Morales-Ocasio et al v. Roman-Melendez et al

Filing 63

ORDER granting in part 61 Motion for Attorney Fees. Defendants shall make the payment by not later than June 6, 2016. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Bruce J. McGiverin on May 3, 2016. (McGiverin, Bruce)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
CARMEN P. MORALES OCASIO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 15-1431 (BJM)

RAFAEL ROMAN MELENDEZ, et al.,
Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
Carmen P. Morales Ocasio (“Morales”), personally and on behalf of her son, R.G.M
sued Rafael Roman Melendez (“Roman”) in his official capacity as Secretary of the Puerto
Rico Department of Education (“DOE”), Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and other
defendants. Plaintiffs, having prevailed by settlement in their federal-court action for
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, seek a total of $4,726.50 in attorney’s fees
and costs from defendants pursuant to the fee-shifting provision of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Docket Nos. 60–61.
Defendants opposed. Docket No. 62. The case is before me by consent of the parties.
Docket No. 30.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
R.G.M is registered with DOE as a student with disabilities. Compl. ¶ 11. DRF has
been diagnosed with specific problems related to her education. Compl ¶ 9. DRF resides
with her mother in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Compl. ¶ 10.
On April 20, 2015, plaintiffs filed for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
before this court, alleging defendants refusal to provide R.G.M. with a free appropriate
public education, as required by IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs
requested a declaration that defendants violated plaintiffs’ federal rights guaranteed by
IDEA, an order to immediately provide R.G.M with appropriate school placement,
consolidation of the injunction hearing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (a) (2), and reasonable
costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. Docket No. 1. In March 4, 2016, the parties settled.
Docket No. 52.

Morales-Ocasio, et al., v. Rafael Roman Melendez, et al., Civil No. 15-1431 (BJM)

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs due to them as prevailing parties pursuant
to the IDEA. The IDEA permits a district court, in its discretion, to award reasonable
attorneys’ fees “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,” subject
to certain limitations. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). The fees to be awarded “shall be
based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the
kind and quality of services furnished. No bonus or multiplier may be used in calculating
the fees awarded . . .” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(C).
Among other restrictions, the court may not award attorneys’ fees “relating to any
meeting of the IEP Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative
proceeding or judicial action, or, at the discretion of the State, for a mediation.” Id. §
1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). A preliminary meeting (which precedes the impartial due process
hearing required to be held after a complaint has been received) conducted pursuant to §
1415(f)(1)(B)(i) is not “a meeting convened as a result of an administrative hearing or
judicial action.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(iii). With certain exceptions, the court must reduce the
fee award if, inter alia, it finds that the parent, or the parent’s attorney, unreasonably
protracted the final resolution of the controversy; the amount of otherwise-authorized fees
“unreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar services by
attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, reputation, and experience”; or “the time spent
and legal services furnished were excessive considering the nature of the action or
proceeding.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F).
Plaintiffs’ first motion seeks compensation of $560.00 in filing fees. Docket No. 59.
The second motion, filed with supporting invoices, seeks compensation of $26.50 for
additional litigation expenses concomitant of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Docket No. 60. The third motion seeks a total of $4,140.00 in
attorneys’ fees. Docket No. 61.
Defendants agree that plaintiffs are prevailing parties entitled to compensation.
However, they argue that the fees charged for IEP Team meetings should not be billed because
IDEA prohibits it. Docket No. 62. Defendants request a reduction of $800.00. Id. Defendants’
second argument is that the total amount billed for IEP meetings is excessive considering the
precarious fiscal condition Puerto Rico is traversing.

Morales-Ocasio, et al., v. Rafael Roman Melendez, et al., Civil No. 15-1431 (BJM)

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The IDEA prohibits awarding attorney's fees and costs “to any meeting of the IEP
Team unless such meeting is convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or
judicial action, or at the discretion of the State, for a mediation described in subsection (e)
of this section.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). The IDEA further states that “a meeting
conducted pursuant to subsection (f)(1)(B)(i) shall not be considered (I) a meeting
convened as a result of an administrative hearing or judicial action; or (II) an administrative
hearing or judicial action for purposes of this paragraph.” Id (iii).
The time consumed appearing at special education IEP team meetings is not
recoverable. Mr. C v. MSAD 6, No. 6–198, 2008 WL 2609362 at *1 (D.Me. June 25, 2008).
Moreover, the statute states that fees may not be awarded “relating” to any IEP Team
meeting. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 2d 338,
345-46 (D.P.R. 2011). IEP meetings are specifically designed to be informal meetings
where parents, teachers, and administrators sit down to work out an IEP by consensus if
possible. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1). Considering them as part of the administrative litigation
process will only encourage adversarial conduct. No fees or costs should be recovered from
these meetings. The invoices adequately state that the entries disputed by defendants were
held in relation to IEP Team meetings, which is sufficient to deny payment for those billed
hours. According to the entire record, no court-ordered IEP Team meetings were directed.
Thus, I conclude that plaintiffs' attorney's fees should be reduced by 8.0 hours from the
solicited fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Bill of Costs, Docket No. 59, Motion for
Cost and Litigation Expenses, Docket No. 60, and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Docket No.
61, are GRANTED in part. Plaintiffs are awarded $3,926.50 in costs, fees, and litigation
expenses.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 3rd day of May 2016.
S/Bruce J. McGiverin
BRUCE J. MCGIVERIN
United States Magistrate Judge