Hernandez-Echevarria v. Walgreens of Puerto Rico, Inc.

Filing 79

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 66 MOTION for Reconsideration re 62 Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Jay A. Garcia-Gregory on 8/4/2015.(CLM)

   IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT  
FOR  THE  DISTRICT  OF  PUERTO  RICO  

YARELIS  HERNANDEZ-­‐ECHEVARRIA,    

Plaintiff,  

v.  

WALGREENS  DE  PUERTO  RICO,  INC.,    

Defendants.  

CIVIL  NO.  13-­‐1757(JAG)  

OPINION  AND  ORDER  

GARCIA-­‐GREGORY,  D.J.  

On   July   15,   2015,   the   Court   denied   a   Motion   for   Summary   Judgment   filed   by  
Walgreens   de   Puerto   Rico,   Inc.   (“Defendant”)   and   entered   summary   judgment   in   favor   of  
Yarelis   Hernandez-­‐Echevarria   (“Plaintiff”)   only   as   to   her   claim   for   failure   to   provide  
reasonable   accommodation.   Docket   No.   62.   Pending   before   the   Court   is   a   Motion   for  
Reconsideration  filed  on  July  21,  2015  by  Defendant.  Docket  No.  66.  Plaintiff  filed  a  timely  
Opposition   to   the   Motion   for   Reconsideration   on   July   30,   2015.   Docket   No.   75.   For   the  
reasons   outlined   below,   Defendant’s   Motion   for   Reconsideration   is   granted   in   part   and  
denied  in  part.    
DISCUSSION  

Rather  than  concise  and  direct,  Defendant  opted  to  be  largely  repetitive  throughout  
its  thirty-­‐one  page  Motion  for  Reconsideration.  First,  Defendant  claims  that  the  Court’s   sua  

sponte   grant   of   summary   judgment   in   favor   of   Plaintiff   as   to   her   failure   to   accommodate  

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claim   violated   Defendant’s   due   process   rights.   Docket   No.   66   at   2-­‐7.   Second,   Defendant  
argues  that  the  record  establishes  that  Guillermo  Rios  (“Rios”),  Elaine  Objio  (“Objio”),  and  
Frank  Bear  (“Bear”)  made  the  decision  to  terminate  Plaintiff  on  July  25,  2012.   Id.  at  7-­‐12.  
Third,   Defendant   contends   that   it   did   not   have   a   duty   to   entertain   Plaintiff’s   request   for  
reasonable   accommodation   because   Rios   and   Objio   had   already   made   the   decision   to  
terminate   her.   Id.   at   12-­‐17.   Fourth,   Defendant   asserts   that   the   Court   established   various  
facts  as  uncontested,  although  these  were  never  conceded  or  admitted.  Id.  at  18-­‐21.    
Fifth,   Defendant   claims   that   the   Court   erroneously   concluded   that   Plaintiff   was   a  
qualified  individual  with  a  disability  under  the  Americans  with  Disabilities  Act  (“ADA”).   Id.  
at   21-­‐24.   Sixth,   Defendant   suggests   that   the   Court   erroneously   held   that   an   ADA   plaintiff  
need   only   show   that   her   disability   was   a   motivating   factor,   as   opposed   to   the   motivating  
factor,   of   the   alleged   adverse   decision.   Id.   at   24-­‐27.   Seventh,   Defendant   argues   that   the  
Court  failed  to  properly  analyze  its  non-­‐discriminatory  reasons  for  Plaintiff’s  termination.  

Id.   at   27.   Finally,   Defendant   asserts   that   the   Court   erroneously   concluded   that   the  
Faragher/Ellerth   defense   to   Plaintiff’s   disability-­‐based   harassment   did   not   apply   in   this  
case.   Id.   at   27-­‐   29.   With   this   in   mind,   the   Court   now   proceeds   to   analyze   the   parties’  
arguments  concerning  the  July  15  Opinion  and  Order.    
I.

Establishing   Facts   for   Purposes   of   the   Motion   for   Summary  
Judgment  

Defendant   argues   on   several   occasions   that   the   Court   has   made   "unsupported   and  
spontaneous  conclusions”  that  have  effectively  deprived  Defendant  of  a  fair  opportunity  to  
present   its   evidence   at   trial.   See,   e.g.,   id.   at   5-­‐6.     According   to   Defendant,   the   Court   has  
committed   a   “manifest   injustice”   in   establishing   certain   facts   as   undisputed   beyond   the  

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summary  judgment  context.  See  id.  at  7.  Defendant  also  states  that  the  Court’s  findings  have  
caused   an   “immediate   and   extreme   prejudice   and   harm”   to   its   position   by   prejudging  
matters  that  belong  to  a  jury.  Id.  at  6.    
The   Court   disagrees   with   Defendant’s   characterization   of   the   Opinion   and   Order’s  
analysis.   Far   from   being   “unsupported”   or   “spontaneous,”   the   Court’s   conclusions   were  
properly  grounded  in  the  summary  judgment  record  as  developed  by  the  parties.  Whether  
it  was  because  of  strategy,  negligence,  or  lack  of  evidence,  the  Court  notes  that  Defendant  
conceded   or   failed   to   oppose   many   facts   that   made   particularly   clear   that   Defendant   was  
not   entitled   to   judgment   as   a   matter   of   law.   Interestingly   enough,   Defendant   included   a  
somewhat   vague   and   ambiguous   footnote   indicating   that   “[a]ny   statement   of   fact   which  
would  be  contrary  to  Walgreens’  position  in  this  case  are  exclusively  taken  as  true  for  the  
limited   purpose   of   the   instant   motion   for   summary   judgment.”   Docket   No.   26   at   1   n.1.   In  
other   words,   Defendant   seems   to   claim   that   its   concessions   or   omissions   should   only   be  
considered  for  summary  judgment  purposes.    
Despite  the  footnote’s  vagueness,  the  Court  recognizes  that  Defendant  is  entitled  to  
assume   Plaintiff’s   version   of   the   facts   as   true   and   still   ask   the   Court   to   enter   summary  
judgment  in  its  favor.  The  Court  also  understands  Defendant’s  concerns  that  any  finding  or  
conclusion   beyond   the   summary   judgment   context   could   affect   Defendant’s   ability   to  
present  its  case  at  trial.  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  56  allows  courts  to  “properly  decide  that  the  cost  of  
determining   whether   some   potential   fact   disputes   may   be   eliminated   by   summary  
disposition   is   greater   than   the   cost   of   resolving   those   disputes   by   other   means,   including  
trial.”  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  56(g)  advisory  committee’s  note.  In  light  of  Defendant’s  footnote,  this  
might   be   such   a   case.   Therefore,   the   Court   would   like   to   clarify   that   its   analysis   of   the  

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record   in   the   instant   case   was   only   for   purposes   of   Defendant’s   Motion   for   Summary  
Judgment.   Id.   (“Even   if   the   court   believes   that   a   fact   is   not   genuinely   in   dispute   it   may  
refrain  from  ordering  that  the  fact  be  treated  as  established.  The  court  may  conclude  that  it  
is  better  to  leave  open  for  trial  facts  and  issues  that  may  be  better  illuminated  by  the  trial  of  
related  facts  that  must  be  tried  in  any  event.”).    
II.

Sua   Sponte   Grant   of   Summary   Judgment   –   Failure   to  
Accommodate  Claim    

Notice  and  Procedural  Prejudice  
Defendant  claims  that  the  Court’s  grant  of  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Plaintiff  as  
to   her   failure   to   accommodate   claim   violated   Defendant’s   due   process   rights.   Specifically,  
Defendant   indicates   that   the   Court   expressly   recognized   in   its   July   15   Opinion   and   Order  
that   no   notice   was   provided.   Id.   at   3.   According   to   Defendant,   the   absence   of   notice   is  
sufficient  grounds  for  reversal.  Id.  Both  statements  are  false.    
First,  the  Court  never  acknowledged  that  Defendant  did  not  have  notice.  The  Court  
merely  stated  that  “[e]ven  if  Defendant  was  not  on  notice  that  summary  judgment  could  be  
entered   in   favor   of   Plaintiff,   Defendant,   as   the   moving   party,   had   the   duty   to   support   its  
position   as   a   matter   of   law   and   therefore   had   a   chance   .   .   .   to   present   its   evidence   on   the  
essential   elements   of   the   claim.”   Docket   No.   62   at   18   n.6   (citations   omitted)   (internal  
quotation  marks  omitted)  (emphasis  added).  Second  and  more  importantly,  lack  of  notice  
by   itself   is   not   sufficient   grounds   for   reversal.   As   Plaintiff   correctly   points   out   in   her  
Opposition,   Defendant   failed   to   show   that   it   was   procedurally   prejudiced   by   the   lack   of  
adequate  notice.  Docket  No.  75  at  4.  The  First  Circuit  has  clearly  stated  that  if  the  party  was  
not  deprived  of  the  opportunity  “to  present  evidence  in  support  of  its  position  as  a  result  of  

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the  unfair  surprise,”  then  it  follows  that  the  “failure  to  provide  notice  is  harmless  error  and  
a  remand  would  be  futile.”   P.R.  Electric  Power  Auth.  v.  Action  Refund,  515  F.3d  57,  64  (1st  
Cir.  2008);  see  also  Vives  v.  Fajardo,  472  F.3d  19,  22  (1st  Cir.  2007).    
In   the   instant   case,   Defendant   moved   for   summary   judgment   as   to   this   very   claim  
and,   thus,   had   both   the   opportunity   and   duty   to   demonstrate   that   it   was   entitled   to  
judgment   as   a   matter   of   law.   Moreover,   in   its   Motion   for   Summary   Judgment,   Defendant  
discussed   each   of   the   elements   of   Plaintiff’s   failure   to   accommodate   claim   at   length.     See  
Docket   No.   26.   Finally,   Defendant’s   position   becomes   even   less   credible   considering   that  
Defendant  filed  a  Motion  for  Reconsideration  that  once  again  discusses  at  length  Plaintiff’s  
failure   to   accommodate   claim.   See   Docket   No.   66   at   2-­‐18.   Therefore,   the   Court   disagrees  
with  Defendant’s  contention  that  its  due  process  rights  were  violated.    
Analysis  of  Plaintiff’s  Failure  to  Accommodate  Claim  

As   the   Court’s   July   15   Opinion   and   Order   clearly   states,   a   plaintiff   asserting   a  

reasonable  accommodation  claim  must  show  that  (1)  she  is  a  disabled  individual  under  the  
ADA,  (2)  that  is  otherwise  qualified,  and  (3)  “that  the  defendant  employer  knew  about  her  
disability   and   failed   to   provide   reasonable   accommodation.”   Docket   No.   62   at   16   (citing  

Valle   Arce   v.   Puerto   Rico   Ports   Authority,   651   F.3d   190,   198   (1st   Cir.   2011).   The   Court  
found   then   that   there   was   sufficient   evidence   in   the   record   to   conclude   at   this   stage   that  
Plaintiff  was  both  disabled  and  qualified  within  the  meaning  of  the  ADA.  Id.  at  16.    
In   its   Motion   for   Reconsideration,   Defendant   argues   that   the   Court   concluded   that  
since  Plaintiff  had  a  mental  impairment,  it  necessarily  followed  that  she  was  substantially  
limited  from  performing  major  life  activities  and,  thus,  disabled  within  the  ADA’s  meaning.  
Docket   No.   66   at   22.   This   cannot   be   further   from   the   truth.   The   Court   clearly   considered  

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Plaintiff’s   evidence   that   her   major   depressive   disorder   affected   “her   ability   to   work,  
concentrate,  think,  take  care  of  herself,  do  housework,  eat,  and  sleep.”  Docket  No.  62  at  9-­‐
10.   Defendant   even   admits   that   Plaintiff   was   substantially   limited   in   several   major   life  
activities,  particularly  her  inability  to  work.  See  Docket  No.  26-­‐1  at  6.  Defendant  now  claims  
that  because  Plaintiff  was  working  prior  to  her  termination  and  during  some  of  the  alleged  
adverse  acts,  she  was  not  substantially  limited.  Docket  No.  66  at  22.  Defendant’s  argument,  
however,   misses   the   point.   It   is   clearly   established   that   “an   impairment   can   substantially  
limit  a  major  life  activity,   even  though  the  plaintiff  is  still  able  to  engage  in  the  activity  to  

some  extent.”   Calero-­‐Cerezo  v.  U.S.  Dept.  of  Justice,  355  F.3d  6,  22  (1st  Cir.  2004).  Such  is  
the   case   here.   See   ADA   Amendment   Act,   110   P.L.   §   2(b)(5),   122   Stat.   3553,   3354   (2008)  
(stating  that  “the  question  of  whether  an  individual’s  impairment  is  a  disability  under  the  
ADA  should  not  demand  extensive  analysis”).    

The  Court  did  not  consider  necessary  in  its  July  15  Opinion  and  Order  to  determine  

whether   Plaintiff   was   disabled   under   the   ADA   under   the   last   two   prongs   —namely,  
whether   she   had   a   “record   of”   her   mental   impairment   or   whether   she   was   “regard   as”  
having   such   an   impairment.   Docket   No.   62   at   9   (citing   42   U.S.C.   §   12102).   Given  
Defendant’s  position  with  respect  to  the  Court’s  disability  analysis,  the  Court  would  like  to  
add  that  there  is  sufficient  evidence  in  the  record  —i.e.,  medical  certificates,  statements  by  
fellow   employees,   history   of   antidepressants,   and   hospitalization—to   find   that   Plaintiff  
either  had  a  record  of  depression  or  was  regarded  as  having  a  disability.  This  evidence  was  
discussed  extensively  throughout  the  July  15  Opinion  and  Order.    

With   respect   to   the   Court’s   qualification   analysis,   Defendant   essentially   rehashes  

those  arguments  already  raised  in  its  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment.  Docket  No.  66  at  23-­‐

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24.  Since  an  absolute  majority  of  Plaintiff’s  absences  were  due  to  her  disability,  it  would  be  
improper  and  illogical  to  consider  these  absences  as  proof  that  Plaintiff  was  not  qualified  to  
perform   her   job   functions.   Docket   No.   62   at   13.   The   Court   already   addressed   these  
arguments  and  will  not  repeat  itself.  

Since   there   is   sufficient   evidence   in   the   record   for   Plaintiff   to   show   that   she   was  

both  disabled  and  qualified  within  the  meaning  of  the  ADA,  the  Court  must  now  determine  
whether   Plaintiff   can   establish   the   third   element   of   her   reasonable   accommodation   claim  
—namely,   whether   Defendant   knew   about   Plaintiff’s   disability   and   failed   to   provide  
reasonable  accommodation.  The  Court  entered  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Plaintiff  as  to  
her   reasonable   accommodation   claim   on   the   basis   that   Defendant   failed   to   dispute   its  
knowledge   of   Plaintiff’s   medical   condition   when   she   made   her   request   for   reasonable  
accommodation.   Id.   at   18.   In   doing   so,   the   Court   essentially   found   certain   facts   as  
established   beyond   the   summary   judgment   context.   The   Court,   however,   recognizes   that  
the  sua  sponte  entry  of  summary  judgment  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  Court’s  finding  in  
the  July  15  Opinion  and  Order  that  there  is  a  genuine  issue  of  fact  as  to  whether  Rios  and  
Objio  knew  about  Plaintiff’s  disability  at  the  time  of  the  various  alleged  discriminatory  acts.  

Id.  at  15.    
Given  the  Court’s  decision  that  it  will  not  find  facts  as  established  pursuant  to  Fed.  R.  
Civ.  P.  56(g),  the  Court  hereby  reverses  its  decision  to  enter  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  
Plaintiff  as  to  this  claim.  Since  Plaintiff  has  proffered  evidence  of  medical  certificates  dated  
prior  to  July  29,  2012,  it  follows  that  Defendant  is  not  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  
law  and  it  is  for  the  jury  to  decide  whether  Defendant  had  knowledge  of  Plaintiff’s  disability  
when  she  made  the  request  for  reasonable  accommodation  and  when  she  was  terminated.    

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Moreover,  Defendant  will  have  “the  opportunity  to  show  that  the  proposed  accommodation  
would   impose   an   undue   hardship.”   Valle-­‐Arce,   651   F.3d   at   198   n.7   (citing   Freadman   v.  

Metro  Prop.  &  Cas.  Ins.  Co.,  484  F.3d  91,  103  (1st  Cir.  2007)).    
Plaintiff’s  Termination  and  Defendant’s  Duty  to  Accommodate    

Defendant  argues  that  it  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law  as  to  this  claim  

because  there  was  no  duty  to  entertain  Plaintiff’s  request  for  accommodation  once  Rios  and  
Objio   made   the   decision   to   terminate   her.   Docket   No.   66   at   12-­‐17.   The   Court   once   again  
rejects  this  argument.    First,  as  stated  in  the  Court’s  July  15  Opinion  and  Order,  Defendant’s  
position   that   Rios   and   Objio   made   the   decision   to   terminate   Plaintiff   on   July   25   is  
unsupported   by   the   record.   Docket   No.   62   at   17   n.4.   Contrary   to   Defendant’s   allegations,  
the   Court   never   made   any   determination   as   to   the   date   in   which   the   decision   was   made.  
The  Court  only  assumed   arguendo   that  the  decision  was  made  on  July  25.   Id.  In  its  Motion  
for   Reconsideration,   Defendants   provide   a   five-­‐page   chart   with   evidence   that   allegedly  
shows  that  the  decision  to  terminate  Plaintiff  was  in  fact  made  on  July  25.  Docket  No.  66  at  
9-­‐12.     Nonetheless,   Bear’s   July   25   email   agreeing   with   Rios   and   Objio’s   position   that  
Plaintiff  should  be  terminated  does  not  in  fact  show  that  the  decision  to  terminate  Plaintiff  
was  made  then.  It  is  certainly  possible  that  Rios  and  Objio  could  have  changed  their  mind,  
especially   considering   the   fact   that   Plaintiff   was   not   notified   of   her   termination   until  
September  4.  Therefore,  there  is  a  genuine  issue  of  fact  as  to  when  Rios  and  Objio  made  the  
decision  to  terminate  Plaintiff.  This  issue  of  fact,  however,  is  immaterial.1      
1  Plaintiff  claims  that  no  reasonable  jury  can  conclude  that  the  decision  to  terminate  her  was  made  by  July  25,  

2012.  Docket  No.  75  at  10.  Not  only  did  Plaintiff  fail  to  make  this  argument  in  her  Opposition  to  Defendant’s  
Motion  for  Summary  Judgment,  but  also,  it  completely  misses  the  point.  A  jury  could  certainly  conclude  from  
Bear’s   email   that   Rios   and   Objio   made   the   decision   to   terminate   Plaintiff   on   July   25.   Interestingly   enough,  
Plaintiff  fails  to  argue  that  Defendant  had  a  duty  to  entertain  her  request  for  accommodation  because  she  was  
not  effectively  terminated  at  the  time  when  she  made  the  request.    

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As  the  Court  already  stated,  the  date  of  the  decision  is  immaterial  since  Plaintiff  was  

not   notified   of   her   termination   until   September   4,   well   after   she   made   her   request   for  
reasonable  accommodation  and  even  after  she  was  allowed  to  come  to  work  after  her  leave  
of  absence.  Docket  No.  62  at  17.  Defendant  cites  various  cases  for  the  proposition  that  it  did  
not   have   a   duty   to   entertain   Plaintiff’s   request   because   Rios   and   Objio   had   already   made  
the   decision   to   terminate   her.2   These   cases,   however,   do   not   stand   for   Defendant’s  
proposition.  In  fact,  Defendant’s  reading  of  these  cases  is  perplexing.  These  cases  are  easily  
distinguishable  and,  if  anything,  support  the  Court’s  analysis.    
In   Green   v.   Medco   Health   Solutions   of   Texas,   LLC,   the   plaintiff   was   awaiting   the  
results  of  her  final  appeal  to  receive  short-­‐term  disability  benefits  “to  determine  if  any  of  
[her]  absences  would  be  deemed  excused  and  thus  her  termination  unwarranted  under  the  
[company’s]  attendance  policy.”  947  F.  Supp.  2d  712,  728  (N.D.  Tex.  2013).  It  was  clear  in  
that   case   that   “Plaintiff   was   effectively   terminated,   when   her   appeal   was   denied.”   Id.  
(emphasis  added).  Since  the  plaintiff  filed  her  request  for  accommodations  “five  days  after  
she  learned  that  none  of  her  absences  would  be  excused,”  the  court  found  in  Green  that  her  
request   was   untimely   and   that   defendant   did   not   have   a   duty   to   entertain   plaintiff’s  
request.   Id.   In   the   instant   case,   there   is   no   evidence   that   Plaintiff   was   “effectively  
terminated”   or  had  reason  to  know  that  she  was  “effectively  terminated”  at  the  time  when  
she  requested  accommodations.  It  cannot  be  seriously  argued  that  a  “decision”  to  terminate  
an  employee  constitutes  an  “effective  termination”  of  said  employee,  especially  when  there  
is  no  evidence  that  the  employee  had  notice  of  the  adverse  decision.3      

2  None  of  these  cases  are  binding  U.S.  Supreme  Court  or  First  Circuit  decisions.    
3   By   “decision,”   Defendant   seems   to   mean   nothing   more   than   the   subjective   choice   that   Plaintiff   had   to   be  

terminated.  It  follows  that  there  was  no  concrete  act  of  termination  in  this  case  until  Plaintiff  was  notified  of  

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Unlike   the   plaintiff   in   Green,   Plaintiff   was   allowed   to   return   from   her   leave   of  
absence   prior   to   her   effective   termination.   Therefore,   Green   bolsters   this   Court’s   analysis  
and  directly  contradicts  Defendant’s  position.   See   also  Cash  v.  Siegel-­‐Robert,  Inc.,  2012  WL  
36,  2012  WL  36466  at  *16  (W.D.  Tenn.  Aug.  24,  2012)  (“Because  [the  employee]  had  been  
effectively   terminated   when   he   requested   the   reasonable   accommodation,   his  
accommodation  request  was  untimely,  and  Defendant’s  failure  to  consider  it  did  not  violate  
the  ADA.”).  
Defendant  also  relies  on   Scott  v.  Memorial  Sloan  Kettering  Cancer  Ctr.,  190  F.  Supp.  
2d   590   (S.D.N.Y.   2002).   The   Court   is   surprised   to   see   Defendant   citing   Scott   considering  
how  detrimental  it  is  to  its  position.  In   Scott,  the  court  found  that  the  employee’s  request  
for   accommodation   was   untimely   after   she   was   administratively   terminated   and   the  
employer   had   already   sent   her   final   paycheck   with   accrued   vacation   nearly   two   months  
before   the   request   was   made.   Unlike   Defendant’s   vague   “decision”   to   terminate   Plaintiff,  
the  employer’s  concrete  actions  in  Scott  clearly  evince  that  the  employee  “had  already  been  
terminated   before   she   requested   the   accommodation.”   Under   such   circumstances,   the  
employee’s   failure   to   receive   notice   of   the   termination   is   immaterial.   In   the   instant   case,  
however,   Defendant   has   failed   to   show   similar   concrete   actions   that   would   allow   a  
reasonable  factfinder  to  conclude  that  Plaintiff  was  effectively  terminated.  
The  third  case  Defendant  cites  is  Tuszkiewicz  v.  Allen-­‐Bradley  Co.,  1998  WL  123985  
(7th   Cir.   Mar.   17,   1998).   In   this   case,   the   Seventh   Circuit   merely   held   that   plaintiff’s  
arguments   on   appeal   were   waived.   Id.   at   *4.   The   Seventh   Circuit   raised   questions   about  
whether  or  not  the  employee  properly  raised  the  failure  to  accommodate  claim  since  he  did  
the   “decision”   on   September   4.   Therefore,   Defendant’s   position   is   especially   worrisome   considering   that   an  
employer  may  easily  change  its  mind  about  an  employee’s  future.  

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not  specifically  mentioned  such  claim  his  EEOC  charge.   Id.  at  *2.  It  is  clear  that  the  Seventh  
Circuit  in  Tuszkiewicz  did  not  reach  the  merits  of  the  case  and  instead  dismissed  the  appeal  
on   procedural   grounds   —namely,   that   plaintiff   waived   the   argument   that   the   employer  
failed   to   consider   his   accommodation   request   while   he   was   subject   to   a   disciplinary  
process   for   ethics   violations.   Id.   at   *1-­‐3.   It   follows   that   this   decision   cannot   be   possibly  
relied  upon  for  the  proposition  that  Defendant  had  no  duty  to  entertain  Plaintiff’s  request  
in  the  instant  case.    
The  last  case  that  Defendant  cites  to  support  its  position  is  my  Opinion  and  Order  in  

Salamo-­‐Martinez  v.  Celulares  Telefonica,  Inc.,  272  F.  Supp.  2d  144  (D.P.R.  2003).  This  case,  
however,  has  nothing  to  do  with  a  failure  to  accommodate  claim.  There  is  no  discussion  of  
whether   an   employee   was   denied   accommodation   or   whether   an   employer   had   to   even  
consider  such  a  request.  The  case  merely  states  that  the  employer  articulated  a  legitimate  
reason  to  terminate  its  employee  and,  therefore,  I  found  that  no  reasonable  factfinder  could  
find   that   the   employee   was   terminated   in   retaliation   for   his   request   for   reasonable  
accommodation.   Id.  at  152.  Since  retaliation  claims  require  that  the  employer’s  motive  and  
intent   to   terminate   the   employee   be   discriminatory,   —i.e.,   but   for   causation—   it   follows  
that   my   holding   in   Salamo-­‐Martinez   was   specific   to   the   analysis   of   plaintiff’s   retaliation  
claim  and  does  not  apply  to  the  instant  case.  Id.  
In  conclusion,  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  showing  that  Plaintiff  was  effectively  
terminated   prior   to   making   her   accommodation   request,   the   “date   of   the   decision”   is  
immaterial   as   a   matter   of   law.   Nonetheless,   at   the   very   least,   a   jury   must   still   decide  
whether  Defendant  had  knowledge  of  Plaintiff’s  disability  when  she  made  her  request  for  

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reasonable   accommodation   and   when   she   was   terminated.   Therefore,   Defendant   is   not  
entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law  as  to  this  claim.    
III.

Causation  in  ADA  Cases:  Disability  as  “a”   factor  or  as  “the”   factor  

This   section   in   Defendant’s   Motion   for   Reconsideration   merely   rehashes   those  
arguments   already   raised   in   its   Motion   for   Summary   Judgment.   Defendant   contends   that  
the   Court   erroneously   concluded   that   in   ADA   cases   a   plaintiff   can   establish   a   disability  
discrimination  claim  if  the  disability  was   a  motivating  factor  as  opposed  to   the  motivating  

factor   for   the   alleged   adverse   action.   Docket   No.   66   at   24-­‐27.   Defendant   criticizes   the  
Court’s  reliance  on  a  1996  decision  —Katz  v.  Metal  Co.,  Inc.,  87  F.3d  26  (1st  Cir.  1996)—  to  
hold  that  a  plaintiff  need  only  show  that  the  adverse  employment  action  was  triggered  “in  
whole   or   in   part”   by   her   disability.   Docket   No.   62   at   13   (quoting   Katz,   87   F.3d   at   33).  
According  to  Defendant,  the  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  a  plaintiff’s  disability  must  be  the  
motivating   factor   in   the   employer’s   adverse   employment   action.   Defendant   relies   on   the  
Supreme   Court’s   decision   in   Univ.   of   Texas   Southwestern   Med.   Ctr.   v.   Nassar,   133   S.   Ct.  
2517  (2013)  as  authority  for  this  proposition.  Docket  No.  66  at  24.    
Defendant   reads   Nassar   to   hold   that   the   ADA   prohibits   discrimination   “because   of  
[an  individual’s]  disability.”   Id.  (quoting   Nassar,  133  S.  Ct.  at  2531).  Defendant  claims  that  
the  Supreme  Court’s  use  of  the  words  “because  of”  necessarily  entails  that  ADA  requires  a  
showing  that  an  employee’s  disability  was  the  reason  that  the  employer  decided  to  act.   Id.  
at  24-­‐25.  Defendant  reaches  this  conclusion  in  light  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  analysis  in  age  
discrimination  cases  under  the  Age  Discrimination  in  Employment  Act  of  1967  (“ADEA”).  

Id.   (citing   Gross   v.   FBL   Fin   Servs.,   Inc.,   129   S.   Ct.   2343,   2350   (2009))   (holding   that   “the  
ordinary   meaning   of   the   ADEA’s   requirement   that   an   employer   took   adverse   action  

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‘because   of’   age   is   that   age   was   the   ‘reason’   that   the   employer   decided   to   act”).   Since   the  
Court   in   Gross   held   that   “[t]o   establish   a   disparate   treatment   claim   under   the   plain  
language   of   the   ADEA   .   .   .   a   plaintiff   must   prove   that   age   was   the   ‘but-­‐for’   cause   of   the  
employer’s   adverse   decision,”   Defendant   contends   that   the   Supreme   Court   extended   the  
same  standard  to  ADA  claims.  Id.  at  24-­‐27.  
While   Defendant’s   argument   is   certainly   creative   and   innovative,   it   is   wrong   as   a  
matter  of  law.  The  Supreme  Court  in   Nassar   addressed  the  standard  of  causation  for  Title  
VII  retaliation  claims.  In  doing  so,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  Title  VII  retaliation  claims  
must  be  proved  according  to  traditional  principles  of  “but-­‐for”  causation,  as  opposed  to  the  
lessened  causation  test  used  for  Title  VII  status-­‐based  discrimination  claims.  Nassar,  133  S.  
Ct.  at  2522-­‐2534.  A  plaintiff’s  burden  under  this  lessened  causation  test  consists  of  showing  
that  the  discriminatory  motive  was  only  one  of  the  employer’s  motives,  even  if  there  were  
other  legitimate  and  non-­‐discriminatory  reasons  for  the  adverse  employment  decision.   See  

id.  (citing   Price  Waterhouse  v.  Hopkins,  490  U.S.  228  (1989)).  It  follows  that  the  Supreme  
Court’s  reference  in   Nassar  to  the  ADA’s  prohibition  of  disability  discrimination  is  nothing  
more  than  dicta.  As  such,  this  Court  is  not  bound  to  follow  dicta  regarding  an  issue  that  was  
not  fully  debated  and  addressed  by  the  Supreme  Court.   See  Central  Va.  Community  College  

v.  Katz,  546  U.S.  356,  363  (2006);   see  also   United  States  v.  Rubin,  609  F.2d  51,  69  (2d  Cir.  
1979)   (Friendly,   J.,   concurring)   (“A   judge’s   power   to   bind   is   limited   to   the   issue   that   is  
before  him;  he  cannot  transmute  dictum  into  decision  by  waving  a  wand  and  uttering  the  
word  ‘hold’.”).    
Nonetheless,   while   the   language   of   the   ADA   is   similar   to   that   of   the   retaliation  
provision   in   Title   VII,   a   closer   look   at   the   ADA’s   text   and   its   legislative   history   illustrates  

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that  Congress  intended  the  ADA’s  discrimination  provision  to  operate  in  a  similar  manner  
as  Title  VII’s  status-­‐based  discrimination  provision.  The  ADA  provides  in  relevant  part  that  
“no   covered   entity   shall   discriminate   against   a   qualified   individual   on   the   basis   of  
disability.”   42   U.S.C.   §   12112(a)   (emphasis   added).   Unlike   the   ADEA’s   “but   for”   causation  
standard,   the   First   Circuit   has   interpreted   the   ADA   to   only   require   disability   to   be   a  
motivating  factor.  See  Katz,  87  F.3d  26.    
Defendant   seems   to   argue   that   the   Supreme   Court’s   dictum   in   Nassar   effectively  
overruled   the   First   Circuit’s   cases   on   this   issue.   Courts,   however,   “must   be   careful   not   to  
apply  rules  applicable  under  one  statute  to  a  different  statute  without  careful  and  critical  
examination.”   Gross,   557   U.S.   at   174.   With   this   in   mind,   I   join   other   courts   in   rejecting  
Defendant’s  position  for  various  reasons.  See,  e.g.,  Siring  v.  Oregon  State  Bd.  of  Higher  Educ.  

ex  rel.  E.  Oregon  Univ.,  977  F.  Supp.  2d  1058  (D.  Or.  2013);   Thompson  v.  Donahoe,  961  F.  
Supp.  2d  1017    (N.D.  Cal.  2013).    
First,   in   2008,   Congress   amended   the   ADA   to   ensure   that   it   is   broadly   applied   to  
plaintiffs’  disability  discrimination  claims.  For  example,  Congress  amended  “the  causation  
language  for  ADA  discrimination  from  ‘because  of’  to  ‘on  the  basis  of’  .  .  .  therefore,  making  
the   ADA   discrimination   claim   less   similar   to   a   Title   VII   retaliation   claim.”   Siring,   977   F.  
Supp.   2d   at   1062  (citing  ADA   Amendments   Act   of   2008,  Pub.   L.  No.  110–325,  §   5(a),  122  
Stat.   3553).   It   is   well   established   that   “[w]hen   Congress   amends   one   statutory   provision  
but   not   another,   it   is   presumed   to   have   acted   intentionally.”   Gross,   557   U.S.   at   174.  
Therefore,  the  amendments  to  the  ADA’s  text  not  only  broadened  the  statute’s  application  
in  favor  of  plaintiffs,  but  also  illustrated  Congress’s  rejection  of  a  heightened  causation  test,  
such  as  the  “but  for”  test  used  in  the  ADEA  claims  and  Title  VII  retaliation  cases.    

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Second,  the  legislative  history  directly  contradicts  Defendant’s  position.  The  House  
Report  on  the  2008  ADA  Amendments  explains  that  the  changed  language  anticipates  and  
permits  the  use  of  “indirect  evidence”  and  “mixed  motives”  in  ADA  discrimination  cases.  Id.  
at   1062-­‐1063   (citing   H.R.   Rep.   110–730(I)   “Discrimination   on   the   Basis   of   Disability”  
(2008)).   In   addition,   the   Report   explains   that   Congress   intended   the   ADA   to   “mirror   the  
structure  of  nondiscrimination  protection  in  Title  VII  of  the  Civil  Rights  Act.”   Id.   It  follows  
that  Nassar  has  not  changed  the  causation  test  for  ADA’s  discrimination  claims.    
This   analysis   becomes   even   more   forceful   considering   that,   despite   the   Supreme  
Court’s  decision  in   Gross,   the  First  Circuit  has  continued  to  hold  that  a  plaintiff  need  only  
establish  that  she  was  “adversely  affected   in  whole  or  in  part  because  of  [her]  disability.”  

Jones   v.   Nationwide   Life   Ins.,   696   F.3d   78,   86-­‐87   (1st   Cir.   2012)   (emphasis   added)  
(citations  omitted).  Therefore,  “[i]n  the  absence  of  a  clear  indication  that   Nassar  applies  to  
[ADA   discrimination   claims],   this   Court   will   follow   existing   [First   Circuit]   precedent”   and  
apply   the   lessened   causation   test   typical   of   Title   VII   status-­‐based   discrimination   cases   —
namely,   that   the   plaintiff’s   disability   need   only   be   a   motivating   factor   for   the   adverse  
employment  action.  Siring,  977  F.  Supp.  2d  at  1062-­‐1063.4  Given  the  evidence  in  the  instant  
case,  it  still  remains  to  be  seen  whether  Plaintiff  was  adversely  affected  in  whole  or  in  part  
because   of   her   disability.   A   jury   must   decide   whether   Defendant   was   aware   of   Plaintiff’s  
disability   during   the   alleged   adverse   acts   and   whether   Defendant   acted   pursuant   to   such  
knowledge.    
IV.

Disability-­‐Based  Harassment    

The Court notes that Defendant failed to cite any cases in which courts have found Nassar to require “but for”
causation for ADA discrimination claims.
4

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Defendant   argues   that   there   is   no   evidence   in   the   record   that   could   indicate   any  
knowledge   of   the   alleged   disability-­‐based   harassment.   Docket   No.   66   at   27-­‐28.   This  
argument  was  already  rejected  in  the  July  15  Opinion  and  Order.  Docket  No.  62  at  18-­‐21.  It  
suffices   to   say   at   this   moment   that   a   jury   must   decide   whether   the   evidence   presented  
shows  that  Defendant  was  aware  of  any  disability-­‐based  harassment.    
Defendant   also   claims   that   the   Court   erroneously   concluded   in   its   July   15   Opinion  
and   Order   that   Defendant’s   Faragher/Ellerth   defense   regarding   the   vicarious   liability   of  
employers  was  inapplicable  in  the  instant  case.  Docket  No.  66  at  28-­‐29.  Defendant  correctly  
points   out   that   the   Faragher/Ellerth   defense   relies   on   common   law   principles   of  

respondeat  superior  liability  and,  thus,  does  not  exclusively  apply  to  Title  VII  cases.   Id.  at  
29.   According   to   Defendant,   the   Court’s   mistake   was   to   hold   that   said   defense   does   not  
extend  to  ADA  cases.   Id.  While  this  Court’s  statement  could  have  been  clearer,  that  is  not  
what   the   Court   said.   The   Court,   rather,   meant   to   point   out   that   the   Faragher/Ellerth  
defense   is   often   invoked   in   hostile   work   environment   claims,   but   not   necessarily   in  
harassment  claims.  Docket  No.  62  at  21  n.  8.  
The  Court  noted  in  its  Opinion  and  Order  that  Plaintiff  used  the  terms  “harassment”  
and  hostile  work  environment”  interchangeably.  Some  circuits,  such  as  the  Fourth  and  the  
Fifth   Circuits,   actively   distinguish   harassment   claims   from   hostile   work   environment  
claims.   The   First   Circuit   has   not   addressed   this   distinction   and   has   merely   “assum[ed]  
without  decid[ing]  that  disability  harassment  is  a  viable  theory  of  recovery.”  McDonough  v.  

Donahoe,   673   F.3d   41,   46   n.9   (1st   Cir.   2012)   (citation   omitted).   Harassment   and   hostile  
work   environment   claims   are   identical   with   the   exception   of   their   fifth   element.   In  
harassment   claims,   a   plaintiff   must   establish   that   “the   employer   knew   or   should   have  

Civil  No.  13-­‐1757  (JAG)  

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known   about   the   harassment   and   failed   to   take   prompt,   remedial   action.”   Flowers   v.  

Southern   Regional   Physicians   Svcs.,   Inc.,   247   F.3d   229,   235   (5th   Cir.   2001).   On   the   other  
hand,  a  plaintiff  making  a  hostile  work  environment  claim  must  establish  that  “some  factual  
basis   exists   to   impute   liability   for   the   harassment   to   the   employer.”   Fox   v.   Gen.Motors  

Corp.,  247F.3d  169,  177  (4th  Cir.  2001).  
 Given   this   difference,   it   would   make   sense   for   the   Faragher/Ellerth   defense   —
which  deals  with  an  employer’s  vicarious  liability—  to  apply  to  hostile  work  environment  
claims,  but  not  necessarily  in  harassment  cases.   See   Gonzalez  v.  Sears  Holding  Co.,  980  F.  
Supp.   2d   170,   208   (D.P.R.   2013)   (analyzing   the   employer’s   Faragher/Ellerth   defense   to  
plaintiff’s   hostile   work   environment   claim).5   Nonetheless,   since   Plaintiff   uses   the   terms  
“harassment”  and  hostile  work  environment”  interchangeably  and  the  First  Circuit  has  not  
addressed   the   legal   distinctions   between   these   two   types   of   claims,   the   Court   will   now  
proceed  to  analyze  Defendant’s  argument.  
Employers  can  be  liable  for  the  actions  of  their  employees  and  supervisors  through  
the  common  law  principles  of  agency  and  respondeat  superior.  See  Faragher  v.  City  of  Boca  

Raton,   524   U.S.   775   (1998);   Burlington   Indus.,   Inc.   v.   Ellerth,   524   U.S.   742   (1998).  
Nonetheless,   in   cases   where   the   harassing   employee   is   the   plaintiff’s   supervisor,   the  
employer  may  assert  a  defense  under  the   Faragher/Ellerth   doctrine  to  avoid  liability.   See  

id.  Under  this  doctrine,  the  employer  must  establish:  (1)  that  it  “exercised  reasonable  care  
to   prevent   and   correct   promptly   any   .   .   .   harassing   behavior,   and   (2)   that   the   plaintiff  
employee   unreasonably   failed   to   take   advantage   of   any   preventive   or   corrective  
5   Since   Plaintiff   relied   on   the   Flowers   framework,   the   Court   assumed   in   its   July   15   Opinion   and   Order   that  

Plaintiff   intended   to   make   a   disability   harassment   claim.   Docket   No.   62   at   21   n.   8.   Nonetheless,   the   Court  
notes  that  Plaintiff  also  goes  back  and  forth  in  its  Opposition  to  Defendant’s  Motion  for  Reconsideration  and  
once  again  uses  the  terms  “harassment”  and  “hostile  work  environment”  interchangeably.   See   Docket  No.  75  
at  20.  

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opportunities  provided  by  the  employer  or  to  avoid  harm  otherwise.”   Reed  v.  MBNA  Mktg.  

Sys.,   Inc.,   333   F.3d   27,   32   (1st   Cir.   2003)   (emphasis   added).   Since   the   employer   must  
establish   both   elements   to   avoid   liability   through   this   affirmative   defense,   it   necessarily  
follows  that  summary  judgment  for  Defendant  would  only  be  proper  if  “the  raw  facts  are  
undisputed  or  assumed  in  favor  of  [Plaintiff]”  —that  is,  if  no  reasonably  jury  could  decide  
[either  of  these  two  elements]  in  the  plaintiff’s  favor.”  Id.  at  34  (citation  omitted).    
Defendant  claims  that  it  had  in  place  a  policy  against  harassment.  Docket  No.  26-­‐2  at  
30.  According  to  Defendant,  since  Plaintiff  was  aware  of  said  policy  and  never  complained  
about   the   alleged   harassment   from   Rios,   it   follows   that   the   defense   applies   and   Plaintiff  
failed   to   state   a   claim.   Id.   There   are   several   problems   with   this   position.   First,   it   is   well  
established  that  “[n]o  affirmative  defense  is  available  .  .  .  when  the  supervisor’s  harassment  

culminates   in   a   tangible   employment   action,   such   as   discharge,   demotion,   or   undesirable  
reassignment.”   Gonzalez,   980   F.   Supp.   2d   at   210   (quoting   Faragher,   524   U.S.   at   808)  
(emphasis  added).  This  is  precisely  what  Plaintiff  claims  in  this  case  —that,   inter  alia,  Rios  
and  Objio  terminated  her  on  the  basis  of  her  disability.  There  is  plenty  of  evidence  in  the  
record   as   to   those   effects,   hence   why   Defendant’s   Motion   for   Summary   Judgment   was  
denied.   See   Docket   No.   62   at   20   (finding   that   Plaintiff   proffered   sufficient   evidence  
indicating   that   the   alleged   harassment   did   affect   a   term,   condition,   or   privilege   of  
employment).     Contrary   to   Defendant’s   position,   the   alleged   harassment   act   need   not   be  
itself   a   tangible   employment   action,   but   rather   only   culminate   in   one.   See   Faragher,   524  
U.S.   at   808.6     Since   an   employer   is   vicariously   liable,   “when   a   supervisor   takes   a   tangible  

6

In the alternative, Defendant claims without much specificity or analysis that “the alleged harassment acts were not
tangible employment actions.” This argument is conclusory and lacks substance. “Judges are not expected to be
mindreaders, thus, . . . a litigant has an obligation to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever

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employment  action,”  it  follows  that  the  defense  does  not  apply  in  the  instant  case  and,  thus,  
Defendant  is  not  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law  as  to  this  claim.   Faragher,  524  U.S.  
at  790;  Ellerth,  524  U.S.  at  762.    
CONCLUSION  
For   the   reasons   stated   above,   the   Court   hereby   grants   in   part   and   denies   in   part  
Defendant’s  Motion  for  Reconsideration.  The  deadlines  for  the  Joint  Pretrial  Memorandum,  
Pretrial/Settlement  Conference,  and  Jury  Trial  will  remain  as  set.    
IT  IS  SO  ORDERED.  
In  San  Juan,  Puerto  Rico,  this  4th  day  of  August,  2015.  

S/  Jay  A.  Garcia-­‐Gregory  
JAY  A.  GARCIA-­‐GREGORY  
United  States  District  Judge  

hold its peace.” Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). It follows
that the defense was inadequately presented and waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)
(“It is not enough to merely mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s
work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.”).