Concepcion-Torres et al v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 6 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Because plaintiffs filed their attorneys' fees claim well within the three-year limitations period, defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 09/17/2014. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ALEIDA CONCEPCION-TORRES
PERSONALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
HER MINOR SON, J.L.C.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF
PUERTO RICO., et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER1
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss.

(Docket

No. 6.) For the reasons discussed below, and after considering the
motion to dismiss and plaintiffs’ reply, the Court DENIES the
motion to dismiss.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Procedural Background
On June 23, 2014, plaintiff Aleida Concepcion-Torres

filed a complaint personally and on behalf of her minor son,
J.L.C.,

alleging

claims

pursuant

to

the

Individuals

with

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 14001482, against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Department of

1

Elizabeth Barreto, a third year law student at the
University of Puerto Rico School of Law assisted in the preparation
of this memorandum.

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

2

Education of Puerto Rico (“DOE”).

(Docket No. 1.)

On August 5,

2014, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule
of

Civil

Procedure

plaintiffs’

claims

12(b)(6)
are

(“Rule

barred

by

12(b)(6)”),
the

relevant

arguing
statute

that
of

limitations. (Docket No. 6.) On August 11, 2014, plaintiffs filed
a response contending that the claim is not time-barred because the
statutory period of three years established by article 1867 of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code, Laws of P.R. Ann. Tit. 31 § 5297(1),
applies.
B.

(Docket No. 7.)
Factual Background
Plaintiff is the mother and legal custodian of nine-year

old J.L.C., who is diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (“ADHD”) and registered with the DOE as a child with a
disability.

(Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 6, 8 and 10.)

Accordingly,

J.L.C. is qualified by federal and state law to participate in the
academic and related services program of the public education
system administered by the DOE.
On

September

30,

Id. at ¶ 12.

2013

plaintiff

filed,

on

J.L.C.’s

behalf, an administrative complaint requesting that DOE cover the
costs for enrolling J.L.C. in Colegio Dr. Roque Diaz-Tizol, a
private school.

(Docket No. 1 at ¶ 18.)

On December 10, 2013,

Administrative Law Judge Elizabeth Ortiz-Irizarry ordered the DOE
to place J.L.C. in the private institution at public cost and to
reimburse the total cost incurred by the parents for his education

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

3

during the preceding two years.
and the resolution became final.

Id. at ¶ 20.

No appeal was filed

Id. at ¶ 21.

On June 23, 2014, plaintiffs, as the prevailing party,
filed this action pursuant to section 1415 (i)(3)(B)(i)(I) of the
IDEA, requesting the payment of the attorney’s fees, costs and
expenses incurred in the administrative proceeding, as well as
additional fees and costs spent in this litigation.
II.

Id. at ¶ 26.

RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12

(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint liberally, treating all
alleged facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff.

Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200,

1210 (1st Cir. 1996).

While a complaint attacked by a Rule

12(b)(6)

motion

to

dismiss

“does

not

need

detailed

factual

allegations,” it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.”
(2007).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all
of the complaint’s allegations are true.”

Id. (internal citations

omitted). Thus, “a plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed perforce’
by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements of the
cause of action.” Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F. 3d 1,
12 (1st Cir. 2011).

“[N]on-conclusory factual allegations in the

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

4

complaint must be treated as true, [however,] even if seemingly
incredible.”
(2009))).

Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

Where those factual allegations “‘allow[] the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility.”
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678).

Id.

As a result, “to survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its

face.”

Iqbal,

556

U.S

at

678

(internal

quotations

and

citations omitted).
“Affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, may
be raised in a motion to dismiss under [Rule 12(b)(6)], provided
that ‘the facts establishing the defense [are] clear on the face of
the plaintiff’s pleadings.’”

Trans–Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v.

Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting
Blackstone Realty LLC v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 2001)).
Dismissal is appropriate where the dates indicated by the complaint
establish

that the

statute

of

limitations

has

run,

and “the

complaint fails to sketch a factual predicate that would warrant
the application of either a different statute of limitations period
or equitable estoppel.”

Id.

III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.
Because the IDEA does not specify a statute of limitations for

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

5

attorneys’ fees actions, they contend that the Court should apply
by analogy the time limit of 30 days established by Puerto Rico’s
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (“UAPA”).
that

application

of

UAPA’s

30-day

statute

Defendants
of

assert

limitations

is

appropriate, reasonable, and consonant with public policy. (Docket
No. 6.)
Defendants rely on Amann vs. Town of Stow, 991 F. 2d. 929 (1st
Cir. 1993), to support their position that the 30-day limitations
period applies in this case.

In Amann, the First Circuit Court of

Appeals affirmed the application of the 30-day limitations period
borrowed from

the

Massachusetts

Administrative

finding it consistent with IDEA’s goals.

Procedure

Id. at 931.

Act,

There,

however, the court applied the borrowed statute of limitations to
a different section of the IDEA, not the attorneys’ fees provision
at issue here.

Id.

In response, plaintiffs contend that defendants’ suggested 30day term violates the procedural safeguards of the IDEA and should
not be applied.

Plaintiffs argue that the UAPA’s provisions

contradict many IDEA provisions because the two texts contain
incongruent procedures.
period

within

which

to

For instance, the IDEA grants a 90-day
file

a

civil

action

to

review

an

administrative decision, while the UAPA is stricter with a 30-day
statute of limitations.

As a result of this incongruence, the

plaintiffs claim that the 30-day statute of limitations for a civil

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

6

action review is inapplicable to the independent cause of action at
issue here.

Accordingly, plaintiffs respond that the claims are

not subject to dismissal on timeliness grounds.
A.

(Docket No. 7.)

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Congress passed the IDEA to secure the free, appropriate

and public education of children with disabilities.

Winkelman ex

rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 517 (2007).
The IDEA protects not only the rights of children with disabilities
but also their parents’ rights.

Id. at 517.

Section 1415 of the

IDEA provides federal district courts with jurisdiction to award
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the parents or guardian of
a child with a disability who prevails in an administrative or
judicial proceeding.

20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).

The parties agree that the IDEA does not provide a
specific

statute

of

limitations

pursuant to section 1415.

for

attorneys’

fees

actions

Rather, the relevant provision simply

requires a party filing a complaint alleging a violation of the
IDEA to do so timely.

As a result, the Court proceeds to analyze

what statute of limitation applies.
B.

The State–Borrowing Doctrine
It has long been recognized that when Congress does not

provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action,
federal

courts

adopt

the

most

limitations in the forum state.

analogous

state

statute

of

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

7

U.S. 656, 660 (1987) (superseded on some grounds by statute);
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1985) (superseded on some
grounds by statute).
the

state

statute

Nonetheless, this doctrine does not apply if
of

limitations

is

“‘inconsistent

Constitution and laws of the United States.’”

with

the

Wilson, 471 U.S.

at 267 (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47–48 (1984)).
C.

Analogous Puerto Rico Statute of Limitations
To

evaluate

whether

Puerto

Rico

has

a

statute

of

limitations analogous to the IDEA, the Court must “characterize the
essence of the claim in the pending case and decide which state
statute provides the most appropriate limiting principle.” Wilson,
471 U.S. at 268.

In choosing statutes of limitations, the Court

balances three IDEA policy goals:

“[(1)] the parental interest in

participation, [(2)] the school's interest in speedy resolution of
disputes, and [(3)] the child's interest in receiving educational
entitlement.”

Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F. 3d 108, 119

(1st Cir. 2003) (citing Amman, 991 F.2d at 931-33).
While the federal circuit courts of appeals are split as
to the source of the most analogous state statute of limitations
for attorneys’ fees actions pursuant to the IDEA, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals has not ruled on the issue.

B.D. v. Georgetown

Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 11–10692, 2012 WL 4482152 (D. Mass. Sept. 7,
2012) (reviewing cases from the First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits).

The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals,

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

8

however, has ruled on the specific issue.

See Rodriguez v. ELA,

No. KAC2012–0323 (807), 2014 WL 2506502 (P.R. Cir. April 30, 2014);
Orraca Lopez v. ELA, KAC2012-9765 (901), 2014 WL 1007087 (P.R. Cir.
Feb. 28, 2014); Amador Lozada v. ELA, No. KAC2012–1151, 2014 WL
897905 (P.R. Cir. Jan. 30, 2014).2

In all three cases, the court

of appeals found that the Puerto Rico Civil Code’s three year
statute of limitations for attorneys’ fees claims was adequate,
reasonable, and the most analogous to IDEA’s principles.

Id.

(citing P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31 § 5297).
Although courts in other circuits have applied the 30-day
statute of limitations suggested by the defendants, the Puerto Rico
Court of Appeals characterized IDEA’s attorneys’ fees claim as an
independent cause of action.

See Rodriguez, 2014 WL 2506502;

Orraca Lopez, 2014 WL 1007087; Amador Lozada, 2014 WL 897905.
30-day

term

that

defendants

suggest

derives

from

a

The

statute

authorizing judicial review of administrative decisions, rather

2

Plaintiffs have not provided English translations of the
Puerto Rico decisions upon which they rely, in contravention of 48
U.S.C. § 864 (“all pleadings and proceedings in the United States
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall be conducted
in the English language.”) and Puerto Ricans for P.R. Party v.
Dalmau, 544 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he failure of
defendants to provide a translated copy of a critical decision
alone warranted denial of their motion.”). Nevertheless, in light
of more recent First Circuit Court of Appeals precedent, the Court
declines to ignore binding Puerto Rico law, and opts instead to
consider the substance of the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals
decisions at issue. See Berrios-Romero v. Estado Libre Asociado de
P.R., 641 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that “[a] decision
of a sister court is a proper matter of judicial notice” and taking
judicial notice of a Puerto Rico appellate court decision as law).

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

9

than an independent claim, like the claim here.

The independent

action for attorneys’ fees requires different application and
execution criteria and hence, is not analogous to a judicial review
proceeding.
Moreover, while the 30-day limitations period may be
appropriate for an appeal of an administrative determination, it is
too short to vindicate the underlying federal policies associated
with the fee-claims provisions of the IDEA.

Rodriguez, 2014 WL

2506502; Orraca Lopez, 2014 WL 1007087; Amador Lozada, 2014 WL
897905.

See also Amman, 991 F. 2d. at 931 (noting that longer,

less analogous state limitations periods are more compatible with
the IDEA’s policy goals). On the other hand, applying a three-year
limitations term to attorneys’ fees claims is likely to encourage
parental involvement in securing appropriate public education for
their children.

Rodriguez, 2014 WL 2506502; Orraca Lopez, 2014 WL

1007087; Amador Lozada, 2014 WL 897905.

As a result, the Court

concludes that the application of the Puerto Rico Civil Code’s
three-year statute of limitations to claims for attorneys' fees
pursuant to the IDEA is consistent with the policies underlying the
federal statute.
Mindful of the need to facilitate IDEA’s purpose — to
compensate the parents for the attorneys’ fees incurred during an
administrative hearing on behalf of the child's education rights,
and to promote social justice — the Court applies the 3-year

Civil No. 14-1494 (FAB)

10

statute of limitations found in article 1867 of the Civil Code of
Puerto

Rico,

P.R.

Laws

Ann.

Tit.

31

§

5297.

Accordingly,

plaintiffs had until June 23, 2017 to file an attorneys’ fees claim
pursuant to section 1415 of the IDEA.
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the 3-year
statute of limitations term to claim attorneys’ fees contained in
article 1867 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann.
Tit. 31 § 5297(1), applies to plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees claim.
Because plaintiffs filed their attorneys’ fees claim well within
the three-year limitations period, defendants’ motion to dismiss
(Docket No. 6) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 17, 2014.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE