Tienda Escolar, Inc. et al v. Magic Transport, Inc.
Filing
8
OPINION AND ORDER granting 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Daniel R. Dominguez on 5/12/2015. (MM)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
TIENDA ESCOLAR, INC., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 14-1843 (DRD)
MAGIC TRANSPORT, INC.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Magic Transport, Inc.’s
(“Defendant” or “Magic”) Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4).
the
reasons
set
forth
below,
Defendant’s
motion
is
For
hereby
GRANTED.
I.
Plaintiffs
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Tienda
Escolar,
Inc.
and
Luis
Hiram
Carrucini-
Quiles (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are engaged in the retail
sale
of
school
Defendant’s
uniforms
services
to
and,
ship
for
their
years,
products
have
to
utilized
Puerto
Rico.
Magic is engaged in the carriage of goods by sea as a Non-Vessel
Operating Common Carrier (“NVOCC”)1 in international and domestic
trade.
1
“In the usual course, an NVOCC assembles small lots into a single large
container at a determinate point of origin for shipment and handling by an
ocean carrier to a specified destination. The freight forwarder arranges for
the bulk load to be broken down dock-side or moved inland to a dispersal
point, as circumstances warrant. In either event, the container is unloaded
1
In 2012, the parties entered into a contract whereby Magic
would provide ocean and inland carriage services to Plaintiffs
from Fort Worth, Texas to Toa Alta, Puerto Rico.
Docket No. 1-3.
See Complaint,
On July 7, 2012, Magic issued a bill of lading
for the carriage of two pallets of school uniform pants, one of
which was never delivered.
On November 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant
in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Bayamón Part, Civil
No. DAC2014-2981 (401), for breach of contract.
On November 21, 2014, Defendant removed the case to federal
court, stressing that Plaintiff’s cause of action arises under
federal law, i.e., the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (“COGSA”).
On December 26, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss
(Docket No. 4) asserting that the case at bar is time-barred.
Defendant argues that all breach of contract actions arising
under
the
COGSA
must
be
filed
within
one
year,
but
that
Plaintiff waited over two (2) years to file its complaint.
Plaintiff has failed to appear in the instant case.
As such,
Defendant’s motion stands unopposed.
by the NVOCC's agents or contractors, and the goods delivered to the
individual consignees. As a freight forwarder, an NVOCC is considered the
‘carrier.’”
Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, Inc., 827 F.2d 859, 860 (1st
Cir. 1987).
2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires plaintiffs to
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Under Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a
plaintiff must “provide the grounds of his entitlement [with]
more
than
labels
and
conclusions.”
See
Ocasio-Hernandez
v.
Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (“in order to
‘show’ an entitlement to relief a complaint must contain enough
factual
material
‘to
raise
a
right
to
relief
above
the
speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’)(quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (citation omitted).
Thus, a plaintiff
must, and is now required to, present allegations that “nudge
[his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible” in
order to comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a).
Id. at 570;
see e.g. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court’s inquiry
occurs in a two-step process under the current context-based
“plausibility” standard established by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. “Context based” means that a Plaintiff
must allege sufficient facts that comply with the basic elements
of
the
cause
(concluding
of
that
action.
See
plaintiff’s
3
Iqbal,
556
complaint
U.S.
was
at
677-679
factually
insufficient to substantiate the required elements of a Bivens
claim, leaving the complaint with only conclusory statements).
First, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations
contained
in
a
complaint[,]”
discarding
legal
conclusions,
conclusory statements and factually threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Yet we
need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Maldonado
v.
Fontanes,
568
F.3d
263,
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678) (quoting
268
(1st
Cir.
2009)
Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557).
Under
determine
the
second
whether,
step
based
of
upon
the
all
inquiry,
assertions
the
Court
that
were
must
not
discarded under the first step of the inquiry, the complaint
“states a plausible claim for relief.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679.
This second step is “context-specific” and requires that the
Court draw from its own “judicial experience and common sense”
to decide whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or, conversely, whether dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.
Thus,
“[i]n
order
to
Id.
survive
a
motion
to
dismiss,
[a]
plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that he has a
plausible entitlement to relief.”
590 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2009).
4
Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo,
“[W]here the well-pleaded
facts
do
not
permit
the
court
to
infer
more
than
the
mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it
has not ‘show[n]’ ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
at
679
(quoting
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
8(a)(2)).
Furthermore, such inferences must be at least as plausible as
any “obvious alternative explanation.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
Id. at 679-80 (citing
“A plaintiff is not entitled to
‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot
the elements of the cause of action.”
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640
F.3d at 12, (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679).
The
First
plausibility
merits,
with
affirming
Circuit
an
has
cautioned
analysis
that
of
the
the
against
likely
plausibility
success
standard
equating
on
the
assumes
“pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiff’s favor” “even
if seemingly incredible.” Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ.
of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556); Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Iqbal,
556 U.S. 679); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“[A] well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it appears that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely.”)(internal quotation marks omitted);
see
Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556)(“[T]he
court
may
not
disregard
properly
pled
factual
allegations, ‘even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof
of those facts is improbable.’”).
5
Instead, the First Circuit
has emphasized that “[t]he make-or-break standard . . . is that
the combined allegations, taken as true, must state a plausible,
[but] not a merely conceivable, case for relief.”
Sepúlveda-
Villarini, 628 F.3d at 29.
However,
a
complaint
that
rests
on
“bald
assertions,
unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the
like” will likely not survive a motion to dismiss.
Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
Aulson v.
Similarly, unadorned
factual assertions as to the elements of the cause of action are
inadequate as well.
Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset, 631 F.3d
592 (1st Cir. 2011).
“Specific information, even if not in the
form of admissible evidence, would likely be enough at [the
motion to dismiss] stage; pure speculation is not.”
Id. at 596;
see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681(“To be clear, we do not reject []
bald allegations on the ground that they are unrealistic or
nonsensical.
.
.
.
It
is
the
conclusory
nature
of
[the]
allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature,
that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”); see Mendez
Internet Mgmt. Servs. v. Banco Santander de P.R., 621 F.3d 10,
14 (1st Cir. 2010) (The
District
Courts
to
Twombly
“screen[]
and
out
Iqbal
rhetoric
standards require
masquerading
as
litigation.”). However, merely parroting the elements of a cause
of
action
is
insufficient.
Ocasio-Hernandez,
6
640
F.3d
at
12
(citing Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir.
2009)).
The First Circuit recently outlined two considerations for
district courts to note when analyzing a motion to dismiss.
García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir.
2013). First, a complaint modeled on Form 11 of the Appendix of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which contains sufficient
facts
to
make
the
claim
plausible
is
ordinarily
enough
to
surpass the standard prescribed under Twombly-Iqbal. Id. at 104.
Second, district courts should accord “some latitude” in cases
where “[a] material part of the information needed is likely to
be
within
the
defendant’s
control.”
Id.
(more
latitude
is
appropriate in cases where “it cannot reasonably be expected
that the [plaintiff], without the benefit of discovery, would
have any information about” the event that gave rise to the
alleged injury.)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
“By
its
terms,
COGSA
governs
bills
of
lading
for
the
carriage of goods ‘from the time when the goods are loaded on to
the time when they are discharged from the ship.’”
Norfolk S.
Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 29 (2004)(quoting COGSA § 1(e),
46 U.S.C. § 30701 notes (previously codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §
1301(e)) defining “carriage of goods” under the Act).
COGSA,
shippers
and
carriers
have
7
the
option
of
Under
extending
COGSA’s
coverage
to
the
period
before
unloading the goods from the vessels.
in
this
chapter
entering
into
shall
any
prevent
a
agreement,
loading
and
after
Id. (“Nothing contained
carrier
or
a
stipulation,
shipper
from
condition,
reservation, or exemption as to the responsibility and liability
of the carrier or the ship for the loss or damage to or in
connection with the custody and care and handling of goods prior
to the loading on and subsequent to the discharge from the ship
on which the goods are carried by sea.”)(quoting COGSA § 7, 46
U.S.C. § 30701 note (previously codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §
1307)); see Greenpack of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Am. President
Lines, 684 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2012)(holding that “the parties
to a shipping contract may agree to extend COGSA’s coverage to
the period before loading or after unloading of the goods.”).
Under
COGSA,
shippers
and
carriers
are
discharged
from
liability for any lost or damaged goods resulting from their
transportation of the same if suit is not initiated within one
year of the date the goods were or should have been delivered.
Id.; see Barretto Peat, Inc. v. Luis Ayala Colon Sucrs., Inc.,
896 F.2d 656, 660 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Mikinberg v. Baltic
S.S. Co., 988 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1993).
In the case at bar, the Bill of Lading expressly provides
that the COGSA governs the transportation of goods before being
loaded
on
and
after
being
discharged
8
from
the
vessel.
See
Docket No. 1, Exhibit 5, Bill of Lading, Clause 1.
one-year
statute
Plaintiffs’
of
complaint,
limitations
Tienda
applies.
Escolar,
Inc.
Hence, the
According
purchased
to
two
pallets of clothing from Willianson-Dickie MFG Co. and shipped
them with Magic in the summer of 2012.
Docket No. 1, Exhibit 3.
The date on the Bill of Lading was July 6, 2012.
delivered one of the pallets and lost the other.
Id.
Magic
Id.
The
summer season is critical to Tienda Escolar’s success, as the
majority of the uniforms for the upcoming year are sold during
the summer months.
Id.
Although Plaintiffs’ complaint does not expressly provide
the
exact
date
Defendant
failed
to
deliver
the
goods,
the
complaint does emphasize that the failure transpired during the
summer of 2012.
This assertion, even construed in the most
liberal manner, leaves no doubt that the instant case is timebarred, as the complaint was filed on November 3, 2014 in state
court.
Hence, more than two (2) years had elapsed since the
date Defendant had contracted with Plaintiffs to deliver the two
pallets.
Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (Docket No. 4).
9
IV. CONCLUSION
For
the
aforementioned
reasons,
Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.
the
Court
holds
Thus, Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss (Docket No. 4) is hereby GRANTED.
Judgment shall be
entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 12th day of May, 2015.
s/ Daniel R. Dominguez
DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
10
that
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