Ayala-Esquilin et al v. Metrohealth, Inc.

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 6 Motion to Remand. The Court GRANTS plaintiffs' motion to remand. This case is remanded to the Commonwealth Court of First Instance, San Juan Superior Division. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 04/01/2014. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
EDGARDO AYALA ESQUILIN, SIXTO
JURADO HERNANDEZ, JOSE MARTINEZ
FIGUEROA, FRANCISCO MULERO BAEZ,
and REYNALDO DIAZ PIZARRO,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL NO. 14-1088 (FAB)

v.
HOSPITAL METROPOLITANO,
METROHEALTH INC., and
ASEGURADORA A, B, C,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Besosa, District Judge.
In December 2013, plaintiffs filed a civil action against
defendant Hospital Metropolitano, Metrohealth Inc. (“Hospital”) in
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, alleging
that they were terminated without just cause, in violation of
Law 80 of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29,
§§ 185a et seq. (“Law 80”), and because of age discrimination, in
violation of Law 100 of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146 et seq. (“Law 100”).

(See Docket No. 4-1.)

On January 29, 2014, the Hospital removed this case to this Court.
(Docket No. 1.)

As a basis for federal jurisdiction, the Hospital

argues that the matter is preempted pursuant to San Diego Bldg.
Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) because the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”) exclusively governs plaintiffs’ claims. Id.

Civil No. 14-1088 (FAB)

2

Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand on February 28, 2014, arguing
that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the NLRA
does not preempt their Law 80 or Law 100 claims.

(Docket No. 6.)

The Hospital responded on March 18, 2014, maintaining that Garmon
preemption

applies

jurisdiction

and

argument

introducing

that

a

plaintiffs’

new

subject

claims

are

matter

completely

preempted under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”).
I.

(Docket No. 10.)

Garmon Preemption
Courts have long held that defendants are not permitted to

remove state claims to federal court on the basis of arguing
preemption pursuant to Garmon. See, e.g., Ethridge v. Harbor House
Rest., 861 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1988); TKO Fleet Enters. v. District
15 Int’l. Ass’n. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 72 F. Supp. 2d
83 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1999) (collecting cases).

This is because a

state court action may be removed only if the action could have
originally been filed in federal court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
“[I]f a claim is pre[-]empted under [the] Garmon analysis, it is
the NLRB, not the courts, which has jurisdiction.”
F.2d at 1401 (citations omitted).

Ethridge, 861

Thus, it is “clear that the

Garmon analysis is not one to be undertaken by the lower federal
courts.”

Ethridge,

861

F.2d

at

1399.

“A

claim

of

Garmon

preemption is a claim that the state court has no power to
adjudicate the subject matter of the case, and when a claim of

Civil No. 14-1088 (FAB)

3

Garmon preemption is raised, it must be considered and resolved by
the state court.”

Int’l. Longshoremen’s Ass’n. v. Davis, 476 U.S.

380, 393 (1986) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Court rejects

defendant’s first argument that the Court enjoys subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Garmon preemption.
II.

Complete Preemption
The Hospital also seeks to base removal jurisdiction on the

complete preemption doctrine pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA.
Because several sections of the collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) between the parties “contemplate[] the issues of age
discrimination, subcontracting and discharge of employees,” the
Hospital claims that plaintiffs’ Commonwealth action is preempted
by

federal

disagrees.1
violation

law.

(Docket

No.

10

at

pp.

7–10.)

The

Court

Section 301 permits federal courts to hear suits “for
of

organization.”

contracts

between

29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

an

employer

and

a

labor

It does not preempt state

discrimination and wrongful termination claims, however, merely

1

A sister district court in the First Circuit convincingly
explained the policy behind rejecting defendant’s proposition:
Such a rule would provide union employers with an
irresistible incentive to pour into the collective
bargaining agreement all the safety, insurance, and
individual rights protected by state law, and then
claim immunity from suit before juries in favor of an
arbitration process in which it exercises joint power
with the union.
La Rosa v. UPS, 23 F. Supp. 2d 136, 144 (D. Mass. 1998).

Civil No. 14-1088 (FAB)
because

a

CBA

contains

4
“just

cause”

language

or

an

anti-

discrimination clause. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486
U.S. 399, 412–13 (1988).

To the contrary, “[o]nly Section 301

claims that require the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement merit complete preemption,” 14B Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 3722.2 (4th ed. 2009).

The Supreme Court

has made clear that merely because a CBA contains broad contractual
provisions pertaining to “conduct that co-incidentally violates
state law does not make the existence or the contours of the statelaw violation dependent upon the terms of the private contract.”
Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413.

State tribunals can typically resolve a

discriminatory discharge claim “without interpreting the ‘just
cause’ language of a collective-bargaining agreement.”

Id.

Here, plaintiffs’ claims of employment discrimination and
wrongful discharge arise from independent Commonwealth-created
rights pursuant to Law 80 and Law 100.

That plaintiffs’ claims may

be “predicated on the same layoffs [over] which the NLRB assumed
jurisdiction prior to the filing of the state law claims” is not
pertinent, because “[t]he focus of the preemption inquiry is not on
whether the same set of facts may be addressed[,] but on the nature
of the legal claim and whether resolution of the dispute requires
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.”

La Rosa,

23 F. Supp. 2d at 144 (citing Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408–10).

The

Court can glean no reason why the resolution of plaintiffs’ Law 80

Civil No. 14-1088 (FAB)

5

and Law 100 claims requires interpretation of the CBA between the
parties in this case.

Thus, plaintiffs’ claims are “‘independent’

of the agreement for Section 301 preemption purposes” and are not
completely preempted.

Id. at 410.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion to remand,
(Docket No. 6).

This case is remanded to the Commonwealth Court of

First Instance, San Juan Superior Division.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 1, 2014.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE