Rivera-Serrano v. Hospital Espanol Auxilio Mutuo de Puerto Rico, Inc. et al

Filing 75

OPINION AND ORDER re 70 MOTION for Reconsideration re 68 Opinion and Order, 74 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by Jose A. Lopez-Rivera. The Court hereby DENIES plaintiff's motion to reconsider. See ECF No. 70. The Court also DISMISSES AS MOOT plaintiff's motion to rule on his motion to reconsider. See ECF No. 74. Signed by Chief Judge Aida M. Delgado-Colon on 5/16/2017.(wm)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

JOSÉ A. LÓPEZ-RIVERA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 16-1129 (ADC)

HOSPITAL AUXILIO MUTUO, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
The day after this Court dismissed the Amended Complaint without prejudice for failing
to state a claim, plaintiff moved the Court to reconsider its judgment. See ECF Nos. 4 (Amended
Complaint); 68 (Opinion and Order); 69 (Judgment); 70 (Motion to Reconsider). Specifically, the
motion asks the Court to alter its judgment by vacating the dismissal order and granting plaintiff
leave to re-amend the complaint. ECF No. 70, ¶ 15. The motion does not identify its procedural
vehicle, but “a post-judgment motion made within [twenty-eight] days of the entry of judgment
that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).” Companion Health Servs., Inc. v. Kurtz, 675 F.3d 75, 87 (1st
Cir. 2012) (quoting Glob. NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2007)). And,
the motion raises “classic Rule 59 claim[s].” See Giuffre v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 759 F.3d
134, 137 (1st Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Pérez-Pérez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc.,
993 F.2d 281, 283 (1st Cir. 1993)). Thus, the Court will consider the motion under Rule 59(e).

Civil No. 16-1129 (ADC)

Page 2

The Court “enjoys ‘considerable’ discretion” when ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion. CarreroOjeda v. Autoridad De Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 723 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Soto-Padró v.
Public Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012)). Courts “generally recognize three valid grounds
for Rule 59(e) relief: ‘an “intervening change” in the controlling law, a clear legal error, or newlydiscovered evidence.’” Id. (quoting Soto-Padró, 675 F.3d at 9). “Requests to amend the pleadings,
on the other hand, are generally governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).” Id. (citing
Fisher v. Kadant, Inc., 589 F.3d 505, 508 (1st Cir. 2009)). “Rule 15(a) says that ‘[t]he court should
freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). But if “a motion to amend is filed after the entry of judgment, the district
court lacks authority to consider the motion under Rule 15(a) unless and until the judgment is
set aside.” Id. (quoting Fisher, 589 F.3d at 508). “In other words, so long as the judgment remains
in effect, a motion under Rule 15(a) is beside the point.” Id. (citing Fisher, 589 F.3d at 509).
To quickly recap, pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court dismissed the Amended
Complaint because the pleading did not provide fair notice to the defendants, nor did it state a
facially plausible legal claim against them. See ECF No. 68 at 7. Because plaintiff had not moved
the Court for leave to re-amend the complaint, the Court dismissed the pleading and, thus, the
action. See id. However, because the Court did not see any reason “to punish [plaintiff] for the
ineffective filings of his attorney,” the Court dismissed the action without prejudice. See id.
Plaintiff’s motion fails to provide the Court with a cognizable reason to alter its dismissal
order. See ECF No. 70. After reciting the procedural history of the case, plaintiff baldly alleges

Civil No. 16-1129 (ADC)

Page 3

that the amended complaint was facially sufficient, id., ¶ 8, and that, in any event, discovery has
made the defendants fully aware of the allegations against them, id., ¶ 9. Plaintiff also complains
that discovery has already progressed to “a very advanced stage,” intimating that any delay due
to a need to refile would throw this action out of sync with a parallel local matter involving “the
same set of facts” and where “all co-defendants are represented by the same attorneys.” Id., ¶¶
5-6. Thus, plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its dismissal order in order to give him leave to
re-amend the complaint. Id., ¶ 15. However, plaintiff does not identify, let alone articulate in a
developed manner, “an ‘intervening change’ in the controlling law, a clear legal error, or newlydiscovered evidence.’” See Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 723 (quoting Soto-Padró, 675 F.3d at 9).
Instead, the only reason that plaintiff’s motion proffers for Rule 59(e) relief is the inconvenience
to his litigation strategy that refiling may cause.
Finally, plaintiff asserts that the Court had a duty to “inform [him] of [his] right to amend
unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.” ECF No. 70, ¶ 13 (citing Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3rd Cir. 2002)). However, Grayson dealt with the specific situation of
a civil-rights plaintiff alleging constitutional claims against the government under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 105. That is the “context” to which the Grayson Court was referring
when it stated that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has “‘never required plaintiffs to request
leave to amend’ in this context.” See id. at 108 (quoting Dist. Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310,
316 (3rd Cir. 1986) (finding, in a Section 1983 case, that the district court should have, sua sponte,
offered the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the pleading of their constitutional claims before

Civil No. 16-1129 (ADC)

Page 4

dismissing the pleading for failing to state a claim)). In the First Circuit, by contrast, “[i]n the
absence of exceptional circumstances, a district court is under no obligation to offer a party leave
to amend when such leave has not been requested by motion.” Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp.,
823 F.3d 724, 735-36 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp.,
360 F.3d 220, 241-42, 241 n.30 (1st Cir. 2004); then citing Emerito Estrada Rivera-Isuzu De P.R., Inc.
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 233 F.3d 24, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2000)). Here, where plaintiff had (and
used) a previous opportunity to amend and where the insufficiency of the amended complaint
was thoroughly briefed and argued in the defendants’ motion to dismiss, see ECF Nos. 4, 38, the
Court finds an absence of exceptional circumstances. See Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 736.
In sum, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. See ECF No. 70. The
Court also DISMISSES AS MOOT plaintiff’s motion to rule on his motion to reconsider. See
ECF No. 74.
SO ORDERED.
At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on this 16th day of May, 2017.
S/AIDA M. DELGADO-COLÓN
Chief United States District Judge