Supp.2d 80, 83 (D.P.R.2009)(“Choosing which
state statute to borrow is unnecessary, however, where the parties
have

contractually

limitations

period

agreed
is

upon

a

limitations

period,

reasonable.”)(internal

provided

quotation

the

marks

omitted)).
Here, the plan stated that “[n]o legal action of any kind may be
filed

against

[MetLife]:

(1)

within

the

60

days

after

proof

of

Disability has been given; or (2) more than three years after proof of
Disability must be filed...”

(Docket 36-2 at 33.)

As the First

Circuit has previously found a contractual provision setting a twoyear limitations period on ERISA claims reasonable, see Island View,
548 F.3d at 27, the Court has no difficulty concluding that the threeyear period provided by the plan is also reasonable.

See Heimeshoff

v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 134 S.Ct. 604, 609 (2013) (holding
that a contractual limitations provision of three years in a long-term
disability benefits scheme governed by ERISA was enforceable); see

Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)

Page 6

also Rios–Coriano, 642 F.Supp.2d at 83 (finding three-year limitations
period on ERISA claims reasonable).

The three-year limitations period

in this case expired on February 18, 2012.
complaint

on

August

contractually

18,

2013.

agreed-upon

Because

three-year

Santana-Diaz filed his

the

Court

limitations

finds
period

that

the

applies,

Santana-Diaz’s claim is time-barred.
In opposition, Santana-Diaz argues that because the final notice
issued by MetLife did not include a statement detailing the time frame
plaintiff had to file a civil action, he is entitled to equitable
tolling.
Where

a

extraordinary

plan

participant

circumstances

prevented

equitable

Heimeshoff, 134 S.Ct. at 615.
extraordinary circumstances:

was

tolling

from
may

filing

suit

apply.

by
See

But Santana-Diaz was not laboring under
he was made aware of both the time limit

for plan participants to file legal action and how the plan calculates
time, since these matters were clearly and explicitly laid out in the
group policy.
provide

(Docket 36-2 at 31-33.)

grounds

justifying

why

As such, Santana-Diaz cannot

the

extraordinary measure of equitable tolling.

Court

should

apply

the

See Tetreault v. Reliance

Standard Life Ins. Co., 769 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that
estoppel would not free a plan participant from satisfying filing
deadlines).
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the MetLife’s motion for summary judgment, (Docket
No. 45), is GRANTED.
WITH PREJUDICE.

The plaintiffs’ federal law claims are DISMISSED

Civil No. 13-1628 (PG)

Page 7

IT SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 23rd, 2014.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE