Padua-Gonzalez v. AT&T et al
Filing
49
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting in part and denying in part 16 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying 30 Supplemental Motion Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 3/31/2015. (VCC)
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ANGEL PADUA GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff
v.
Civil Case No. 14-1243(PG)
AT&T MOBILITY PUERTO RICO,
CARIBEX WORLDWIDE, INC.
ANGEL RIOS ORTIZ,
INC.,
Defendants
OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff
Angel Padua Gonzalez (“Padua”) filed suit against CaribEx
Worldwide, Inc. (“CaribEx”), AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc. (AT&T) and
Angel Rios Ortiz (“Rios”) alleging that the defendants conspired to bring
false accusations and criminal charges against him. CaribEx and AT&T filed
separate motions to dismiss. See Dockets No. 8 and 16, respectively.
Subsequently, CaribEx filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. See Docket
No. 30. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT in part and DENY in
part both motions to dismiss.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
This
suit
plaintiff
was
claims
filed
damages
on
March
under
42
20,
2014.
U.S.C.
§
See
1983
Docket
and
No.
1.
The
supplemental
jurisdiction under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 31 § 5141. According to Padua, he was falsely accused by CaribEx
(his employer) and AT&T for stealing some of the latter’s merchandise that
CaribEx had been contracted to transport in Puerto Rico. See Docket No. 1
at ¶ 8. The plaintiff claims that following the nefarious meeting where
CaribEx and AT&T officials confronted him with the alleged theft, he was
first suspended, and then, wrongfully dismissed. See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 7.
Padua goes on to recount that on March 21, 2012, he was formally
charged with several counts of aggravated theft for the same incident for
which he was terminated. Id. ¶ 14. The plaintiff claims that AT&T and
CaribEx actively conspired with Rios, a state prosecutor assigned to the
district of Aguadilla, to bring the criminal charges against him. Id. ¶
14. As to defendants’ motivations for engaging in the alleged conspiracy,
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 2
the plaintiff states they were sorely moved by a desire to “conspire to
deprive [him] of his federal rights.” Id. at ¶ 20.
On March 19, 2013, the Superior Court of Aguadilla held a bench
trial in the matter of the People of Puerto Rico v. Angel Padua Gonzalez,
Criminal No. A1VP20120178-0179 (the “Criminal Case”). Id. ¶ 15. On March
8, 2013, the court found Padua not guilty. Id. at ¶ 16. The Court of First
Instance notified the Judgment on March 19, 2013. See Docket No. 30-3.
Prompted by his belief that the Criminal Case had been actively
promulgated by AT&T and CaribEx, in cahoots with the prosecutor, the
plaintiff initiated this action. On May 5, 2014, CaribEx filed a Motion to
Dismiss, which was duly opposed by plaintiff. See Dockets No. 8 and 15,
respectively. CaribEx’s Reply soon followed. See Docket No. 21.
Shortly thereafter, on June 4, 2014, AT&T also filed a Motion to
Dismiss. See Docket No. 16. Plaintiff opposed the motion. See Docket No.
25. AT&T replied to the opposition. See Docket No. 28.
On August 20, 2014, CaribEx filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss
to further develop a statute of limitations argument for dismissal. See
Docket No. 30. Plaintiff moved to strike CaribEx’s motion on the grounds
that
CaribEx
1
Memorandum.
had
to
obtain
prior
leave
of
Court
to
file
a
Reply
See Docket No. 31. On March 26, 2015, the Court denied the
motion to strike. See Docket No. 47.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. “To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Garcia-Catalan
v.
U.S.,
734
F.3d
100,
102
(1st
Cir.2013)
(quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, a district court must “ask whether the complaint states a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face, accepting the plaintiff’s
factual
1
allegations
and
drawing
all
reasonable
inferences
in
the
CaribEx replied and plaintiff responded. See Dockets No. 33 and 36,
respectively. Lastly, CaribEx filed a Sur-reply to the motion to strike. See
Docket No. 44.
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 3
plaintiff’s favor.” Cooper v. Charter Communications Entertainments I,
LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 104 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Maloy v. Ballori–Lage, 744
F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir.2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“To
cross
the
plausibility
threshold
[sic],
the
plaintiff
must
‘plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Cooper,
760
Ashcroft
v.
allegations
F.3d
at
Iqbal,
must
106
556
be
(citing
U.S.
enough
Maloy,
662,
to
744
678
raise
F.3d
(2009).
a
right
at
252).
That
to
is,
relief
See
also
“[f]actual
above
the
speculative level, … , on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) … .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
“In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court should employ a twopronged
approach.
It
should
begin
by
identifying
and
disregarding
statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched
as fact or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.”
Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is,
the court “need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint
or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Maldonado v.
Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678). “A complaint ‘must contain more than a rote recital of the elements
of
a
cause
allegations.’”
of
action,’
but
Rodriguez-Vives
need
v.
not
Puerto
include
Rico
‘detailed
Firefighters
factual
Corps
of
Puerto Rico, 743 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir.2014) (citing Rodríguez–Reyes v.
Molina–Rodríguez,
711
F.3d
49,
53
(1st
Cir.2013)).
“Non-conclusory
factual allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even
if seemingly incredible.” Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 681).
III. ARGUMENTS
A. CARIBEX’S MOTION TO DISMISS
(1)
Failure to State a Claim for Malicious Prosecution under § 1983
CaribEx avers that plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1983 for
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 4
several reasons. First and foremost, CaribEx argues that it is not state
actor for § 1983 purposes. In addition, CaribEx points out that plaintiff
did not state which of his federal constitutional or statutory rights was
violated. Moreover, even putting that omission aside, CaribEx affirms that
plaintiff’s
allegations
do
not
configure
violations
under
either
the
Fourteenth or the Fourth Amendment for malicious prosecution. See Docket
No. 8.
Section 1983 “provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation
takes place under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457
U.S. 922, 924 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail in a
§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must allege facts sufficient to support a
determination (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed under
color of state law, and (ii) that [the alleged] conduct worked a denial of
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” CeperoRivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Romero–
Barceló v. Hernández– Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.1996)).
(i)
Caribex is not a State Actor
In its Motion to Dismiss, CaribEx argues that the plaintiff is
unable to successfully maintain a claim of malicious prosecution because
it cannot establish that CaribEx is a state actor. See Docket No. 11 at
page 18.
One of the threshold elements to a claim under § 1983 is that the
deprivation of the right claimed was committed by a person acting under
color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 47, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101
L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). The state actor component requires that “the party
charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to
be a state actor.” Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45,
49 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 940–
41 (1982). “A defendant may be a state actor because he is a state
official, because he acted together with a state official, or because his
conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.” Gonzalez-Morales, 221 F.3d
at 49 (citing Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.3d
252, 258 (1st Cir. 1993)).
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 5
Plaintiff acknowledges that CaribEx is not a state actor under §
1983 but avers that, because it acted “in such proximity” or so “closely
with a state actor,” it can be deemed to be one. See Docket No. 15 at
page 7. Furthermore, says plaintiff, “the state action arises when AT&T
then passes all the information compiled by CaribEx to the Police and the
Fiscal de Distrito (Aguadilla District Attorney)”. See Docket No. 15 at
pages 8-9. According to Padua, he was “wrongfully charged” solely on the
basis
of
that
“false
information...which
was
not
independently
corroborated…” Id. at page 9.
Though plaintiff is correct in that an otherwise private party can
be viewed as a state actor by virtue of its close relation with a public
entity, “something more than mere resort to a state court is required to
transform the moving party into ‘a co-conspirator or a joint actor…’” See
Casa Marie, 988 F.2d at 259 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28
(1980)).
“The ‘state action’ requirement may be met where (1) a sufficient
financial or regulatory nexus exists between the private party and the
state entity; (2) the private party has been delegated authority to
conduct a public function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative
of the State; or (3) the private party and the state entity share a
symbiotic, interdependent relationship.” See Casa Marie, 988 F.2d at 259,
n.7 (quoting Rodriguez–Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 96–99 (1st Cir.
1990)).
Though Padua points to the joint action/nexus test as grounds for
finding that CaribEx is a state actor, this court fails to see how the
allegations in the Complaint support that conclusion.
Plaintiff’s claims
do not justify a finding that the state “has so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence with [the private party]”2, that its
conduct is thus attributable to CaribEx.
Aside from postulating that the criminal charges were solely based
on CaribEx’s and AT&T’s version of the facts, there is no allegation that
2
Camilo Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Barrios–
Velazquez v. Asociacion De Empleados Del Estado Libre Asociado, 84 F.3d 487, 494
(1st Cir.1996)).
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 6
suggests an actual conspiracy between those parties and the prosecutor to
deprive
plaintiff
elapsed
between
of
the
a
federally
meeting
protected
where
Padua
right.
was
Roughly
allegedly
7
months
accused
of
theft,(which took place on October, 2011), and the filing of criminal
charges against him (May, 2012). Plaintiff does not address this delay. A
plausible
explanation
could
well
be
that
during
those
7
months
the
government was carrying out an independent investigation regarding the
criminal complaint against Padua. Hence, the time lapse further supports
a conclusion that plaintiff did not establish a conspiratorial nexus
between CaribEx, AT&T and the prosecutor.
Even if we took as true Padua’s conclusory allegations, he still
fails to sufficiently plead that CaribEx was a willful participant in a
joint conspiratorial activity with the state or its agents. Therefore, as
pleaded in the Complaint, CaribEx is not amenable to suit under § 1983.
(ii)
Failure to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment
CaribEx correctly points out that the Complaint does not specify
under which Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are the § 1983 claims
being brought. See Docket No. 8 at page 10. Plaintiff disagrees, stating
he has sufficiently pled a Fourth Amendment cause of action. See Docket
No. 15 at page 10.
The
Amendment
First
Circuit
malicious
has
recognized
prosecution
suit
the
under
existence
§
1983
of
in
a
Fourth
certain
circumstances. Hernandez Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir.
2013). In Hernandez Cuevas, this Circuit finally stated that it was
“convinced that an individual does not lose his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable seizure when he becomes detained pursuant to
judicial process.” Id. at 100.
Certainly,
in
most
cases,
the
neutral
magistrate’s
determination
that
probable
cause exists for the individual’s arrest is
an intervening act that could disrupt any
argument that the defendant officer had
caused the continued unlawful seizure. … But,
if a plaintiff can overcome this causation
problem and demonstrate that law enforcement
officers were responsible for his continued,
unreasonable
pretrial
detention,
the
plaintiff has stated a constitutional injury
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 7
that may
action.
be
vindicated
through
a
§
1983
Id. (internal citations omitted).
It
follows,
then,
that
in
order
to
bring
a
§
1983
malicious
prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff shall establish
that “the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to
legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings
terminated
in
plaintiff’s
favor.”
Hernandez–Cuevas,
723
F.3d
at
101
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
In its Motion to Dismiss, CaribEx avers that plaintiff did not
allege that he was arrested without probable cause or otherwise seized
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thereby failing to support a
claim for malicious prosecution. See Docket No. 8 at page 13. Again, this
court agrees with CaribEx’s reading of the Complaint.
In cases of malicious prosecution under § 1983 “the constitutional
violation
lies
in
the
‘deprivation
of
liberty
accompanying
the
prosecution’ rather than in the prosecution itself.” See Moreno-Medina,
458 Fed.Appx. 4 at 7 (quoting Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st
Cir. 1999)). “Typically, the alleged deprivation takes ‘the form of an
arrest warrant (in which case the arrest would constitute the seizure) or
a subsequent charging document (in which case the sum of post-arraignment
deprivations
would
comprise
the
seizure).’”
Id.
(internal
citations
omitted).
Hence, Padua must, at the very least, allege that he was somehow
“forced to ‘yield’ to the assertion of authority over him and thereby
[had] his liberty restrained, for example by being detained or having his
travel restricted.” Id. at 8. There are no allegations here that Padua
was arrested at any point or otherwise seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Therefore, his allegations are not enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.
Based on the above, the court GRANTS CaribEx’s request that the
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims be dismissed.
(iii) Failure to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
Despite the fact that the Complaint is silent as to any allegations
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff makes a passing reference
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 8
to malicious prosecution actions under said Amendment in his Reply to
CaribEx’s opposition to the motion to dismiss.
to
whether
plaintiff
is
claiming
a
The court is unclear as
Fourteenth
Amendment
violation.
However in reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, it will briefly touch on the matter.
Padua is mistaken in declaring that the Supreme Court of the United
States
recognized
Fourteenth
§
Amendment
1983
in
malicious
Albright
prosecution
v.
Oliver,
actions
510
U.S.
under
266
the
(1993).
Actually, Albright stands for the opposite proposition. See HernandezCuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 98 (1st Cir.2013)(recognizing that Albright
firmly
closed
the
door
on
substantive
due
process
as
a
vehicle
for
bringing claims of malicious prosecution).
Moreover,
the
First
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals
has
held
that
a
plaintiff’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, as the case is here, “is
not properly based on either a procedural or substantive due process
violation.” Meehan v. Town of Plymouth, 167 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir.1999).
“A § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution as a deprivation of procedural
due process is barred where, as here, the state’s tort law recognizes a
malicious prosecution cause of action.” Id. (quoting
Roche v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256 (1st Cir.1996); Perez-Ruiz
v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir.1994)). See also Montalvo
Febus
v.
Sanchez,
No. 11-1428(GAG),
2013
WL
6628299,
at
*5
(D.P.R.
December 16, 2013).([T]he availability of an adequate remedy for malicious
prosecution under Commonwealth law, see P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141
(1991), is fatal to Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim.”).
Therefore, the court GRANTS CaribEx’s request that the plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment claims be dismissed.
(2)Statute of Limitations
Although § 1983 provides a federal cause of action, the length of
the limitations period is drawn from state law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384,
387
(2007).
The
parties
do
not
dispute
that
the
statute
of
limitations period of one year for tort actions under Puerto Rico law
applies to a § 1983 suit. Centro Medico del Turabo v. Feliciano de
Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005); see also 31 P.R. Laws Ann. §
5298(2). Unlike the limitation period itself, the accrual date of a
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 9
§ 1983 claim is a matter of federal law. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.
Consequently, section 1983 claims accrue at the moment the plaintiff
knows, or has reason to know, of the injury that is the basis for the
claim. Calero–Colon v. Betancourt–Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1995).
In Medina v. Toledo, 718 F.Supp.2d 194, 204 (D.P.R. 2010), this
Court held that “a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment,
if properly pled, would begin to accrue on…the date the criminal charges
against [Plaintiff] were dismissed.” See also, Hernandez-Cuevas, 723 F.3d
at 96 (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390))(Holding that a claim of malicious
prosecution accrues on the day that the proceedings terminate in the
plaintiff’s favor.)
In the Motion to Dismiss, CaribEx expressed that because the claims
were not “properly pled,” it could not be said that the action was timely.
See Docket No. 8 at page 17. This stab at dismissal is undeveloped, at
best, but the Court is more concerned with the argument that CaribEx put
forth in the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. In the latter, CaribEx avers
that plaintiff’s acquittal in the Criminal Action took place on March 8,
2013. See Docket No. 30 at page 4 and Docket No. 30-3. The judgment,
however, was notified on March 19, 2013. See Docket No. 30-3.
It is CaribEx’ position that because Padua was present in Court on
the day that he was found not guilty, he became aware at such time of the
alleged injury that he suffered, namely “the filing of false criminal
charges.” See Docket No. 30 at page 6. Hence, the statute of limitations
started to run on March 8 and not on the date that the judgment was
notified, i.e., on March 19, 2013. See Docket No. 30-3.
The plaintiff claims the opposite. He states that it is the entry of
judgment, and not the verdict that starts the clock on the statute of
limitations.
See
Docket
No.
31.
In
any
case,
says
Padua,
he
served
defendants with a notice of potential claim via certified mail that tolls
the statute of limitations under Puerto Rico law.3 See Docket No. 31 at
page 4. But Padua did not attach a copy of the letter and CaribEx refutes
its existence. See Docket No. 33.
3
Padua first mentions the CaribEx tolling letter in his Motion to Strike
CaribEx’s Supplemental Motion. See Docket No. 31.
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Generally,
pleadings
12(b),
when
when
Page 10
the
Court
will
considering
matters
a
outside
not
motion
the
consider
to
matters
dismiss. “Under
pleadings
are
presented
outside
the
Fed.R.Civ.P.
to
and
not
excluded by the district court, the court shall treat the motion as one
for
summary
judgment,
and
must
provide
ten
days
notice
prior
to
a
hearing according to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).” Puerto Rican-American Ins. Co.
v. Benjamin Shipping Co. Ltd., 829 F.2d 281, 285 (citing Hickey v. Arkla
Indus., Inc., 615 F.2d 239, 240 (5th Cir.1980)); see also Garita Hotel
Ltd. Partnership v. Ponce Federal Bank, 958 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1992).
In the Supplemental Motion, CaribEx includes several exhibits and
asks the Court to read them in conjunction with the Complaint to rule on
of the statute of limitations issue. See Docket No. 30. Moreover, in
order to properly assess Padua’s claim that the statute of limitations
was tolled with a correspondence that complies with Article 1873 of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5303, the Court would
need to examine such correspondence. That would necessarily entail the
review of extraneous documents and hence, the conversion of the Motion to
Dismiss into one for Summary Judgment.
For
that
reason,
the
court
declines
to
address
the
statute
of
limitations controversy at this juncture.
(3) Supplemental Claims
Lastly, insofar as the federal claims do not withstanding 12(b)(6)
review, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims against CaribEx. See Camelio v. American Federation, 137
F.3d 666, 672 (1st Cir. 1998) (“the balance of factors ordinarily weigh
strongly in favor of declining jurisdiction over state law claims where
the foundational federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage in
the litigation.”)
B. AT&T’S MOTION TO DISMISS
(1)
Failure to state a claim
AT&T essentially raises the same defenses as CaribEx, arguing that
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 and the
local statutes. AT&T also claims that it is not a “state actor” for
purposes of § 1983. See Docket No. 16.
We agree with AT&T that plaintiff has not alleged any facts to
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 11
support a claim that the former acted under color of state law. The
Complaint
merely
states
that
AT&T
“conspired”
with
CaribEx
and
the
Aguadilla Prosecutor to deprive Padua of his federally-protected rights.
See Docket No 1 at ¶ 19. This is the type of conclusory allegation that
does not survive the 12(b)(6) hurdle.
AT&T correctly points out that the only allegation in the Complaint
that would support a claim of malicious prosecution is that Padua was
found “not guilty” in the Criminal Case. That alone does not suffice. See
Roche v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 254 (1st Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff replies that AT&T obtained his personal and employment
information and “then used it to fabricate various false formal criminal
charges.” See Docket No. 25 at page 5. According to Padua, these charges
were
the
“foundation
and
in
fact
the
sole
basis
for
the
criminal
investigation and subsequent criminal charges filed.” Id. More evidence of
the conspiracy, says plaintiff is that “the only two witnesses utilized by
the prosecutor” at the preliminary hearing were employees of AT&T and
CaribEx, respectively.
See Docket No. 25 at page 6.
Again, we fail to read in these allegations a claim for malicious
prosecution.
If
AT&T
and
CaribEx
filed
a
criminal
complaint
for
the
alleged theft of the mobile devices, it is not surprising that their
officers and employees assisted the investigators in charge. Roche, 81
F.3d at 254, n. 2 (“There is a strong public interest in encouraging
people
to
bring
Consequently,
possible
when
a
wrongdoing
private
party,
to
the
acting
authorities'
in
good
attention.
faith,
reports
suspected criminal activity to the police, the cutlass of the federal
civil rights statute remains in its scabbard.”) (Citations omitted).
Thus, we fail to see how the Complaint avers a cause of action for Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution violations.
Lastly, AT&T also posits that the complaint is time-barred. See
Docket No. 16. The Court has already addressed this matter and thus there
is no need to restate our previous determinations.
Therefore, after examination of the parties’ pleadings, the court
GRANTS AT&T’s Motion to Dismiss the malicious prosecutions claims under
the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendment.
(2)
Supplemental Claims
Civil No. 14-1243 (PG)
Page 12
Insofar as the federal claims do not withstanding 12(b)(6) review,
the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims against AT&T.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the court finds that plaintiff’s
§
1983-based
malicious
prosecution
claims
against
CaribEx
and
AT&T
pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Hence, the claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
As no federal claims remain as to these two defendants, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any pending
state law claims as to CaribEx and AT&T, thereby DISMISSING them WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 31, 2015.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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