PPV Entertainment LLC v. Rodrguez-Almodovar

Filing 15

ORDER denying 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 6/8/2015. (VCC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
PPV ENTERTAINMENT, LLC.
Civil No. 14-1675 (PG)

Plaintiff,
v.
DWIGHT RODRIGUEZ ALMODOVAR d/b/a
PANCHO VILLA CASA DE TEQUILAS
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Dwight Rodriguez Almodovar’s Amended Motion
to Dismiss (Docket No. 10). For the reasons stated herein, we DENY the
request.
I.
Factual Background
Plaintiff

PPV

Entertainment,

LLC.

(“PPVE”)

brought

suit

on

September 7, 2014, against Dwight Rodriguez Almodovar (“Rodriguez”),
doing business as Pancho Villa Casa de Tequilas (“Pancho Villa”). See
Docket No. 1. On January 7, 2015, Rodriguez filed the Amended Motion
to Dismiss that is now before the Court. See Docket No. 10. PPVE’s
Opposition was filed on January 23, 2015. See Docket No. 12.
II.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. “To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Garcia-Catalan v. U.S., 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir.2013)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, a district court must “ask whether the
complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,
accepting

the

plaintiff’s

factual

allegations

and

drawing

all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Cooper v. Charter

Civil No. 14-1675(PG)

Page 2

Communications Entertainments I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, (1st Cir. 2014).
Additionally, courts “may augment these facts and inferences with data
points

gleaned

from

documents

incorporated

by

reference

into

the

complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial
notice.” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80
(1st Cir.2013) (citing Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st
Cir.2011)).
“To cross the plausibility threshold [sic], the plaintiff must
‘plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level, … , on the assumption
that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful
in fact) … .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
III.
Discussion
Rodriguez’s grounds for dismissal are straightforward. He claims
that Pancho Villa is an independent corporate entity on which he holds
no

proprietary

adduces

no

interest.

plausible

cause

Hence,
of

Rodriguez

action

posits,

against

him

the

Complaint

because

all

the

allegations refer to PPVE. See Docket No. 10 at page 2. PPVE responds
that dismissal is not warranted insofar as Rodriguez is liable for a
series of violations as PPVE’s manager. See Docket No. 12.
We look to the allegations of the Complaint to determine whether
it surpasses the plausibility threshold as to Rodriguez.
The Complaint alleges that Rodriguez illegally intercepted and
then transmitted the boxing fight between Saul “Canelo” Alvarez and
Alfredo Angulo held on March 8, 2014. See Docket No. 1. According to
PPVE, Rodriguez allowed the patrons of Pancho Villa to watch the fight
without paying the commercial license. Id.
We read the Complaint to allege that Rodriguez, not Pancho Villa,
is

responsible

for

the

violations

to

47

U.S.C.

§553(a)(1)

in

his

personal capacity. For starters, plaintiff specifically described the

Civil No. 14-1675(PG)

Page 3

defendant as follows: “Dwight Rodriguez Almodovar, is a natural person
who, upon information and belief, is the owner, partner, manager,
agent or employee of the business known as ‘Pancho Villa Casa de
Tequilas…’.” See Docket No. 1 at paragraph 5.
Moreover, the Complaint avers that the defendant “transmitted,
divulged

and

transmitting,
patrons

in

broadcasted
divulging

his

said

and

communication,

broadcasting

establishment.”

See

or

Docket

No.

in

communication,

said

assisted

to

1

at

¶15

(emphasis

added).
Again in paragraph 18 of the Complaint, plaintiff states: “[t]he
defendant enabled the patrons within his establishment to view the
event,

to

which

neither

the

defendant

nor

the

patrons

of

his

establishment were entitled to.” Id. at ¶18 (emphasis added).
This language points to Rodriguez as the sole defendant. The
case’s caption, however, is misleading, as it indicates that defendant
Rodriguez “does business as” Pancho Villa. The “doing business as”
designation

simply

means

that

the

“business

may

be

licensed

or

incorporated under a different name.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009). “Doing business under another name does not create an entity
[separate] from the person operating the business. The individual who
does business as a sole proprietor under one or several names remains
one

person,

personally

liable

for

all

his

obligations.”

Duval

v.

Midwest Auto City, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 1381 (D. Nebraska 1977), aff’d,
578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1978).
Rodriguez denies that he has a proprietary interest in Pancho
Villa, yet that fact, even if true, is immaterial to the cause of
action. The statute under which plaintiff brought suit provides, in
relevant part:
No person shall intercept or receive or assist in
intercepting or receiving any communication service offered
over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do
so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically
authorized by law.
See 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).

Civil No. 14-1675(PG)

Hence,

Rodriguez

intercepting

or

authorization
sufficiently

Page 4

or

may

be

sued

receiving

the

assisting

in

in

alleged

that

his

personal

communication
such

Rodriguez

without

endeavor.

incurred

in

capacity

The

for

PPVE’s
Complaint

violations

to

47

U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). The Motion to Dismiss as to Rodriguez is thus
DENIED.
IV.
Conclusion
In

light

of

the

above,

the

Court

DENIES

defendant’s

Amended

Motion to Dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 8, 2015.
S/ JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
JUAN M. PÉREZ-GIMÉNEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE