MCS Health Management Options, Inc. v. Mellado-Lopez et al

Filing 43

ORDER denying 36 Motion to Set Aside. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 10/27/2015. (VCC)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

MCS
HEALTH
INC.

MANAGEMENT

OPTIONS,

Plaintiff
CIV. NO. 14-1223 (PG)
v.
CARLOS R. MELLADO LOPEZ, et al.
Defendants
ORDER
On March 17, 2015, the Court issued an Opinion and Order granting
plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering defendants
to suspend all administrative proceedings against MCS Health Management
Options, Inc. (“MCS”) in Administrative Case No. 2011-OP-06 before the
Office of the Patient’s Advocate (“OPA”). See Docket No. 35.
Defendant Carlos R. Mellado Lopez (“Mellado”) filed a Motion to Set
Aside

the

Opinion

and

Order.

See

Docket

No.

36.

For

the

reasons

discussed, the request is DENIED.
I. Standard of Review
“The federal rules do not specifically provide for the filing of
motions

for

reconsideration;

notwithstanding,

any

motion

seeking

the

reconsideration of a judgment or order is considered as a motion to alter
or amend a judgment if it seeks to change the order or judgment issued.”
Villanueva-Mendez v. Nieves Vazquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.P.R. 2005),
aff'd, 440 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2006).
“Motions for reconsideration are generally considered either under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 or Rule 60, depending on the time such a motion is
served.” See Villanueva-Mendez v. Nievez Vazquez, 360 F.Supp.2d 320, 322
(citing Perez–Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281, 284
(1st Cir.1993)). However, under either rule, a motion for reconsideration
“cannot be used as a vehicle to relitigate and/or rehash matters already
litigated

and

decided

by

the

Court.

Id.

(citations

omitted).

“These

motions are entertained by courts if they seek to correct manifest errors
of law or fact, present newly discovered evidence, or when there is an
intervening change in law.” Id. (citations omitted).

Civil No. 14-1223 (PG)

Page 2

Rule 59(e) “does not list specific grounds for affording relief
but, rather, leaves the matter to the sound discretion of the district
court.” Ira Green, Inc. v. Military Sales & Service Co., 775 F.3d 12, 27
(1st Cir.2014). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Rule
59(e) motions are granted only “when the original judgment evidenced a
manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or in
certain other narrow situations.” Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuño-Burset, 777
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2015) (citing Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772
F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir.2014)).
II.

Discussion

Although Mellado fails to cite the specific procedural rule upon
which he seeks to vacate the order, we will consider his motion pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59.
Defendant challenges the Court’s decision on several grounds, most
notably, that the financial scheme conducive to bias that the First
Circuit highlighted in Esso Std. Oil Co. v. Lopez-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136
(1st Cir. 2008)(“Esso II”) is not present here. Mellado explains that a
finding of “extreme bias” required for abstention under the doctrines of
Younger1

and

Gibson2,

mandates

that

either

the

examiner

or

the

adjudicative agency be paid out of the same special account into which
the fines are deposited.
The Court already addressed this matter extensively in the Opinion
and Order and Mellado has not put forth any compelling reason that
justifies a departure from our original conclusion. The Court’s decision
took into account a number of factors, including those detailed in the
Esso cases and others that were not, but that the Court considered
significant. And, despite Mellado’s theory, nothing in the Esso cases
categorically states that only where financial gain from the proceeding’s
outcome is present may the Court make a finding of “extreme bias.”
Next, Mellado invites the Court to revisit its analysis regarding
the actions of examining offers Carlos Santiago and Karen L. Garay.
Again,

the

Court’s

prior

findings

regarding

this

matter

are

neither

unreasonable nor manifestly unjust. See Ellis V. U.S., 313 F.3d 636, 648
(1st Cir. 2002)(quoting Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 109 (2nd Cir.
1
2

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).

Civil No. 14-1223 (PG)

Page 3

1981)(“In that regard, however, neither doubt about the correctness of a
predecessor judge's rulings nor a belief that the litigant may be able to
make a more convincing argument the second time around will suffice to
justify reconsideration).
Mellado

also

questions

the

Court’s

determination

that

the

defendants “did not provide a solid rationale” for their decision to
“multiply the fine by the total number of beneficiaries.” See Docket No.
at 22-23. The defendant then restates the allegations included in the
original pleadings but puts forth no evidence that the Court’s original
determination “evidenced a manifest error of law.” Hence, his argument
fails.
The only consideration that merits discussion is Mellados’ claim
that the discovery shortcomings were remedied. Specifically, he avers
that the agency provided MCS with a certified copy of its file regarding
the investigation, including two compact discs containing the registry of
pregnant women subscribed to Mi Salud and a list of the ob-gyn providers.
As to the other discovery requests that MCS complains about, OPA admits
that they are “currently outstanding.” See Docket No. 36.
MCS concedes that the OPA provided two CDs containing information
about the registry of pregnant women that were insured by Mi Salud and
also a list of claims filed before the OPA. See Docket No. 38 at page 5.
It avers, however, that the OPA provided the copy of the claims a mere
two days before the hearing on the merits.
MCS counters that even if the “procedural missteps” are corrected,
those errors constitute an “uninterrupted pattern of repeated acts of
arbitrariness and prejudice against MCS”. See Docket No. 38 at page 6.
They assert that this pattern can only be remedied with the court’s
intervention.
Though the delivery of the requested discovery certainly weighs in
favor of the OPA, it does not obliterate all the other instances of
arbitrary

decisions

exhibited

in

the

administrative

proceedings.

The

hurdles in discovery were one of several factors that the Court took into
account. Furthermore, the Court shall examine the impact of the discovery
provided—including whether it tips the bias scale in favor of defendants—
at the hearing on the merits.

Civil No. 14-1223 (PG)

Page 4

III. Conclusion
Having reviewed defendant Carlos Mellado’s motion for setting aside
the Opinion and Order, the Court finds that it simply repeats “old
arguments

previously

considered

and

rejected”

or

raises

“new

legal

theories that should have been raised earlier.” See Villanueva-Mendez,
360 F.Supp.2d at 323.

Thus, the motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 27, 2015.

s/ Juan M. Pérez-Giménez
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE