Colon-Padilla v. Rodriguez-Alvarado et al
Filing
12
ORDER dismissing case without prejudice. Signed by Judge Juan M. Perez-Gimenez on 6/10/2015.(PMA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ANGEL L. COLON-PADILLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIV. NO. 14-1718 (PG)
PEDRO RODRIGUEZ-ALVARADO, ET ALS.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
On September 22, 2014, plaintiff Angel L. Colon-Padilla (“Colon” or
“Plaintiff”) filed the above-captioned claim against several correctional
officers for violations to his constitutional rights. See Docket No. 2. At the
outset, Colon moved to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 1) and this court
granted his request (Docket No. 5). The Plaintiff, an inmate in a state
institution, describes an incident where some correctional officers allegedly
used excessive force against him and treated him inhumanely. See Docket No. 2.
He thus seeks to recover for the physical and emotional damages suffered as
a result. In his petition form, Colon states that he filed a grievance and a
request for reconsideration, and that an investigation is allegedly still in
course. See Docket No. 2 at pages 3, 9. However, the Plaintiff complains that
he still ignores the result of these requests. See id. at page 9.
After a thorough review of the complaint, the court sua sponte dismisses
the Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title,
or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PRLA’s exhaustion requirement applies
to
“all
inmate
suits
about
prison
life,
whether
they
involve
general
circumstances, or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force
or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the
quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to
CIV. NO. 14-1718 (PG)
Page 2
this purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials
time and opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal case. In
some instances, corrective action taken in response to
an
inmate’s
grievance
might
improve
prison
administration and satisfy the inmate, thereby
obviating the need for litigation. In other instances,
the internal review might filter out some frivolous
claims. And for cases ultimately brought to court,
adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative
record that clarifies the contours of the controversy.
Id. at 524-525 (citations and quotations omitted).
The
prisoner
must
exhaust
administrative
remedies
even
if
the
administrative procedures “would appear to be futile at providing the kind of
remedy sought.” Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002).
In fact, even if the plaintiff seeks monetary relief which the prison
administrative process does not encompass, the inmate is still not excused
from completing the prison administrative process. See Lopez-Vigo v. Puerto
Rico, No. 13-1071, 2014 WL 495721, at *3 (D.P.R. February 06, 2014) (citing
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001)); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
85
(2006).
Although
not
jurisdictional,
the
exhaustion
requirement
is
nonetheless mandatory. See Casanova v. Dubois, 289 F.3d 142, 147 (1st Cir.
2002)(citing Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 501 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2001)).
The applicable administrative remedies are defined not by the PLRA, but
by the prison grievance process itself. See Tomassini v. Correctional Health
Services Corp., No. 09-2059, 2012 WL 1601528, at *1 (D.P.R. May 07, 2012)
(citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)). The Puerto Rico Department
of Corrections (PRDOC) has adopted administrative rules and regulations for
the application and review
of requests for administrative remedies by
incarcerated inmates. See Torres Garcia v. Puerto Rico, 402 F.Supp.2d 373, 379
(D.P.R. 2005). The PRDOC has promulgated the Regulation to Address the
Applications for Administrative Remedies Filed by Members of the Correctional
Population, setting forth the grievance procedures for inmates under their
custody. See Regulation No. 8145 of January 19, 2012; see also Cruz-Berrios
v. Oliver-Baez, 792 F.Supp.2d 224, 228-229 (D.P.R. 2011) for a detailed
description of the proceeding set forth in Regulation No. 8145.
Pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (“UAPA”), “[a]ny
party which is adversely affected by a final order or resolution of an agency
and who has exhausted all of the remedies provided by the agency or by the
corresponding administrative appellate body may file a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals,” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 2172, within a specified
CIV. NO. 14-1718 (PG)
Page 3
term. The UAPA also provides that “[t]he judicial review provided herein shall
be the exclusive proceeding to review the merits of an administrative decision
submitted under this chapter, whether adjudicative or informal in nature.”
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 2172 (emphasis ours).
By way of omission, Plaintiff admits in his complaint to not having
exhausted all administrative remedies. That is, by simply stating that he
filed a grievance and a request for reconsideration, and nothing more, he
concedes to not having finalized the required process as described above. It
appears from a simple reading of the complaint that the Plaintiff’s request
for
administrative
Commonwealth’s
remedies
within
Administration
of
the
relevant
Corrections,
agency,
is
still
to
wit,
in
the
process.
Alternatively, it does not stem from the pleadings that Colon sought the
appropriate judicial review as required by local law.
B. Sua Sponte Dismissal
The PLRA “includes several provisions which grant this Court the
authority to screen and dismiss prisoner complaints.” Aldrich v. U.S., No.
13–12085–NMG, 2013 WL 6196002, at *4 (D.Mass. November 22, 2013) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (proceedings in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (screening
of suits against governmental officers and entities)).
Upon authorization for the commencement of a suit without prepayment of
fees (proceedings in forma pauperis) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a federal court
may dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous
or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(ii) and (iii). “In forma pauperis complaints may be
dismissed sua sponte and without notice under section 1915 if the claim is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual allegations that
are clearly baseless.” Aldrich, 2013 WL 6196002 at *4 n. 8 (citing Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-328 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
32–33 (1992)).
On the other hand, Section 1915A encourages courts to review as soon as
practicable
a
civil
action
in
which
a
prisoner
seeks
redress
from
a
governmental entity or officer. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Upon screening, a
court shall dismiss the action if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks relief from
a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). During this
CIV. NO. 14-1718 (PG)
Page 4
preliminary screening, a court must keep in mind that pro se pleadings are to
be liberally construed. See Voravongsa v. Wall, 349 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2003).
This court recognizes that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies
is an affirmative defense that “must be raised and proved by the defense.”
Cruz–Berrios v. Gonzalez–Rosario, 630 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir.2010) (citing Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)); Rodriguez–Melendez v. Fortuno–Burset, No.
10–2044, 2011 WL 3442471, at * 3 (D.P.R. Aug. 8, 2011). Nevertheless, our
sister court of the District of Massachusetts “has held that when a prisoner
states in his pleadings that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies,
a dismissal sua sponte for failure to exhaust is appropriate.” Cullinan v.
Mental Health Management Correctional Services, Inc., No. 11–10593–JLT, 2012
WL 2178927, at *3 (D.Mass. June 11, 2012) (citations omitted). See also United
States v. Del Toro–Alejandre, 489 F.3d 721, 723 (5th Cir.2007) (“[T]he usual
PLRA practice would permit a district court to dismiss sua sponte a prisoner’s
complaint for failure to exhaust in the rare instance where the prisoner’s
failure to exhaust appeared on the face of [her] complaint.”). This court
agrees with said approach.
The same rationale is applicable here where Colon appears to have only
taken the initial steps towards exhaustion by only filing a grievance and a
request for reconsideration, as per his own allegations. As an inmate within
the meaning of the statute, Colon was bound to follow the exhaustion of
remedies procedures set forth by the PRDOC before filing this complaint. As
such, the Plaintiff may not proceed with the above-captioned claim until such
time as he exhausts administrative remedies.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff’s claims against all
defendants for violations to his constitutional rights are hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 10, 2015.
S/ JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
JUAN M. PEREZ-GIMENEZ
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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