Rodriguez-Rivera v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. et al

Filing 13

ORDER denying 9 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Answer to the complaint due on 6/17/2015. Signed by Judge Daniel R. Dominguez on 6/3/2015. (MF)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

Mayra Rodriguez-Rivera
Plaintiff
v.

Civil No. 14-1504 (DRD)

Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc., et al.
Defendants

OPINION & ORDER
Federal tribunals are courts of limited jurisdiction.

Moreover, pursuant to

constitutional authority, congress enacted a statute that restricts the diversity jurisdiction
of district courts. See U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1-2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Over time, diversity
jurisdiction has come to be one of the major avenues traversed in order to reach the
federal judiciary. The instant case tests the limits of diversity jurisdiction, specifically
with regard to its amount-in-controversy requirement.
Pending before the Court is a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Docket No. 9. For the ensuing grounds, the motion to dismiss
must be DENIED.

I.

FOREWORD

At the outset, it should be noted that when evaluating a “Rule 12(b)(1) motion, we
must ‘credit the plaintiff's well-pled factual allegations and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor.’” Sanchez ex rel. D.R.-S. v. United States, 671 F.3d
86 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010)).

Hence, the Court shall briefly recite the germane factual allegations of the complaint in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
Mayra Rodríguez-Rivera (“Plaintiff”)—who is domiciled in the state of Florida—
and her aunt were at the Sam’s Club store of Humacao, Puerto Rico. Specifically, they
found themselves in the parking lot of the store after purchasing some items. While
Plaintiff attempted to place the merchandise in the car, she stepped in a “crack” in the
cement and suffered a violent fall that resulted in trauma to her head, shoulders, arms,
waist, knees, legs, and foot. As a result of the fall, she suffered a “transverse nondisplaced fracture at the base of the fifth metatarsal bone of her right foot.” This fracture
forced Plaintiff to use crutches, a wheelchair, and a walker. However, the use of these
items of assistance caused problems of their own: Plaintiff developed “pain, swelling,
and tenderness” of her shoulders, arms, and hands. This lawsuit is a product of the
foregoing events.
Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. The causes of action arise exclusively from the Puerto Rico tort statutes.
See 31 P.R. Laws § 5141, et seq. The entity responsible for the damages, according to
Plaintiff, is Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. (“Defendant”), which is alleged to be the entity
that “owned, controlled, operated and provided maintenance” to the store and parking
lot in question.1 Plaintiff seeks a judgment in excess of $4,000,000 in compensation for

1

The Court notes that the complaint also includes as defendants fifty (50) unknown employees that
“owned, controlled, operated and provided maintenance” to the store and parking lot subject to the
controversy. Further, the complaint also includes as defendants fifty (50) unknown insurance companies
that may have had insurance policies on behalf of any other defendant to cover occurrences such as
Plaintiff’s fall. Also of note is that Plaintiff asserts that these one hundred (100) Defendants are domiciled
outside of Florida, which would avoid any potential jurisdictional problems for lack of complete diversity.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

-2-

the physical, emotional, and economic damages that have occurred, will occur, or are
occurring.
However, Defendant contends that there is no hook upon which federal
jurisdiction may hang.

Defendant challenges this Court’s jurisdiction by declaring that

the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold cannot be met. Prior to delving into the particulars
of this contention, it is best to present the general principles surrounding the age-old
amount-in-controversy bar.

II.

PRICE OF ADMISSION

There are two obstacles that a proponent of diversity jurisdiction must overcome
before being allowed to enter the realm of the federal judiciary: (i) demonstrating the
existence of complete diversity of citizenship between the parties; and (ii) establishing
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive interests and costs. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332.2

Defendant’s attack is directed exclusively against the latter

requirement; hence, Defendant concedes that, at least for the sake of this motion,
2

28 U.S.C. § 1332

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the district courts
shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection of an action between citizens of a State
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent residence in
the United States and are domiciled in the same State;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional
parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of
different States.
...

-3-

complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties. Therefore, for ease of
exposition, the Court shall limit its discussion to the amount-in-controversy prong.
At the outset, the Court recognizes that the “determination of the value of the
matter in controversy for purposes of federal jurisdiction is a federal question to be
decided under federal standards.” Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352
(1961) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941)); see also
Stewart v. Tupperware Corp., 356 F.3d 335, 339 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Using Puerto Rico
Supreme Court cases to analyze the amount-in-controversy for diversity purposes is the
equivalent of comparing apples and oranges.”).
The second observation is that the Court must determine which party carries the
burden of persuasion as to the existence of federal jurisdiction. A determination of this
nature depends on whether the case was originally filed in federal court or reached the
federal judiciary via removal. In cases that originate in federal court, it is the plaintiff
who carries the burden; in contrast, in removal cases the burden is carried by the
defendant. See e.g. Esquilin-Mendoza v. Don King Productions, Inc., 638 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2011); and Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 50-51 (1st Cir.
2009); and 14AA Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3702.1, at
330 (4th ed. 2011).
Similarly, it should be noted that the amount-in-controversy analysis changes
depending on whether the case reached the federal judiciary via removal or was
originally filed in federal court.

For instance—when the amount in controversy is

challenged in diversity-jurisdiction cases that commence in federal court—the plaintiff
must, in order to repel the challenge, make a showing that there is no “legal certainty

-4-

that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.”

St. Paul Mercury

Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938) (cited in approval in
Esquilin-Mendoza, 638 F.3d at 4). On the contrary—in cases where the amount in
controversy is challenged in the removal context—it is the defendant that must make a
showing that there is a “reasonable probability” that plaintiff’s claims exceed the
jurisdictional amount. Amoche, 556 F.3d at 50-51 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Romulus v.
CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 770 F.3d 67, 80 n. 13 (1st Cir. 2014); c.f. 28 U.S.C. §
1446(c)(2)(B).3
With respect to the amount-in-controversy requisite in cases that begin in federal
court, the First Circuit summarized the rules established by the Supreme Court as
follows:
First, federal courts must diligently enforce the rules establishing and limiting
diversity jurisdiction. Second, unless the law provides otherwise, the plaintiff's
damages claim will control the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes if
it is made “in good faith.” If the face of the complaint reveals, to a legal certainty,
that the controversy cannot involve the requisite amount, jurisdiction will not
attach. [St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 289]. Moreover, if later evidence shows, to a legal
certainty, that the damages never could have exceeded the jurisdictional
minimum such that the claim was essentially feigned (colorable) in order to
confer jurisdiction, the action must be dismissed. See also id. at 290, 58 S.Ct. at
591 (noting that plaintiff's good faith in choosing a federal forum may be
challenged by trial facts which establish that the “claim never could have
amounted to the sum necessary to give jurisdiction”). Finally, if events
subsequent to commencement of the action reduce the amount in controversy
below the statutory minimum, the federal court is not divested of jurisdiction.
A careful review of St. Paul evinces its primary concern for the plaintiff's
“good faith” in alleging the amount in controversy. When discerning a plaintiff's
good faith, a court may look to whether it “appear[s] to a legal certainty that the
claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 289,
3

It should be noted that the “preponderance of the evidence” language of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B) is
equivalent to the First Circuit’s “reasonable probability” standard. “[T]he reasonable probability standard
is, to our minds, for all practical purposes identical to the preponderance standard adopted by several
circuits.” Amoche, 556 F.3d at 50 (collecting cases). “Yet because questions of removal are typically
decided at the pleadings stage where little or no evidence has yet been produced, the removing
defendant's burden is better framed in terms of a ‘reasonable probability,’ not a preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. (citing Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005)).

-5-

58 S.Ct. at 590; see also Horton, 367 U.S. at 353, 81 S.Ct. at 1573; Jones v.
Landry, 387 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir.1967) (“Thus, there is but one test; good faith
and legal certainty are equivalents rather than two separate tests.”). But see
Local Div. No. 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist.,
589 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1978) (apparently finding alternative tests, noting that
where there is no evidence that the amount claimed was not in good faith, it must
appear “to a legal certainty” that the amount in controversy does not exceed the
jurisdictional minimum), overruled on other grounds by Local Div. 589,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1117, 102 S.Ct. 2928, 73 L.Ed.2d 1329 (1981).
Coventry Sewage Associates v. Dworkin Realty Co., 71 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995)
(discussing St. Paul).

“Courts determine whether a party has met the amount-in-controversy requirement by
‘looking to the circumstances at the time the complaint is filed.’” Spielman v. Genzyme
Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Coventry Sewage, 71 F.3d at 4; and Wright &
Miller § 3702 at 28–29 n. 31).
Clearly, a grander burden is placed on the shoulders of a defendant in the
removal context than on a plaintiff in cases originating in federal court.

“This

discrepancy in treatment of plaintiffs and defendants may be justified by the historical
tradition that the plaintiff is the master of the forum and is empowered to choose the
court system and venue in which litigation will proceed.” 14C Wright, Miller & Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3725, at 95 (3d ed.1998) (cited in approval in
Amoche, 556 F.3d at 50-51).
Having introduced these general concepts, the Court is now prepared to discuss
the flaws in Defendant’s argument.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s

position cannot survive scrutiny.

-6-

III.

WRONG CASE, WRONG STANDARD, OR BOTH?

Upon reading Defendant’s motion to dismiss, a particular Supreme Court citation

caught the Court’s attention: “[u]pon defendant’s challenge, however, ‘the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to establish facts indicating, to a legal certainty, that the claim involves
more that [sic] the jurisdictional minimum.’” See Docket No. 9, p. 5 (mistakenly citing St.
Paul, 303 U.S. at 288-89). Unfortunately, this quote caught the Court’s eye for all the
wrong reasons.
If true, this Supreme Court quote would appear to contradict this Court’s previous
discussion along with decades of federal case law; the burden placed on a diversityjurisdiction plaintiff’s shoulders would be much too onerous as it would essentially force
them to prove their claims twice in order to prevail. Therefore, intuitively, the Court was
convinced that there must have been some inaccuracy (in addition to the grammatical
error) contained in this powerful citation.
At first, the Court believed that this quote must have been taken from the St. Paul
case out of context. Thus, this Court dusted off the Supreme Court Reporter for the
year of 1938 (the year that St. Paul was decided) and turned to the pages of
Defendant’s citation. Alas, Defendant’s quote could not be found. Undeterred, in an
abundance of caution, the Court reread the entire case several times in an effort to find
this mysterious quote. These attempts were unsuccessful.
The Court subsequently speculated that Defendant may have mistakenly cited
the wrong case. Thus, the Court dropped the books and turned on the computer.
These efforts were for naught: after thoroughly searching through the known research

-7-

engines on the internet, it was clear that the Court underestimated Defendant’s mistake.
It would appear that this imaginary quote does not exist in any published court opinion
in the United States. Of course, this is not surprising because, as previously alluded to,
said quote would tear down a mountain of case law.
For the sake of clarity, the Court emphasizes the difference between fiction and
reality. “If the opposing party questions the damages allegation, then the party seeking
to invoke jurisdiction has the burden of alleging with sufficient particularity facts
indicating that it is not a legal certainty that the claim involves less than the jurisdictional
amount.” (internal quotations omitted). Stewart v. Tupperware Corp., 356 F.3d 335 (1st
Cir. 2004) (citing Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939); St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 288–89 &
n. 10; McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). In the
instant case, “[a]s the proponent of federal court jurisdiction, it is well-established that
the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that there is no legal certainty that he or she
cannot recover the applicable jurisdictional amount.” 14AA Wright, Miller & Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3702, at 317-19 (4th ed. 2011) (collecting cases).
This modest standard is much less demanding than the one (incorrectly) provided by
Defendant: “[Plaintiff must] establish facts indicating, to a legal certainty, that the claim
involves more that [sic] the jurisdictional minimum.” Admittedly, the wording of the
correct standard may appear confusing at first glance due to its use of a double
negative; perhaps this would explain Defendant’s oversight. In the end, however, this
phantom quote from the highest authority constitutes a misstatement of the proper test.4

4

The Court expects defense counsel to explain this matter, but knowing that it is expected that this error
was one of merely copying a wrong citation without there being any intent to mislead the Court.

-8-

IV.

ANALYSIS

All that remains is for Plaintiff to demonstrate that there is no “legal certainty that
the claim is really for” $75,000 or less. See St. Paul, 303 U.S. at 288-89 (cited in
approval in Esquilin-Mendoza, 638 F.3d at 4).

Plaintiff adequately shoulders this

modest burden.
Defendant’s motion argues for a dismissal based on three similar district-court
cases in which a jury rendered a verdict for less than $75,000. Plaintiff counters with
another similar case against another Wal-Mart entity in which the jury awarded the
victims $665,000. Clearly, the jury award turns on the weight and credibility of the
evidence presented at trial.
In the instant case, the Court is convinced that the allegations, if proven at trial,
do not support a finding that there is a legal certainty that the damages are of $75,000
or less. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered a “transverse non-displaced fracture at the
base of the fifth metatarsal bone of her right foot.”5 This fracture required that Plaintiff
use crutches, a wheelchair, and a walker.

However, the use of these items of

assistance caused Plaintiff to develop “pain, swelling, and tenderness” of her shoulders,
arms, and hands. Plaintiff was unable to work, which resulted in loss of earnings.
Moreover, as a result of these injuries, Plaintiff was forced to incur in medical expenses.
Plaintiff, additionally, was forced to hire someone to care for her and to carry out house
chores. Finally, the disability caused by these injuries is alleged to be continuous,
progressive, and permanent.
5

The Court notes that Defendant also mistakenly asserts that the instant case does not involve any bone
fracture.

-9-

For these reasons, the Court cannot find to a legal certainty that the claim is for
less than the jurisdictional amount. Thus, Defendant’s challenge must fail as Plaintiff
has met her burden. Notwithstanding, it should be noted that if a jury returns a verdict
for less than $75,000, the Court may deny costs to Plaintiff and/or impose costs in
Defendant’s favor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b).

V.

AFTERWORD

For all of the abovementioned reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s
motion to dismiss. The Court rules that Plaintiff has demonstrated that there is no “legal
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” St. Paul, 303
U.S. at 288-89 (cited in approval in Esquilin-Mendoza, 638 F.3d at 4).

Therefore,

Plaintiff has successfully invoked diversity jurisdiction in the instant case. As such,
Defendant is hereby ordered to answer the complaint within the next fourteen (14) days.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 3rd day of June, 2015.
/s/ DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ
DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ
U.S. District Judge

- 10 -