Cartagena Enterprises, Inc. v. EGC, Corp. et al

Filing 39

OPINION AND ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Marcos E. Lopez on 12/3/2014. (MT)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
CARTAGENA ENTERPRISES, INC.
d/b/a CARTAGENA PUBLISHING,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO.: 14-1500 (MEL)
v.
EGC, CORP. et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 23, 2014 Cartagena Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a/ Cartagena Publishing (“plaintiff”)

filed a complaint against EGC, Corp. (“EGC”) and Select-O-Hits, Inc. (“Select-O-Hits”)
(collectively “defendants”) alleging copyright infringement in violation of the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (the “Copyright Act”), false destination of origin and unfair competition in
violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and unjust enrichment in violation
of “principles of equity and Puerto Rico Law”. ECF No. 1. On August 21, 2014, defendants
moved for dismissal of plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims and Puerto Rico law unjust enrichment
claims. ECF No. 16. Defendants filed a response in opposition on September 14, 2014 and
plaintiff filed a reply on September 24, 2014. ECF Nos. 21; 26. For the following reasons
defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The court draws the following factual allegations from the complaint (ECF No. 1):

Plaintiff is a music publisher that owns and controls a catalog of music compositions authored by
composers in the Latin music genre. ¶ 9. On or about September 3, 2013 plaintiff received a

license request from Select-O-Hits, a music distributor, on behalf of ECG, seeking the permit
and authorization to commercially use two compositions that are wholly owned and controlled
by plaintiff: “Cupido” by composer Luis López Cabán and “Inmaginación” [sic] by composer
Perín Vázquez. ¶¶ 11-12. Select-O-Hits sought the authority to legally include sound recordings
from “Cupido” and “Inmaginación” [sic] in an album entitled “El Gran Combo de Puerto Rico –
50 Aniversario” by the salsa band El Gran Combo. ¶ 13. Plaintiff requested a sample of the
album with the songs for “listening reference” and Select-O-Hits provided plaintiff the same. ¶¶
14-15. After examining the sample provided, plaintiff denied the license request, finding that the
style and manner in which the songs were used “significantly altered” their basic melodies,
structures, and musical arrangements. ¶ 15.
Plaintiff also put Select-O-Hits on notice that two other compositions wholly owned by
plaintiff were featured on the “El Gran Combo de Puerto Rico – 50 Aniversario” album:
“Carmencita” by composer Kito Vélez and “Te Vas a Arrepentir” by composer Roberto Anglero.
¶ 16. Plaintiff also denied Select-O-Hits a license to use those songs on the album. Id. After
plaintiff issued its notice of license denial for the songs in question, Select-O-Hits attempted to
secure a compulsory license via § 115 of the Copyright Act, but was unsuccessful. ¶ 18. SelectO-Hits notified plaintiff that it had acquired a license through the Harry Fox Agency. ¶ 17.
Plaintiff responded to Select-O-Hit’s notice of license acquisition by informing Select-O-Hits
that the Harry Fox Agency did not have the authority to issue a license for the songs in the
question, and such licenses were not valid. Id. Plaintiff also sent a cease-and-desist letter to the
Harry Fox Agency, requesting that it cease and desist from issuing licenses to compositions that
it did not control. Id.

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Defendants proceeded to feature the compositions “Carmencita,” “Te Vas a Arrepentir,”
“Cupido,” and “Inmaginación” [sic] in the “El Gran Combo de Puerto Rico – 50 Aniversario”
album, without a license issued by plaintiff. ¶ 19. The album was manufactured, distributed,
marketed, and made available for sale to the public on October 7, 2013. Id. Defendants altered
the lyrics of the songs. ¶ 20. Defendants also included a song entitled “El Gran Combo Ahí” on
the “El Gran Combo de Puerto Rico – 50 Aniversario” album, which features portions of other
compositions solely owned and controlled by plaintiff, without plaintiff’s authorization,
including: “Brujería” by Jorge Borrergo, “El Menú” by Perín Vázquez, “Jala Jala” by Pellín
Rodríguez, and “Julia” by Omar Mario Carrizo Castillero. ¶ 21. Plaintiff has acquired registered
copyrights to the compositions “Carmencita,” “Te Vas a Arrepentir,” “Cupido,” “Inmaginación,”
[sic] “Brujería,” “El Menú,” “Jala Jala,” and “Julia.” ¶ 22.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must limit its focus

to the allegations of the complaint. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Colón, 587 F.2d 70, 72 (1st Cir. 1978).
Specifically, the inquiry should be “whether a liberal reading of [the complaint] can reasonably
admit of a claim . . . .” Id. An evaluation of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) requires the
court to “accept as true ‘all well-pleaded factual averments and indulg[e] all reasonable
inferences in plaintiff=s favor.’” Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (1st Cir. 1996)
(quoting Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
appropriate only if the facts alleged, taken as true, do not warrant recovery. Aulson, 83 F.3d at 3.
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must Aset forth factual allegations, either
direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some
actionable legal theory.@ Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988). Although

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all inferences must be made in plaintiff=s favor, the court need not accept Abald assertions,
unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like.@ Aulson, 83 F.3d at 3.
The Supreme Court held in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), that in
order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “a plausible
entitlement to relief.” Rodríguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559). AWhile Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading
of specifics, it does require enough facts to ‘nudge [plaintiffs=] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.’ Accordingly, in order to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the
grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.’” Torres v. Bella Vista Hosp., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 2d 123, 133 (D.P.R.
2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56) (citation omitted).
IV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. Lanham Act Claim
The majority of the Lanham Act pertains to trademark registration, use, and infringement;

§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act, however, “is one of the few provisions that goes beyond trademark
protection,” prohibiting conduct that would lead to confusion with respect to the “origin,
sponsorship, or approval” of goods or services. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Centry Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28-29 (2003) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125). “Section 43(a) provides a federal
remedy for using either ‘a false designation of origin’ or a ‘false description or representation’ in
connection with any goods or services.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 779
(1992). In Dastar, the United States Supreme Court held that the phrase “origin of goods” “refers
to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea,
concept, or communication embodied in those goods.” 539 U.S. at 37.

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Defendants assert that plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims must be dismissed in light of the
decision in Dastar, claiming that they are “actually copyright claims in disguise,” which do not
properly state a cause of action pursuant to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. ECF No. 16, at 12.
Plaintiff does not address this argument in its response, stating only that it “voluntarily dismisses
without prejudice” its cause of action pursuant to the Lanham Act. ECF No. 21, at 2. A “plaintiff
may dismiss an action without a court order by filing: (i) a notice of dismissal before the
opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). A review of the
docket reveals that no answer or motion for summary judgment has been filed in this case;
therefore, plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 31-38) is dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to its announcement of voluntary dismissal.
2. Unjust Enrichment Claim
Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act preempts any state cause of action that is equivalent
to a federal copyright infringement claim. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36
F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994). “To avoid preemption, ‘a cause of action defined by state law
must incorporate elements beyond those necessary to prove copyright infringement, and must
regulate conduct qualitatively different from the conduct governed by federal copyright law.’”
Guedes v. Martínez, 131 F.Supp.2d 272, 279 (D.P.R. 2001) (internal citations omitted). “If a
state cause of action requires an extra element, beyond mere copying, preparation of derivative
works, performance, distribution or display, then the state cause of action is qualitatively
different from, and not subsumed within, a copyright infringement claim and federal law will not
preempt the state action.” DataGen., 36 F.3d at 1164 (internal citations omitted).

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Defendants contend that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim under Puerto Rico law is
preempted, arguing that it does not contain an element that makes it “qualitatively different”
from a copyright infringement claim under federal law. ECF No. 14, at 13-14. State law unjust
enrichment claims based on the use of copyrighted material are “generally preempted because
the theory of unjust enrichment protects rights that are essentially equivalent to those protected
under the Copyright Act.” Amador v. McDonald’s Corp., 601 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408-09 (D.P.R.
2009) (finding Puerto Rico law unjust enrichment claim was preempted by the Copyright Act
where it was based on the same conduct that was alleged to violate the Copyright Act) (citing
Guedes, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 280); see also 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright § 1.01(B)(1)(g) (2008) (“[A] state law cause of action for unjust enrichment or quasi
contract should be regarded as an ‘equivalent right’ and hence, pre-empted insofar as it applied
to copyright subject matter.”).
In support of its unjust enrichment claim, plaintiff reincorporates each of the allegations
which underlie its claim under the Copyright Act. ECF No. 1, ¶ 39. It adds that “[defendants],
through their actions unjustly enriched themselves at plaintiff’s, Cartagena Publishing expenses
[sic] and as such, they should be required to make restitution of or for the property and/or
benefits received from their intentional and unjust acts of using the compositions . . . without
consent” and that “through and with knowledge of their actions [d]efendants [sic] patrimony
increased substantially while plaintiff, Cartagena Publishing’s decreased.” Id. at ¶¶ 40-41. The
complaint contains no factual allegations in support of the unjust enrichment claim regarding
defendant’s conduct that are distinct from those alleged in support of the federal claim. Plaintiff
essentially alleges that the unauthorized use of plaintiff’s copyrighted musical compositions, in
violation of the Copyright Act, unjustly enriched defendants and thus entitles plaintiff’s to

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compensation, which is precisely the type of state law unjust enrichment claim that the
Copyright Act preempts. See e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grummon Sys. Support Corp., 795 F.
Supp. 501, 506 (D.Mass. 1992) aff’d 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Count VI of the complaint
alleges a claim for unjust enrichment. This claim is for damages of the alleged violation of Data
General’s exclusive right to control the use of the copyrighted materials, and is thus another
repackaged allegation of copyright infringement. Such a claim is preempted by federal law.”)
(citations omitted); see also Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1126 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (“[W]here the plaintiff’s theory of relief is that the defendant has improperly
benefited from using a certain work and that a contract should be implied in law (e.g., a quasicontract, quantum meruit, or unjust enrichment claim), such claims are preempted.”). Because
plaintiff’s cause of action for unjust enrichment is not qualitatively different from its copyright
infringement claim, it is preempted by the Copyright Act and therefore is dismissed with
prejudice.
V.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) is granted.

Plaintiff’s cause of action for false designation of origin and unfair competition pursuant to § 43
the Lanham Act is dismissed without prejudice in accordance with its decision to voluntarily
desist from the pursuing the claim. Its cause of action for unjust enrichment in violation Puerto
Rico law is dismissed with prejudice as it is preempted by federal copyright law. Plaintiff’s cause
of action for copyright infringement claims in violation of the Copyright Act survives.
IT IS SO ORDERED
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 3rd day of December, 2014.
s/Marcos E. López
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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