Velazquez-Caussade et al v. Orta-Rodriguez et al

Filing 156

OPINION AND ORDER regarding 138 Memorandum of law and 142 Memorandum of law. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Marcos E. Lopez on 8/9/2015. (MT)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
VÍCTOR VELÁZQUEZ CAUSSADE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIVIL NO.: 13-1761 (MEL)
RAMÓN ORTA RODRÍGUEZ, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
The memoranda of law filed by plaintiffs and defendant Ramón Orta Rodríguez (ECF
Nos. 138; 142) are noted. Orta argues that a letter dated June 26, 2013, which plaintiffs have
announced as an exhibit for trial, should be deemed inadmissible for plaintiffs’ failure to produce
a copy of the letter to him in a timely manner. ECF Nos. 142. He claims, in the alternative, that
the letter cannot be properly authenticated at trial. Id. at 3-5. Plaintiffs contend that although the
letter dated June 26, 2013 was not produced along with their initial disclosures, Orta had the
letter prior to his deposition and to the deadline to file dispositive motions, and thus was not
significantly prejudiced by the untimely production of the letter. ECF No. 138. As to the
authentication issue, plaintiffs state that they can authenticate the letter by testifying that plaintiff
Víctor Velázquez Caussade wrote the letter, that both Velázquez and plaintiff José Pérez Olivares
signed the letter, and that Pérez personally delivered the letter “to his secretary or receptionist.”
ECF No. 138. Taking into account the parties’ arguments, the June 26, 2013 letter is admissible

for the purpose of demonstrating Orta’s knowledge of plaintiffs’ political affiliations, subject to
plaintiffs laying the foundation for its admissibility at trial.1
Although the letter should have been produced with plaintiffs’ initial disclosures, Orta has
not articulated any prejudice to him from its late production. Orta had possession of the letter
within the period to conduct discovery and, mostly notably, prior to his own deposition. He was
able to raise arguments regarding the letter in his motion for summary judgment, which the court
considered in reaching its decision as to his dispositive motion. See ECF No. 127, at 9-10. In
sum, plaintiffs’ use of the letter at trial does not come as an unfair surprise to Orta; he has had
sufficient time to prepare his defense regarding the June 26, 2013 letter.
Assuming that plaintiffs’ testify that the letter is a true and exact copy of the letter that
Velázquez drafted, they signed, and Pérez delivered (see ECF No. 142-1, at 5-9), they will have
produced “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what [they] claim it is,” as
Federal Rule of Evidence 901 requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 901(a). Pérez testified at his deposition
that he “went to the office of Secretary Ramón Orta and delivered the letter at the front . . . to the
lady that was there at the front of the office.” ECF No. 142-2, at 6: 17-18; 8: 8-9. Although Pérez
could not recall the name of the woman to whom he handed the letter at the office of Secretary
Orta, he explained that she was a new employee. Id. at 6: 19-22. Orta also points out that Pérez
did not receive any proof of delivery upon delivering the letter, such as a signature or stamp, and
that a letter dated August 22, 2013, from Pérez to co-defendant Benjamín Cruz Lugo, does not
mention the June 26, 2013 letter that plaintiffs sent to Orta. Insisting that plaintiffs offer the name
of the individual Pérez handed the letter in her office, that they submit proof of delivery, or that

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The letter may not, however, be used for the truth of the matters asserted within it, as it is hearsay if offered for that
purpose.

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Pérez mention the June 26, 2013 letter in a communication he sent to Cruz two months later
would place a higher burden on plaintiffs than Rule 901 requires to authenticate the document.
Even taking into account that the “office of the Secretary” may be a large department in
which many individuals are employed, a jury can draw a reasonable inference as to whether the
letter, which was personally addressed to Secretary Orta, was given to him by the woman “at the
front of the office.” Of course, the jury may choose to give lesser weight to the June 16, 2013,
letter based on Pérez’s apparent uncertainty as to whom exactly he handed the letter. See Wright
& Miller, 31 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 7103 (noting that Rule 901 authenticity concerns must be
distinguished from matters such as probative value, weight, and personal knowledge).
Furthermore, Orta is free, within the confines of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to present
evidence that he did not in fact receive and / or read the letter, and the jury can make its
credibility determinations and weigh Orta’s evidence accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 9th day of August, 2015.
s/Marcos E. López
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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