Chaparro-Cortes v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION affirming the Commissioner's decision. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Silvia Carreno-Coll on 3/15/2016.(VCC)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

MIGDALIA M. CHAPARROCORTES,
Plaintiff,
CIV. NO.: 14-1566(SCC)
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Migdalia M. Chaparro-Cortes asks this court to
review the decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social
Security (“the Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s application
for disability benefits. Docket No. 1. After a review of the
record and the parties’ memoranda, we affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Social Security Act (“the Act”), a person is
disabled if he is unable to do his prior work or, “considering

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his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). The Act provides that “[t]he
findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence exists “if a reasonable mind, reviewing
the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as
adequate to support [the] conclusion.” Irlanda-Ortiz v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991). Thus,
the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld if we determine
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, even if
we would have reached a different conclusion had we
reviewed the evidence de novo. Lizotte v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 654 F.2d 127, 128 (1st Cir. 1981).
The scope of our review is limited. We are tasked with
determining whether the ALJ employed the proper legal
standards and focused facts upon the proper quantum of
evidence. See Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). The ALJ’s decision must be
reversed if his decision was derived “by ignoring evidence,
misapplying law, or judging matters entrusted to experts.”
Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999). In reviewing a

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denial of benefits, the ALJ must have considered all of the
evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3).
The Act sets forth a five-step inquiry to determine whether
a person is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The steps
must be followed in order, and if a person is determined not to
be disabled at any step, the inquiry stops. Id. Step one asks
whether the plaintiff is currently “doing substantial gainful
activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). If he is, he is not disabled
under the Act. Id. At step two, it is determined whether the
plaintiff has a physical or mental impairment, or combination
of impairments, that is severe and meets the Act’s duration
requirements. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The plaintiff bears
the burden of proof as to the first two steps. Step three
considers the medical severity of the plaintiff’s impairments. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If, at this step, the plaintiff is
determined to have an impairment that meets or equals an
impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P., app. 1, and
meets the duration requirements, he is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
If the plaintiff is not determined to be disabled at step three,
his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is assessed. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4), (e). Once the RFC is determined, the inquiry

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proceeds to step four, which compares the plaintiff’s RFC to his
past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the plaintiff
can still do his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Id. Finally, at step five, the plaintiff’s RFC is considered
alongside his “age, education, and work experience to see if
[he] can make an adjustment to other work.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can make an adjustment to
other work, he is not disabled; if he cannot, he is disabled. Id.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff made her initial application for disability benefits
on January 10, 2011, alleging that her disability began on
September 22, 2010. See TR. at 271.1 The claim was initially
denied, as was the reconsideration, and Plaintiff thereafter
requested a hearing. See id. at 189-192. The hearing was held
on May 13, 2013. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not
disabled. See id. at 15-28. The appeals council refused to review
the ALJ’s decision, see id. at 1-5, and she filed this appeal.
Docket No. 1.
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the Residual

1.

We will refer to the Social Security Transcript as “TR.” throughout.

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Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform “light” work with a
series of restrictions. TR. at 20. The ALJ then found that while
she could no longer perform her past relevant work, there
existed work that she could perform; therefore, she was not
disabled. Id. at 27.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s erroneous determination that
she could perform other alternative work was not supported
by the record or the applicable legal standards. Moreover, she
claims that the hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the
vocational expert did not accurately describe her limitations.
According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred by not having given
“good

reasons”

for

disregarding

the

diagnosis

of

“fibromyalgia, vertigo and dizzy spells,” made by her treating
physician, Dr. Navid Pourahmadi. Docket No. 18 at page 3. In
particular, Plaintiff avers that the ALJ did not discuss whether
her fibromyalgia diagnosis was severe enough to preclude
substantial gainful activity. Finally, Plaintiff complains that the
ALJ “failed to give adequate consideration” to her obesity,
which severely limits her.
A careful review of the evidence shows that, contrary to
what Plaintiff alleges, the ALJ took into consideration those

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medical conditions when it concluded that Plaintiff had the
RFC to perform “light” work with several additional
limitations, such as the amount of weight that she could carry,
the amount of time she could spend sitting or walking, among
others.
In making those findings, the ALJ granted “great weight”
to the clinical evaluation of Dr. Pourahmadi, whose
observations are consistent with other evidence on the record.
TR. at 25. The Commissioner’s regulations require the ALJ to
give the opinions of treating physicians “on the nature and
severity” of a plaintiff’s impairments “controlling weight,” at
least where the opinions are “well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and
are “not inconsistent with other substantial evidence” in the
case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). But see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2) (noting that “final responsibility for deciding”
various issues, including an impairment’s nature and severity,
“is reserved to the Commissioner”). The ALJ must “always
give good reasons” for the weight it gives a treating source
opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Polanco-Quiñones v.
Astrue, 477 F. App’x 745, 746 (1st Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
As part of his assessment, Dr. Pourahmadi reported that

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Plaintiff had a “normal gait”, normal motor strength all
around, “intact sensation” and normal reflexes. TR. at 437-438.
No ataxia or abnormality on gait and station were found. Id.
He also reported “no limitations of movement, deformities,
inflammation, fractures or edema.” Id. Though he recorded
that Plaintiff complained of dizziness, he found that her
prognosis was “fair.” Id.
Dr. Pourahmadi’s observations are consistent with the
clinical signs reported by other doctors who examined Plaintiff.
For example, Dr. Sotomayor’s clinical report, which was
granted “great weight” by the ALJ, indicated that Plaintiff
had “moderate” pain and “mild dorsal lumbar scoliosis.” TR.
at 434-435. The medical opinions of Dr. Rafael Queipo and Dr.
C. Hernandez were also consistent with the other reports, and
were only given “partial weight” because the ALJ actually
found that Plaintiff had “additional limitations.” TR. at 24. State
agency consultant Dr. Hernández also assessed limitations
consisted with a recommendation of light work. TR. at 507.
Based on those observations, the ALJ concluded that the
record did not support Plaintiff’s complaints of “severe body
pain.”TR. at 23. Plaintiff had not required periods of
hospitalization, emergency room treatment or surgery. In fact,

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her medical conditions had been treated with “routine
treatment.” TR. at 23. Moreover, her overall strength had been
4/5, as Dr. Pourahmadi found, and there was no evidence that
she used a cane or other device for ambulation. Id. at 24.
Furthermore, she fell on the “younger individual” category, as
defined in 20 CFR §404.1563.
In all, the ALJ was very thorough in explaining the factors
assessed when making the determination. In setting forth
Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ itemized numerous limitations, each
attributable to a particular medical condition. For example, the
ALJ stated that Plaintiff was “limited to occasional handling
and fingering” taking into consideration her own subjective
symptoms, as well as the positive Tinel signs and the “objective
testing of bilaterial median entrapment neuropathy and
sensorimotor polyneuropathy.” TR. at 23. Another limitation,
that Plaintiff should not perform work that requires “overhead
reaching with the right upper extremity” (TR. at 20), stems
form the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s “cervical pain with
radiation to the right shoulder and diminished range of
motion.”TR. at 23.
Because Plaintiff’s arguments as to the propriety of the
questions posed to the vocational expert are founded on the

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ALJ’s allegedly improper RFC determination–a matter that we
have already addressed--we find that the ALJ appropriately
factored in Plaintiff’s diagnosis when posing a hypothetical to
the vocational expert.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the decision of
the Commissioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 15th day of March, 2016.
S/ SILVIA CARREÑO-COLL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE