Cruz et al v. Puerto Rico Planning Board et al
Filing
16
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. All claims against co-defendant Myrianne Roa and the claims under the Fifth Amendment and of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amen dment are dismissed with pejudice; all claims against co-defendant Magdalena Vazquez are dismissed without prejudice; claims under ADA are dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 4/15/2015. (PMA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
DAVID CRUZ, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
PUERTO RICO PLANNING BOARD, ET AL.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in both
their official and individual capacity. See Docket No. 8. For the reasons set
forth below, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the defendants’
motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2014, plaintiffs Davis Cruz (“Cruz”), Wanda Miranda
(“Miranda”) and their Conjugal Partnership filed the above-captioned complaint
against defendants the Puerto Rico Planning Board (“PRPB”), the Puerto Rico
Developmental Disabilities Council (PRDDC), Myrianne Roa (“Roa”),1 Magdalena
Vazquez (“Vazquez”), and Luis Garcia-Pelatti (“Garcia-Pelatti”), in their
official and individual capacities. According to the complaint, Cruz was the
Executive Director at the PRDDC, and his wife, plaintiff Miranda, held the
position of Confidential Secretary I. See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 3.1-3.2. Miranda
was appointed to this position as part of a reasonable accommodation in favor
of Cruz insofar as he has been blind since he was sixteen years old. Id. at
¶¶ 4.14, 4.23.
Both Cruz and Miranda claim they were harassed and terminated from their
employment without being afforded their due process rights and because they
were affiliated with the New Progressive Party (“NPP”). Id. at ¶ 3.6. Pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs now seek compensatory and punitive damages
and injunctive relief for the alleged violations of their constitutional
1
In their response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs concede they
do not have a plausible cause of action against co-defendant Roa. See Docket No. 10 at page
8. Thus, all claims against her are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 2
rights under the First, Fifth2 and Fourteenth Amendments. See Docket No. 1. The
plaintiffs also lodge claims of disability discrimination pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.. The
plaintiffs additionally invoke the court’s supplemental jurisdiction over the
state-law claims brought pursuant to Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code
of Puerto Rico (“Articles 1802 and 1803”), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 5141 and
5142. See Docket No. 1.
According to the allegations in the complaint, co-defendant GarciaPelatti was the President of the PRPB at all relevant times herein. See id.
at ¶ 3.8. He was appointed to this position by the current Governor, Alejandro
Garcia Padilla, from plaintiffs’ opposing party, the Popular Democratic Party
(“PDP”). Id.
Co-defendant Vazquez is the Human Resources Director of the
PRPB. Id. at ¶ 3.9. The PRDDC is alleged to be an instrumentality of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the purpose of which is to provide assistance to
individuals with developmental disabilities. Id. at ¶¶ 3.11., 4.1. The
plaintiffs allege that pursuant to the Developmental Disabilities Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq., any state that receives federal funds under this
Act must establish a Council on Developmental Disabilities and must designate
a state agency to provide support to this Council. Id. at ¶ 4.2. In the case
at hand, the PRPB was the designated state agency for such purposes. Id. at
¶ 4.3.
After the defeat of the NPP in the 2012 general elections, co-defendant
Garcia-Pelatti was appointed President of the PRPB. On or around February of
2013, he allegedly asked plaintiff Cruz to resign. Id. at ¶ 4.15. According
to the plaintiffs, Garcia-Pelatti told them that he was being pressured to get
rid of those affiliated to the NPP. Id. Plaintiff Cruz refused to resign and
continued serving in what he claims was a politically-charged atmosphere. Id.
at ¶¶ 4.16-4.17.
Some months thereafter, on June 14, 2013, Cruz allegedly received a phone
call from Garcia-Pelatti’s secretary requesting his presence at the PRPB to
receive a letter. Id. at ¶ 4.18. Plaintiff Cruz responded that he could not
attend until June 17th, after the closing ceremony of the Youth Leadership
Forum for people with Disabilities, which was taking place at the time. Id.
2
The plaintiffs also request the dismissal of their due process claims under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in their opposition to the defendants’
motion to dismiss. See Docket No. 10 at page 8. Therefore, these claims are hereby DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
at
¶
4.19.
However,
Page 3
when
the
plaintiffs
were
speaking
to
some
Forum
participants immediately following the closing ceremony, co-defendant Vazquez
and Angel Valle Valle, the Administrative Director of the PRPB, approached
them to hand deliver termination letters, which the plaintiffs refused to
receive. Id. at ¶ 4.20. The letters were later sent to plaintiffs via
certified mail, but purportedly failed to inform them of their due process
right to appeal such decision. Id. at ¶ 4.38. Subsequent to his dismissal,
plaintiff Cruz was replaced by Roa, who is affiliated with the PDP and is not
a disabled individual. Id. at ¶ 4.23.
According to the plaintiffs, all individual defendants were aware of
their political affiliation as avid supporters of the NPP. And because both
Garcia-Pelatti and Vazquez acted in their official capacities, the plaintiffs
aver liability attaches to the PRPB. See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 4.44.
Instead of answering the complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss all
claims except for the political discrimination claims against co-defendant
Garcia-Pelatti. See Docket No. 8. The plaintiffs filed a response to the
defendants’ request (Docket No. 10) and the defendants replied (Docket
No. 14).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a
complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. “To
avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Garcia-Catalan v.
U.S., 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir.2013) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). When
ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court
must “ask whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face, accepting the plaintiff’s factual allegations and drawing all
reasonable
inferences
in
the
plaintiff’s
favor.”
Cooper
v.
Charter
Communications Entertainments I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir.2014) (citing
Maloy v. Ballori–Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir.2014)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Additionally, courts “may augment these facts and inferences
with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the
complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial
notice.” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st
Cir.2013) (citing Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2011)).
“To cross the plausibility threshold, the plaintiff must ‘plead[ ]
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 4
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106
(citing Maloy, 744 F.3d at 252). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, … , on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) … .” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
“In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court should employ a two-pronged
approach. It should begin by identifying and disregarding statements in the
complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact or threadbare
recitals
of
the
elements
of
a
cause
of
action.”
Ocasio-Hernandez
v.
Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, the court “need not accept
as true legal conclusions from the complaint or naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st
Cir.2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “A complaint ‘must contain more
than a rote recital of the elements of a cause of action,’ but need not
include ‘detailed factual allegations.’” Rodriguez-Vives v. Puerto Rico
Firefighters Corps, 743 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir.2014) (citing Rodríguez–Reyes
v. Molina–Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2013)). “Non-conclusory factual
allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even if seemingly
incredible.” Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
… be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial
experience
and
common
sense.”
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
at
664-664.
Nevertheless, when evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim, a court may
not “attempt to forecast a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits;
a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if … a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.” Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12-13 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). As a result, courts should read the complaint “as a whole” and be
cautious not to apply the plausibility standard “too mechanically.” See
Rodriguez-Vives, 743 F.3d at 283 (citing Garcia–Catalan, 734 F.3d at 101,
103).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983
Section 1983 “provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 5
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924
(1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail in a Section 1983 claim,
a plaintiff “must allege facts sufficient to support a determination (i) that
the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and
(ii) that [the alleged] conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d
124, 129 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Romero–Barceló v. Hernández– Agosto, 75 F.3d
23, 32 (1st Cir.1996)). For Section 1983 liability purposes, “a state employee
generally acts under color of state law when, while performing in his official
capacity or exercising his official responsibilities, he abuses the position
given to him by the State.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
“Public officials may be held liable under § 1983 for a constitutional
violation only if a plaintiff can establish that his or her constitutional
injury resulted from the direct acts or omissions of the official, or from
indirect
conduct
that
amounts
to
condonation
or
tacit
authorization.”
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 16 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). “Rather, ‘only persons who were directly involved in the wrongdoing
may be held liable.’” Torres-Santiago v. Municipality of Adjuntas, 693 F.3d
230, 239 (1st Cir.2012) (citing Martinez–Vélez v. Rey–Hernández, 506 F.3d 32,
41 (1st Cir.2007).
Section 1983 claims require that a plaintiff establish three elements for
liability to ensue: deprivation of a right, a causal connection between the
actor and the deprivation, and state action. See Sanchez v. Pereira–Castillo,
590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir.2009); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The causation element
requires that the plaintiff establish (1) that the actions of the defendant
deprived the plaintiff of a protected right, and (2) “that the defendant’s
conduct was intentional, grossly negligent, or amounted to a reckless or
callous indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Concepción v.
Municipality of Gurabo, 558 F.Supp.2d 149, 162 (D.P.R.2007). Moreover, a
plaintiff must link each particular defendant to the alleged violation of
federal rights. See González–Piña v. Rodríguez, 407 F.3d 425, 432 (1st
Cir.2005). A plaintiff may do so by indicating any “personal action or
inaction [by the defendants] within the scope of [their] responsibilities that
would make [them] personally answerable in damages under Section 1983.” Pinto
v. Nettleship, 737 F.2d 130, 133 (1st Cir.1984).
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 6
1. Claims against Vazquez
The plaintiffs here bring suit for the violation of their constitutional
rights under the First Amendment, which “insulates public employees who hold
nonpolicymaking positions from the vicissitudes of personnel decisions rooted
in partisan political concerns.” Bergeron v. Cabral, 560 F.3d 1, 7 (1st
Cir.2009) (citing Rutan v. Repub. Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 74-76 (1990)).
In essence, “[g]overnment officials are forbidden by the First Amendment from
taking adverse action against public employees on the basis of political
affiliation, unless political loyalty is an appropriate requirement of the
employment.” Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 10 (citing Rutan, 497 U.S. at
75–76; Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 938–39 (1st Cir.2008)). Accordingly, “a
government employer cannot discharge public employees merely because they are
not sponsored by or affiliated with a particular political party.” Galloza v.
Foy, 389 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350
(1976)).
To establish a claim of political discrimination, “the workers must show
that: (1) they and the defendants have ‘opposing political affiliations,’
(2) the defendants were aware of the workers’ political affiliations, (3) an
‘adverse employment action’ (e.g., an employment termination) occurred, and
(4) ‘political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for the
adverse employment action.’” Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 777 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir.2015) (citations omitted) (“Ocasio-Hernandez II”).
In their motion to dismiss, the defendants argue that the complaint is
defective as to co-defendant Vazquez because it lacks any allegation in
support of a claim of political discrimination against her. See Docket No. 8
at pages 10-11. Instead, the defendants sustain that the few allegations
against Vazquez are simply conclusory. Id. This court agrees.
Firstly, the court is at a loss to find an allegation in the complaint
establishing the first element of a political discrimination claim, to wit,
that plaintiffs and co-defendant Vazquez have opposing political affiliations.
And
while
the
plaintiffs
argue
in
their
opposition
that
Vazquez
was
unquestionably aware of the plaintiffs’ political affiliation in light of
their active and public support of the NPP, see Docket No. 10 at page 10, “[a]
plausible discrimination claim requires more than an awareness
of
the
plaintiffs’ political affiliations. It requires a reasonable inference that
the plaintiffs’ political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor
in the defendants’ conduct.” Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 16.
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 7
The plaintiffs address this causation element by arguing in their
response that Vazquez, as Human Resources Director, necessarily had a role in
their illegal dismissal. See Docket No. 10 at pages 8-10. To that effect, the
plaintiffs allege in the complaint that “[u]pon information and belief,
Defendant Magdalena Vazquez, acted and advised Defendant Garcia Pelatti, on
issues pertaining to Human Resources including the illegal dismissal of the
Plaintiffs. She acted in her individual capacity as well as her official
capacity as Human Resources Director of the PRPB.” Docket No. 1 at ¶ 4.42.
In support of their argument, the plaintiffs make specific reference to
Ocasio-Hernandez, where the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the
plaintiffs’ allegations of political discrimination against a co-defendant who
held the Chief of Staff position were adequately pled insofar as a Chief of
Staff
at
La
Fortaleza,
the
plaintiffs’
place
of
employment,
“itself
indicate[d] his role in personnel management.” Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at
17. However, Cruz and Miranda’s reliance on this language is misguided. In
Ocasio-Hernandez, the First Circuit found that, in addition to being Chief of
Staff, this co-defendant had, among other things, allegedly lied to the press
about the plaintiffs’ termination and made disparaging remarks about the prior
administration under the opposing party. Id. The court thus concluded that the
facts alleged in the complaint showed “above plausibly,” id., that each of the
named defendants had participated in the decision to terminate the plaintiffs.
Id. Notwithstanding, in addition to having to name those who were actually
responsible
for
the
decision
to
terminate
them,
the
plaintiffs
in
Ocasio-Hernandez still had to adequately allege that political affiliation was
a motivating factor behind their decision to terminate them. Id. at 17-19.
No doubt exists that Vazquez has a role in personnel management as Human
Resources Director of the PRPB. However, “liability cannot rest solely on a
defendant’s position of authority … .” Id. at 16 (citing Ayala–Rodriguez v.
Rullán, 511 F.3d 232, 236 (1st Cir.2007)). The plaintiffs here need also have
alleged
that
Vazquez’s
participation
in
this
employment
action
“was
substantially motivated by political affiliation,” id. at 17, in order to
survive defendants’ motion to dismiss. To that effect, the First Circuit has
“previously
explained
that
a
politically
charged
employment
atmosphere
‘occasioned by the major political [party] shift … coupled with the fact that
plaintiffs and defendants are of competing political persuasions[ ] may be
probative of discriminatory animus.” Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 17-18
(citing Acevedo–Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir.1993)).
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 8
In the complaint, the plaintiffs allege twice, without much meat, that
there was a highly charged political atmosphere within the government offices
of PRDDC and PRPB after the 2012 elections. See Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 4.12, 4.16.
However, the only incident that supports this allegation involves co-defendant
Garcia-Pelatti - and not Vazquez - asking them to resign due to pressure from
his political party, the PDP. See id. at ¶ 4.15. The plaintiffs’ failure to
plead any allegation showing Vazquez’s discriminatory motivation behind the
decision to terminate the plaintiffs is detrimental to their endeavor to have
their claims against Vazquez survive dismissal under Rule 12.
In their opposition, the plaintiffs simply wish that this court infer
that Vazquez’s decision to hand the plaintiffs their termination letters in
person at the Forum - as opposed to waiting until the next day - is an
indication of her discriminatory animus. See Docket No. 10 at pages 8-10. To
that effect, the complaint specifically states:
After the Closing ceremony, Plaintiffs Cruz and Miranda
were talking with several participants of the Forum
when co-defendant Vazquez and Angel Valle Valle,
Administrative Director of the PRPB, approached them to
hand deliver a letter. When the plaintiffs asked what
were the letters about, defendant Vazquez informed them
that they were termination of employment letters, at
which point the plaintiffs refused to receive the
letters per instructions of the Chairperson of PRDDC.
The letters were dated June 14, 2013, with effective
date of June 15, 2014[sic], and were later sent via
Certified Mail.
Docket No. 1 at ¶ 4.20. The plaintiffs argue in their opposition that it
reasonably stems from that allegation that Vazquez tracked down Cruz and
Miranda at the Forum to embarrass and humiliate them in front of the Forum’s
attendees. See Docket No. 10 at page 9. We find the plaintiffs’ reasoning is
farfetched.
In
making
our
“contextual
judgment
about
the
sufficiency
of
the
pleadings,” Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 16, this court finds them to be
lacking as to co-defendant Vazquez. Despite her potential involvement in the
decision
to
terminate
the
plaintiffs,
the
complaint
is
devoid
of
any
allegation stating her political affiliation or claiming that she made any
disparaging remarks regarding the plaintiffs’ political party. Simply alleging
that she handed the plaintiffs their termination letters is, in this court’s
judgment, insufficient. To hold otherwise, would be to “shoot the messenger,”
as the axiom goes. See Gleason v. Scoppetta, No. 12 CV 4123(RJD)(RLM), 2014
WL 5780729 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. November 05, 2014) (finding axiom “don’t shoot the
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 9
messenger” applied where conclusory allegations based on “information and
belief” against co-defendants did not plausibly establish personal involvement
in violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights).
Thus, the defendants’ request that the claims against co-defendant
Vazquez be dismissed is hereby GRANTED, and the claims against her are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
In their motion to dismiss, the defendants seek that the plaintiffs’ due
process claims pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment be dismissed because the
“First Amendment claim supersedes the Fourteenth Amendment claim.” Docket
No. 8 at page 12. The plaintiffs argue in opposition that they have properly
alleged to have a property interest in their continued public employment. See
Docket No. 10 at page 13. Moreover, the plaintiffs also contend that the
defendants’ reliance on Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) in their
motion is more akin to a request for dismissal of the substantive - not the
procedural - due process claim. Id. The court agrees with the plaintiffs.
The Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee has both procedural and
substantive aspects. See Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753 (1st Cir.1990).
“Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, persons who possess
a property interest in continued public employment cannot be deprived of that
interest without due process of law.” Figueroa–Serrano v. Ramos–Alverio, 221
F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Kercado–Melendez v. Aponte–Roque, 829 F.2d
255, 263 (1st Cir.1987). “In a due process claim stemming from the termination
of employment, ‘a public employee must first demonstrate that he has a
reasonable expectation, arising out of a statute, policy, rule, or contract,
that he will continue to be employed.’” Acevedo–Feliciano v. Ruiz–Hernandez,
447 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery
Comm’n, 300 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir.2002). “It is well established, both in
Puerto Rico and in federal law, that a person has secured a property right in
his employment if he has an expectation of continuity in said employment.”
Quiles Rodriguez v. Calderon, 172 F.Supp.2d 334, 344 (D.P.R.2001).
In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they had a property right
in their respective positions, see Docket No. 1 at ¶ 4.25; that their
positions did not entail policy-making determinations, id. at ¶¶ 4.27-4.28;
that their termination letters did not inform them of their right to appeal
such decision, id. at ¶ 4.38; and that they were not afforded a hearing prior
to termination, id. at ¶ 8.3. Absent any argument to the contrary, the court
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 10
finds that the plaintiffs have properly pled a procedural due process claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
On the other hand, the First Circuit has held that “[t]he substantive due
process guarantee functions to protect individuals from particularly offensive
actions on the part of government officials, even when the government employs
facially neutral procedures in carrying out those actions.” Pagan v. Calderon,
448 F.3d 16, 32 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)). A “claim is cognizable as a violation of substantive due process only
when it is so extreme and egregious as to shock the contemporary conscience.”
McConkie v. Nichols, 446 F.3d 258, 260 (1st Cir.2006); see also Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994)) (“Substantive due process claims generally
have something to do with ‘matters relating to marriage, family, procreation,
and the right to bodily integrity’ rather than property or employment
issues.”);
Bibiloni
Del
Valle
v.
Puerto
Rico,
661
F.Supp.2d
155,
185
(D.P.R.2009) (“The very nature of this constitutional protection has caused
that substantive due process protection be used sparingly.”).
The First Circuit has held that a plaintiff’s substantive due process
claims, in connection with allegations of political discrimination, are
coextensive with his First Amendment claims. See Ramírez v. Arlequín, 447 F.3d
19, 25 (1st Cir.2006)) (citing Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964
F.2d 32, 46 (1st Cir.1992)). Substantive due process “is an inappropriate
avenue of relief” when the governmental conduct at issue is covered by the
First Amendment. See Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d at 33. “It is the First
Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, that guards individuals against
state-sponsored acts of political discrimination or retaliation … . Thus, when
allegations of political discrimination and retaliation are covered by the
First Amendment, those allegations cannot serve as a basis for a substantive
due process claim.” Quiles–Santiago v. Rodriguez–Diaz, 851 F.Supp.2d 411, 427
(D.P.R. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The court does not glean from the facts alleged in the complaint that the
plaintiffs set forth a substantive due process claim. To the extent that such
a claim was raised, it is, however, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. American with Disabilities Act
Plaintiffs here assert a cause of action under ADA. In their complaint,
the plaintiffs allege that Cruz is blind and is thus disabled, and that
plaintiff Miranda was appointed to her position as part of a reasonable
accommodation. See Docket No. ¶¶ 4.13-4.14, 9.2. They also allege that they
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 11
were qualified to perform the duties of the job and that they were performing
such duties satisfactorily. Id. at ¶ 4.36-4.37. The plaintiffs claim that the
defendants discriminated against plaintiff Cruz by “refusing to maintain [him]
in his position,” id. at ¶ 9.4, and eventually terminating his employment, as
well as plaintiff Miranda’s. Id. at ¶¶ 9.4-9.5. Finally, the plaintiffs set
forth that Cruz was replaced by an individual without disabilities. Id. at
¶ 4.23.
The defendants seek to dismiss the claims under ADA. See Docket No. 8.
In their motion to dismiss, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs have
failed to provide any factual averments in support of their ADA claim, and
thus, have failed to comply with the pleading standards set forth in Twombly
and Iqbal. See Docket No. 8 at page 13. In fact, the defendants complain that
the plaintiffs do not even specify which of the five (5) titles contained in
the ADA is applicable to this case. See id. at page 13. In addition, the
defendants sustain that no individual liability attaches under ADA pursuant
to applicable law. Id.
Although the plaintiffs admit in their response that there is no
individual liability under ADA, Docket No. 10 at page 14, the plaintiffs
oppose the dismissal of their ADA claims. According to them, they have pled
the elements of an ADA claim under Title I, and have thus “passed the line
between possibility and plausibility in asserting a regarded-as violation of
the ADA.”3 Id.
To state a claim of disability discrimination under Title I of the ADA,
plaintiff Cruz needed to allege facts showing that: “(1) he was disabled
within the meaning of the Act; (2) he could perform the essential functions
of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) the employer
took adverse action against him, in whole or in part, because of his
disability.” Roman-Oliveras v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Authority, 655 F.3d 43,
48 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 82
(1st Cir.2008); Bailey v. Ga.–Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir.2002))
(emphasis ours). There is no question that Cruz is disabled under the meaning
of the Act and that an adverse action was taken against him, to wit, his and
Miranda’s discharge from their respective positions. Plaintiff Cruz also
alleged that he was qualified for the job and was able to perform such duties
3
The court notes that the complaint is devoid of any reference to a claim of
disability discrimination under the “regarded-as” prong.
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 12
with the help of plaintiff Miranda, who was appointed to her position as a
reasonable accommodation for Cruz.
However, absent from the complaint is any allegation of causation: that
he was terminated, in whole or in part, because he was blind. And although the
court is not faulting the complaint for failing to establish a prima facie
case of disability discrimination - a focus that is decidedly misplaced at the
pleading stage, see Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st
Cir.2013) - we simply find that the absence of such an allegation renders the
claim implausible. See id. at 54 (“In a nutshell, the elements of a prima
facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the
claim.”).
Actually, the complaint does not even contain a conclusory statement to
that effect. And beyond the timing of their termination, the plaintiffs give
us no facts - e.g., negative comments, complaints, unfavorable expressions by
their superiors in performance reviews - that would lead this court to
conclude that Cruz’s disability was a factor behind the plaintiffs’ removal
from their positions. See Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica, 755
F.3d 711, 720 (1st Cir.2014) (finding plaintiff failed to sufficiently show
causal connection between her FMLA-leave-taking and her termination to push
her claim beyond the plausibility threshold).
Instead, the plaintiffs allege in the complaint that Cruz’s termination
was “solely motivated by political reasons,” Docket No. 1 at ¶ 4.22 (emphasis
ours); that Cruz’s dismissal “was clearly politically motivated,” id. at
¶ 4.24; and, that Cruz and Miranda were terminated from their positions “for
the sole reason that they did not belong to the political party of the new PDP
Governor, Garcia Padilla,” id. at ¶ 4.29.
The plaintiffs’ complaint offers nothing to connect Cruz’s disability to
their termination. Therefore, the defendants’ request that this claim be
dismissed is hereby GRANTED and all claims under ADA are hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants’ motion (Docket No. 8)
is
hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The court, thus, concludes as
follows:
Plaintiffs’ claims against co-defendant Myrianne Roa are voluntarily
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
CIV. NO. 14-1016(PG)
Page 13
Plaintiffs’ due process claims under the Fifth Amendment are voluntarily
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
Plaintiffs’ claims against co-defendant Magdalena Vazquez are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and,
Plaintiffs’ claims under ADA are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The
case
shall
thus
continue
as
to
the
plaintiffs’
political
discrimination claims pursuant to the First Amendment and procedural Due
Process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment against co-defendants the Puerto
Rico Planning Board, the Puerto Rico Developmental Disabilities Council and
Garcia-Pelatti.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 15, 2015.
S/ JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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