Fortes-Cortes et al v. Garcia-Padilla et al
Filing
90
ORDER granting 76 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Bruce J. McGiverin on February 8, 2016. (McGiverin, Bruce)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
NILDA FORTES-CORTES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 14-1892 (BJM)
ALEJANDRO GARCIA-PADILLA, et al.,
Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
Nilda Fortes-Cortes (“Fortes”), personally and on behalf of her daughter, DRF,
sued Alejandro Garcia-Padilla (“Garcia”) in his official capacity as Governor of Puerto
Rico, Rafael Roman Melendez (“Roman”) in his official capacity as Secretary of the Puerto
Rico Department of Education (“DOE”), and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs,
having prevailed by settlement in their federal-court action for preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief, seek a total of $26,255.77 in attorney’s fees and costs from defendants
pursuant to the fee-shifting provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Docket Nos. 74-76. Defendants opposed. Docket No.
85. The case is before me by consent of the parties. Docket No. 40.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
DRF is registered with DOE as a student with disabilities. Compl. ¶ 10. DRF has
been diagnosed with mental retardation, Down’s syndrome, and with specific problems
related to her health and education. Compl ¶ 8. DRF resides with her mother in San Juan,
Puerto Rico. Compl. ¶ 9.
In December 2014, after almost 10 years of on-going litigation, plaintiffs filed for
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief before this court, alleging defendants’ refusal
to provide DRF with a free appropriate public education, as required by IDEA. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 et seq. Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs requested a declaration that defendants violated
plaintiffs’ federal rights guaranteed by IDEA, an order to immediately provide DRF with
appropriate school placement, consolidation of the injunction hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P.
65 (a) (2), and reasonable costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. Docket No. 1. In September
2015, the parties settled. Docket No. 68. An evidentiary hearing was held later, but limited
Fortes-Cortes, et al., v. Garcia Padilla, et al., Civil No. 14-1892 (BJM)
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to the few issues that were pending and that the parties could not resolve via settlement. Docket
No. 69.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs due to them as prevailing parties pursuant
to the IDEA. The IDEA permits a district court, in its discretion, to award reasonable
attorneys’ fees “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,” subject
to certain limitations. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). The fees to be awarded “shall be
based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the
kind and quality of services furnished. No bonus or multiplier may be used in calculating
the fees awarded . . .” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(C).
Among other restrictions, the court may not award attorneys’ fees “relating to any
meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative
proceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of the State, for a mediation” Id. §
1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). A preliminary meeting (which precedes the impartial due process
hearing required to be held after a complaint has been received) conducted pursuant to §
1415(f)(1)(B)(i) is not “a meeting convened as a result of an administrative hearing or
judicial action.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(iii). With certain exceptions, the court must reduce the
fee award if, inter alia, it finds that the parent, or the parent’s attorney, unreasonably
protracted the final resolution of the controversy; the amount of otherwise-authorized fees
“unreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar services by
attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, reputation, and experience”; or “the time spent
and legal services furnished were excessive considering the nature of the action or
proceeding.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F).
Plaintiffs’ first motion seeks compensation of $1,071.25 in filing fees, fees for service
of summons and subpoena, and cost of special interpretation services under 28 U.S.C. § 1828.
Docket No. 74. The second motion, filed with supporting invoices, seeks compensation of
$5,429.52 for additional litigation expenses concomitant of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Docket No. 75. Lastly, the third motion seeks a
total of $19,755.00 in attorneys’ fees–$13,475.00 for attorney Juan Rafael González Muñoz
and $6,280.00 for attorney Juan Nieves González. Docket No. 76.
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Defendants agree that plaintiffs are prevailing parties entitled to compensation.
However, they argue that the fees charged are excessive and duplicative because they bill for
similar labor by two different attorneys. Docket No. 85. Defendants request a reduction of
$2,290.00. Id. ¶ 6. Defendants’ second argument is that the total amount billed for meetings,
conferences, and email communications should be reduced by $307.50, a reduction of 50%.
According to defendants, the descriptions provided by the plaintiffs in the invoice entries
lacked specificity in describing the work performed. Id. ¶ 9. Also, defendants find excessive
the hours billed for reviewing and drafting documents, and legal research, and seek a reduction
of $2,828.00. Id. ¶ 1. Lastly, the defendants ask that the $2,162.29 expense for translation of
documents be denied. Id. ¶ 12. Considering all requests for reductions, defendants seek a total
deduction of $7,587.79. I will address these objections in turn.
Hours Billed for the Same Labor
The IDEA requires the court to employ an hourly rate “based on rates prevailing in
the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services
furnished,” without using any bonus or multiplier. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). There is no
dispute over the reasonableness of the hourly rate charged. “Fees are presumptively
reasonable where the requesting party has multiplied a reasonable hourly rate by the
number of hours reasonably spent on litigation.” Peguero-Moronta v. Gabriel-Santiago,
No. 256 CIV. A. 01-1390 JAF, 2010 WL 1444863, at *1 (D.P.R. Apr. 8, 2010). The lodestar
approach is the standard adopted by the First Circuit that allows the trial judge to determine
the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation. Gay Officers Action League v.
Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2001). Under the lodestar method, “the judge
calculates the time counsel spent on the case, subtracts duplicative, unproductive, or
excessive hours, and then applies prevailing rates in the community (taking into account
the qualifications, experience, and specialized competence of the attorneys involved). Id.
at 295. Therefore, a district court can find reported hours unreasonable if they are
unnecessary. Colón Vázquez v. Puerto Rico, 2015 WL 847291, at *2 (D.P.R. 2015). It
should be noted that “[e]ffective preparation and presentation of a case often involve the
kind of collaboration that only occurs when several attorneys are working on a single
issue.” Gay Officers Action League, 247 F.3d at 297.
After carefully reviewing the hours worked by the attorneys, I disagree with the
defendants’ arguments. Docket No. 76. The hours billed and detailed in Exhibit 1 – Invoice
Fortes-Cortes, et al., v. Garcia Padilla, et al., Civil No. 14-1892 (BJM)
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– appear reasonable. Docket No. 76-1. I have also reviewed the table prepared by the
defendants, and am not persuaded with their argument. The hours billed by attorney Juan
R. González Muñoz are for different labor than the hours billed by attorney Juan Nieves
González. See Exhibit 1, Docket No. 76-1.
Conferences, Meetings, and E-mails
A court may adjust the hours to account for time records that are “too generic”,
causing them to be “insufficient as a practical matter to permit a court to answer questions
about excessiveness, redundancy, and the like.” Colón Vázquez, 2015 WL 847291, at *2
(citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The Grendel’s Den standard
requires attorneys to keep contemporaneous and detailed time records, except in
extraordinary circumstances. Grendel’s Den, Inc. v Larkin, 749 F2d 945, 951 (1st Cir.
1984). The plaintiffs are “not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time
was expended.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. They should, however, identify the general
subject of the time being billed. Id. at 455. The problem with imprecise records is that “they
fail to allow [ ] the paying party to dispute the accuracy of the records as well as the
reasonableness of the time spent.” Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1992)
(internal citation and quotation omitted)(alteration in original).
Records will be sufficient and compensable if the subject matter and nature of the
tasks are either explicitly stated or readily ascertainable based on other information
contained in the records. Parker v. Town of Swansea, 310 F. Supp. 2d 376, 392 (D. Mass.
2004). When there is no interrelation between the entries and the dates or surrounding
entries, a full account of the task performed will be required. Walsh v. Boston Univ., 661
F. Supp. 2d 91, 106 (D. Mass. 2009). References to telephone calls should not require
extensive details to be compensable. Parker, 310 F. Supp at 392. A court must be cognizant
of the attorney client issue when attorneys are describing a task such as an email or a
conference with the client; therefore, if the court can deduce the general reason by
examining the date of the task surrounding it, it will be considered reasonable. Walsh, 661
F. Supp. 2d at 117.
Defendants argue that the communications via e-mail and conference calls were
vague, unnecessary, or duplicative. Docket No. 85. However, they fail to provide the court
with evidence to prove that these calls, e-mails and meetings in fact were unnecessary. The
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burden is on the unsuccessful party to show circumstances that are sufficient to overcome
the presumption in favor of the prevailing party. Charles Alan Wright, et al., 10 Federal
Practice & Procedure § 2668 (3d ed., 2015).
After reviewing the time records, I conclude that the hours billed were kept
contemporaneously and give sufficient detail regarding the nature of the legal issue being
discussed. Exhibit 1, Docket No. 76.
Time Drafting and Researching
In regard to the hours billed by attorneys for drafting and researching, the district
court has broad discretion to determine “how much was done, who did it, and how
effectively the result was accomplished.” Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 939 (Citing Wagenmann v.
Adams, 829 F2nd 196, 224 (1st Cir. 1987)). The number of hours can be reduced to account
for excessive hours. See Spooner v. EEN, Inc., 644 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2011). Examples
of such excesses include spending fifteen minutes reading a single-sentence order, or
spending 90 minutes reading short motions and replies. See Cortes-Reyes v. SalasQuintana, 806 F. Supp. 2d 470, 477 (D.P.R. 2011).
Defendants ask this court to reduce the amount for entries related to reviewing
documents and conducting legal research, arguing that the amount of hours billed was
excessive. However, defendants shed no light as to the length of time it takes other
experienced lawyers to perform these tasks. I have reviewed the pleadings at issue, and the
hours devoted by the attorneys appear reasonable and are explained with detail in their
invoice. See Ex. 1-Docket No. 76-1.
Document Translations
Relying on Taniguchi, defendants argue that this court should deny the expenses
incurred in document translations. Docket No. 85. In Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.,
the Supreme Court held that “compensation of interpreters” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1920
“is limited to the cost of oral translation and does not include the cost of document
translation.” 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2000 (2012). Plaintiffs, however, do not rely on 28 U.S.C. §
1920. Plaintiffs argue that the translation of documents is a proceeding expense permissible
Fortes-Cortes, et al., v. Garcia Padilla, et al., Civil No. 14-1892 (BJM)
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). Docket No. 76. The court agrees
with plaintiffs that Taniguchi does not apply to this request as claimed by defendants. Colon
Vazquez, 2015 WL 847291 at *1. “[T]ranscription costs may be classified as reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses normally billed to the client and, therefore, may be included in
costs awarded to a prevailing party under § 1988.” Id. at *2.
Accordingly, I find that the certified translation costs incurred by plaintiffs were
‘reasonable out-of-pocket expenses’ that may be included in costs awarded to them as the
prevailing party.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Bill of Costs, Docket No. 74, Motion for
Cost and Litigation Expenses, Docket No. 75, and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Docket No.
76, are GRANTED. Plaintiffs are awarded $26,255.77 in costs, fees, and litigation
expenses.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 8th day of February 2016.
S/Bruce J. McGiverin
BRUCE J. MCGIVERIN
United States Magistrate Judge
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