Medina-Padilla et al v. Piedmont Aviation Services, Inc. et al

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER granting 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Daniel R. Dominguez on 3/10/2015. (MM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
HERIBERTO MEDINA-PADILLA, et
al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 14-1048 (DRD)

PIEDMONT AVIATION SERVICES,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are: (a) Motion to Dismiss filed
by

co-defendants

United

States

Aviation

Underwriters,

Inc.

(hereinafter “USAU”) and United States Aircraft Insurance Group
(hereinafter “USAIG”), Docket No. 13; (b) Opposition to Motion
to

Dismiss,

filed

by

plaintiffs

Heriberto

Medina-Padilla

and

Lopez & Medina Corp. (hereinafter “L & M”), Docket No. 18; (c)
Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by co-defendants
USAU and USAIG, Docket No. 21. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
I.
On

September

1,

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2001,

USAU

and

USAIG,

among

other

co-

insurers, issued Airline Insurance Form PA–01, Policy # SIHL1–
200A (the “Policy”) to Pace Airlines, Inc. (“Pace”). The Policy
covered

certain

risks

assumed

by

1

its

insured

in

contractual

agreements, generally charter programs, with other companies.1 As
a “Named Insured” under the Policy, Pace listed two Boeing 737–
200 aircraft as the insured subjects.
Later

that

month,

Pace

entered

into

a

charter

program

contractual arrangement with Patriot Air, LLC (“Patriot Air”).
The

Aircraft

Charter

and

Management

Agreement

(“Charter

Agreement”) provided that, for the payment of certain management
fees, Pace would lease some of its Boeing 737 aircraft for use
in Patriot Air’s charter flight operations.
The following year, on May 15, 2002, Patriot subscribed to
a

Passenger

Lopez

&

Aircraft

Medina

Corp.

Agreement
(“L

&

(“Passenger

M”),

of

which

Agreement”)
current

with

plaintiff

Heriberto Medina Padilla (“Medina”) served as its sole owner.
Pursuant to this agreement, Patriot Air, acting as an indirect
air

carrier,

agreed

to

provide

L

&

M

with

aircraft

transportation, by way of the Boeing 737 aircraft leased from
Pace, in the transportation of its customers to destinations
that

L

&

M

had

booked

on

the

travelers'

behalf.

Operations

finally took off on June 22, 2002 with the departure of its
first chartered flight from San Juan to the Dominican Republic;
however,
prompt

turbulent

plummet.

business

Soon

after,

relations
on

July

led
18,

to

the

2002,

venture’s

Patriot

Air

terminated the Passenger Agreement.
1

This case is directly intertwined with
Marsh USA, Inc., 667 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2012).

2

Lopez &

Medina

Corp.

v.

Two

months

bankruptcy

in

later,

the

Patriot

United

Air

States

filed

Bankruptcy

for
Court

voluntary
for

the

Northern District of Texas. The bankruptcy court subsequently
disallowed L & M’s proof of claim against Patriot Air, which
asserted

as

its

basis

the

alleged

breach

of

the

Passenger

Agreement and failure to provide chartered aircraft to L & M’s
booked

passengers.

By

August

31,

2004,

all

bankruptcy

proceedings had been terminated.
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 3, 2005, L & M filed a breach of contract complaint
against, among other co-defendants, USAU and USAIG, as insurers
for Patriot Air. Plaintiff L & M set forth three causes of
action: (1) that the insurers were liable under Puerto Rico’s
Direct Action Statute, 26 L.P.R.A. § 2003, for risks insured
under the Policy; (2) a declaratory judgment establishing that
the risks associated by the breach of the Passenger Agreement,
the

Charter

Agreement,

or

any

other

agreements

concerning

Patriot Air and Pace’s charter operations were covered by the at
least one of the defendants’ insurance policies; and, (3) a
determination that the Policy insured against breach of contract
risk.

See Civil Case No. 05-1595 (PG).

On March 8, 2010, this Court dismissed L & M’s complaint
against USAU and USAIG with prejudice. The Court considered the
Policy’s plain language, in light of Puerto Rico insurance and

3

contract

law,

and

held

that

the

Policy

“clearly

and

unambiguously covers only tort claims brought by natural persons
who have been wrongfully refused the right to transportation on
Pace’s aircrafts.” 694 F.Supp.2d 119, 128 (D.P.R. 2010). The
Court’s determination that the Policy does not provide coverage
for

L

&

M’s

breach

of

contract

claim

thus

did

not

cover

Plaintiff’s claim against either Pace or Patriot Air.
L & M promptly appealed, asserting that the district court
had erred in determining that the Policy’s scope was limited to
tort claims.

On January 26, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed

the

Court’s

District

holding.

Following

an

analysis

of

the

relevant Policy terms,2 the Court held that the coverage provided
under the Policy, specifically “Part I-Liability Coverage” or
the

comprehensive

general

liability

(“CGL”)

provision,

was

limited to tort liability and did not extend to contract-based
claims.
In the current suit, plaintiffs Medina and L & M contend
that they “first discovered that they had a cause of action for
torts

against

defendants

opinion” in 2012.

when

the

circuit

court

issued

its

Docket No. 1, page 13. For this reason, on

January 23, 2013, plaintiffs sent an extra-judicial claim to

2

The Policy provides two types of coverage, listed under: (1) “Part
Physical Damages,” which extends coverage for standard aviation risks
physical damages sustained to the insured aircraft (uncontested); and
“Part I-Liability Coverage,” the scope of which had been contested and
under consideration in the preceding cases.

4

IIand
(2)
was

defendants to toll the statute of limitations. On January 21,
2014 plaintiffs filed a complaint against USAU and USAIG for
claims sounding in tort for the damages sustained for Patriot
Air’s breach of the Passenger Agreement and for the “negligent
refusal and withholding of transportation.” Docket No. 1, page
11. Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for
failing

to

state

a

claim

pursuant

to

Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6).

Defendants further provide that plaintiffs’ claims are not only
barred by res judicata, but also time-barred as a matter of law.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Under Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a
plaintiff must “provide the grounds of his entitlement [with]
more

than

labels

and

conclusions.”

See

Ocasio-Hernandez

v.

Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (“in order to
‘show’ an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough
factual

material

‘to

raise

a

right

to

relief

above

the

speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’)(quoting
Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

555)

(citation

omitted).

Thus,

a

plaintiff must, and is now required to, present allegations that
“nudge

[his]

claims

across

the

5

line

from

conceivable

to

plausible” in order to comply with the requirements of Rule
8(a).

Id. at 570; see e.g. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009).
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court’s inquiry
occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based
“plausibility” standard established by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. “Context based” means that a Plaintiff
must allege sufficient facts that comply with the basic elements
of

the

cause

(concluding

of

action.

that

See

Iqbal,

plaintiff’s

556

U.S.

complaint

at

was

677-679

factually

insufficient to substantiate the required elements of a Bivens
claim, leaving the complaint with only conclusory statements).
First, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations
contained

in

a

complaint[,]”

discarding

legal

conclusions,

conclusory statements and factually threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Yet we

need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Maldonado

v.

Fontanes,

568

F.3d

263,

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678) (quoting

268

(1st

Cir.

2009)

Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557).
Under
determine

the

second

whether,

step

based

of

upon

the
all

inquiry,
assertions

the

Court

that

were

must
not

discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the complaint

6

“states a plausible claim for relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679.

This second step is “context-specific” and requires that the
Court draw from its own “judicial experience and common sense”
to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or, conversely, whether dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.
Thus,

“[i]n

order

to

Id.
survive

a

motion

to

dismiss,

[a]

plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he has a
plausible entitlement to relief.”

Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo,

590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).
facts

do

not

permit

the

court

to

“[W]here the well-pleaded
infer

more

than

the

mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it
has not ‘show[n]’ ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Iqbal,

556

U.S.

at

679

(quoting

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

8(a)(2)).

Furthermore, such inferences must be at least as plausible as
any “obvious alternative explanation.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).

Id. at 679-80 (citing

“A plaintiff is not entitled to

‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot
the elements of the cause of action.”

Ocasio-Hernandez, 640

F.3d at 12, (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679).
The

First

plausibility
merits,

with

affirming

Circuit
an

has

cautioned

analysis

that

of

the

the

against

likely

plausibility

success

standard

equating
on

the

assumes

“pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiff’s favor” “even

7

if seemingly incredible.” Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ.
of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556); Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Iqbal,
556 U.S. 679); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“[A] well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it appears that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely.”)(internal quotation marks omitted);

see

Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556)(“[T]he

court

may

not

disregard

properly

pled

factual

allegations, ‘even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof
of those facts is improbable.’”).

Instead, the First Circuit

has emphasized that “[t]he make-or-break standard . . . is that
the combined allegations, taken as true, must state a plausible,
[but] not a merely conceivable, case for relief.”

Sepúlveda-

Villarini, 628 F.3d at 29.
However,

a

complaint

that

rests

on

“bald

assertions,

unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the
like” will likely not survive a motion to dismiss.
Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).

Aulson v.

Similarly, unadorned

factual assertions as to the elements of the cause of action are
inadequate as well.

Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset, 631 F.3d

592 (1st Cir. 2011).

While the Court is bound by the factual

allegations of a complaint, the same aphorism is inapplicable to
the

plaintiff’s

(“[T]he

tenet

legal

that

a

conclusions.
court

must

8

Iqbal,

accept

as

556
true

U.S.
all

at

678

of

the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.”).

“Specific information, even if not in the form

of admissible evidence, would likely be enough at [the motion to
dismiss]

stage;

pure

speculation

is

not.”

Id.

at

596;

see

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681(“To be clear, we do not reject [] bald
allegations

on

nonsensical.

.

the
.

.

ground
It

is

that
the

they

are

conclusory

unrealistic
nature

of

or

[the]

allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature,
that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”); see Mendez
Internet Mgmt. Servs. v. Banco Santander de P.R., 621 F.3d 10,
14 (1st Cir. 2010) (The
District

Courts

to

Twombly

“screen[]

and

out

Iqbal

rhetoric

standards require
masquerading

as

litigation.”). However, merely parroting the elements of a cause
of

action

is

insufficient.

Ocasio-Hernandez,

640

F.3d

at

12

(citing Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir.
2009)).
The First Circuit recently outlined two considerations for
district courts to note when analyzing a motion to dismiss.
García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir.
2013). First, a complaint modeled on Form 11 of the Appendix of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which contains sufficient
facts

to

make

the

claim

plausible

is

ordinarily

enough

to

surpass the standard prescribed under Twombly-Iqbal. Id. at 104.
Second, district courts should accord “some latitude” in cases

9

where “[a] material part of the information needed is likely to
be

within

the

defendant’s

control.”

Id.

(more

latitude

is

appropriate in cases where “it cannot reasonably be expected
that the [plaintiff], without the benefit of discovery, would
have any information about” the event that gave rise to the
alleged injury.)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
IV.ANALYSIS
Res Judicata Claims
In their motion to dismiss, defendants contend that L & M
and Medina’s claims are barred by res judicata and may not be
relitigated.

Following

an

analysis

under

federal

law

on

the

doctrine of res judicata, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims
are barred under res judicata.
The federal law of res judicata “governs the effect of
a prior federal judgment in a diversity case.”

Johnson v. SCA

Disposal Services of New England, Inc., 931 F.2d 970, 974 (1st
Cir.

1991).3

Under

the

doctrine

of

res

judicata,

“a

final

judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or
their privies from relitigating claims that were raised or could
have been raised in that action.”

Apparel Art Int’l v. Amertex

Enterprises, 48 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir. 1995)(citing Allen v.

3

The outcome
applied state
judicata effect
204 F.3d 14, 18

in the case at bar would have been the same had the Court
law on res judicata, which “applies in deciding the res
of a state court judgment in federal court.” Cruz v. Melecio,
(1st Cir. 2000).

10

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) and Gonzalez v. Banco Cent.
Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 755 (1st Cir. 1994)).
Res

judicata

“prevent[ing]
instead

seeks

to

plaintiffs

“provide

a

conserve

from

strong

judicial

splitting

incentive

their

for

them

resources

by

claims”
to

and

plead

all

factually related allegations and attendant legal theories for
recovery the first time they bring suit.”

Apparel Art Int’l, 48

F.3d at 583; see Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892 (“By precluding parties
from

contesting

matters

that

they

had

a

full

and

fair

opportunity to litigate, these two doctrines protect against the
expense

and

vexation

attending

multiple

lawsuits,

conserve

judicial resources, and foster reliance on judicial action by
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”)(quoting
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1979))(internal
quotations omitted).
For res judicata to apply, the movant has the burden of
proving that: (1) the earlier suit resulted in a final judgment
on the merits; (2) the causes of action asserted in the earlier
and later suits are sufficiently identical or related; and (3)
the

parties

in

closely related.

the

two

suits

are

sufficiently

identical

or

See Apparel Art Int’l, 48 F.3d at 583.

First, for “finality” purposes, a final decision is one
that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment.”

11

Firestone Tire &

Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-374 (1981)(citations
omitted); see Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernández, 22 F.3d 384, 388
(1st Cir. 1994).

“Ordinarily, a dismissal for failure to state

a claim is treated as a dismissal on the merits, and there is
abundant case law to this effect.”

AVX Corp. v. Cabot Corp.,

424 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2005)(citations omitted).
Second, the First Circuit follows a “transactional approach
to determine the identity of the underlying claims or causes of
action.”

Apparel Art Int’l, 48 F.3d at 583 (internal citations

omitted).

Under said approach, courts must determine whether

the claims asserted by the plaintiff in the present case arise
from the same nucleus of operative facts as those claims that
were

the

subject

of

the

prior

judgment.

Id.

at

584;

Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass’n,
142 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (“[A] cause
of

action

is

characterized

defined
as

transactions.”).

a

as

single

a

set

of

transaction

facts
or

which

series

of

can

be

related

In making this determination, a court shall

weigh three factors: (1) “whether the facts are related in time,
space, origin or motivation;”

(2)

“whether the facts form a

convenient trial unit;” and (3) “whether treating the facts as a
unit conforms to the parties’ expectations.” Id. at 584.
Third,

and

perhaps

most

importantly,

the

application

of

claim preclusion to parties that did not have an opportunity to

12

litigate

and/or

contest

the

earlier

action

raises

constitutional rights and due process concerns.

See Gonzalez v.

Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751 (1st Cir. 1994).
Court

must

inquire

whether

the

final

important

Therefore, the

judgment

was

entered

against the same parties or persons in privity with the parties
of the second action.4

Privity has been found to exist “where

the party adequately represented the nonparties’ interests in
Robertson, 148 F.Supp.2d at 449.5

the prior proceeding.”

The

Court considers not only the identity of interests between the
two parties, but also “whether the party’s interests were fully
represented in the earlier case, albeit by another.”
Boyd

v.

US

Ecology,

Inc.,

48

F.3d

359,

361

County of
(8th

Cir.

1995)(citations omitted).
The

Court

also

considers

“whether

there

is

a

close

relationship between the prior and present parties . . .,” as
well as “the adequacy of the prior representation, where the
adequacy

is

viewed

in

terms

of

incentive

to

litigate.”

Robertson, 148 F.Supp.2d at 450; see Gonzalez, 27 F.3d at 762.
“One party ‘adequately represents’ the interests of another when
the interests of the two parties are very closely aligned and
4

“The term privity is merely a word used to say that the relationship
between one who is a party on the record and another is close enough to
include the other within res judicata.” Robertson v. Bartels, 148 F.Supp.2d
443, 449 (D.N.J. 2001)(quoting EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 921 F.2d
489, 493 (3d Cir. 1990))(internal quotations omitted)).
5

This category of privity is also known as the doctrine of virtual
representation, a concept that is common to both claim and issue preclusion
doctrines. See Robertson, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 450, n.4.

13

the first party had a strong incentive to protect the interests
of the second party.”

Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 455-56

(8th Cir. 1996).
Res judicata claim against L & M
In the present case, plaintiffs have reformulated their
complaint as a tort claim pursuant to Art. 1802 of the Puerto
Rico Civil Code and have done little to disguise the inherently
contractual nature of L & M’s claim, which was already litigated
(and subsequently denied) in the previous suit. Moreover, the
fact that L & M did not properly bring forth the torts cause of
action in the previous case, but subsequently included in its
“Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,” Docket No. 92 of Civil Case
No. 05-1595, an entire section titled “Under Puerto Rico Civil
Law a Breach of Contract Claim does not Preclude Concomitant
Tort Damages as Alleged in the Complaint.” Case No. 05-1592,
Docket No. 92, at 6. In this section, plaintiff avers that “the
co-existence

of

Patriot’s

breach

of

the

Passenger

Agreement

entered into with plaintiff, when it withheld the transportation
provided by Pace’s aircraft does not automatically preclude or
exclude the existence of concomitant tort damages suffered by
plaintiff L & M.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
While L & M did not ever clearly or expressly assert a tort
violation in the preceding case, the court also cannot “predict
additional

claims

that

might

14

be

imbedded

amongst

those

specifically alleged.”

Lopez & Medina, 667 F.3d at 66. They

shared perfect identity in the operative facts and the basis for
L & M’s claims is sufficient to satisfy the “thing and cause”
requirement. As Defendants indicate, the “factual predicates for
both

complaints

are

identical

and

even

the

measure

of

the

damages requested by L & M in both actions is the same, to the
last dollar.” See Docket 1 in Case No. 05-1595 at ¶¶ 9-29; see
also Docket No. 1 of this case at ¶¶ 6-26.
While
justice,

Plaintiffs
the

exceptions6,

contend

doctrine

we

do

not

of

that,
res

believe

acting

judicata
we

are

at

the

allows

before

one

behest

of

for

some

of

these

exceptional circumstances here. In this case, quite simply, a
claim that could have been brought in the previous case was not
and,

as

Universal

such,

was

relinquished

Insurance

Commissioner,

755

Company
F.3d

from

v.

34

further

Office

(1st

Cir.

of

litigation.
the

2014).

See

Insurance
For

the

aforementioned reasons, we find that the present action fulfills
the res judicata
relitigating

this

requirements and
claim.

We

must

6

that
now

L & M is barred from
turn

our

attention

to

“A judgment may be without res judicata effect where: (1) the judgment was
rendered pursuant to an invalid acceptance of the claim by the defendant; (2)
the court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgment; (3) an attempt to
appeal was unsuccessful through no fault of the plaintiff; (4) there is
fraud; (5) there is a miscarriage of justice; or (6) public policy demands an
exception to res judicata.” Medina v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 737 F.2d
140, 144 (1st Cir.1984).

15

Medina’s personal tort claim, which was not asserted in the
previous suit.
Res judicata claim against Medina
Claim

preclusion

requires

a

perfect

identity

of

the

parties. The perfect identity requirement may be fulfilled if
the

parties

in

the

present

action

were

also

parties

in

the

previous action, or if the parties in the current action are in
privity with the parties in the prior action.

“[W]here one

party acts for or stands in the place of another in relation to
a particular subject matter, those parties are in privity for
purposes of the Puerto Rico preclusion statute.”7

R.G. Fin.

Corp. v. Vergara-Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 187 (1st Cir. 2006).
In the case at bar, Medina, as the sole owner and principal
as L & M, has acquired information about the case which not only
allow him to bring suit for damages, but also possibly succeed
(given that the district court previously limited the scope of
the Policy to natural persons). Medina finds himself in the much
coveted win-win situation, in which, even if L & M’s claim is
dismissed, he still has a chance at prospering in this second
suit.

7

See, e.g., Futura Dev., 761 F.2d at 43–44 (holding that perfect identify
existed between a parent corporation, on one hand, and its subsidiary and
agents, on the other hand); cf. Fiumara v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 746 F.2d
87, 92 (1st Cir. 1984) (concluding under New Hampshire res judicata law that
arson investigators were in privity with the insurance companies for which,
as agents, they had acted).

16

It

is

principal

uncontested
of

litigation.

L

&

Medina

M,

that
had

could

Medina,
complete

have

easily

as

the

sole

owner

control

over

the

joined

the

and

prior

litigation

commenced in 2005, three years after the alleged events took
place, but for whatever reason voluntarily chose not to do so.
Seven years later, in 2012, Medina found himself equipped with
sufficient knowledge so as to argue his way through his personal
tort claim. It would be patently unfair to allow Medina to fully
litigate the claims of his wholly owned corporation (over which
he had absolute control) and then, after failing to prevail,
have a second chance to commence a new case based on exactly the
same facts and the same alleged injurious conduct.
Although a comparative view of the parties in the current
suit shows that they are not perfectly identical to the ones in
the previous action, particularly because this case has accrued
an additional plaintiff (Medina, in his personal capacity), we
find

however

that

sufficient

privity

between

L

&

M,

as

a

corporate entity, and Medina, in his personal capacity, exists
so as to satisfy this requirement.
Given the fact that there is clearly privity between L & M
and Medina, to the extent that L & M’s claims are barred by res
judicata, so are Medina’s claims.
not go further.

17

Accordingly, the Court need

V.
In

view

of

the

CONCLUSION

foregoing,

the

Dismiss, Docket No. 13, is granted.

Defendants’

Motion

Judgment shall be entered

accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 10th day of March, 2015.
s/Daniel R. Dominguez
DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ
United States District Court

18

to