Marietti v. Santacana et al

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 40 Report and Recommendation; re 14 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; and re 27 Motion to Dismiss. The Court ADOPTS IN PART and REJECTS IN PART the magistrate judge's R & R. The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Defendants' motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim is GRANTED, and plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining claims is DENIED. Defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint is MOOT. The Court ORDERS plaintiff Marietti to show cause, no later than July 27, 2015, whether the Court has jurisdiction over her claim brought pursuant to Rule 69. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 06/26/2015. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
DIANA MARIETTI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)

EDUARDO SANTACANA, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER1
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before the Court is United States Magistrate Judge Camille L.
Velez-Rive’s amended Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) (Docket
No. 40), recommending that defendants Eduardo Santacana and Sheila
Gomez’s

motion

to

dismiss

(Docket

No.

27)

plaintiff

Diana

Marietti’s first amended complaint (Docket No. 22) be granted in
part and denied in part.

Plaintiff and defendants objected to the

R & R (Docket Nos. 41-42), and defendants responded to plaintiff’s
objections (Docket No. 45).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and
REJECTS IN PART the magistrate judge’s R & R, and GRANTS IN PART
and DENIES IN PART defendants’ motion to dismiss.

1

Rachel L. Hampton, a second-year student at the University of
Michigan Law School, assisted in the preparation of this Memorandum
and Order.

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)

2

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may refer a pending dispositive motion to a
magistrate judge for a report and recommendation.
§ 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1).

See 28 U.S.C.

Any party may file

written objections to the report and recommendation, and a party
that

files

a

timely

objection

is

entitled

to

a

de

novo

determination of those portions of the report to which specific
objections are made.
72(b)(2)-(3).

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.

In conducting its review, the court is free to

“accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations

made

by

the

magistrate

judges.”

28

U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
II.

BACKGROUND

On February 2, 2015, Diana Marietti (“Marietti”) filed an
amended complaint against Eduardo Santacana (“Santacana”), his wife
Sheila

Gomez

(collectively,

(“Gomez”),

and

“defendants”).

their
(Docket

conjugal
No.

22.)

partnership
Plaintiff

requests:
(1)

a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201, certifying defendants’ obligation to pay
spousal maintenance, Individual Retirement Account
(“IRA”) funds, and attorneys’ fees pursuant to
judgments ordered by a Minnesota state court;

(2)

a writ of execution pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 69 (“Rule 69”) to enforce Minnesota
state court judgments for spousal maintenance

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)
($359,771.82),
IRA
funds
($33,354.80),
attorneys’ fees ($2,926.80); and
(3)

3
and

restitution
for
defendant
Santacana’s unjust
enrichment that resulted from his noncompliance
with the child support judgment ordered by a
Minnesota court ($91,297.71).

Id. at pp. 13-14.
On February 9, 2015, defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint on four grounds:
(1)

that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the declaratory judgment claim because
Minnesota and Puerto Rico courts already clarified
the relationship between the parties;

(2)

that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to the domestic relations
exception;

(3)

that the Court should abstain from entertaining the
case pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); and

(4)

that the claims against co-defendant Gomez should
be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).

(Docket No. 27.)
On April 23, 2015, the magistrate judge recommended:
(A)

that dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim be
granted;

(B)

that dismissal pursuant to the domestic relations
exception be denied;

(C)

that dismissal pursuant to Younger abstention be
granted as to plaintiff’s claim concerning the
spousal maintenance judgment, and denied as to the

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)

4

claims concerning IRA funds, attorneys’ fees, and
child support; and
(D)

that dismissal
denied.

of

the

claims

against

Gomez be

(Docket No. 40 at p. 10.)
III.
Neither

party

DISCUSSION

objected

to

the

magistrate

judge’s

recommendation as to (A) dismissal of the declaratory judgment
claim, (B) denial of dismissal pursuant to the domestic relations
exception, and (D) denial of dismissal of the claims against
Gomez.2

See Docket Nos. 41-42.

The Court has conducted an

independent review and ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendations as to these three parts.

Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the declaratory judgment claim is GRANTED, and plaintiff
Marietti’s declaratory judgment claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The motion to dismiss the complaint based on the domestic relations
exception and the motion to dismiss of the claims against Gomez are
DENIED.
The Court now addresses the magistrate judge’s recommendation
regarding Younger abstention.

2

In their objection to the R & R, defendants state that they
object to recommendation D, but completely fail to elaborate on
their reasoning. (Docket No. 42 at p. 3.) The Court does not
consider this incomplete thought as an objection.

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)
A.

5

Younger Abstention
The Younger abstention doctrine, based on the principle of

comity, instructs that federal courts should not interfere with
ongoing state court or administrative proceedings. Rossi v. Gemma,
489 F. 3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007).

On the whole, however, federal

courts must decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction.
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013).
“Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court
proceeding involves the same subject matter.”

Id.

The United States Supreme Court clarified in Sprint that
Younger abstention is triggered only by three narrow categories of
state court proceedings: (1) “ongoing state criminal prosecutions,”
(2) “certain ‘civil enforcement proceedings,’” and (3) “‘civil
proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance
of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.’”
Id. at 591 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. (NOPSI) v. Council
of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)).
On February 28, 2014, plaintiff Marietti brought suit against
defendant Santacana in Puerto Rico state court requesting that the
court give full faith and credit to a Minnesota court judgment
ordering Santacana to pay spousal maintenance.
¶

29.)

The

Puerto

Rico

state

court

(Docket No. 22 at

issued

a

judgment

in

plaintiff’s favor on January 23, 2015, ordering defendant Santacana

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)

6

to pay plaintiff $359,771.82 and to make monthly payments of $2,000
based

on

the

original

Minnesota court.

spousal

maintenance

judgment

from

the

Id. at ¶ 31.

Defendants argued, and the magistrate judge agreed, that the
Court should abstain from deciding plaintiff’s claim seeking a writ
of

execution

of

the

spousal

maintenance

judgment

to

avoid

interference with this ongoing proceeding in Puerto Rico state
court.

Neither defendants nor the magistrate judge addressed,

however, whether the Puerto Rico court proceeding fits into one of
the three categories of cases delineated in Sprint. The Court will
proceed with that analysis now.
First, plaintiff Marietti’s suit in Puerto Rico court is not
a “state criminal prosecution”; it is a civil suit.
Second, Marietti’s suit in Puerto Rico court is not a “civil
enforcement proceeding.” For this category of cases, abstention is
appropriate

where

“noncriminal

proceedings

relationship to proceedings criminal in nature.”

bear

a

close

Middlesex Cnty.

Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
These cases routinely involve a state actor that has initiated the
state action.

Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592.

Here, Marietti’s suit in

Puerto Rico court is not criminal in nature, nor does it involve a
state actor.

Instead, it is a civil suit filed by Marietti

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)

7

herself, requesting that the court give full faith and credit to a
Minnesota court judgment against Santacana.
Third, Marietti’s suit does not involve an order concerning
the state court’s ability to perform its judicial function.

This

category of cases includes a state court’s enforcement of its
contempt procedures, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336-38 (1977),
and a state court’s enforcement of its post-judgment collection
procedures, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987).
Here, plaintiff Marietti’s civil suit against defendant Santacana
in Puerto Rico court in no way involves an order related to the
court’s enforcement of its procedures.
Because Marietti’s suit in Puerto Rico court does not fit into
any

of

the

three

categories

of

cases

that

trigger

Younger

abstention, the Court REJECTS the magistrate judge’s recommendation
to grant dismissal of plaintiff’s claim concerning the spousal
maintenance judgment.

The magistrate judge correctly found that

plaintiff Marietti did not seek enforcement of the Minnesota
judgments concerning IRA funds, attorneys’ fees, and child support
in her suit before the Puerto Rico court.
ADOPTS

the

magistrate

judge’s

The Court accordingly

recommendation

that

Younger

abstention is not appropriate for these claims. Defendants’ motion
to dismiss pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine is therefore
DENIED.

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)
B.

8

Defendant Santacana’s New Suit in Puerto Rico Court
In their objections to the R & R, defendants argue that the

Court should abstain from hearing this case pursuant to Younger
“based on facts that . . . occurred after the filing of the Motions
to Dismiss.”

(Docket No. 42 at pp. 3-5.)

These “new facts” are a

civil suit that defendant Santacana initiated against plaintiff
Marietti on January 16, 2015, in the San Juan Superior Court,
seeking child support for the living and educational expenses of
their youngest child.

Id.

Defendant Santacana filed the suit in the San Juan Superior
Court on January 16, 2015, more than three weeks before defendants
moved to dismiss the amended complaint on February 9, 2015.

Thus,

defendants’ argument is not based on “new facts,” and indeed it
could have been raised in the motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.

The Court is not required to review new theories that

were not raised before the magistrate judge.

See Paterson-Leitch

Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990-91 (1st
Cir. 1988) (“Systemic efficiencies would be frustrated and the
magistrate’s role reduced to that of a mere dress rehearser if a
party were allowed to feint and weave at the initial hearing, and
save its knockout punch for the second round.”).
The Court will nonetheless give short shrift to defendants’
argument.

The new suit filed by defendant Santacana in the San

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)
Juan

Superior

Court

9
is

plainly

not

a

“state

criminal

prosecution[],” a “‘civil enforcement proceeding[],’” or a “‘civil
proceeding[] involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance
of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.’”
See Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 591 (quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368).
Thus, the new suit does not fall within any of the three categories
of cases that trigger Younger abstention, and the Court therefore
finds defendants’ belated Younger argument unpersuasive.
C.

Colorado River Abstention
Defendants raise yet another new argument that they could

have, but inexplicably did not, raise before the magistrate judge
in their motion to dismiss.

In light of the suits brought before

Puerto Rico courts by plaintiff Marietti on February 28, 2014 and
by defendant Santacana on January 16, 2015, defendants argue that,
the Court should dismiss this case pursuant to the Colorado River
v. United States principle of “wise judicial administration, giving
regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive
disposition of litigation,” 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

(Docket No. 42 at pp. 5-

10.)
Here the Court must pull back the reins on defendants’ attempt
to use the magistrate system as a dress rehearsal.
Circuit

Court

of

Appeals

has

held

“categorically

The First
that

an

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)

10

unsuccessful party is not entitled as of right to de novo review by
the judge

of

magistrate.”

an

argument

never

seasonably

raised

before

the

Paterson-Leitch Co., 840 F.2d at 990-91; accord

Borden v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.
1987) (“Parties must take before the magistrate, not only their
best shot but all of their shots.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).

“[I]t would be fundamentally unfair to permit

[defendants] to set [their] case in motion before the magistrate,
wait to see which way the wind was blowing, and — having received
an unfavorable recommendation — shift gears before the district
judge.”

Paterson-Leitch Co., 840 F.2d at 991.

This is exactly

what defendants are doing with their newly-raised Colorado River
argument,

and

the

Court

will

not

permit

this

unfairness.

Accordingly, the Court deems defendants’ Colorado River abstention
argument as waived due to their failure to present the argument
before the magistrate judge.
D.

Marietti’s Cause of Action Brought Pursuant to Rule 69
Although

neither

party

raised

this

concern,

the

Court

questions whether it has jurisdiction over plaintiff Marietti’s
claim brought pursuant to Rule 69.

See Spooner v. EEN, Inc., 644

F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2011) (“A court is duty-bound to notice, and
act upon, defects in its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.”).
In her Rule 69 claim, plaintiff seeks a writ of execution to

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)

11

enforce money judgments established by the Minnesota state court.
See Docket No. 22 at p. 11.

Case law suggests, however, that Rule

69 is not available to enforce state court judgments in federal
court.

See Gagan v. Monroe, 269 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2001)

(“[Rule 69] allows a judgment creditor . . . to return to the
district court where the judgment was entered and seek the district
court’s assistance in enforcing the judgment.”); Threlkeld v.
Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Inasmuch as the
federal courts are not appendages of the state courts, a federal
court

cannot

enforce

a

state-court

judgment

without

first

independently establishing its own jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties.”); United States v. Potter, 19 F.R.D. 89, 89-90
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (“Rule 69(a) . . . provides for conformity of
procedure in enforcing judgments of the Federal Court to state
practice but does not constitute the Federal Court an arm of the
State Court with respect to collection of its judgments.”); United
States v. Fairbank Realty Corp., 50 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D.N.Y.
1943), aff’d sub nom. Rottenberg v. United States, 142 F.2d 151 (2d
Cir. 1944) (“Rule 69(a) . . . in no way gives [the federal court]
jurisdiction

in

supplementary

proceedings

over

state

court

judgments until they have been reduced to judgment in [the federal
court].”); see also 12 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3011 (2d ed. 2015) (“Rule 69 applies only to money

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)

12

judgments of the federal court . . . [and] has no application to
state-court judgments.”).
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS plaintiff Marietti to show cause
why the Court has jurisdiction over her claim brought pursuant to
Rule 69.
E.

Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint
Finally, the Court corrects some apparent confusion as to the

role

of

plaintiff’s

original

complaint

(Docket

defendants’ motion to dismiss (Docket No. 14).

No.

1)

and

Because plaintiff

filed an amended complaint (Docket No. 22) and defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Docket No. 27), the
original complaint (Docket No. 1) and motion to dismiss (Docket No.
14) are MOOT.

See Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st

Cir. 2008) (“An amended complaint, once filed, normally supersedes
the antecedent complaint.

Thereafter, the earlier complaint is a

dead letter and no longer performs any function in the case.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Court ADOPTS IN PART and
REJECTS IN PART the magistrate judge’s R & R (Docket No. 40).
The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendant’s motion
to dismiss the amended complaint (Docket No. 27).

Defendants’

motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim is GRANTED, and

Civil No. 14-1902 (FAB)

13

plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the remaining claims is DENIED.
Defendants’

motion

to

dismiss

the

original

complaint

(Docket

No. 14) is MOOT.
Furthermore, the Court ORDERS plaintiff Marietti to show
cause,

no

later

than

July

27,

2015,

whether

the

Court

jurisdiction over her claim brought pursuant to Rule 69.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 26, 2015.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

has