United States v. Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company

Filing 173

ORDER: PRIDCO's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. (Docket No. 164.) Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 5/13/2019. (AA)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 15-2328 (FAB)

PUERTO RICO INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Before

the

Court

is

Puerto

Rico

Industrial

Company (“PRIDCO”)’s motion for reconsideration.
164.)

Development
(Docket No.

For the reasons set forth below, PRIDCO’s motion for

reconsideration is DENIED.
I.

Background
The United States commenced this action on September 25, 2015,

asserting that PRIDCO is liable for all response costs “incurred
by the [Environmental Protection Agency] in connection with the
[Maunabo Area Groundwater Contamination Superfund Site]” pursuant
to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. sections 9607 et seq.
No. 1; Docket No. 8 at p. 7.)
motion

to

trifurcate

this

(Docket

The Court granted the United States’
litigation

into

a

Liability

Phase

(“Phase I”), a Cost Phase (“Phase II”), and a Contribution Phase

Civil No. 15-2328 (FAB)
(“Phase III”).

2

(Docket No. 85.)

The Court held that PRIDCO is prima facie liable pursuant
to CERCLA in Phase I.

United States v. P.R. Indus. Dev. Co., 287

F. Supp. 3d 133 (D.P.R. 2017) (Besosa, J.).1

The Court granted

PRIDCO leave, however, to assert the third-party defense in Phase
II.

Id. at 141, 153.

The third-party defense offered PRIDCO a

potential reprieve from the strict-liability regime set forth in
CERCLA.

Id. (citing Acushnet Co. 191 F.3d at 74 (“CERCLA, as we

have said on other occasions, sketches the contours of a strict
liability regime.”)).
The United States and PRIDCO filed cross-motions for summary
judgment regarding the third-party defense and costs.
Nos. 142 & 143.)

(Docket

To invoke the third-party defense, PRIDCO had to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “an act or
omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
[PRIDCO], or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with

a

contractual

contamination.

relationship”

caused

the

groundwater

42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3); see, e.g., United States

The United States prevailed in Phase I by establishing that: (1) the property
is a facility pursuant to section 107(b) of CERCLA, (2) PRIDCO falls within one
of four categories of covered persons pursuant to section 107(a); (3) a release
or threatened release occurred on the property; and (4) the release or
threatened release caused the United States to incur response costs that are
not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan. 42 U.S.C. § 107; Acushnet
Co. v. Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 1999) (“By and large, a person
who falls within one of the four categories defined in [section 107] is exposed
to CERCLA liability.”).
1

Civil No. 15-2328 (FAB)

3

v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 198, 209 (D.R.I.
2008) (“In order to take advantage of the [third-party] defense,
Lombardi Realty must first meet the threshold burden of proving
that the contamination at the Site was caused solely by an act or
omission of a third party.”) (internal citation and quotation
omitted).

PRIDCO

emphasized

contamination is unknown.
proposition

only

inapplicable.

repeatedly

that

the

source

(Docket No. 143 at p. 45.)

underscored

that

the

third-party

of

This

defense

is

Accordingly, the Court granted the United States’

motion for summary judgment regarding the third-party defense.
United States v. P.R. Indus. Dev. Co., Case No. 15-2328, 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53194 (D.P.R. Mar. 25, 2019) (Besosa, J.).2
PRIDCO moves for reconsideration to “correct a clearly unjust
outcome

resulting

from

the

Court’s

misapprehension

of

the

applicable standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and their interaction
with the third-party defenses under CERCLA.”
p. 6.)

(Docket No. 164 at

The arguments set forth in the motion for reconsideration

are unavailing.

The Court denied the United States’ motion for summary judgment regarding
costs, ordering the United States to “specify which response actions (e.g.
removal actions, remedial actions) underlie the costs that PRIDCO is purportedly
liable for in this action.” P.R. Indus. Dev. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53194
*28.
2

Civil No. 15-2328 (FAB)
II.

4

Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not specifically

provide for the filing of motions for reconsideration.”

Sánchez-

Pérez v. Sánchez-González, 717 F. Supp. 2d 187, 193-94 (D.P.R.
2010) (Besosa, J.) (citation omitted).

The First Circuit Court of

Appeals has held, however, that a motion requesting “the court to
modify its earlier disposition of a case because of an allegedly
erroneous legal result is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).”
Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a district
court will alter its original order only if it “evidenced a
manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or
in certain other narrow situations.”

Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage,

Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

A

motion for reconsideration does “not provide a vehicle for a party
to undo its own procedural failures [or] allow a party [to] advance
arguments that could and should have been presented to the district
court prior to judgment.”

Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94,

104 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

In deciding a motion for

reconsideration, the reviewing court has considerable discretion.
Venegas-Hernández v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir.
2004).

“As a general rule, motions for reconsideration should

Civil No. 15-2328 (FAB)
only

be

exceptionally

5
granted.”

Villanueva-Méndez

v.

Nieves-

Vázquez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323 (D.P.R. 2005) (Domínguez, J.).
III. Discussion
PRIDCO misconstrues CERCLA, asserting that the United States
failed

“to

meet

its

statutory

obligation

of

identifying

the

location of the actual release or the source of the groundwater
contamination within PRIDCO’s property.”
4.)

(Docket No. 164 at p.

The Court has reiterated throughout this litigation that

“CERCLA contains no causation element.”

P.R. Indus. Dev. Co., 287

F. Supp. 3d at 133 (citing Prisco v. A & D Carting Corp., 168 F.
3d 593, 606 (2d Cir. 1999) (“No causation is needed, however, to
establish liability under CERCLA.”) (internal citation omitted)).
The United States is under no “statutory obligation” to prove that
PRIDCO’s property is the source of the contamination.

Docket No.

164 at p. 4.; see United States v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 766 F.
Supp. 404, 415 (D. Md. 1991) (“The government need not trace each
defendant’s waste to a specific release and response.”).
To

escape

liability,

PRIDCO

shouldered

the

burden

of

establishing that a third-party’s actions or omissions were the
sole cause of the contamination.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).

Instead

of proving that a third-party caused the release of hazardous
substances,

however,

PRIDCO

speculates

that

the

groundwater

contamination originated from the Navarro property.

(Docket No.

Civil No. 15-2328 (FAB)
164 at p. 10.)

6

The third-party defense cannot rest on speculation

and conjecture.

See Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp.

1532, 1540 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that defendants could not
avail themselves of the third-party defense because they “have not
shown any evidence, nor have they argued, that a third party was
the sole cause of the release and concomitant harm”); Fairchild
Indus., 766 F. Supp. at 411 (“Congress did not intend there to be
a general third-party defense; instead, a party must allege and
prove a specific set of facts [among which are]:

that the third

party was the sole cause of the release; [and] that the third party
was not an employee or agent of the defendant.”).

Because PRIDCO

does not set forth an intervening change in the law, a manifest
error

of

law,

or

newly

discovered

reconsideration is denied.

evidence,

its

motion

for

Docket No. 164; see Biltcliffe, 772

F.3d at 930.
IV.

Conclusion
For

the

reasons

asdfasdfasdfasd

set

forth

above,

PRIDCO’s

motion

for

Civil No. 15-2328 (FAB)
reconsideration is DENIED.

7
(Docket No. 164.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 13, 2019.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE