Diaz v. Astrue

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re 1 Complaint filed by Jonathan Diaz. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 6/7/2016.(VCC)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

JONATHAN DIAZ VAZQUEZ,
Plaintiff,
CIV. NO.: 14-1499 (SCC)

v.
COMMN’R OF SOC. SEC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jonathan Diaz Vazquez asks this court to review
the decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security
(“the Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s application for
disability benefits. Docket No. 1. After a review of the record
and the parties’ memoranda, we remand this matter to the
Commissioner.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Social Security Act (“the Act”), a person is
disabled if he is unable to do his prior work or, “considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). The Act provides that “[t]he
findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). Substantial evidence exists “if a reasonable mind,
reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could
accept it as adequate to support [the] conclusion.”
Irlanda-Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765,
769 (1st Cir. 1991). Thus, the Commissioner’s decision must
be upheld if we determine that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s findings, even if we would have reached a
different conclusion had we reviewed the evidence de novo.
Lizotte v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 654 F.2d 127, 128 (1st
Cir. 1981).
The scope of our review is limited. We are tasked with
determining whether the ALJ employed the proper legal
standards and focused facts upon the proper quantum of
evidence. See Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). The ALJ’s decision must
be reversed if his decision was derived “by ignoring

DIAZ v. COMMISSIONER

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evidence, misapplying law, or judging matters entrusted to
experts.” Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999). In
reviewing a denial of benefits, the ALJ must have considered
all of the evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3).
The Act sets forth a five-step inquiry to determine
whether a person is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
The steps must be followed in order, and if a person is
determined not to be disabled at any step, the inquiry stops.
Id. Step one asks whether the plaintiff is currently “doing
substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If
he is, he is not disabled under the Act. Id. At step two, it is
determined whether the plaintiff has a physical or mental
impairment, or combination of impairments, that is severe
and meets the Act’s duration requirements. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof as
to the first two steps. Step three considers the medical
severity

of

the

plaintiff’s

impairments.

20

C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If, at this step, the plaintiff is determined
to have an impairment that meets or equals an impairment
listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P., app. 1, and meets the
duration

requirements,

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

he

is

disabled.

20

C.F.R.

DIAZ v. COMMISSIONER

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If the plaintiff is not determined to be disabled at step
three, his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is assessed. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), (e). Once the RFC is determined, the
inquiry proceeds to step four, which compares the plaintiff’s
RFC to his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
If the plaintiff can still do his past relevant work, he is not
disabled. Id. Finally, at step five, the plaintiff’s RFC is
considered alongside his “age, education, and work
experience to see if [he] can make an adjustment to other
work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can make
an adjustment to other work, he is not disabled; if he cannot,
he is disabled. Id.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff made his initial application for disability benefits
on February 16, 20111 alleging that his disability began on
July 1, 2010. See TR. at 443-51. 2 The claim was denied, as was
1.

Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s motion both use Jan. 31, 2011 as the date
of application of disability benefits. However, in the Social Security
Transcript, the Application for Social Security Benefits found in TR.
at 443-51 is dated February 16, 2011, and so we have dated it in this
Opinion accordingly.

2.

We will refer to the Social Security Transcript as “TR.” throughout.

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reconsideration. See id at 378-85. Plaintiff then requested a
hearing, which was held on January 9, 2013. See id at 402. On
February 15, 2013, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
issued an unfavorable decision. See id at 164. The appeals
council refused to review the ALJ’s decision, see id. at 1, and
Plaintiff filed this appeal. Docket No. 1.
The ALJ made several findings. First, he determined that
claimant’s impairments do not have more than a de minimis
effect on [Mr. Diaz’s] ability to perform substantial gainful
activity and therefore are “non-severe.” TR. at 172-73
(emphasis supplied). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments
equaling one of those listed at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.
1. Id. The ALJ then found that though Plaintiff could not
perform past relevant work, he had the Residual Functional
Capacity (RFC) to “perform light work,” limited to simple,
unskilled, repetitive work, that allows alternating positions
every two hours. Id. at 175-81. The ALJ concluded that “there
are jobs that exist in the national economy that the claimant
can perform” under 20 CFR § 404.1569 and § 404.1569 (a),
and that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social
Security Act § 404.1520 (g) from July 1, 2010 through

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February 15, 2013. Id. at 181-82.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges four errors in the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff
claims that the ALJ: 1) erred in denying the request for a
supplemental hearing, 2) erred in interpreting raw medical
data in functional terms, and 3) erred in not including that
the claimant has bilateral limitations with hands, feet and
more postural limitations than those found in his RFC
assessment. Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ did not base his
conclusions regarding the claimant’s ability to perform the
RFC assessment on substantial evidence.
Defendant concedes that remand to the Commissioner
for further proceedings is necessary because the ALJ did not
explain the weight given to the consultative examiner’s
medical opinion or allow Plaintiff the opportunity to
question the vocational expert. After reviewing the ALJ’s
decision, the Court agrees.
The Commissioner’s regulations require the ALJ to
“always give good reasons” for the weight it gives a treating
source opinion. 20 C.F.R §404.1527(c)(2); see Polanco-Quiñones
v. Astrue, 477 F. App’x 745, 746 (1st Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
But see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (noting that “final

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responsibility for deciding” various issues, including an
impairment’s nature and severity, “is reserved to the
Commissioner”). The commissioner also has to base
conclusions on substantial evidence, (RFC§ 205(g), 42
U.S.C.A. § 405(g). See also Mercado v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
767 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D.P.R. 2010). By its own admission,
because the ALJ failed to properly substantiate the
conclusion, remand is required by 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g).
Furthermore, if the claimant requests a supplemental
hearing, the ALJ must grant the request, unless the ALJ
receives additional documentary evidence that supports a
fully favorable decision. HALLEX I-2-5-58. 3 In cases that
warrant compliance with requirements of substantial
evidence rule, including the need for further RFC findings,
“sentence four remand” is in order. See (RFC§ 205(g), 42
3.“The Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law manual provides the
format and guidance for the Deputy Commissioner for Disability
Adjudication and Review convey[ing] guiding principles, procedural
guidance, and information to Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review staff. HALLEX defines procedures for carrying out policy and
provides guidance for processing and adjudicating claims at the hearing,
Appeals Council, and civil action levels. It also includes policy statements
resulting from Appeals Council en banc meetings under the authority of
the Appeals Council Chair.” See HALLEX I-1-0-1

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U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Mercado v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 767
F. Supp. 2d 278 (D.P.R. 2010). Defendant is in agreement that
the ALJ failed to follow the HALLEX guidelines 4 and that
remand is in order pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we REMAND this matter to
the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 7th day of June, 2016.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

4.“The Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law manual provides the
format and guidance for the Deputy Commissioner for Disability
Adjudication and Review convey[ing] guiding principles, procedural
guidance, and information to Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review staff. HALLEX defines procedures for carrying out policy and
provides guidance for processing and adjudicating claims at the hearing,
Appeals Council, and civil action levels. It also includes policy statements
resulting from Appeals Council en banc meetings under the authority of
the Appeals Council Chair.” See HALLEX I-1-0-1