Diaz-Carrasquillo v. Garcia-Padilla et al
Filing
142
OPINION AND ORDER denying 131 Motion for Reconsideration; denying 135 Motion requesting Order; noted 136 Motion to clarify; granting 141 Motion to Strike; and denying 141 Motion requesting Order. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Daniel R. Dominguez on 4/30/2015. (MM)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
IVAN DIAZ-CARRASQUILLO,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 13-1646 (DRD)
ALEJANDRO
al.,
GARCIA
PADILLA,
et
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending
before
the
Court
is
Defendants’
Motion
for
Reconsideration Under Rule 59(e) (Docket No. 131) arguing, inter
alias,
that
opting
to
the
Court
dismiss
committed
without
Carrasquillo’s
(“Plaintiff”)
grounds.
the
For
foregoing
a
manifest
prejudice
claims
on
reasons,
error
Plaintiff
purported
Defendants’
of
Ivan
law
by
Díaz-
abstention
motion
is
summarily DENIED.
I.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
1
On October 1, 2013, the Court entered a Second Amended Opinion and
Order (Docket No. 75) granting Plaintiff Iván Díaz-Carrasquillo’s request for
a preliminary injunction. The Court, recognizing that state law was unclear
on several issues, also certified four critical questions to the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico and stayed all further proceedings until said questions
were answered. On October 3, 2013, a transmittal letter was sent to the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court (Docket No. 76). On October 18, 2013, the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court issued a Writ of Certification (Docket No. 89-2).
On
October 24, 2013, the First Circuit Court of Appeals’ record was supplemented
to show that the Supreme Court had accepted this Court’s certification
request. See Docket No. 90.
Notwithstanding, the First Circuit entered its opinion on April 16,
2014, approximately nine weeks before the P.R. Supreme Court emitted its
decision. Hence, the First Circuit Court of Appeals did not stay its hand,
much to the dismay of Associate Justice Rafael L. Martínez Torres, who filed
1
On June 19, 2014, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico emitted
its Opinion (Docket Nos. 103 and 109-1) pursuant to the petition
for Inter-jurisdiction
Therein,
the
Supreme
Certification requested by this Court.
Court
of
Puerto
Rico,
the
highest
interpreters of Puerto Rico state law, concluded that Plaintiff
Ivan Díaz Carrasquillo “has a proprietary interest throughout
the duration of his appointment,” thereby signifying that he may
only
be
removed
from
his
position
removal established by law.
Supreme
Court
Immunity
further
cannot
limit
held
the
Plaintiff
is
entitled
to
stressed
that
“when
the
solely
for
the
causes
See Docket No. 190-1, at 1.
that
the
Doctrine
proprietary
under
the
right
laws
Legislative
of
of
The
Legislative
to
Puerto
Assembly
of
which
the
Rico
and
eliminated
a
position and created another one with a different name, but
maintains the rights and obligations of the former, the official
who holds it does not lose the proprietary interest of said
position.”
Id. at 1-2.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the Plaintiff’s position,
as determined by this Court, is neither quasi-legislative or
a concurring opinion in the case before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. See
Docket No. 103-4 (emphasizing that cooperation amongst brother jurisdictions
was dissipated in the case at bar and stressing that judicial deference
amongst jurisdictions constitutes a two-way avenue). Therein, Justice
Martínez Torres stresses that “[s]peculation by a federal court about the
meaning of a state statute in the absence of prior state court adjudication
is particularly gratuitous when . . . the state courts stand willing to
address questions of state law on certification from federal court.”
Id.
(quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79
(1997))(internal quotations omitted).
2
quasi-judicial
but
rather
one
involving
hybrid
functions,
meaning that the “Governor may be required to prove just cause
for
his
removal,”
an
important
aspect
lacking
Legislative Assembly’s removal of the Plaintiff.
from
the
Id. at 17.
Further, the Supreme Court was unpersuaded by Defendants’
argument
that
the
Advocate
for
Persons
with
Disabilities
position was lawfully abolished when the Legislative Assembly
passed
Law
No.
Defendants,
the
75-2013
Puerto
and
Law
Rico
No.
78-2013.
Legislature
According
was
intent
to
on
restructuring the “offices of the various ombudsmen who provide
for and protect the rights of the veterans, the elderly, health,
and the people with disabilities,” with the goal of operating
these
offices
independently
from
Administration of the Ombudsmen.
the
Office
of
the
Docket No. 99, at 4.
The
Supreme Court essentially concluded that the restructuring plan,
which created a new position almost identical to the one held by
Plaintiff, did not abolish Plaintiff’s position and, thus, a
just
cause
lawful.
determination
See
Docket
No.
had
to
109-1,
be
at
made
28—32.
before
removal
Hence,
was
Plaintiff
“could only be removed after being given notice and a hearing
for having been negligent in the performance of his functions,
3
having
failed
to
comply
with
his
duty
or
having
engaged
in
Id. at 28.2
improper conduct.”
On December 15, 2014, the Court entered an
Opinion and
Order (Docket No. 127) staying the case for ten (10) business
days to give Plaintiff Iván Díaz-Carrasquillo an opportunity to
file suit in state court.
The Court held that a federal case
was no longer necessary as a result of the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court decision, and emphasized that it did not want to create
any
potential
discord
federal courts.
or
lack
of
comity
between
state
and
The Court reasoned that, following the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court’s decision on June 19, 2014, Plaintiff had an
adequate remedy at law in a more appropriate forum, stressing
that
federal
courts
must
stay
their
hand
in
cases
of
this
nature.
On January 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion In Compliance
With
Order
(Docket
No.
130)
indicating
that
it
had
filed
a
complaint seeking injunctive relief before the Superior Court of
San Juan (Civil Case No. 2015-0002).3
2
Plaintiff also requested
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico emphasized that the role of the Advocate
for Persons with Disabilities is not only to scrutinize and optimize the
services offered to persons with disabilities, but also to investigate and
process private and public agencies who violate the rights of persons with
disabilities. Docket No. 109-1, at 27. The Legislative Assembly found the
Advocate’s role to be so essential that it “issued the position a term of ten
(10) years, so that the Advocate could exercise his functions without the
pressure
and
political
swings
that
affect
the
positions
that
are
circumscribed to the term of appointment of a governor.” Id. at 28.
3
On December 30, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request for a brief
extension of time to file the state complaint. See Docket No. 129.
4
that the stay remain in place for an additional thirty (30)
days.
On
January
12,
2015,
Defendants
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration Under Rule 59(e) (Docket No. 131) arguing that
the
Court
relinquish
committed
its
a
manifest
jurisdiction
error
to
the
of
law
state
in
opting
courts.
to
Hence,
Defendants request that the Court decide its renewed motion to
dismiss on the merits and enter judgment in its favor dismissing
with prejudice the instant complaint.
On
January
29,
2015,
the
Court
granted
March 2, 2015 to respond to Defendants’ motion.
Plaintiff
until
See Docket No.
134.
On
Entry
March
of
3,
Judgment
(Docket No. 136).
2015,
Defendants
(Docket
No.
filed
135)
and
a
a
Motion
Motion
Requesting
to
Clarify
In essence, Defendants requested that their
motion for reconsideration be deemed unopposed, and urged the
Court to enter judgment on its behalf.
On
March
3,
2015,
Plaintiff
filed
another
Motion
for
Extension of Time (Docket No. 137) until March 9, 2015 to file
its reply.
On March 4, 2015, Defendants opposed said request.
Court
agreed,
and
denied
Plaintiff’s
time.
See Docket No. 138 and 139.
5
request
for
The
additional
Notwithstanding,
on
March
9,
2015,
Plaintiff
filed
its
response (Docket No. 140) in opposition to the pending motion
for reconsideration.
(Docket
No.
141)
Unsurprisingly, Defendants filed a motion
seeking
to
strike
Plaintiff’s
response
and
requesting the Court decide the motion for reconsideration in
its favor.4
On
April
1,
2015,
the
First
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
entered its Opinion in Montañez-Allman v. García-Padilla, Civil
Case No. 13-1683 (PG).
See Montañez-Allman v. García-Padilla,
782 F.3d 42, 2015 WL 1455141 (1st Cir. 2015).5
The Montañez-
Allman plaintiff was the former veteran’s ombudsman, one of the
four individuals removed from their position as a result of Law
75-2013 (“Law 75”).
In its opinion, the Court noted that its
decision in Díaz-Carrasquillo v. García-Padilla, 750 F.3d 7 (1st
Cir. 2014), was undertaken before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
decision issued on June 19, 2014.
As a result of the decision
undertaken by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, the First Circuit
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
vacate the preliminary injunction within thirty days in order to
4
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s response in opposition at
Docket No. 140 was untimely. The Court had granted Plaintiff until March 2,
2015 to file its motion and denied its request for a further extension of
time. Hence, Defendants’ motion at Docket No. 141 is hereby granted in part
and denied in part.
Specifically, Defendants’ request to strike Docket No.
140 is granted, but its request for the entry of judgment in its favor is
denied.
5
The Court, hereinafter, uses the Westlaw citation, as the pages on the
Federal Reporter, Third Series, have not yet been identified.
6
provide plaintiff time to file suit and seek an injunction in
state court.
In so holding, the First Circuit cited this Court
Opinion and Order in the instant case dated December 15, 2014,
emphasizing that comity concerns weighed in favor of dismissing
plaintiff’s injunctive request without prejudice.
The First Circuit, citing El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon,
963
F.2d
488
(1st
Cir.
1992),
further
stressed
that
the
plaintiff would not suffer irreparable injury if denied federal
equitable relief, as there is an equivalent remedy available in
state court.
be
Hence, “[s]imply because an equitable remedy may
available
does
automatically issue.”
not
necessarily
mean
that
it
must
Montañez-Allman, 2015 WL 1455141 at *3
(citing El Dia, 963 F.2d at 4970).
II.
ANALYSIS
It is well recognized that “[a] motion for reconsideration
. . . certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence
or
advance
new
arguments
that
could
or
should
presented to the district court prior to judgment.”
have
been
Marks 3-
Zet-Ernst Marks GMBH & Co. KG v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7, 1516 (1st Cir. 2006).
be
used
as
adjudicated.
a
Thus, a motion for reconsideration cannot
vehicle
to
re-litigate
matters
previously
See Standard Quimica De Venezuela v. Cent. Hispano
Int’l, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 202, n. 4 (D.P.R. 1999).
7
Motions for reconsideration are entertained by courts if
they
seek
to
correct
manifest
errors
of
law,
present
newly
discovered evidence, or when there is an intervening change in
law.
See Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 2008);
see also Rivera Surillo & Co. v. Falconer Glass Indus., Inc., 37
F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1994)(citing F.D.I.C. Ins. Co. v. World
University, Inc., 978 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992)).
A motion
for reconsideration is unavailable if said request simply brings
forth
a
point
of
disagreement
between
the
court
and
the
litigant, or rehashes matters already properly disposed of by
the Court.
See e.g., Waye v. First Citizen’s Nat’l Bank, 846 F.
Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
In the case at bar, Defendants’ motion merely brings forth
a point of disagreement between the Court and the losing party,
failing to set forth any new evidence, showing a manifest error
of law or fact, or demonstrating a change in law.
We briefly
explain.
The
thrust
of
Defendants’
argument
in
support
of
reconsideration is that the Court committed a manifest error of
law by dismissing Plaintiff’s causes of action without prejudice
in
order
for
proceedings.
state
courts
to
adjudicate
over
the
instant
This argument was quickly put to rest by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, who adopted this Court’s approach in
Montañez-Allman, supra, noting, on several occasions, that the
8
factual
and
legal
scenarios
presented
in
Montañez-Allman
are
almost identical to the ones presented here.
For starters, the First Circuit stressed that it need not
decide
whether
binding
or
the
merely
Puerto
Rico
advisory,
Supreme
“because,
Court’s
in
opinion
either
case,
was
it
provides persuasive authority of how the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court would likely decide the issue.”
Montañez-Allman, 2015 WL
1455141 at *3 (citing United States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64, 66
(1st Cir. 2001) and Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d
1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1996)).6
It thus relied on the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court’s determination that Plaintiff Díaz-Carrasquillo
had
a
proprietary
interest
in
his
ombudsman
position
in
concluding that Agustin Montañez-Allman had an adequate remedy
in state court.
In the Montañez-Allman opinion, the First Circuit based its
decision
in
large
part
on
comity
grounds,
accentuating
that
federal courts shall not issue injunctions “against officers of
a State . . .
necessary
to
unless in a case reasonably free from doubt when
prevent
great
and
(quoting Mass. State Grange v.
(1926)).
irreparable
injury.”
Id.
Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 527-29
The Court further explained that Agustin Montañez-
Allman would not suffer irreparable injury if denied federal
6
The Court strenuously believes that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s opinion
is not merely persuasive, but rather binding authority as to all state law
issues.
9
injunctive relief in light of the relief now available in Puerto
Rico under Díaz-Carrasquillo.
As
we
previously
Id.
explained,
federal
courts
may
exercise
wide discretion in restraining their authority to avoid needless
friction with state policies.
Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
The goals of comity and
federalism will thus be better served if the Court defers ruling
on the instant case, particularly given the immense importance
of this case to the Commonwealth’s own constitutional balance of
powers and the relief now available to Plaintiff in state court.
Therefore,
in
cases
such
as
this,
where
a
plaintiff
has
an
adequate remedy at law in a more appropriate forum, “denial of a
federal anodyne would [work] no irreparable injury.”
El Dia,
Inc.,
rush
963
F.2d
at
498
(“Federal
courts
should
not
to
judgment when declaratory relief would produce ‘uncoordinated
and unnecessarily disruptive adjudications of disputes in which
state and federal issues are intertwined.’”)(quoting Geni-Chlor
Int’l, Inc. v. Multisonics Dev. Corp., 580 F.2d 981, 985 (9th
Cir. 1978)).
declaratory
Further, a federal court should not grant federal
relief
in
cases
when
the
moving
adequate remedy at law in the state forum.
because
an
equitable
remedy
may
be
party
has
an
Id. at 497 (“Simply
available
does
not
necessarily mean that it must automatically issue.”)(internal
citations omitted).
10
Additionally, should Plaintiff prevail, the remedy sought
under
federal
Carrasquillo’s
law
becomes
original
absolutely
complaint
moot.
requested
Plaintiff
monetary
Díaz-
damages
under the First Amendment for political discrimination, which
the District Court asked Plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice.7
Plaintiff agreed with the Court’s recommendation, and filed an
amended
complaint
prejudice.
withdrawing
all
monetary
requests
without
The First Amendment and the consequential potential
damages have thus disappeared from the complaint, as well as the
necessity to conduct a jury trial, as the only the equitable
remedy of injunctive relief based on due process, which has
already
been
decided
in
Plaintiff’s
favor,
remains.
Hence,
unlike the plaintiff in Montañez-Allman, injunctive relief is
the only remedy available to Plaintiff Díaz-Carrasquillo in the
case
at
bar,
and
that
issue
has
Plaintiff’s favor under local law.
already
been
decided
in
Furthermore, Defendants have
not yet answered the complaint. As such, all state and federal
causes
of
actions
are
reasonably
dismissed
without
prejudice
once the Court dismisses the federal causes of action.
See
Rodríguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1176 (1st Cir.
1995)(finding
that
dismissal
of
supplemental
state
actions
without prejudice is appropriate where there is an “unfavorable
7
The Court was under the impression that a due process violation constituted
a faster remedy, as Plaintiff’s position was for a specific term of ten
years, identical to the term established by prior and current legislation.
11
disposition
Figueroa
of
v.
a
plaintiff's
Alejandro,
597
federal
F.3d
claims”
423,
431
before
n.10
trial);
(1st
Cir.
2010)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
According,
in
light
of
the
holding
in
Montañez-Allman,
Defendants’ contention that the Court committed a manifest error
of law in its Opinion and Order (Docket No. 127) must fail.
III.
For
the
aforementioned
Reconsideration
DENIED.
Under
Rule
CONCLUSION
reasons,
59(e)
Defendants’
(Docket
No.
Motion
131)
is
for
hereby
The instant case shall continue, without further delay,
in state court.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 30th day of April, 2015.
/S/ DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ
DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ
U.S. District Judge
12
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