USA v. $29,373.00 in U.S. Currency et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 13 Claim; re 14 Motion to Set Aside Judgment; and re 16 Motion to Strike. The Court DENIES Maribel Santiago-Lisboa's and the estate of Santos Seda-Rodriguez's motion to set aside the default judgment, (Docket No. 14), and GRANTS the United States' motion to strike the claim, (Docket No. 16). The claim, (Docket No. 13), is STRICKEN. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 02/19/2015. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)

v.
$29,373.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY, and
$11,580.19 IN U.S. CURRENCY,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
The Court entered default judgment in this civil forfeiture
action against

the

defendant

currency

after no claim

currency was filed in the period set forth by statute.

to

the

A month

after default judgment was entered, Maribel Santiago-Lisboa and the
estate of Santos Seda-Rodriguez moved to set aside the default
judgment and filed a claim to the defendant currency.

The United

States opposed the motion to set aside the judgment and moved to
strike the claim.

For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES

Maribel Santiago-Lisboa’s and the estate of Santos Seda-Rodriguez’s
motion to set aside default judgment, (Docket No. 14), and GRANTS
the United States’ motion to strike the claim, (Docket No. 16).

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)
I.

2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The

facts

set

forth

below

are

drawn

from

the

unsworn

declaration under penalty of perjury1 supporting the United States’
complaint, (Docket No. 1-1).
On December 18, 2011, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”) seized fifty-eight kilograms of cocaine from inside an
aircraft at Las Americas International Airport in Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic.

(Docket No. 1-1 at ¶ 3.)

The aircraft was

scheduled to fly to Puerto Rico that day and was registered to
Santos Seda-Rodriguez (“Seda-Rodriguez”), a United States citizen,
pilot, and owner of Jeshua Air Services, Inc. (“Jeshua”).
¶¶ 3-4.

Id. at

The next day, on December 19, 2011, the body of Seda-

Rodriguez was found in the Dominican Republic.
appeared to have been beaten to death.

Id. at ¶ 6.

He

Id.

Thereafter, the DEA investigated Seda-Rodriguez’s activities.
(Docket No. 1-1 at ¶ 7.)

DEA agents interviewed Jeshua employees

and Seda-Rodriguez’s son, used a canine unit to detect controlled
substances

in

Jeshua

aircraft

and

vehicles,

reviewed

Seda-

Rodriguez’s phone records, and obtained information about the
Customs and Border Protection’s investigations of Seda-Rodriguez.
Id. at ¶¶ 7-25.

The DEA determined that Seda-Rodriguez was

involved in smuggling narcotics and transporting illicit drug
proceeds between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.

1

28 U.S.C. § 1746.

Id. at

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)
¶ 26.

3

As a result, between December 2011 and February 2012, the

DEA seized six aircraft, eight vehicles, and two vessels belonging
to Seda-Rodriguez.

Id.

Seda-Rodriguez’s widow and estate never

attempted to claim these sixteen assets, which totaled $755,947 in
value.

Id. at ¶ 27.

In September 2013, DEA agents received information regarding
bank accounts belonging to Seda-Rodriguez.
¶ 35.)

(Docket No. 1-1 at

Two accounts were located at Banco Popular de Puerto Rico:

business account number 084-209941 and personal account number 482351425.
accounts.

Id. at ¶ 36.

Seda-Rodriguez was the sole holder of both

Id. at ¶ 40.

In 2011, $16,500 in cash, in amounts

ranging from $2,000 to $6,000, and $27,488 in checks drawn from a
different account owned by Seda-Rodriguez had been deposited into
the personal account.

Id. at ¶ 33.

No one associated with Seda-

Rodriguez (including his widow and members of his estate) attempted
to remove funds from either account in the nearly two years since
Seda-Rodriguez’s death in December 2011.

Id. at ¶ 40.

On November

26, 2013, the DEA seized $29,373.00 and $11,580.19 from the Banco
Popular accounts pursuant to a federal warrant to seize property
subject to forfeiture.

Id. at ¶ 1.

On January 16 and 22, 2014,

the DEA mailed notices of the two seizures to Seda-Rodriguez’s
widow, Maribel Santiago-Lisboa, who received them on January 22 and
27, 2014.

(Docket No. 14-1 at ¶ 1; Docket No. 14-2 at ¶ 1.)

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)
II.

4

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 6, 2014, the United States filed a verified complaint

for

forfeiture

in

rem

against

defendants

$29,373.00

in

U.S.

currency and $11,580.19 in U.S. currency pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841, 881, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 981.

(Docket No. 1.)

The

United States included an unsworn declaration under penalty of
perjury by a DEA special agent in support of the complaint.
(Docket No. 1-1.)

On May 13, 2014, the Clerk of the Court issued

a warrant of arrest in rem for the defendant currency.

(Docket

No.

on

5.)

Notice

of

the

seizures

was

published

the

www.forfeiture.gov website for thirty consecutive days from May 16
through June 14, 2014.

(Docket No. 7.)

On June 10, 2014, plaintiff served notice and the complaint on
Maribel Santiago-Lisboa, both personally and through her attorney,
Heriberto Güivas-Lorenzo.

(Docket No. 16-1 at pp. 1, 3.)

On

June 10, 2014, plaintiff also served notice on the estate of SedaRodriguez, through Maribel Santiago-Lisboa and through Mr. GüivasLorenzo, who was also the estate’s attorney.

Id. at pp. 2, 4.

The applicable statute provides that claims to seized property
may be filed no later than thirty days after (1) the date of
service of the complaint, or (2) the date of the final publication
of

notice

of

the

complaint.

18

U.S.C.

§

983(a)(4)(A).

Accordingly, the period to file a claim in this case expired on
July 14, 2014, thirty days after the final publication of notice of

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)
the complaint.
that day.
entered

5

The United States moved for default judgment on

(Docket No. 9.)

judgment

in

favor

The Court granted the motion and
of

the

United

States

against

the

defendant currency on July 15, 2014, indicating that any claim
brought on or after that date would be time-barred.

(Docket

No. 12.)
On August 11, 2014, Maribel Santiago-Lisboa and the estate of
Seda-Rodriguez (collectively, “claimants”) filed a claim to the
defendant

currency

(Docket No. 13.)
action.

through

attorney

Heriberto

Güivas-Lorenzo.

This was claimants’ first appearance in the

Claimants also moved the Court to set aside the default

judgment.

(Docket No. 14.)

On August 19, 2014, plaintiff United

States moved to strike the claim and opposed the motion to set
aside the default judgment.

(Docket No. 16.)

Claimants did not

oppose the United States’ motion to strike.
III. MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
A court may set aside a default judgment in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (“Rule 60(b)”). Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(c).

Rule 60(b)(1) provides that “mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, [and] excusable neglect” are grounds for relief from a
final judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

Relief pursuant to Rule

60(b) “is extraordinary in nature,” and a party seeking this relief
must demonstrate, “at a bare minimum, that his motion is timely;
that

exceptional

circumstances

exist,

favoring

extraordinary

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)

6

relief; that if the judgment is set aside, he has the right stuff
to mount a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that no
unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the
motion be granted.”

Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19

(1st Cir. 2002).
Here,
criteria.

claimants

meet

their

burden

on

two

of

these

four

First, their motion to set aside the judgment, filed

twenty-seven days after the Court entered judgment, was timely.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (providing that a Rule 60(b)(1) motion
must

be

made

judgment”).

“no

more

than

a

year

after

the

entry

of

the

Second, setting aside the judgment would not unfairly

prejudice plaintiff United States; the United States concedes it by
not identifying any prejudice in its opposition.

See Docket No.

16.
Claimants

fail

to

remaining two criteria.

carry

their

burden,

however,

on

the

First, claimants make no showing “that

exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief.”
See Karak, 288 F.3d at 19.

Claimants explain that they failed to

file a claim timely because it took time to contact the multiple
members of Seda-Rodriguez’s estate and because their attorney was
dealing with the hospitalization of his ill father. (Docket No. 14
at ¶¶ 9-10.)

Under these circumstances, claimants should have

filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file a claim.
But they did not make this simple request, and they offer no reason

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)
for

their

inability

7
to

do

so.

As

such,

their

proffered

explanations do not justify relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1). See,
e.g., Rivera-Velazquez v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins.
Co., 750 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that “an attorney’s
illness may constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting
relief under Rule 60(b)(1),” but the “party seeking relief must
persuade the court not only that his attorney was ill but also that
the illness prevented the party from taking reasonable steps to
prosecute the case or to inform the court of an inability to do
so”).
Claimants also state that they failed to file a claim timely
because they “were in the process of organizing all [c]laimants to
jointly represent them, [but] by inadvertence and/or mistake, the
[v]erified [c]laim had not been presented, though [they] thought
otherwise.”

(Docket No. 14 at ¶ 10.)

Claimants do not elaborate

on the circumstances of their mistaken belief that they had filed
a claim.

Without more, the Court cannot evaluate whether the

mistake is justified, excusable, or honest.

See 11 Charles A.

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2858 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that a party seeking
Rule 60(b)(1) relief “must make some showing justifying the failure
to avoid the mistake or inadvertence”); accord Cashner v. Freedom
Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that Rule
60(b)(1)’s “mistake” provision allows for the reconsideration of

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)
judgments

“only

where:

8
(1)

a

party

has

made

an

excusable

litigation mistake or an attorney in the litigation has acted
without authority from a party, or (2) where the judge has made a
substantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment or order”
(emphasis added)).

Simply alleging the fact of a mistaken belief

does not suffice to show an “exceptional circumstance” warranting
Rule 60(b) relief.
Finally, to the extent that claimants allege that the mistake
of their attorney should not be visited upon them, it is wellsettled that “the neglect of an attorney acting within the scope of
his or her authority is attributable to the client.”

Nansamba v.

N. Shore Med. Ctr., Inc., 727 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2013).
As to the remaining criterion, claimants make no attempt to
show that they have “the right stuff to mount a potentially
meritorious claim” if the judgment is set aside.
F.3d at 19.

See Karak, 288

In a civil forfeiture action, the United States has

the burden “to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the property is subject to forfeiture.”

18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1).

Here, the United States alleges that the seized funds are subject
to forfeiture because they were used to facilitate the sale of
controlled substances and were involved in illegal money laundering
transactions.

(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 6.)

Accordingly, to demonstrate

that they could “mount a potentially meritorious claim,” claimants
must argue that the United States would not be able to carry its

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)
burden at trial.

9

For example, they might show that the seized

funds derived from legal sources.

Claimants, however, make no

attempt to demonstrate how their claim would be meritorious.
Thus, the Court concludes that claimants are not entitled to
Rule 60(b)’s extraordinary relief and DENIES their motion to set
aside judgment.
IV.

MOTION TO STRIKE CLAIM
The United States moves to strike the claim on two grounds:

(1) that claimants lack constitutional standing to contest the
forfeiture

because

they

have

not

asserted

a

legal

right

of

ownership over the defendant property, and (2) that claimants lack
statutory standing because they did not comply with Rule G(5)(a)(i)
of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and
Asset Forfeiture Actions (generally, “Rule G”) and did not file a
timely claim.
A.

(Docket No. 16 at pp. 2-3.)

Constitutional Standing
Pursuant to Rule G(8)(c)(i)(B), the United States may

move to strike a claim “because the claimant lacks standing.”
Supp. R. G(8)(c)(i)(B).

To establish constitutional standing in a

civil forfeiture case, a claimant must “demonstrat[e] an ownership
or possessory interest in the seized property.”

United States v.

$8,440,190.00 in U.S. Currency, 719 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 2013).
The requirements for demonstrating standing are forgiving at the

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)

10

initial stages of intervention:

an “allegation of ownership,

coupled with some evidence of ownership, is sufficient.”

Id.

Here, the United States and the claimants agree that the
defendant money was seized from two bank accounts belonging to
Seda-Rodriguez.

See Docket No. 1-1 at ¶ 37; Docket No. 13 at ¶ 5.

Claimant Maribel Santiago-Lisboa alleges that she was married to
Seda-Rodriguez from August 3, 1996, until his death in 2011, and
that all property acquired during their marriage - including the
money seized from the accounts - legally belongs to both spouses as
marital property.

(Docket No. 13 at ¶¶ 5-7.)

She presents a copy

of their Puerto Rico marriage license as evidence of their conjugal
partnership.

(Docket No. 13-1 at p. 1.)

The estate of Seda-

Rodriguez also claims ownership of the seized funds and presents a
resolution of the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Aguadilla
Superior Division, to prove that Seda-Rodriguez’s estate comprises
his widow and seven children.

See id. at p. 2; Docket No. 13 at

¶ 8.
The United States presents two undeveloped and misplaced
arguments to challenge the claimants’ constitutional standing.
first

alleges

sufficient.

that

a

“bald

assertion

(Docket No. 16 at p. 4.)

of

ownership”

is

It
not

But here, claimants’

assertions of ownership are not “bald” - they are based on their
statuses as Seda-Rodriguez’s widow and estate and are supported by
documentary evidence.

The United States next argues that the

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)

11

claimants’ allegations are “irrelevant” because “forfeiture is not
limited to commingled money.”

Id. at p. 6.

“Commingling” in the

civil forfeiture context occurs when funds from legitimate and
illegitimate sources are deposited into the same account.
United States v. McGauley, 279 F.3d 62, 65 (1st Cir. 2002).

See
Here,

claimants do not allege that funds in the accounts were commingled,
so the United States’ argument is inapposite.
The Court finds that the claimants’ allegations of their
legal ownership interests in the funds seized from Seda-Rodriguez’s
accounts, supported by documentary evidence proving that claimants
are Seda-Rodriguez’s widow and estate, are sufficient to establish
constitutional standing.

See U.S. Currency, $8,440,190.00, 719

F.3d at 57.
B.

Statutory Standing
In addition to constitutional standing, claimants in

civil forfeiture actions must establish statutory standing. United
States v. One-Sixth Share of James J. Bulger in All Present &
Future Proceeds of Mass Millions Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326
F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2003).

Rule G(5) and 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)

(generally,

set

“section

983”)

forth

the

statutory

standing

requirements for contesting forfeiture.
Pursuant to Rule G(5), a claim must (1) “identify the
specific property claimed,” (2) “identify the claimant and state
the claimant’s interest in the property,” (3) “be signed by the

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)

12

claimant under penalty of perjury,” and (4) “be served on the
[designated] government attorney.” Supp. R. G(5)(a)(i). Here, the
claim fails to satisfy three of these four requirements.
the claim does not identify the specific property.

First,

The claim

vaguely states an interest in the currency “forfeited from two (2)
bank accounts” and identifies the currency values in the case
caption but fails to specify the banks or the bank accounts from
which the currency was seized.

See Docket No. 13.

claim is not signed by the claimant.2

Second, the

The last page of the claim

has a type-written “Oath Under Penalty of Perjury” with a signature
line for Maribel Santiago-Lisboa, but there is no signature.
id. at p. 4.

See

Third, there is no certificate of service to verify

that the claim was served on the designated government attorney,
although the United States does not object to this defect.
Section 983 sets forth the remaining requirements for
statutory standing.

It provides that a claim must be filed no

later than thirty days after the date of service of the complaint
or the date of the final publication of notice of the complaint.
18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A).

A claimant must also file an answer to

the complaint no later than twenty days after filing the claim.
Id. § 983(a)(4)(B).

2

Here, claimants fail both of these statutory

Requiring the claim to be signed is not a procedural
technicality:
“[i]t forces claimants to assert their alleged
ownership under oath, creating a deterrent against filing false
claims.” United States v. $23,000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157,
163 (1st Cir. 2004).

Civil No. 14-1360 (FAB)
requirements.

13

They filed the claim sixty-two days after directly

receiving notice and fifty-eight days after the final publication
of notice of the complaint. Additionally, claimants never filed an
answer to the complaint.
As a result of their failure to abide by Rule G(5) and
section 983, claimants lack statutory standing to contest the
forfeiture.

The Court accordingly GRANTS the United States’

unopposed motion to strike the claim.
V.

CONCLUSION
For

the

forgoing

reasons,

the

Court

DENIES

Maribel

Santiago-Lisboa’s and the estate of Santos Seda-Rodriguez’s motion
to set aside the default judgment, (Docket No. 14), and GRANTS the
United States’ motion to strike the claim, (Docket No. 16).

The

claim, (Docket No. 13), is STRICKEN.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 19, 2015.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE