Colon-Vazquez et al v. Department of Education of Puerto Rico

Filing 134

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 102 MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by E.C.C., Ivis Colon-Vazquez, GRANTING 103 MOTION requesting Reimbursement of Costs and Litigation Expenses filed by E.C.C., Ivis Colon-Vazquez. Plaintiffs are hereby awarded $28,124.20 in attorneys' fees ($19,270 for Attorney Juan Rafael Gonzalez-Munoz and $8,854.20 for Attorney Juan Nieves-Gonzalez), and $4,303.71 in costs and litigation expenses, for a total of $32,427.91. Defendants shall remit payment to Plaintiffs within fourteen (14) days of this Order. Signed by Judge Jose A. Fuste on 02/26/2015.(mrj)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

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IVIS COLÓN VAZQUEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 3:14-cv-01644 (JAF)

v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO,
et al.,
Defendants.
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ORDER

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I.

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Introduction

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Plaintiffs brought this action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

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(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482, which “obligates school districts to furnish a free

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appropriate public education . . . to children with disabilities.” Maine School

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Administrative District No. 35 v. Mr. R., 321 F.3d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2003). Ivis Colón-

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Vázquez, personally and on behalf of her minor child, ECC, moves the court for

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attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with the underlying suit.

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II.

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Law and Analysis

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Initially, Plaintiffs requested $30,880 in attorneys’ fees ($20,570 for Attorney Juan

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Rafael González-Muñoz and $10,310 for Attorney Juan Nieves-González), and $4,303.71

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in costs and litigation expenses ($2,579.35 for costs recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920

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and $1,724.36 for additional litigation expenses). (Docket Nos. 102 and 103.)

Civil No. 3:14-cv-01644 (JAF)

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IDEA provides that “the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’

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fees” to a prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). Defendants do not dispute that

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Plaintiffs are “prevailing parties” within the meaning of § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). Defendants

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seek downward adjustments of $3,517.50 to the requested attorney fees for Attorney Juan

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Rafael González-Muñoz and $1,455.80 to the requested attorney fees for Attorney Juan

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Nieves-González. Defendants do not object to the reasonableness of the hourly rates.

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Plaintiffs agreed to adjust Attorney Nieves’ fee request to $8,854.20 ($10,310 minus

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Defendants’ adjustment of $1,455.80). (See Docket No. 124 at 2.)

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Defendants dispute $1,644.36 of the additional litigation expenses, which represent costs

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Additionally,

incurred for translation expenses.

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Accordingly, the court must decide 1) whether the certified translation expense

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requested by Plaintiffs is recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 20 U.S.C.

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§ 1415(i)(3)(C); and 2) whether to adjust Attorney González’s attorney fee request.

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A.

Certified Translation Expense

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In Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the Supreme Court held that

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“compensation of interpreters” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 “is limited to the cost of oral

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translation and does not include the cost of document translation.” 132 S.Ct. 1997, 2000

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(2012). Following Taniguchi, the First Circuit found that the expense incurred for the

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translation of documents into English of exhibits to motion for summary judgment could

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not be taxed as costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Davila–Feliciano v. Puerto Rico State Ins.

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Fund, 683 F.3d 405, 406 (1st Cir. 2012). Relying on Dávila-Feliciano, Defendants argue

Civil No. 3:14-cv-01644 (JAF)

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that the court should not award $1,644.36 in costs incurred for the translation into English

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of certain written documents.

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Plaintiffs, however, do not rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that

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the translation of documents is a litigation expense allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and

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20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). The court agrees with Plaintiffs that Taniguchi does not apply

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to this request for costs.

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Expenses that are not deemed “costs” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1920

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may be recovered by the prevailing party where such costs are a part of attorneys’ fees

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under the typical federal fee-shifting statute. Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32,

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43 (1st Cir. 2006).

The court finds that transcription costs may be classified as

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reasonable out-of-pocket expenses normally billed to the client and, therefore, may be

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included in costs awarded to a prevailing party under §1988. See Poy v. Boutselis, 352

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F.3d 479, 490 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

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Here, the translations were necessary for Plaintiffs to present their case. The court

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ordered the transcription of one set of documents by the court’s interpreter and translator.

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The court ordered Plaintiffs to pay this cost, also stating that it would certify the expense

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as recoverable costs in the event that Plaintiffs prevailed. (See Docket No. 28.) The

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remaining documents were significantly related to Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

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judgment and were reviewed and relied on by this court in forming its opinion.

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Accordingly, this court finds that the certified translation costs incurred by Plaintiffs were

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reasonable out-of-pocket expenses that may be included in costs awarded to them as the

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prevailing party under §1988.

Civil No. 3:14-cv-01644 (JAF)
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B.

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Attorney Fee Adjustment

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“A reasonable fee typically is determined through the lodestar method, which

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involves multiplying the number of hours productively spent by a reasonable hourly rate

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to calculate a base figure.” Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir.

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2008) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “In fashioning the lodestar,

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a district court may adjust the hours claimed to eliminate time that was unreasonably,

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unnecessarily, or inefficiently devoted to the case.” Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434,

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103 S.Ct. 1933. “[A] district court may deem an expenditure of time unreasonable if the

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reported hours are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. Additionally, a

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court may adjust the hours to account for time records that are “too generic” causing

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them to be “insufficient as a practical matter to permit a court to answer questions about

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excessiveness, redundancy, and the like.” Id.

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Defendants seek a downward adjustment of $3,517.50 to the requested attorney

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fees for Attorney Juan Rafael González-Muñoz.

In support of the adjustment,

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Defendants provide a chart listing objections to ten time entries: Six objections for “block

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billing”, two objections for work claimed by the attorney that could have been done by a

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paralegal, one objection for excessive time spent on a task, and one objection to counsel’s

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request for fees incurred for legal research and drafting on a matter “not related to the

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case”. (See Docket No. 114-1.) The court notes that these objections were contained in a

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chart and not elaborated on in any manner by Defendants in their opposition brief.

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The court has reviewed Defendants’ objections and counsel for Plaintiffs’ time

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entries and finds no merit to all but one of the objections. 1 Counsel for Plaintiffs’ time

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entry on December 11, 2014, relating to research for a motion for consolidation and

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referral to U.S. Magistrate Judge is not related to this case. Defendants’ objection is

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sustained.

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Plaintiffs’ counsel billed 5.2 hours on December 11, 2014, for “Legal Research re:

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reassignment of cases; referral to US Magistrate; Motion for Consolidation; draft and file

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Motion for Consolidation and Informative Motion.” On December 11, 2014, Plaintiffs’

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counsel moved to consolidate two additional matters with this case. (Docket No. 98.)

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Having closed this matter on December 5, 2014, this court retained jurisdiction only to

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enforce the injunction and determine the attorney fees and costs’ request. The court

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denied counsel’s request to consolidate on January 5, 2015. (Docket No. 117.)

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In that motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel sought to consolidate with this case two other

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cases brought against the Department of Education. Plaintiff Ivis Colón-Vázquez and her

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minor child ECC are not plaintiffs in either of the other two cases. Instead, those cases

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involved relief sought on behalf of other persons allegedly wronged by the Department of

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Education in a manner similar to this case. The court finds that the motion to consolidate

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was not related to this case and that Plaintiffs’ counsel could not bill Plaintiffs for the

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time spent in researching or drafting the motion to consolidate. Accordingly, the 5.2

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hours spent on the legal research and drafting of the motion on December 11, 2014, are

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The court has reviewed the contentions related to block billing, alleged “paralegal work,” and excessive
time. The court finds no basis to reduce the sought fees based on these objections.

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not reasonable out-of-pocket expenses normally billed to the client and, therefore, may

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not be included in costs awarded to a prevailing party under § 1988. Plaintiffs’ fee award

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is adjusted by $1,300.

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III.

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Conclusion

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For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees (Docket

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No. 102) is GRANTED IN PART; Plaintiffs’ motion for costs and litigation expenses

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(Docket No. 103) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are hereby awarded $28,124.20 in attorneys’

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fees ($19,270 for Attorney Juan Rafael González-Muñoz and $8,854.20 for Attorney

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Juan Nieves-González), and $4,303.71 in costs and litigation expenses, for a total of

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$32,427.91. Defendants shall remit payment to Plaintiffs within fourteen (14) days of

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this Order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 26th day of February, 2015.

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S/José Antonio Fusté
JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE