Perez-Molina et al v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority et al

Filing 65

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. GRANTED 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Partial Judgment will be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Salvador E. Casellas on 9/23/2014. (AVB)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

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CARLOS PEREZ-MOLINA, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 13-1638 (SEC)

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v.

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PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER
AUTHORITY, ET AL.,

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

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Before the Court are defendant Eliu Cruz’s motion to dismiss, Docket # 11, and the

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plaintiffs’ opposition thereto. Docket # 16. After reviewing the filings and the applicable law,

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this motion is GRANTED.

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Background

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The plaintiffs bring this action under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA),

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advancing claims of disability-discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), and retaliation under

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§ 12203(a). Their complaint also contains pendent local-law claims under Puerto Rico Law 44,

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P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 501, which prohibits disability discrimination; Puerto Rico Law 115,

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P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194a, which bars retaliation; and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil

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Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141, Puerto Rico’s general tort statute. Docket # 1.1 The

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Insofar as the plaintiffs advance claims under “the Civil Rights Act,” Docket # 1, ¶ 1, any such
claim would fail at the starting gate. The short answer is that because this purported claim was not
pleaded as a cause of action, but, rather, briefly mentioned on the first two pages of the complaint, see
id. at 1-2, it falls miles short of meeting the plausibility standard. See Alicea v. Machete Music, 744
F.3d 773, 788 (1st Cir. 2014); Fábrica de Muebles J.J. Alvarez, Incorporado v. Inversiones Mendoza,
Inc., 682 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012); Marrero-Rodríguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 677 F.3d 497,
501 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiff’s purported Fourth Amendment claim fails to meet the pleading standards
of Iqbal [since it] was not even pled as a claim, but only mentioned on the first page of the complaint.”
(citation omitted)). That unplausible claim is therefore dismissed.

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Civ. No. 13-1638

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defendants are plaintiff Carlos Perez-Molina’s employer, the Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority, and one of Perez-Molina’s supervisors, defendant Cruz. The plaintiffs sue Cruz only
in “his personal capacity, specifically under state laws for damages caused by him against
Carlos in the case at hand.” Id. ¶ 10.
Cruz moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), maintaining that because the ADA provides for no individual liability,
the ADA claim against him must be dismissed. Docket # 11, p. 6. He then requests that the
local-law claims against him be dismissed without prejudice. Id., p. 8-9.
The plaintiffs timely opposed. Docket # 16. But their opposition nowhere discusses
Cruz’s legal defense that no individual liability attaches under the ADA. The plaintiffs
nonetheless invite the Court to retain supplemental jurisdiction over their pendent state-law
claims, in the event that their ADA claims are dismissed. Id., pp. 4-5. The Court addresses these
matters sequentially.
Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that
fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At the pleadings stage, the courts must
accept “the plaintiff's factual allegations and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's
favor.” Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To forestall dismissal, a complaint must “satisf[y] Rule
8(a)(2)’s requirement of a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing
Fed. R.Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). So, although the plaintiffs need not demonstrate likelihood of success,
their allegations must nevertheless “‘suggest more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.’” García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102-103 (1st Cir. 2013)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

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Civ. No. 13-1638

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The analysis begins with a threshold determination: Whether the ADA provides for
individual liability. The answer, per the First Circuit, is plainly no. Román-Oliveras v. Puerto
Rico Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2011); accord Dactelides v. Bd. of Sch.
Trustees of S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 562 F. App’x 534, 536-537 (7th Cir. 2014)
(unpublished); Vélez-Miranda v. Puerto Rico, No. 13-1371, 2014 WL 4063326, *2 (D.P.R.
Aug. 15, 2014);González v. Sears Holding Co., 980 F. Supp. 2d 170, 203 (D.P.R. 2013);
Márquez-Ramos v. Puerto Rico, No. 11-1547, 2012 WL 1414302, *6 (D.P.R. Apr. 2, 2012).
“Title I of the ADA, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, ‘addresses the conduct of employers
only and does not impose liability on co-workers.’” Román-Oliveras, 655 F.3d at 52 (citations
omitted).2 So because binding caselaw dictates that Cruz cannot be held liable under the ADA,
the ADA claims brought against him fail as a matter of law.3 That ends this aspect of the matter.
One last task remains. As said, Cruz also requests that the local-law claims asserted
against him be dismissed without prejudice. The plaintiffs opposed, arguing, without much in
the way of an argument, that declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their local-law
claims will “greatl[y] prejudice” them, “since they filed the case in the instant forum[,] and all
the preparation . . . [has] been done in English.” Docket # 16, pp. 4-5.
When, as here, “a plaintiff’s anchor claim is a federal cause of action and the court
unfavorably disposes of the plaintiff's federal claim at the early stages of a suit, well before trial,
the court generally dismisses any supplemental state-law claims without prejudice.”

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Even assuming, dubitante, that the plaintiffs’ ADA claims were actionable under Title II (their
complaint is silent on this score), the same result would obtain. “Title II of the ADA does not permit
lawsuits against individuals.” Márquez-Ramos v. Puerto Rico, No. 11-1547, 2012 WL 1414302, *6
(D.P.R. Apr. 2, 2012) (quoting Sindram v. Merriwether, 506 F.Supp.2d 7, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2007)).
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Of course, the same is true of plaintiffs’ retaliations claims under the ADA. Spiegel v.
Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir.2010) (finding no individual liability under ADA’s retaliation
provision).

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Civ. No. 13-1638

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Ramos-Echevarría v. Pichis, Inc., 659 F.3d 182, 191 (1st Cir. 2011). But that general principle
is not a “mandatory rule to be applied inflexibly in all cases,” Redondo Const. Corp. v.
Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), as “[d]istrict court[s] must exercise
‘informed discretion’ when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims.” Id. (quoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256-57 (1st
Cir.1996)). This determination implicates a weighing of several factors, to wit: comity, judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness. Id. (citations omitted).
The Court having evaluated these factors, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs’ state-law claims. The plaintiffs’ perfunctory, undeveloped, and frivolous
contention that they will be “greatly prejudiced” if their pendent claims are litigated in local
court is rejected out of hand, not least because this case is still at an early stage; the discovery
is still ongoing; and under the ADA, no federal interest is vindicated by permitting plaintiffs to
impermissibly haul an individual defendant into federal court. Instead, comity will be better
served by allowing the Commonwealth courts to resolve issues of individual liability under
Puerto Rico law. The pendent claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, Cruz’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 23rd day of September, 2014.
s/ Salvador E. Casellas
SALVADOR E. CASELLAS
U.S. Senior District Judge