Puerto Rico Medical Emergency Group, Inc. v. Iglesia Episcopal Puertorriquena, Inc. et al

Filing 121

OPINION AND ORDER re 94 Motion for Protective Order and re 109 Motion in Compliance. The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART PRMEG's renewed motion to compel discovery, (Docket No. 109), and DENIES defendants' motion for a protecti ve order, (Docket No. 94). The Court ORDERS defendants HESL, SGE, and SSE to comply with this Order by August 12, 2016, or be subject to sanctions. The Court EXTENDS the discovery period until August 26, 2016. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 07/26/2016. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
PUERTO RICO MEDICAL EMERGENCY
GROUP, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

v.
IGLESIA EPISCOPAL
PUERTORRIQUEÑA, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER1
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is a renewed motion to compel discovery filed
by plaintiff Puerto Rico Medical Emergency Group, Inc. (“PRMEG”).
(Docket No. 109.)
(“HESL”),

Defendants Hospital Episcopal San Lucas, Inc.

Servicios

Generales

Episcopales,

Inc.

(“SGE”),

and

Servicios de Salud Episcopales (“SSE”) opposed the motion, (Docket
No. 111), and PRMEG replied, (Docket No. 114).
Also before the Court is a related motion for a protective
order filed by defendants Iglesia Episcopal Puertorriqueña, Inc.
(“IEP”), HESL, SGE, and SSE.

(Docket No. 94.)

PRMEG opposed.

(Docket No. 105.)
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART PRMEG’s renewed motion to compel discovery, (Docket

1

Nathanael R. Krevor, a second-year student at The George
Washington University Law School, assisted in the preparation of
this Opinion and Order.

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

2

No. 109), and DENIES defendants’ motion for a protective order,
(Docket No. 94).
I.

BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2015, PRMEG sent its first discovery request
to defendants IEP, HESL, SGE, and SSE.
response,

defendants

requested

a

(Docket No. 92-1.)

conference

to

“provide

In
the

documentation that [they] possess[ed]” and to “coordinate the
additional time required for the few remaining documents.” (Docket
No. 92-3.)

The parties met on December 23, 2015, and agreed that

defendants would answer PRMEG’s first discovery request on or
before January 11, 2016.
12,

2016,

HESL,

SGE,

(Docket No. 92-4 at p. 1.)

and

SSE

sent

answers

to

On January

PRMEG’s

first

discovery request. (Docket No. 92-6.) PRMEG responded, explaining
why the answers were inadequate and incomplete. (Docket No. 92-7.)
The

parties

met

again

to

address

the

discovery

issues,

and

defendants agreed to provide further disclosures by February 8,
2016.

(Docket No. 92-8 at p. 1.)

Because defendants failed to

make further disclosures by the agreed upon date, PRMEG filed a
motion to compel discovery on February 9, 2016.2

(Docket No. 92.)

Defendants HESL, SGE, and SSE opposed, (Docket No. 93), and PRMEG
replied, (Docket No. 99).

2

PRMEG’s motion to compel asked the Court to compel discovery from
only three defendants - HESL, SGE, and SSE. (Docket No. 92-1 at p.
11.)
PRMEG’s renewed motion to compel discovery also makes no
request for an order directed to the fourth defendant, IEP.
(Docket No. 109 at p. 12.)

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

3

On January 26, 2016, PRMEG sent notice to take depositions of
all defendants.

(Docket No. 94-2.)

The notice scheduled four

separate depositions, one for each defendant.

Id.

On February 1,

2016, PRMEG sent notice to depose a non-party corporation, Saint
Luke’s Memorial Hospital, Inc. (“SLMH”).
On

February

18,

2016,

defendants

(Docket No. 109-1.)
moved the Court

for

a

protective order limiting and quashing certain topics in PRMEG’s
deposition notice.

(Docket No. 94.)

PRMEG opposed.

(Docket No.

105.)
The parties consolidated the four depositions of defendants
and the deposition of SLMH into a single deposition, and defendants
and SLMH designated the same two individuals to speak to all topics
listed in the deposition notices.
109-2; 114 at pp. 2-3.

See Docket Nos. 109 at p. 3 n.3;

The consolidated deposition of the two

individuals representing defendants and SLMH took place in April
2016.

See Docket No. 109 at p. 3.

On April 26, 2016, after the discovery deadline passed, the
Court asked the parties whether the outstanding discovery motions
were moot.

(Docket No. 108.)

PRMEG responded that the motion to

compel discovery was not moot and renewed its request to order
HESL, SGE, and SSE to produce the outstanding discovery subject to
sanctions for noncompliance.

(Docket No. 109.)

In that motion,

PRMEG reiterated the inadequacy of the response by defendants HESL,
SGE, and SSE to PRMEG’s first discovery request, id. at pp. 2-9,

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

4

and described the inadequacy of defendants’ deponents, id. at pp.
9-11.

Defendants HESL, SGE, and SSE opposed the renewed motion to

compel discovery, (Docket No. 111), and PRMEG replied, (Docket No.
114).
II.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (“Rule 26”) states that
“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case” and that information “need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”
26(b)(1).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Within the scope of Rule 26, a party may conduct

discovery by serving another party with a request for documents
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 (“Rule 34”) and by
conducting oral depositions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30 (“Rule 30”).

If “a party fails to produce documents

. . . as requested under Rule 34” or “a deponent fails to answer a
question asked under Rule 30,” the affected party may move for an
order compelling discovery.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i), (iv).

In its renewed motion to compel discovery, PRMEG claims that
HESL, SGE, and SSE are deficient in their obligations to produce
documents and to name and prepare representatives for deposition.
(Docket No. 109.)

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)
A.

5

Production of Documents
Rule 34 allows a party to serve on any other party a request

to produce documents or electronically stored information within
the “responding party’s possession, custody, or control.”
Civ. P. 34(a)(1).

Fed. R.

“The party to whom the request is directed must

respond in writing within 30 days after being served,” although
“[a] shorter or longer time may be stipulated to under [Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure] 29 or be ordered by the court.”

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). “For each item or category, the response must
either

state

that

inspection

and

related

activities

will

be

permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for
objecting to the request, including the reasons.”
34(b)(2)(B).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

“An objection must state whether any responsive

materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C).
PRMEG moves to compel HESL, SGE, and SSE to produce (1)
documents

related

to

companies

and

documents

(2)

between defendants.
1.

defendants’

interactions

related

to

with

monetary

insurance

transactions

(Docket No. 109.)

Documents Related to
Insurance Companies

Defendants’

Interactions

with

PRMEG claims that HESL, SGE, and SSE failed to provide
(1) HESL’s billing records in an adequate format, (2) documentation
regarding settlement agreements between defendants and insurance
companies,

and

(3)

documents,

including

communications

and

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)
negotiations,
insurance

6

relating

companies

to

to

contracts

bill

for

between

emergency

defendants
room

and

services.

See Docket No. 109 at pp. 3-7.
a.

Billing Records
In its first discovery request, PRMEG requested “a

list in electronic format, in a non-encrypted data form, (Excel
format), of all transmission of data, that includes each and every
claim for payment for services rendered at the [e]mergency [r]oom
located in the Hospital Episcopal San Lucas in Ponce, including at
El Tuque Emergency Room, for any and all insurance companies . . .
for

services

rendered

from

including[] May 2, 2014.”
First,

September

25,

2007[,]

up

to

and

and

SSE

(Docket No. 92-1 at p. 5.)

PRMEG

claims

that

HESL,

SGE,

“inundated PRMEG with millions of items related to all the billing
made

to

all

departments,”

insurance
including

companies
billing

in

records

all

of

the

for

services

hospital
“totally

unrelated to the allegations in the complaint.” (Docket No. 109 at
pp. 3-4.)

HESL, SGE, and SSE argue that the scope of the billing

information provided complies with PRMEG’s request.

(Docket No.

111 at pp. 3-5.)
PRMEG does not identify line items in the billing
records to explain specifically how the records do not satisfy its
discovery request.

Without that, the Court has no facts at its

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

7

disposal to conclude that the billing records produced do not
comply with PRMEG’s discovery request.
Second,

PRMEG

claims

that

HESL,

SGE,

and

SSE

provided HESL’s billing records in PDF format when the request
specified Excel format.

(Docket No. 109 at pp. 3-4.)

HESL, SGE,

and SSE argue that the parties did not agree upon a specific file
format and that the billing software permits only PDF format.
(Docket No. 111 at p. 4.)
The response to a request for the production of
electronically stored information “may state an objection to a
requested form,” and “[i]f the responding party objects to a
requested form . . . the party must state the form or forms it
intends to use.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(D).

“If the responding

party fails to make a timely objection, or fails to state the
reason for an objection, he may be held to have waived any or all
of his objections.”

Marx v. Kelly, Hart & Hallman, P.C., 929 F.2d

8, 12 (1st Cir. 1991).
Here,

PRMEG

requested

the

billing

records

from

defendants in Excel format in PRMEG’s first discovery request on
September 30, 2015.

(Docket No. 92-1 at p. 5.)

On December 23,

2015, the parties agreed that defendants would answer PRMEG’s first
discovery request on or before January 11, 2016.
at p. 1.)
one day.

(Docket No. 92-4

Defendants HESL, SGE, and SSE missed this deadline by
(Docket No. 92-6.)

In their untimely response, HESL,

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

8

SGE, and SSE did not object to the Excel file format.
enough to waive all future objections.

Id.

This is

See Marx, 929 F.2d at 12;

Brenford Envtl. Sys., L.P. v. Pipeliners of P.R., Inc., 269 F.R.D.
143, 147 (D.P.R. 2010) (Arenas, C. Mag. J.) (waiving party’s
objections to document requests because party failed to object
timely with specific reasons for its objections).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PRMEG’s request to
compel HESL, SGE, and SSE to produce the billing information for
services provided by PRMEG at the Hospital Episcopal San Lucas in
Ponce, including at El Tuque Emergency Room, in Excel format.

If,

for example, the billing software cannot provide the information in
Excel format, then the Court ORDERS HESL, SGE, and SSE to convert
the information to Excel format at their expense.

In their best

interests, the parties may want to communicate regarding the scope
of the data required.
b.

Settlement Agreements
PRMEG claims that HESL, SGE, and SSE failed to

produce documentation of settlement agreements between defendants
and

insurance

services.

companies

of

unpaid

(Docket No. 109 at p. 6.)

claims

for

emergency

room

HESL, SGE, and SSE argue that

PRMEG never requested settlement agreements between defendants and
insurance companies in an adequate discovery request.
111 at pp. 5-6.)
baseless.

(Docket No.

The Court finds HESL, SGE, and SSE’s argument

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

9

In PRMEG’s first discovery request, PRMEG requested
“a list of all payments received by [HESL], [SSE,] and/or [SGE] as
a result of all claim [sic] for payment for services rendered at
the [e]mergency [r]oom located in the Hospital Episcopal San Lucas
in Ponce, including at El Tuque Emergency Room, for any and all
insurance companies.”
encompasses

payments

(Docket No. 92-1 at p. 6.)
made

through

settlement

This request
agreements.

Furthermore, because a settlement agreement is a contract, PRMEG’s
request

for

“all

contractual

agreements

between

any

and

all

insurance companies and [HESL], [SSE,] and/or [SGE] that include
the form and manner in which payment for services rendered at the
[e]mergency [r]oom located in the Hospital Episcopal San Lucas in
Ponce” in its first discovery request, id., includes settlement
agreements in its scope.

Defendants mentioned the existence of

settlement documents in their deposition.

See Docket No. 114-5

(“For any settlement we will have record[s].”).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PRMEG’s request to
compel HESL, SGE, and SSE to produce all documentation in their
possession, custody, or control relating to settlement agreements
between insurance companies and defendants for services performed
by PRMEG at the emergency room in the Hospital Episcopal San Lucas
in Ponce, including at El Tuque Emergency Room.

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)
c.

10

Billing Contracts
PRMEG claims that HESL, SGE, and SSE failed to

produce documents related to billing contracts between defendants
and insurance companies, including communications and negotiations.
(Docket No. 109 at pp. 6-7.)

HESL, SGE, and SSE argue that this

request was satisfied by third parties, which absolves them of
their discovery obligations.

(Docket No. 111 at p. 6.)

HESL, SGE, and SSE make no citation to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or case law to support their argument.
Rule 34 requires a party to produce documents in its “possession,
custody, or control.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1).

Courts have held

that a responding party is required to produce documents in its
possession,

custody,
is

or

control

already

in

regardless
possession

of
of

whether
the

the

requesting

party

requested

documents.

See Med. Protective Co. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines

Ins. Co., No. 1:13-CV-00357, 2014 WL 4979394, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct.
6, 2014) (“[I]t is not a proper objection to discovery to suggest
that the other party already has the information or that it is
available elsewhere.”

(internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)); Redding v. ProSight Specialty Mgmt. Co., No. 12-98-HCCL, 2014 WL 11412743, at *2 (D. Mont. July 2, 2014) (explaining
party had duty to produce requested document regardless of whether
defendants already held requested document in their possession);
Gomez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 8:08CV21, 2012 WL 3111897, at *4

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)
(D.

Neb.

July

31,

11

2012)

(“[A]

party

is

required

to

produce

documents in its possession, custody, or control, regardless of
whether

it

believes

the

requesting

party

already

has

those

documents.”); Walt Disney Co. v. DeFabiis, 168 F.R.D. 281, 284
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (“[Defendant] is required to produce documents he
has in his possession, custody or control, regardless of whether he
believes plaintiff already has those documents.”).
The

fact

that

third

parties

may

have

provided

documents to PRMEG does not excuse defendants from producing
documents in their possession, custody, or control.

Accordingly,

the Court GRANTS PRMEG’s request to compel discovery regarding
documents, including communications and negotiations, related to
billing contracts between defendants and insurance companies.
2.

Monetary Transactions Between Defendants
First, PRMEG claims that HESL, SGE, and SSE have not

produced “internal or external communications . . . detailing any
transfer of moneys between [defendants].”

(Docket No. 109 at

p. 9.)

HESL, SGE, and SSE argue that these communications do not

exist.

(Docket No. 111 at pp. 7-8.)

HESL, SGE, and SSE made the

same assertion in their answer to PRMEG’s first discovery request.
(Docket No. 92-6 at p. 3.)

PRMEG does not effectively impeach

HESL, SGE, and SSE’s assertion because PRMEG fails to cite to the
deposition transcript or other evidence to refute the claim that
the

requested

documents

do

not

exist.

See

Docket

No.

109.

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

12

Accordingly, the Court DENIES PRMEG’s request to compel defendants
HESL, SGE, and SSE to produce “internal or external communications
. . . detailing any transfer of moneys between [defendants],”
(Docket No. 109 at p. 9).

If these communications do exist and are

in HESL, SGE, or SSE’s possession, custody, or control, those
parties have the duty to supplement or correct their previous
response.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A).
Second, PRMEG claims that HESL, SGE, and SSE have not

produced “documentary evidence of intercompany transactions between
[IEP] and [the other] corporate defendants . . . includ[ing] bank
documents as well as internal memoranda.”
9.)

(Docket No. 109 at p.

HESL, SGE, and SSE argue that PRMEG never requested these

documents.
discovery

(Docket No. 111 at pp. 7-8.)
request,

transactions
defendants.”

between

however,
[IEP]

it
and

requested
any

of

In PRMEG’s first
“all

the

(Docket No. 92-1 at pp. 11.)

intercompany

other

corporate

The Court is not

concerned with finding the exact word-for-word match like HESL,
SGE,

and

SSE

seem

to

be.

PRMEG

provides

an

excerpt

from

defendants’ deposition identifying the existence of a “general
ledger” that defendants did not previously produce. See Docket No.
114-10 (“[E]very general ledger has the transactions . . . .”).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PRMEG’s request to compel discovery
of all documentary evidence of intercompany transactions between
IEP and the corporate defendants, including bank documents and

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

13

internal memoranda used to prepare and authorize each financial
transaction.
B.

Depositions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) (“Rule 30(b)(6)”)

allows a party to request a deposition from an organization.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).

Fed.

In so doing, a party “must describe with

reasonable particularity the matters for examination.”

Id.

“The

named organization must then designate one or more officers,
directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who
consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on
which each person designated will testify.”

Id.

“The persons

designated must testify about information known or reasonably
available to the organization.”
Rule

30(b)(6)

requires

Id.
the

persons

representing

an

organization to discuss items beyond their personal knowledge, and
the

persons

designated

may

need

to

prepare

additional employees, and other resources.

using

documents,

See Trs. of Bos. Univ.

v. Everlight Elecs. Co., Nos. 12-CV-11935-PBS, 12-CV-12326-PBS, 12CV-12330-PBS, 2014 WL 5786492, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 24, 2014);
Philbrick v. eNom, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 2d 352, 363 (D.N.H. 2009);
Briddel v. Saint Gobain Abrasives Inc., 233 F.R.D. 57, 60 (D. Mass.
2005).

“Although adequately preparing a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition

can be burdensome, this is merely the result of the concomitant
obligation from the privilege of being able to use the corporate

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

14

form in order to conduct business.”

Thomas & Betts Corp. v. New

Albertson’s, Inc., No. 10-11947-DPW, 2013 WL 11331377, at *3 (D.
Mass. July 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Before the Court are (1) issues raised by PRMEG in its renewed
motion to compel discovery regarding the adequacy of HESL, SGE,
SSE, and SLMH’s deposition, (Docket No. 109 at pp. 9-11), and (2)
defendants’ motion for a protective order quashing deposition
topics, (Docket No. 94).
1.

PRMEG’s Renewed Motion to Compel Discovery
PRMEG claims that HESL, SGE, and SSE failed to produce a

representative to testify about two topics: “[t]he business and
daily operations of [HESL, SGE, SSE,] and [SLMH], from 2005 through
2010” and “[a]ny and all intercompany transactions between [IEP,
HESL, SGE, SSE, and SLMH] from 2005 through 2015.”
at p. 11.)

(Docket No. 109

In addition, PRMEG claims that SLMH failed to produce

required documents at its deposition.
a.

Id.

HESL, SGE, and SSE
The

deposition

transcript

suggests

preparation on the part of defendants’ deponents.

a

lack

of

PRMEG asked the

deponent designated to testify about intercompany transactions,
“[w]hat’s the amount, currently owed, by related parties, to [SSE]?
More or less.

More than [twenty million dollars]?

[twenty million dollars]?”

(Docket No. 114-7.)

Less that [sic]
The deponent

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

15

answered, “I don’t remember.”

Id.

PRMEG also asked the deponent

if there was an expectation that the debts between defendants would
be paid, to which the deponent answered, “I don’t know really” and
that his responsibility is limited to confirming the total debt
balance

but

not

individual

See Docket No. 114-8.

transactions

between

defendants.

Defendants’ second deponent limited his

answers to the date he started working for defendants, see Docket
No. 114-12 at p. 1 (“I can only speak from 2010 on.”), and met with
no one other than his attorneys to prepare for the deposition,
(Docket No. 114-13 at p. 1).

These excerpts of the deposition

support PRMEG’s claim that defendants’ deponents could not “testify
about

information

known

or

reasonably

organization,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).

available

to

the

HESL, SGE, and SSE made

no argument regarding the adequacy of their deponents and instead
focused on PRMEG’s lack of citation to the deposition transcript,
see Docket No. 111 at pp. 8-9, which PRMEG rectified in its reply,
(Docket No. 114). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PRMEG’s request to
compel further discovery through deposition of HESL, SGE, and SSE
on the two topics listed in PRMEG’s renewed motion to compel
discovery, (Docket No. 109 at p. 11).
b.

SLMH
PRMEG requested documents from SLMH in its notice of

deposition pursuant to Rule 34, see Docket No. 109-1, which only
applies to parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a).

SLMH is not a party

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

16

to this litigation. Therefore, the Court DENIES PRMEG’s request to
compel discovery from SLMH.

The Court advises PRMEG to pursue a

subpoena through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 if PRMEG
requires documents from a non-party.
With this Order concerning SLMH, the Court cautions
all

defendants.3

control

of

If

documents

defendants
held

by

have

SLMH

possession, custody,

and

those

documents

or

have

previously been requested by PRMEG, this part of the Court’s
Opinion and Order will not protect defendants from sanctions for
failure to produce those documents.
2.

Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order
Rule 26 provides that “[a] party or any person from whom

discovery is sought may move for a protective order.”
P. 26(c)(1).
protect

a

Fed. R. Civ.

“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to
party

or

person

from

annoyance,

oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .”

embarrassment,

Id.

“[T]he party

seeking a protective order has the burden of showing that good
cause exists for issuance of that order.”

3

Pub. Citizen v. Liggett

PRMEG explains the intertwined relationship between defendants
and SLMH in its various motions.
See Docket Nos. 99 at p. 3
(“[SLMH] is controlled by [IEP] and has the same Board of Directors
as [HESL, SGE, and SSE].”); 109 at p. 4 (“[SLMH is] the corporate
successor [to [HESL].”); 114 at p. 2 (“It is undisputed in this
case that [SLMH] is controlled by [IEP]. It is also undisputed
that Mr. Colon [defendants’ deponent] not only is the CEO for
[SSE], but also for, [SLMH].”) Although defendants do not argue
otherwise, PRMEG does not cite to evidence or stipulated facts to
support these claims.

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

17

Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 789 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987)).

“A

finding of good cause must be based on a particular factual
demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements.”
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986); see Pansy
v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Broad
allegations

of

harm,

unsubstantiated

by

specific

examples

or

articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing.”
(internal

quotation

marks

and

citations

omitted));

McLeod,

Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485
(5th Cir. 1990) (holding that conclusory statements that production
requests were “overly broad, burdensome, and oppressive” are not
sufficient objections or grounds for a protective order); Metcalf
v. Bay Ferries Ltd., No. 12-40075-TSH, 2014 WL 3670786, at *4 (D.
Mass. July 21, 2014) (denying request for a protective order to
limit scope of deposition because movant provided only “thin
argument” that document review would be unduly burdensome without
providing information “regarding the volume of documents, or the
location of documents, etc., that would warrant a determination” of
hardship).
Defendants moved for a protective order after receiving
PRMEG’s notice of deposition topics.
motion,

defendants

requested

that

(Docket No. 94.)
the

Court

quash

In that
the

two

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)

18

deposition topics that PRMEG later moved to compel its in renewed
motion.

Id. at p. 5; see Docket No. 109 at p. 11.
Defendants do not meet their burden of establishing good

cause for a protective order. First, defendants attempt to justify
the grant of a protective order on the basis that the deposition
topics “are simply too ambiguous or overbroad and [do] not permit
[defendants] to determine the identity and number of persons
required to provide answers.”

(Docket No. 94 at p. 4.)

This

argument is a conclusory statement devoid of substantiation through
facts or any attempt at explanation and, therefore, does not
establish good cause for a protective order.
Second, defendants claim that the deposition topics will
require the deponent to “review the minutiae contained in documents
dating as far as [August 2007] and . . . the health insurance
claims of an [e]mergency [r]oom which had thousands of visits
monthly.”

(Docket No. 94 at pp. 4-5.)

A party can move for a

protective order to prevent undue burdens, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c)(1), but this statement provides no facts describing how
reviewing past documents, and even the “minutiae” in them, creates
an undue burden for defendants.

“It is not enough merely to

mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the
court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument,
and put flesh on its bones.”

United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1,

17 (1st Cir. 1990). Without the specificity required for a finding

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)
of

good

cause,

the

19

Court

cannot

grant

a

protective

order.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion for a protective
order, (Docket No. 94).
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART PRMEG’s renewed motion to compel discovery, (Docket
No. 109), and DENIES defendants’ motion for a protective order,
(Docket No. 94).

The Court ORDERS defendants HESL, SGE, and SSE

to:
1.

Provide to PRMEG in Excel format every claim for payment
of services rendered by PRMEG at the emergency room
located in the Hospital Episcopal San Lucas in Ponce,
including the El Tuque Emergency Room, made to insurance
companies between September 25, 2007, and May 2, 2014.

2.

Provide to PRMEG all documentation relating to settlement
agreements between all defendants and insurance companies
for services provided by PRMEG in the Hospital Episcopal
San Lucas in Ponce, including the El Tuque Emergency
Room.

3.

Provide to PRMEG all documents, including communications
and
negotiations,
relating
to
contracts
between
defendants and insurance companies.

4.

Provide to PRMEG all documentary evidence of intercompany
transactions between IEP, HESL, SGE, and SSE, including
bank documents and internal memoranda used to prepare and
authorize each financial intercompany transaction.

5.

Produce representatives for deposition that can testify
to matters known or reasonably available to defendants’
organizations on the following topics:
a.

The business and daily operations of IEP, HESL,
SGE, and SSE from 2005 through 2010.

Civil No. 14-1616 (FAB)
b.

20

Intercompany transactions between IEP, HESL, SGE,
and SSE from 2005 through 2015.

The Court GRANTS PRMEG leave to conduct additional depositions
with all defendants on the these two topics.
defendants

HESL,

SGE,

and

SSE

to

comply

The Court ORDERS

with

this

Order

by

August 12, 2016, or be subject to the sanctions available to the
Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(i)(vii).

The Court EXTENDS the discovery period until August 26,

2016.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, July 26, 2016.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE