Rodriguez-Cortes v. Superintendencia del Capitolio et al
Filing
53
OPINION AND ORDER re 44 motion for summary judgment. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 02/17/2017. (brc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ENDEL RODRIGUEZ-CORTES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIVIL NO. 15-1535 (FAB)
SUPERINTENDENCIA DEL CAPITOLIO,
et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER 1
BESOSA, District Judge.
Plaintiff Endel Rodriguez-Cortes (“Rodriguez”) brought suit
against
his
former
employer,
Superintendencia
del
Capitolio
(“Superintendence”), Javier Vazquez-Collazo, in his official and
personal capacities, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, seeking
reinstatement and monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Puerto Rico law.
Plaintiff Rodriguez seeks reinstatement to
his former position as Project Coordinator by the Commonwealth and
the Superintendence, and damages from defendant Vazquez-Collazo. 2
1
Mariana Deseda-Colon, a recent graduate of the University of
Puerto Rico School of Law, assisted in the preparation of the
Opinion and Order.
2
The Court previously dismissed plaintiff Rodriguez’s monetary
claims against the Commonwealth and defendant Vazquez in his
official capacity. See Docket No. 18.
Civil No. 15-1535 (FAB)
2
Before the Court is defendants Superintendence, Javier VazquezCollazo (“Vazquez”) in his personal capacity, and the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico (“Commonwealth”)’s motion for summary judgment,
(Docket No. 44), which plaintiff opposes. (Docket No. 52.) Having
considered the motion and plaintiff’s response, the Court GRANTS
IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants’ motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56 require
that facts supporting a Motion for Summary Judgment be properly
supported by a citation to the record, Local Rule 56(e), and
established
in
a
separate
uncontested fact (“SUMF”).
short
and
concise
statement
of
Because defendants’ SUMF includes
several facts not relevant to the claims before the Court, and
because plaintiff’s counter-SUMF fails to controvert the majority
of defendants’ asserted facts properly, see P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v.
Rivera-Vazquez, 603 F.3d 125, 134 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that
facts which are properly supported “shall be deemed admitted unless
controverted in the manner prescribed by the local rule”), the
Court includes only those facts which are properly supported by
the record and relevant to plaintiff’s asserted claims.
Rodriguez began working at the Capitol as a “General Services
Assistant”.
(Docket Nos. 45-2 at p. 27; 50-2 at p. 1).
At the
time he was hired, the Superintendent of the Capitol was a member
Civil No. 15-1535 (FAB)
3
of the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”).
pp. 6-37.)
(Docket No. 45-2 at
Because of his work progress, Rodriguez was promoted
to the position of “Project Coordinator.”
Id. at pp. 47, 49.
Twelve years later, Rodriguez was terminated from his position.
(Docket No. 50-1.)
At the time of his dismissal, the governor was
a member of the PDP.
(Docket No. 1 at p. 3.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A court will grant summary judgment if the moving party shows,
based on materials in the record, “that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and [the moving party] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
“A dispute is
genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable
jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.”
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 786 (1st Cir. 2011)
(quoting
Rodriguez–Rivera
v.
Federico
Trilla
Carolina, 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2008)).
if
it
has
litigation.”
the
potential
of
determining
Reg’l.
Hosp.
of
“A fact is material
the
outcome
of
the
Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.
2008).
At the summary judgment stage, a court must construe the
entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.
Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 2005).
DePoutot v.
The Court refrains
Civil No. 15-1535 (FAB)
4
from making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence.
See McGrath v. Tavares, 757 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2014).
also
disregards
speculation.
conclusory
and
unsupported
Id.
III.
A.
allegations
The Court
DISCUSSION
Political Discrimination Claim
Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s political
discrimination
claim
on
the
grounds
that
plaintiff
establish a prima facie case of political discrimination.
No. 45 at p. 7.)
fails
to
(Docket
In his opposition, plaintiff concedes “that he
has no political discrimination claim.”
(Docket No. 52 at p. 4.)
Even if plaintiff had not conceded this point, his political
discrimination
claim
would
not
have
been
able
to
survive
defendants’ motion for summary judgment because, in choosing not
to include his party affiliation in his motion, see Docket No. 52,
plaintiff has not established that he and the firing entity were
from opposite political parties.
He, therefore, cannot satisfy
the first prong of the First Circuit’s four prong test to establish
a prima facie case of political discrimination. 3
See Ocasio-
Hernandez v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2011)
3
Because both parties focus on the prima facie case, the Court
does not reach the issue of a potential Mt. Healthy argument.
Civil No. 15-1535 (FAB)
5
(establishing the four prong test as requiring “(1) that the
plaintiff
and
defendant
have
opposing
political
affiliations,
(2) that the defendant is aware of the plaintiff’s affiliation,
(3) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (4) that
political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor for
the adverse employment action”).
Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz Velez, 630
F.3d 228, 239 (1st Cir. 2010).
Because the parties agree that
there is no political discrimination claim, defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to plaintiff’s political discrimination claim
is GRANTED.
B.
Qualified Immunity and Due Process Clause Claim
Defendants next move for summary judgment on the theory that
defendant Vazquez has qualified immunity as a government employee.
(Docket No. 45 at pp. 13-15.)
The qualified immunity doctrine
protects government officials from suit on federal claims for
damages where, in the circumstances, a reasonable official could
have believed his conduct was lawful. See Olmeda v. Ortiz-Quiñones,
434 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2006).
Qualified immunity does not protect
those who knowingly violate the law.
See Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
In determining whether qualified immunity shields a state
actor from liability, the Court uses a two-part test:
“(1) whether
the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation
Civil No.
15-1535 (FAB)
6
of a constitutional right, and (2), if so, whether that right was
clearly established at the time of defendant’s violation.”
See
Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
For the first prong of the test, the Court must determine if
plaintiff’s
constitutional
rights
were
violated
by
the
Commonwealth, the Superintendence and by defendant Vazquez acting
in his personal capacity.
Id.
In order to do so, the Court must
first address plaintiff’s Due Process Clause claim.
1.
Due Process Clause Claim
The
Due
Process
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
provides both procedural and substantive rights 4 to Puerto Rico
citizens.
See Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F. 3d 864, 879 (1st
Cir. 2010).
Rodriguez alleges in his initial complaint that the
defendants violated his procedural due process when they terminated
him without a prior hearing.
(Docket No. 1 at p. 4.)
Defendants
move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Due Process Clause claim.
(Docket Nos. 44, 45.)
4
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants only provide
the legal standard of substantive due process and fail to develop
an argument. (Docket No. 45 at pp. 7-9.) Accordingly, the Court
finds this argument waived. See Rodriguez v. Munic. of San Juan,
659 F. 3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Judges are not mind-readers,
so parties must spell out their issues clearly, highlighting the
relevant facts and analyzing on-point authority.”)
Civil No.
15-1535 (FAB)
7
The Due Process Clause guarantees public employees a
property interest in their continued employment only if “existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law” create a reasonable expectation that their employment
will continue.
Alberti v. Carlo-Izquierdo, 548 F. Appx. 625, 635
(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
Pursuant to Puerto Rico law, a career
position is a constitutionally protected property interest.
See
Kauffman v. P.R. Tel. Co., 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir. 1998).
Persons who hold permanent and career positions must be hired or
fired on merit-based criteria.
3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2009).
See Costa-Urena v. Segarra, 590 F.
Trust employees, on the other hand, are
“involved in policy-making and can be more or less hired or fired
at will.”
Id.
Here,
defendants
maintain
the
legal
plaintiff’s position was a trust position.
pp. 12-13.)
conclusion
that
(Docket No. 45 at
“While the government’s classification of a particular
position is a relevant fact for the Court to consider, it is not
dispositive.”
Sastre-Fernandez v. Superintendencia del Capitolio,
972 F. Supp. 2d 217, 219 (D.P.R. 2013) (Fusté, J.) (citing Galloza
v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2004)).
In order to determine
if a position is a trust position, the Court must make a factspecific inquiry. Id. The First Circuit Court of Appeals typically
Civil No.
15-1535 (FAB)
8
employs a two-pronged test to make this determination, looking
first to the political nature of the employing agency and second
to the political nature of the plaintiff’s position.
See Mendez-
Aponte v. Bonilla, 645 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2011).
In the first prong, the Court evaluates whether “the
discharging agency’s functions entail decision making on issues
where there is room for political disagreement on goals or their
implementation.”
O’Connell v. Marrero-Recio, 724 F.3d 117, 126
(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d 12,
18 (1st Cir. 2003)).
Rodriguez’s employing agency, the Office of
the Superintendent of the Capitol Building, oversees “the upkeep,
maintenance,
extension,
construction
and
remodeling
of
buildings and grounds of the Commonwealth Capitol Building.”
Laws Ann. tit. 2 § 651.
the
P.R.
“The maintenance and upkeep of the
Commonwealth’s Capitol grounds hardly involves partisan political
interests.”
Sastre-Fernandez, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
Rodriguez’s
employing agency does not satisfy the first prong of a trust
position.
Furthermore, the position fails to satisfy the second
prong.
The
Court
examines
whether
“the
particular
responsibilities of the plaintiff’s position resemble those of a
policymaker, privy to confidential information, a communicator,
or some other office holder whose function is such that a party
Civil No.
15-1535 (FAB)
9
affiliation is an equally appropriate requirement for continued
tenure.”
Rosenberg, 328 F.3d at 18.
The Court considers the
position’s “relative pay, technical competence, power to control
others, authority to speak in the name of policymakers, public
perception, influence on programs, contact with elected officials,
and responsiveness to partisan politics and political leaders.”
O’Connell, 724 F.3d at 127 (quoting O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d
at 910).
Here, Rodriguez coordinated meetings, inspections, and
jobs
for
issues.
construction
projects
and
mechanical
(Docket No. 45-2 at pp. 51-52.)
and
electrical
He asserts that he (1)
never had the authority to make policy; (2) did not evaluate other
employees, discipline them, or recommend that they be disciplined;
(3) had no authority to hire or fire an employee; and (4) did not
report to the
Superintendent directly. 5 (Docket No. 52-2.)
These
responsibilities do not resemble those of a trust position, nor do
they have to do with partisan ideology.
F.
Supp.
2d
at
219
(finding
that
See Sastre-Fernandez, 972
plaintiff’s
duties
as
a
groundskeeper did not constitute those of a trust position, even
though
5
the
government
had
labeled
plaintiff’s
position
as
Rodriguez reported to Alex Martinez (Project Manager), who
reported to Pablo Sastre (Deputy Superintendent), who reported to
the Superintendent. (Docket No. 52-2 at p. 1.)
Civil No.
15-1535 (FAB)
“trust”).
Rodriguez’s
Project
Coordinator
position
10
does not
satisfy the second prong of a trust position.
Plaintiff’s position of Project Coordinator fails to meet
the requirements of a trust position. 6
The Court finds that
plaintiff’s position was a career position, and he was therefore
entitled to a pre-termination hearing.
By not affording him a
hearing, defendants violated Rodriguez’s procedural due process
right.
2.
Vazquez’s Defense of Qualified Immunity
Defendants
argue
that
even
if
the
Court
decides
plaintiff’s Due Process Clause claim is valid, Vazquez is still
entitled to qualified immunity.
(Docket No. 45 at p. 15.)
The
Court disagrees.
“Due process in a pre-termination hearing of a career
civil servant with a property interest in his job is required by
law.”
Maldonado Aqueda v. Montalvo, 826 F. Supp. 47, 51 (D.P.R.
1993); see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Looudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 537
(1985).
6
Here, the Court has already established that Rodriguez
Pablo Sastre (“Sastre”) filed a parallel case prior to this one
before another Court against the same defendants. The defendants
moved to dismiss, arguing that Sastre’s duties included policy
making-powers.
(Docket No. 52-2.)
Sastre-Fernandez v.
Superintendencia del Capitolio, 972 F. Supp. 2d (2013). The Court
denied the motion to dismiss and found that Sastre’s job position
was not a trust position. Id. at p. 220.
Civil No.
held
a
15-1535 (FAB)
career
position,
_ 11
and
that
defendants
failed
to
offer
Rodriguez a pre-termination hearing. (Docket No. 52 at p. 3).
Plaintiff’s
deprivation
Constitutional
violation,
of
a
and,
pre-termination
therefore,
hearing
satisfies
the
is
a
first
element of qualified immunity’s two-part test.
For the second prong of the test, the Court must determine
if plaintiff’s right was clearly established at the time of the
violation.
See Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269.
The First Circuit
Court of Appeals divides this part of the test into two inquiries:
“(1) whether the contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right, and (2) whether in the specific context of the
case, a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
Mosher v. Nelson,
589 F. 3d 488, 438 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Maldonado, 568 F.3d at
269).
First, the First Circuit Court of Appeals and this Court
have held for many years, and in many instances, that employees
holding career positions in Puerto Rico are entitled to pretermination hearings because they have a property right in their
employment.
Accord Laborde-Garcia v. P.R. Tel. Co., 993 F.2d 265,
266-67 (1st Cir. 1993); Rodriguez-Diaz v. Cruz-Colon, 878 F. Supp.
2d 333, 344 (D.P.R. 2012) (Gelpi, J.) (“Career employees . . . have
Civil No.
15-1535 (FAB)
_ 12
a property interest in their continued employment under Puerto Rico
law.”); Feliciano v. P.R. State Ind. Fund, 818 F. Supp. 2d 482,
494-95 (D.P.R. 2011) (Dominguez, J.).
Thus, the contours of the
Constitutional right were clear here – plaintiff was entitled to a
hearing. Knowing this well-established rule, and that plaintiff’s
job responsibilities did not resemble those of a policymaker, a
reasonable defendant would have realized that plaintiff Rodriguez
was a career employee, and thus, terminating him without a hearing
deprives him of a property interest and violates his Due Process
Clause rights.
Defendants fail to satisfy either part of the
qualified immunity test.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the
defense of qualified immunity does not apply to defendant Vazquez.
Because plaintiff’s due process rights were violated and
defendant
Vazquez’s
defense
of
qualified
immunity
fails,
defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Due
Process Clause claim is DENIED.
IV.
For
the
reasons
Conclusion
expressed
above,
defendants’
motion
for
summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 17, 2017.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
United States District Judge
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