Benitez Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 17 Motion to Dismiss: GRANTED. Benitez's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 4/29/2019. (ab)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

DIONISIO BENÍTEZ-RODRÍGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, as receiver for
DORAL BANK

Civil No. 15-1678 (FAB)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Defendant Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as receiver
for Doral Bank (“FDIC-R”), moves to dismiss the claims set forth
by plaintiff Dionisio Benítez-Rodríguez (“Benítez”) pursuant to
Federal

Rule

of

(Docket No. 17.)

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(1)

(“Rule

12(b)(1)”).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

the FDIC-R’s motion to dismiss.
I.

Background
Doral Bank (“Doral”) loaned Benítez $206,400.00 to purchase

a property in Gurabo, Puerto Rico.
56.)

(Docket No. 13, Ex. 1 at p.

Benítez defaulted on the loan, prompting Doral to commence

a foreclosure action in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance,
Caguas Division, on April 7, 2014 (hereinafter the “foreclosure
action”).

Id.; see Doral Bank v. Benítez-Rodríguez, Case No.

Civil No. 15-1678 (FAB)
EAC2014-0415.

2

Doral moved for summary judgment on April 22, 2014.

(Docket No. 13, Ex. 1 at p. 40.)

The Court of First Instance

granted Doral’s motion for summary judgment, ordering Benítez to
pay “$180.58.88 [sic] in principal, plus interests [sic] at 6.950%
annually starting October 1, 2013, as well as the current and
future interests [sic] accrued beginning on that date until the
debt is paid in full.”

Id. at p. 45.

In the event that Benítez

failed to comply with the revised payment schedule, the Court of
First Instance ordered the “Marshalls [sic] to sell the mortgaged
property . . . and to apply to the debt monies received from the
sale.”

Id. 1

On December 31, 2014, Benítez commenced an action against
Doral, asserting that Doral “fraudulently alleged that it was the
holder by endorsement of the Original PROMISSORY NOTE, which it
was not, which constitutes fraud on the Court” (hereinafter the
“fraud causes of action”).
Benítez-Rodríguez
Benítez

v.

requested

Doral

that

the

Docket No. 15, Ex. 1 at p. 12; see
Bank,

Case

Court

of

Division, nullify the foreclosure action.

1

The Court of First
schedule on October,
Instance issued the
This discrepancy is
analysis.

No.

First

EAC2014-0538704.
Instance,

Caguas

Id.

Instance ordered Benítez to commence the revised payment
2013. (Docket No. 13, Ex. 1 at p. 45.) The Court of First
judgment, however, on November 12, 2014. Id. at p. 46.
immaterial to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction

Civil No. 15-1678 (FAB)

3

Before disposition of the fraud causes of action, the Office
of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions closed Doral and
appointed the FDIC-R to serve as Doral’s receiver.
at p. 1.)

(Docket No. 1.

The FDIC-R “succeeded to all of Doral’s rights, titles,

powers, privileges, assets, and liabilities, including Doral’s
interest

in

this

pending

action.”

Id.

(citing

12

U.S.C.

§

1821(d)); see O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994)
(holding

that

pursuant

to

the

language

of

12

U.S.C.

section

1821(d), the FDIC “steps into the shoes” of a failed institution).
On May 14, 2015, the FDIC-R notified Benítez that “any claims
against [Doral] must be filed on or before June 04, 2015 (the
‘Claims Bar Date’).”

(Docket No. 17, Ex. 1 at p. 4.)

The notice

provided that:
In order for the Receiver to consider your claim you
must submit the properly completed Proof of Claim Form
along with the supporting documentation to the Receiver
by the Claims Bar Date . . . Failure to file your claim
on or before the Claims Bar Date will result in
disallowance by the Receiver, and the disallowance will
be final.
Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(c)(i)).
the notice to Benítez’s attorney.

The FDIC-R also mailed

(Docket No. 17. Ex. 1 at p.

11.)
The FDIC-R removed the fraud causes of action to this Court
on May 27, 2015.
however,

“until

(Docket No. 1.)
September

8,

The Court stayed this action,

2015

or

for

60

days

after

the

Civil No. 15-1678 (FAB)

4

disallowance of claims, whichever date [occurred] first.”
No. 10.)

(Docket

The stay allowed Benítez “to exhaust the administrative

remedies allowed by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).”

Id.

Benítez did not file “an

administrative claim with the FDIC-R by the Claims Bar Date and/or
the submission deadline.”

(Docket No. 17, Ex. 1 at p. 3.)

The

FDIC-R moves to dismiss the fraud causes of action because Benítez
failed to comply with the administrative review process in FIRREA.
(Docket No. 17 at p. 8.)

The FDIC-R’s motion to dismiss is

unopposed.
II.

Motion to Dismiss
The

FDIC-R

moves

to

dismiss

the

fraud

causes

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
17 at p. 1.)

of

action

(Docket No.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may move to

dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

See

Subject-matter jurisdiction is properly

invoked when a plaintiff asserts a colorable claim “arising under”
the United States Constitution or federal law.

28 U.S.C. § 1331;

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (internal citation
omitted).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court “must

credit the plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”

Merlonghi v.

U.S., 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

Civil No. 15-1678 (FAB)

5

A. FIRREA Sets Forth a Mandatory Administrative Claims Process
The

Financial

Institutions

Reform,

Recovery

and

Enforcement Act of 1989 sets forth a statutory claims process
“designed

to

create

an

efficient

administrative

processing claims against failed banks.”
F.2d 1148, 1154 (1st Cir. 1992).
the

FDIC

required

“to

publish

institution’s

creditors

must

file

must

be

date,

which

publication of the notice.”

for

Marquis v. FDIC, 965

Pursuant to this review process,

is

specified

protocol

notice

claims
at

least

that

with

the

ninety

the
FDIC
days

failed
by

a

after

Acosta-Ramírez v. Banco Popular de

Puerto Rico, 712 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(3)(B)(i)).
If a timely claim is filed, the FDIC must approve or
disallow the claim within 180 days.
19 (citing § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i)).

Acosta-Ramírez, 712 F.3d at

“Claimants then have sixty days

from the date of disallowance or from the expiration of the 180–
day administrative decision deadline to seek judicial review in an
appropriate federal district court (or to seek administrative
review).” Id. at 19 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A)). The First
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that failure to comply with the
administrative claims process “deprives the courts of subject

Civil No. 15-1678 (FAB)
matter

jurisdiction

6

over

financial institution.”

any

claim

to

assets

of

the

failed

Simon v. FDIC, 48 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir.

1995) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(i)). 2

Failure to exhaust

the administrative review process in FIRREA warrants dismissal
with prejudice.

See, e.g., FDIC v. Pedreira-Pérez, 323 F. Supp.

3d 291, 303 (D.P.R. 2018) (Besosa, J.); FDIC v. Estrada-Colón, 848
F. Supp. 2d 206, 212-13 (D.P.R. 2012) (Delgado-Colón, J.).
Benítez did not file a Proof of Claim with the FDIC-R.
Consequently, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
fraud causes of action must be dismissed.

The

See e.g., FDIC v. Ben.

Mortg. Corp., 858 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D.P.R. 2012) (Besosa, J.)
(holding that defendant “forfeited [his] right to pursue any claim
against the failed institution’s assets” by failing to submit an
administrative claim to the FDIC-R); Silva Bros., Inv. v. FDIC,
894 F. Supp. 42, 45 (D. Mass. 1995) (“Having failed to submit its
claims against [the failed bank] to the administrative process
provided by FIRREA, Silva Brothers is precluded from litigating

2

FIRREA provides that no court shall have jurisdiction over:
(i)

any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking
a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of
any depository institution for which the [FDIC] has been
appointed receiver, including assets which the [FDIC] may
acquire from itself as such receiver; or

(ii)

any claim relating to any act or omission
institution or the [FDIC] as receiver.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).

of

such

Civil No. 15-1678 (FAB)
the matter before this Court.”).

7
Accordingly, the Court grants

the FDIC-R’s motion to dismiss.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the FDIC-R’s motion to
dismiss is GRANTED.

Docket No. 17; see Benítez-Rodríguez v. Doral

Bank, Case No. EAC2014-0538704.
WITH PREJUDICE.

Benítez’s complaint is DISMISSED

Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

Because

the Court of First Instance, Caguas Division, also lacks subject
matter jurisdiction for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum
and Order, remand would be a vacuous act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 29, 2019.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE