Rivera et al v. Life Link Foundation

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re 4 Motion to Dismiss. LifeLink's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims seeking damages for their emotional distress and mental anguish are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. Signed by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 09/26/2016. (brc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
JUANITA RIVERA,
DR. CRUCIE MORALES,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)

LIFELINK FOUNDATION, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge
Before the Court is defendant LifeLink Foundation, Inc.’s
(“LifeLink”) motion to dismiss the complaint against it pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”).1

(Docket No. 4.)

Having considered that motion, plaintiffs’ multiple oppositions,
(Docket Nos. 10 & 17), and defendant’s reply and sur-reply, (Docket
Nos. 15 & 24), the Court GRANTS LifeLink’s motion to dismiss.
I.

BACKGROUND

On November 4, 2015, plaintiffs Juanita Rivera and Crucie
Morales filed a complaint against LifeLink based on the handling of
their loved

one’s

Administration

1

body

Hospital

following
in

San

his death
Juan.

at

the Veteran’s

(Docket

No.

1.)

LifeLink’s motion also sought dismissal of the complaint for
insufficient service of process pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(5).
That issue of improper service, however, has been
resolved, see Dockets Nos. 5-8, and defendant no longer seeks
dismissal on that ground. See Docket No. 9.

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)

2

Specifically, plaintiffs assert that, after their husband and
father, Mr. Agustin Morales, passed away on January 9, 2011,
defendant “assigned a case # without [their] authorization,” and
thereafter “disposed of the body without authorization of any of
[his] relatives.”

Id. at pp. 1-2.

Plaintiffs allege, however,

that they did not learn of those actions until January, 2014, when
“the Complete Medical Records” were sent to them.
at p. 1.)

(Docket No. 17

Upon receiving this news, plaintiffs contacted the VA

Hospital and LifeLink, both by phone and in writing, to seek
further information.

Id.

Despite these attempts, no explanation

as to the treatment of Mr. Morales’ body was ever provided to them.
Plaintiffs allege that they suffered “significant mental anguish,
pain and despair” as a result of these events, and filed this suit
to obtain relief for the infliction of that “emotional suffering.”
Id. at p. 2.

On December 22, 2015, defendant LifeLink moved to

dismiss plaintiffs’ claims as being barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.

(Docket No. 4.)
II.

A.

LEGAL STANDARD

Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

See

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “to state a claim

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)

3

to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp. v.

The Court must decide whether

the complaint alleges sufficient facts to “raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”

Id. at 555.

In so doing, the Court

accepts as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
87, 90 (1st. Cir. 2008).

Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d

This is true even when the factual

allegations contained in the complaint are “seemingly incredible.”
Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
“Affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, may
be raised in a motion to dismiss under [Rule 12(b)(6)], provided
that ‘the facts establishing the defense [are] clear on the face of
the plaintiff’s pleadings.’”

Trans–Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v.

Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting
Blackstone Realty LLC v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir.2001)).
Dismissal is appropriate where the dates indicated by the complaint
establish

that the

statute

of

limitations

has

run,

and “the

complaint fails to sketch a factual predicate that would warrant
the application of either a different statute of limitations period
or equitable estoppel.”

Id.
III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant LifeLink argues, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), that
plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed because it was filed long

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)

4

after the applicable statute of limitations had expired.
No. 4 at p. 2.)

(Docket

Plaintiffs counter that their complaint is indeed

timely because the limitations period was effectively tolled when
they began “calling, writing and . . . waiting for an explanation”
from LifeLink and the VA Hospital.

(Docket No. 17 at p. 2.)

For

the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with LifeLink that
plaintiffs’ action is time-barred.
A.

Choice of Law
As an initial matter, when jurisdiction is based on the

diversity

of

citizenship,

federal

courts

substantive law and federal procedural law.

must

apply

state

Erie R. Co. v.

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91–92, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
In Puerto Rico, statute of limitations issues are questions of
substantive

law

Alejandro-Ortiz v.
Cir. 2014).

rather

than

procedural

matters.

See

P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 756 F.3d 23, 27 (1st

Therefore, as this case comes before the Court

pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, Puerto Rico substantive law
must be applied to resolve the statute of limitations issue in
dispute.
B.

Puerto Rico’s Applicable Statute of Limitations
In

this

case,

plaintiffs

seek

to

recover

for

emotional

distress brought about by defendant’s alleged negligence.

Article

1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico (“Article 1802”), P.R. Laws

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)
Ann.

tit.

31

§

5141,

5
is

therefore

the

governing

statute.2

Article 1869 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code provides a one-year
statute of limitations for tort claims arising under Article 1802.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit 31, § 5298.

“That period ordinarily begins to

run at the time that the aggrieved party knows (or should have
known) of both his injury and the identity of the party who caused
it.”

Gonzalez Figueroa v. J.C. Penney P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 313,

318 (1st Cir. 2009).
Here, plaintiffs assert that, while Mr. Morales died in
January 2011, they did not discover LifeLink’s alleged wrongdoing
until January 2014.

Although it is somewhat difficult to imagine

that three full years passed before plaintiffs learned the fate of
their loved one’s body, the Court is bound, at the motion to
dismiss stage, to accept those factual allegations as true.

Thus,

accepting January 2014 as the date when plaintiffs first knew of
the alleged wrong against them, plaintiffs had until January 2015
to commence this litigation.

Because they waited a full 21-22

months, until November 2015, to bring suit against LifeLink, their
2

Plaintiffs do not specifically invoke Article 1802 in their
complaint. The Court finds, however, that their cause of action
for “profound emotional suffering” is properly brought pursuant to
that provision of Puerto Rico law. See, e.g., Santini Rivera v.
Serv. Air, Inc., 137 D.P.R. 1, 10, P.R. Offic. Trans. (1994)
(holding that Article 1802 permits an individual to receive
“compensation for the sufferings, emotional distress or mental
anguish experienced as a consequence of the material or other
damages caused directly to their relatives.”)

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)
claims

are

6

presumptively

barred

by

the

applicable

one-year

prescriptive period.
C.

Statutory Tolling of the Limitations Period
The analysis does not stop there.

Plaintiffs challenge the

conclusion that their claims are time-barred by arguing that they
effectively “interrupted” the statute of limitations by making
“diligent” efforts to contact LifeLink and the VA Hospital for more
information regarding the handling of Mr. Morales’ body.

This

argument that the limitations period was tolled, however, is
unavailing.
Article 1873 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code (“Article 1873”),
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5303, governs the interruption of the
one-year statute of limitations period applicable in Article 1802
actions.

See Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. v. Perez & Cia., 142 F.3d 1,

4 (1st Cir. 1998).

Pursuant to Article 1873, there are three ways

to toll the prescriptive period, all of which “must be interpreted
restrictively

against

the

person

invoking

their

protection.”

Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1990).
“Prescription of actions is interrupted by their institution before
the courts, by extrajudicial claim of the creditor, and by any act
of acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.”
31, § 5303.

P.R. Laws Ann. tit.

In this case, plaintiffs have not shown that they

filed suit with any court until after the limitations period had

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)
expired.

Nor

have

7
they

argued

that

acknowledged liability for any wrongdoing.

LifeLink

previously

Thus, only the second

tolling mechanism - the making of an extrajudicial claim - is
potentially relevant in deciding whether the statute of limitations
was in fact interrupted to permit the current action.
The

Puerto

Rico

requirements

for

effectively

Supreme

Court

has

established

determining

when

an

extrajudicial

tolls

extrajudicial
limitations.

claim

the

limitations

must

be

period.

presented

within

certain
claim

“First,
the

period

the
of

Second, the claim must be made by the creditor or his

or her legal representative. Third, the claim must be addressed to
the debtor, and it must require or demand the same action or relief
sought in the subsequent suit.

Fourth, the extrajudicial claim

must be ‘precise and specific,’ so as to let the debtor know that
the

claimant

does

not

wish

to

lose

the

right

claimed.”

Campos–Matos v. Evanstone Ins. Co., 208 F.Supp.2d 170, 172 (D.P.R.
2002) (Garcia-Gregory, J.) (internal citations omitted). Where the
extrajudicial claim consists of a letter to the tortfeasor, the
Puerto

Rico

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

the

“identical” to a subsequently filed complaint.

letter

must

be

See Santana-Castro

v. Toledo-Davila, 579 F.3d 109, 114 (1st Cir. 2009).

This means

that the extrajudicial letter and subsequent complaint “must seek
the same form of relief,” and that “[t]he causes of action asserted

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)

8

[in the complaint] must be based on the same substantive claims” as
asserted in the extrajudicial letter.

See Rodriguez-Garcia v.

Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 98 (1st Cir. 2004).

Finally,

because tolling provisions are interpreted restrictively against
the person invoking their protection, “the requirements for making
an extrajudicial claim are strict.” Nieves–Vega v. Ortiz–Quinones,
443 F.3d 134, 137 (1st Cir. 2006).
Here, plaintiffs have not alleged facts or provided any
supporting documentation that would indicate that they successfully
made

an

extrajudicial

claim

prior

to

the

expiration

of

the

prescriptive period. Although they assert that they made telephone
calls and wrote letters to LifeLink seeking an explanation for the
handling

of

Mr.

Morales’

body,

the

mere

act

of

requesting

information from the defendant would not amount to an extrajudicial
claim.

See, e.g., Bonilla-Aviles v. Southmark San Juan, Inc., 992

F.2d 391, 394 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to find an extrajudicial
claim where plaintiffs had simply requested insurance information
from defendant hotel without alerting it to the particulars of a
likely damages suit). Rather, to satisfy the requirements laid out
above, plaintiffs would have needed “to alert the defendant to the
specific causes of action against which it would be forced to
defend itself.”

Id. at 393–94.

In essence, they needed to have

asserted, at some point in their communication with LifeLink, the

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)

9

same claim that they now attempt to bring in federal court:

one

for emotional suffering based on defendant’s alleged negligence.
Because nothing in the complaint suggests that plaintiffs sought
this “precise and specific” relief as part of their correspondence
with defendant, the Court is unable to conclude that an effective
extrajudicial claim was made before the limitations period lapsed.
Plaintiffs, therefore, do not qualify for the protection offered by
any of Article 1873’s various tolling mechanisms.
D.

Equitable Tolling
Plaintiffs

also

suggest

that

equitable

prescriptive period is proper in this case.

tolling

of

the

The doctrine of

equitable tolling provides that, in exceptional circumstances, a
statute of limitations “may be extended for equitable reasons not
acknowledged in the statute creating the limitations period.”
David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 345–46 (1st Cir. 2003).

In order “to

preserve the usefulness of statutes of limitations as rules of
law,” however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has warned that
the

doctrine

‘sparingly.’”

of

equitable

tolling

“should

be

invoked

only

Neverson v. Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32, 42 (1st Cir.

2004) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96
(1990)).
own

lack

Thus, it is “not available to rescue a litigant from his
of

due

diligence,”

and

is

“appropriate

only

when

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)

10

circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control have prevented him
from filing on time.”

Id.

Here, while plaintiffs may have exercised due diligence in
contacting LifeLink after learning of the disposal of Mr. Morales’
body, their vigilance ended there.
nothing to

prevent

them

from

As defendant notes, there was

filing

this

suit

shortly after

LifeLink allegedly stonewalled them by refusing to return their
calls.

Instead, they elected of their own accord to wait until

November 2015 to commence this action.

By voluntarily delaying

their demand for judicial relief, plaintiffs “inexcusably sle[pt]
upon their rights,” Ramos-Martinez v. United States, 638 F.3d 315,
323 (1st Cir. 2011).

The Court will not now apply the sparingly

invoked doctrine of equitable tolling to save their claim from
dismissal.
Because plaintiffs’ action was filed beyond the limitations
period and qualifies neither for statutory nor equitable tolling,
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to

dismiss.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, defendant LifeLink’s motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is hereby GRANTED.

(Docket

Civil No. 15-2729 (FAB)
No. 4.)

11

Plaintiffs’ claims seeking damages for their emotional

distress and mental anguish are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 26, 2016.

s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE