Cano-Angeles et al v. Department of Education of Puerto Rico et al

Filing 45

ORDER granting 41 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Bruce J. McGiverin on February 29, 2016. (McGiverin, Bruce)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
YOLANDA CÁNO-ANGELES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 15-1005 (BJM)

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO
(DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION),
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Yolanda Cáno-Angeles and Genaro Herrera Dos Reis, personally and on behalf of
their son, FHC (collectively, “Cáno”), appealed the administrative decision of the Puerto
Rico Department of Education (“the Department”). Plaintiffs, having prevailed in their
federal-court appeal, seek a total of $4,270.00 in attorney’s fees and costs from defendants
pursuant to the fee-shifting provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Docket No. 40-41. Defendants opposed. Docket No.
42. The case is before me by consent of the parties. Docket No. 18.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
FHC is registered with the Department as a student with disabilities. Compl. ¶ 13.
FHC has been diagnosed with autism. Compl. ¶ 11. FHC resides with his parents in the
municipality of Caguas, Puerto Rico. Compl. ¶ 12.
On May 2014, Cáno filed an administrative complaint against the Department, but
the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) dismissed it. The ALJ concluded the she lacked
jurisdiction “to resolve the controversy regarding the applicable rate for [the] transportation
scholarship.” Docket No. 35-4 at 4. Plaintiffs appealed the ALJ’s dismissal and asked this
court to reverse it, and order the Department to pay transportation reimbursements. See
Docket No. 1. On October of 2015, I reversed ALJ’s decision and remanded the case, so
that the merits of dispute may be resolved in the first instance by the ALJ. Docket No. 38.

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs due to them as prevailing parties pursuant
to the IDEA. The IDEA permits a district court, in its discretion, to award reasonable
attorneys’ fees “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,” subject
to certain limitations. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). The fees to be awarded “shall be
based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the
kind and quality of services furnished. No bonus or multiplier may be used in calculating
the fees awarded . . .” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(C).
Among other restrictions, the court may not award attorney’s fees “relating to any
meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative
proceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of the State, for a mediation” under the
IDEA. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). A preliminary meeting (which precedes the impartial due
process hearing required to be held after a complaint has been received) conducted pursuant
to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i) is not “a meeting convened as a result of an administrative
hearing or judicial action.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(iii). With certain exceptions, the court must
reduce the fee award if, inter alia, it finds that the parent, or the parent’s attorney,
unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the controversy; the amount of otherwiseauthorized fees “unreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the community for
similar services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, reputation, and experience”;
or “the time spent and legal services furnished were excessive considering the nature of the
action or proceeding.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F).
Plaintiffs’ first motion seeks compensation of $460.00 in filing fees, and fees for
service of summons and subpoena. Docket No. 40. The second motion, filed with supporting
statements, seeks compensation of $3,810.00 in attorneys’ fees and for additional litigation
expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Docket No. 41.
Defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs are prevailing parties entitled to
compensation. 1 Instead, they argue that the fees charged are excessive and duplicative. Docket
No. 42. Defendants find excessive the hours billed for reviewing and drafting documents, and
1

But see; “[w]hen plaintiff’s success consisted of an appellate court decision reversing a
directed verdict for the defendant and ordering a new trial, the plaintiff was not a prevailing party.”
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980); Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 83 (2007).

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legal research, and seek a reduction of $764.00. Defendants’ second argument is that the total
amount for meetings, conferences, and e-mail communications should be reduced a total
amount of $245.00, a reduction of 50%. According to defendants, the descriptions provided by
the plaintiffs in the invoices lacked specificity in describing the work performed. Considering
all requests for reductions, defendants seek a total deduction of $1,009.00. I will address these
objections in turn.

Time Drafting and Researching
In regards to the hours billed by attorneys for time drafting and researching the
district court has broad discretion to determine “how much was done, who did it, and how
effectively the result was accomplished.” Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 939 (1st Cir.
1992). The number of hours can be reduced to balance for excessive hours. See Spooner v.
EEN, Inc., 644 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2011). Examples of such excesses include spending
fifteen minutes reading a single-sentence order, or spending 90 minutes reading short
motions and replies. See Cortes-Reyes v. Salas-Quintana, 806 F. Supp. 2d 470, 477 (D.P.R.
2011).
Defendants ask this court to reduce the amount for entries related to reviewing
documents and conducting legal research, arguing that the amount of hours billed was
excessive. However, defendants provide no guide as to what time it takes other experienced
lawyers to perform the same task. I have reviewed the pleadings at issue and the hours
devoted by the attorneys appear reasonable and are explained with sufficient detail in their
invoice. See Exhibit 1-Docket 41-1.
Conferences, Meetings and E-mails
A court may adjust the hours to account for time records that are “too generic,”
causing them to be “insufficient as a practical matter to permit a court to answer questions
about excessiveness, redundancy, and the like.” Colón Vázquez v. Puerto Rico, 2015 WL
847291, at *2 (D.P.R. 2015)(citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The
Grendel’s Den standard requires attorneys to keep contemporaneous and detailed time
records, except in extraordinary circumstances. Grendel’s Den, Inc. v Larkin, 749 F2d 945,
951 (1st Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs are “not required to record in great detail how each minute
of his time was expended.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. They should, however, identify the

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general subject of the time being billed. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 455. The problem with
imprecise records is that “they fail to allow [ ] the paying party to dispute the accuracy of
the records as well as the reasonableness of the time spent.” Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 938
(internal citation and quotation omitted)(alteration in original).
Records will be sufficient and compensable if the subject matter and nature of the
tasks are either explicitly stated or readily ascertainable based on other information
contained in the records. Parker v. Town of Swansea, 310 F. Supp. 2d 376, 392 (D. Mass.
2004). When there is no interrelation between the entries and the dates or surrounding
entries, a full account of the task performed will be required. Walsh v. Boston Univ., 661
F. Supp. 2d 91, 106 (D. Mass. 2009). References to telephone calls should not require
extensive details to be compensable. Parker, 310 F. Supp at 392. A court must be cognizant
of the attorney/client issue when attorneys are describing a task such as an email or a
conference with the client; therefore if the court can deduce the general reason by
examining the date of the task surrounding it, it will be considered reasonable. Walsh, 661
F. Supp. 2d at 117.
Defendants argue that the communications via email and conference calls were
vague, unnecessary, or duplicative. Docket No. 42. However, they fail to provide the court
with proof that these calls, emails, and meetings in fact were unnecessary. The burden is
on the unsuccessful party to show circumstances that are sufficient to overcome the
presumption in favor of the prevailing party. Charles Alan Wright, et al., 10 Federal
Practice & Procedure § 2668 (3d ed., 2015).
After reviewing the time records, I conclude that the hours billed were kept
contemporaneously. For example, a telephone conference call of 12 minutes with Yolanda
Cáno was made successively after drafting and reviewing opposition motions. See Exhibit
1 – Docket No. 41. Also, a telephone conference of 6 minutes was billed the same date the
drafting of the verified complaint began. Id. As noted, the records are interrelated and
provide details to one another. None of the entries are inconsistent, vague, excessive, or
duplicative.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Bill of Costs, Docket No. 40, Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees and Cost and Litigation Expenses, Docket No. 41, are GRANTED.
Plaintiffs are awarded $4,270.00 in costs, fees, and litigation expenses.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 29th day of February, 2016.
S/Bruce J. McGiverin
BRUCE J. MCGIVERIN
United States Magistrate Judge